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ABSTRACT
This thesis has two main objectives, namely, - to contribute to 
the theory of foreign divestment through a detailed analysis of 
the causes of UK plant closures by foreign-owned MNCs, - and to 
evaluate UK legislation on employee disclosure/consultation, with 
particular reference to its effect on foreign MNCs.
The Financial Times has recorded since 1978 the closure of 96 
manufacturing operations majority-owned by foreign MNCs. This 
thesis analyses 13 of them which involved compulsory redundancy 
of 500 or more employees in four industrial case studies. A 
total of 11 MNCs from 5 countries are examined, and the impact of 
home country culture is assessed.
Of the three theoretical explanatory models of foreign 
divestment, condition-based theory emerges as far more
appropriate than the motivation-based, and precipitating-
circumstance based theories.
The plant closures by foreign MNCs were due to certain 
unfavourable changes in the business environment, though these
were not always sufficient to explain some closures.
Deteriorating conditions created strong motives to divest, and 
new Chief Executives were often appointed. The arrival of a new 
man should be seen, not as a cause of, but, as a signal to 
divestment.
The Department of Employment is content that workers receive the 
statutory minimum notification of redundancy, or pay in lieu of 
notice. Thus, not surprisingly, British employees’ 
representatives were not consulted "at the earliest opportunity", 
but were informed some months after the decision had been made by 
the parent company at corporate headquarters.
Regardless of market conditions and the parent company's 
financial situation. Union Officials will always castigate
(xiv)
companies which close plants. It matters little whether they 
receive three months or three years notice, and whether or not 
their representatives meet the Chief Executive Officer of the 
parent company.
Proponents of greater information disclosure believe that 
employees would use the knowledge to save jobs, but in two 
closures, the fully-informed workforces voted against proposals 
in the knowledge that rejection endangered their plants.
The behaviour of the Dutch, French, German and Canadian MNCs 
conformed with cultural profiles. Home country culture appears to 
have had influence on the three European MNCs and on the Canadian 
firm, but the behaviour of the seven US MNCs is so disparate that 
national culture appears to have had little impact.
The British TUC has accused one foreign-owned firm of breaching 
the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises during the 
divestment process. This case is analysed and reinforces the view 
that the key section on Employment and Industrial Relations is of 
little value. This crucial (diapter of the Guidelines has no 
impact on corporate behaviour and is ineffective because it does 
not in any way supplement national law.
While the EEC’s "Vredeling Proposals" would raise the minimum 
legal requirements, many firms already exceed the UK legal 
minimum in some respects, eg. period of notice of closure.
All of the plant closures examined in this thesis were part of a 
broader corporate restructuring strategy. Britain has not lost 
its attraction for foreign investors, thou^^ divestment will 
continue. Delays in restructuring may ultimately prove counter­
productive. As the rate of technological change accelerates, the 
western world must come to grips with its fundamental economic 
and social problem, ie. a surplus of labour. Protracted debate 
and discussion on further legislation on employee disclosure and 
consultation has tended to divert attention from more pressing 
matters.
(xv)
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PART I
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
j.1.: The Problems being Investigated
This thesis has a dual focus. Its first objective is to 
contribute to the theory of foreign divestment by identifying the 
causes of major plant closures by foreign MNCs operating in the 
UK. The second major objective is to evaluate the effectiveness 
of UK employee legislation on the foreign divestment process. 
Part IV of the 1975 Employment Protection Act states that 
employers proposing to dismiss as redundant 100 or more employees 
at one establishment are obliged to give the Department of 
Employment at least 90 days notice. Consultation with trades 
union representatives of employees facing this predicament should 
"begin at the earliest possible opportunity" [1975 Employment 
Protection Act, Part IV, Section 99].
Employees of foreign subsidiaries may feel they have less job 
security than employees of native companies since investment and 
divestment decisions are made abroad by executives who are beyond 
the reach of the employees* representatives and the scope of 
their country’s legislation.
Between 1979 and 1986, unemployment in Britain has more than 
doubled, reaching an all-time high of 3.3m in the winter of 1986. 
Closure of foreign-owned plants contributed to this state of 
affairs. Since 1978, the Financial Times has reported the 
closure of 96 manufacturing facilities majority-owned by non-UK 
MNCs. Some of these plants had been the lifeblood of many local 
communities.
The town of Clydebank, acknowledged its dependence on The Singer 
Company by incorporating the sewing machine in its coat of arms. 
At its peak the US MNC’s factory had a labour force of over 
16,000, but at the time of closure in 1980, that number had 
fallen to 3,000. The Scottish town has since then redesigned its
coat of arms, omitting the Singer symbol.
The true economic cost to Britain when MNCs divest is concealed 
by the gradual process of run-down, as in the Singer case. But 
this thesis does not aim to evaluate the economic and social 
consequences of foreign divestment, though they merit close 
study. The thesis seeks to contribute to the theory of foreign 
divestment, and identify signals of the likelihood of plant 
closure, in a way which may prove advantagous to those wishing to 
mitigate the adverse effects of closure and unemployment.
Recent research on foreign divestment suggests the relevance of 
an "eclectic" theory based on condition-based, motivation-based, 
and precipitating-circumstance based theories. Thirteen closures 
involving 500 or more compulsory redundancies are here examined 
in case studies of four different industries. The causes of 
divestment are identified in each case; this allows us to 
evaluate the existing theory of foreign divestment.
The thesis also seeks to assess how well divesting foreign MNCs 
adhere to British legislation. According to the managerial
literature the divestment decision is the prerogative of the 
parent company’s Chief Executive Officer. The latter is not
legally bound to relay immediately his decision down the 
corporate hierarchy to the British workforce. Workers’ interests 
are thus dependent to some extent on voluntary disclosure by 
foreign-based management.
Once a divestment decision has been reached, the CEO has various
options to choose from. He can keep his decision secret and let
foreign subsidiary management believe no such decision has been 
taken; or, he can reveal the news to whatever levels in the 
corporate hierarchy he considers expedient, with the specific 
instruction that it remains confidential information. Then again, 
he may inform subsidiary management and empower them to break the 
news to employees whenever appropriate. Or, he may directly 
inform those affected by his decision.
This example presumes centralised decision-making, but some firms
have a decentralised decision-making structure which permits 
subsidiary management to allocate resources or withhold them. 
Trade union representatives may find it impossible to verify 
whether closure decisions have been made at parent company level 
or by subsidiary management. This uncertainty breeds suspicion.
The thesis evaluates the impact of home country culture on 
corporate behaviour in disclosing information to employees, and 
consulting with their representatives. Each case study examines 
the source of the divestment decision, and the period involved in 
imparting this information to subsidiary/plant management and, 
or, the workforce.
It should be apparent from this brief introduction that employee 
disclosure and consultation is deeply complex in the foreign- 
owned plant closure situation. Trade Union officials may be 
suspicious of corporate information received from sources other 
than the CEO of the parent company.
J^2.; Importance and Oontrlbatlon of the Study
Multinational companies (MNCs) first emerged in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and by the outbreak of World War Two 
many American firms had established manufacturing plants in 
Europe, and British MNCs had strong contacts with Commonwealth 
countries. But, it was not until the early 1960s that academics 
devoted considerable attention to developing a theory of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).
Since the mid-1970s, many MNCs have restructured to meet changing 
conditions, and a growing number of foreign subsidiaries have 
been divested. During the past decade, some of the early foreign 
investors have ceased or reduced manufacturing within the UK. A 
perusal of the business press confirms that other industrial 
nations are having to contend with foreign divestment. Indeed, 
most of the firms examined in the four case studies have closed 
factories throughout the world.
As academics realised the growing importance of foreign
divestment, a small number, mainly at American universities, 
undertook elaborate descriptive studies. The past couple of years 
has seen the first attempt by Boddewyn [1983] to construct 
foreign divestment theory. This thesis evaluates this prototype 
theory, and seeks to highlight its strengths and weaknesses.
The key feature of this study is its contribution to a debate 
that has raged in all the Triad countries (ie. Europe, Japan, 
and the US). The cause of this trans-national verbal battle, and 
heated exchanges between Europe's labour movement and the world's 
corporate giants, has been the EEC's Draft Directive on Employee 
Disclosure and Consultation, which was prepared by the Dutch EEC 
Commissioner, Henk Vredeling.
Since the "Vredeling Proposals" introduction in 1980, the 
European Trade Union Confederation has spearheaded labour's 
campaign to have the controversial proposals pass through the 
EEC's labyrinth of legal channels and become legislation. The 
"Vredeling Proposal" were doomed to a lengthy passage by the 
EEC's cumbersome decision-making process, and perhaps this was 
not fully appreciated by American and Japanese business 
interests. The original proposals had no sooner been submitted 
when employers organisations from both countries lent their full 
support to the opposing group led by Europe's employer
organisations. The most expensive lobbying campaign ever 
witnessed by the EEC was launched in a frantic bid to bury the 
Draft Directive. Large individual MNCs played a prominent role in 
the campaign backed by US and Japanese employers who threatened 
to curtail investment in the EEC, and indeed divest, if the 
Proposals were enacted.
Despite this intimidation, the European Parliament has approved 
the diluted 19 83 version, but in order for it to become
legislation all EEC member governments must agree to accept the 
"Vredeling Proposals". Prior to Spain and Portugal joining the 
Community in January 1, 1986, the majority of EEC governments
supported the Draft Directive. "Vredeling's" major opponent was,
and remains, Britain's Conservative Government.
The UK Government argues that "Vredeling" is inappropriate to 
British industrial relations precisely because it proposes
legislation, rather than a voluntarist approach. The Government 
has indeed argued that "Vredeling" is unnecessary precisely 
because MNCs already adhere to Guidelines issued by the
International Labour Office (ILO), and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), As former 
Employment Minister, Mr. Tom King said:
"The Government believes that if these proposals were to 
become law they would discourage investment in the
Community. There are, in any case, already OECD and ILO (ie. 
International Labour Office) voluntary guidelines on 
informing and consulting employees and the Cwnmission has 
produced no evidence that these are not working 
satisfactorily" [Mr. King, Press Notice Issued Jointly by 
the Department of Employment and the Department of Trade and 
Industry, November 9, 1983].
This thesis concentrates on the Employment and Industrial 
Relations chapter, the key section, of the OECD Guidelines. In 
the past the ETUC has presented a number of carefully selected 
plant closures to highlight the alleged inadequacy of national 
legislation and of the Guidelines. All of these celebrated cases 
occurred in Continental Europe, but this study focusses on large 
plant closures in the UK. It is hoped that the results of this 
study may prove valuable to those embroiled in the current debate 
on the efficacy of the Guidelines and the need for and 
desirability of "Vredeling".
1.3.; Outline of the Study
This thesis is a three Part Study. Part 1, Chapters 2-4, 
concentrates on foreign divestment. These chapters illustrate the 
growth of this phenomenon, and examine its causes, and highlights 
the strategy and employee discloure policies of divesting firms. 
Part 2, Chapters 5-7, focuses on national cultural values, and 
the legal and voluntary measures which MNCs should adhere to when 
issuing redundancies. Parts 1 and 2 provide the groundwork for 
Part 3 which comprises a Chapter on research methodology, four 
industrial case studies, and the overall conclusions.
Part 3 reviews foreign divestment in the UK and relates findings 
to those presented in Part 1, and at the same details the conduct 
of foreign divestors in the UK and allows an assessment of 
whether home country culture appears influential on corporate 
behaviour. It also provides for an assessment of current UK
legislation and the OECD’s voluntary code of conduct. With this
insight of the divestment process, one can identify whether the 
controversial "Vredeling Proposals" are either desirable, 
necessary, or both. A more detailed outline of each individual
chapter follows.
Chapter 2 reviews the descriptive literature on foreign 
divestment. These studies have been undertaken mainly by US-based 
academics who, not surprisingly, have concentrated on foreign 
divestment by US MNCs. However, Sachdev [1976] has done a major 
study on UK foreign divestment while several studies have 
reviewed foreign divestment within the entire EEC or part of it, 
and all of these point to a significant increase in foreign 
divestment during the late 1970s. One of the most detailed
studies was by Hood and Young [1982].
Since the 1960s the theory of foreign direct investment has been 
subject to major development and refinement; but it is really 
only in the past decade that foreign divestment has attracted 
academic analysis. The early studies were descriptive, but the 
more recent literature, reviewed in Chapter 3 has sought to 
foster interest in constructing a theory of foreign divestment.
Chapter 4 examines a topic already mentioned in this thesis: 
employee disclosure and consultation. The chapter details when 
and how the various layers of management become involved in the 
divestment process, and the factors which determine the speed of 
its implementation. A summary of notorious cases indicates that, 
on occasions, employees receive the bare minimum of notice, and 
in a time of recession, how they can react angrily to the threat 
of job losses. These examples illustrate that the divestment 
process can prove a costly corporate nightmare.
The Chapter also highlights the determination of potential host
countries to attract inward investment: - some EEC countries 
apparently even offer illegal financial inducements. It is only 
to be expected; therefore, that host country governments will 
fiercely resent the closure of plants, especially those which 
have enjoyed substantial government aid. Foreign divestors 
violating host country laws have met with fines, but, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, no industrialised country has imposed 
an import ban on the products of a divesting company. Foreign 
divestors have an obvious interest in avoiding a ban on imports, 
the ultimate sanction, and must seek to implement closures 
without treading too heavily on the toes of the host government 
which might in turn carry out economic reprisal.
Chapter 5 presents profiles of the national culture of MNCs from 
five home countries - Canada, France, the Netherlands, the US, 
and West Germany. Studies of cultural relativism indicate that 
certain characteristics encourage frankness, while others have 
the opposite effect and promote secrecy. Consequently, one would 
anticipate that Dutch MNCs followed by Canadian would furnish 
employees with most information while those from France and 
Germany would be prone to secretiveness, and US MNCs would be 
somewhere in the middle.
National culture is supposedly reflected in all aspects of the 
social framework including the legal system. Employment 
protection legislation is reviewed in order to assess how it 
conforms with the value system explicit in the profile of 
national culture. The behaviour of foreign firms divesting in the 
UK would be expected to reflect home country standards, and these 
may vary from absolutely no legal obligations to rigorous 
requirements of notice and compensation.
In order to overcome the inadequacies of national legislation and 
ensure uniform behavior internationally, firms normally adhere to 
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which were 
introduced in 1976 by the OECD. This claim is made by supporters 
of the OECD initiative who oppose the EEC’s "Vredeling Proposals" 
which, if enacted, would harmonise and extend employee disclosure 
and consultation throughout the EEC.
Chapter 6 traces the origins of the Guidelines and examines why 
the OECD chose to introduce them when it did. It outlines the 
administration of the Guidelines with reference to celebrated 
cases. Their value to Trades Unionists are then assessed.
Chapter 7 deals with the EEC’s controversial draft Directive on 
Employee Information and Consultation, otherwise known as the 
"Vredeling Propsals". The draft Directive’s journey through EEC 
legislative channels is explored, together with the main 
arguments of its supporters and its critics. The UK’s 
Conservative Government has been identified as the major 
stumbling block to its enactment as Community legislation. The 
Government argues that the Directive is unnecessary as MNCs 
already voluntarily adhere to the OECD Guidelines which differ 
from "Vredeling" only in terms of legal status.
Chapter 8 outlines the methodology of the thesis, the data 
collection strategy, and reveals which companies and Trades Union 
organisations agreed to participate, as well as those which 
refused. It provides too, aggregate data on foreign plant 
closures in the UK since 1978.
Four industries are studied in Chapters 9-12: Man-made Fibres; 
Domestic Appliance and Consumer Electronics; Tyre and Rubber 
Industry, and the Farm and Construction Equipment Industry. Each 
case study seeks firstly, to analyse the causes of closure in 
order to contribute to foreign divestment theory, and secondly, 
to gauge the employee disclosure and consultation practice of 
these firms against current UK legislation, and in the process 
assess the impact of home country national culture on corporate 
behaviour during the divestment process.
The thirteenth, and final chapter, summarises the findings, 
offers recommendations to interested parties, and suggests areas 
worthy of future research.
CHAPTER 2
THE MAGNITUDE AND NATURE OF FOREIGN DIVESTMENT
A; INTRODUCTION
It is abundantly clear that foreign divestment by MNCs has grown 
dramatically over the past two decades, and that the increase was 
most marked in the 1970s. Empirical documentation of these 
divestitures, however, is confined to a very small number of 
sources (eg., Boddewyn and Torneden, 1973; the Business 
International study, 1976; Chopra, et al., 1978; Curhan, et al, 
1977; Sachdev, 1976; Wilson, 1980).
Although data on US and UK foreign divestment is lacking 
altogether for recent years (ie. mid-1970’s-present), a casual 
perusal of the business press suggests that the 1970*8 trend 
shows little sign of abating. Difficulties experienced by the 
above researchers may have discouraged others from attempting to 
gain access to data on divestiture.
A number of researchers (eg. Torneden, 1975; Sachdev, 1976) have 
warned that gathering information on divestitures is, at best, 
extremely difficult due to the secrecy and stigma enshrouding 
divestment decisions. Although executives* attitudes are changing 
concerning the role of divestitures in a firm’s overall strategy, 
many executives continue to regard divestment as an admission of 
failure; even those who use it as a means of restructuring the 
enterprise are often reluctant to provide details due to the 
strategic content of their decision. Despite these problems, a 
few major studies have been undertaken.
The earliest literature on foreign divestment was mainly 
prescriptive in nature and highlighted the role of divestment in 
fostering or impeding the development of host nation economies, 
especially those of Latin America [Behrman, 1972].
In recent years, academic interest in this subject area has been 
stimulated by divestment’s apparent increasing importance in 
corporate strategy, and by the aforementioned works which 
proposed several hypotheses worthy of further testing.
This chapter, by comparing several descriptive studies, presents 
the major findings of the literature on the magnitude and nature 
of foreign divestment from both the home and host country 
perspective.
Firstly, it examines US foreign divestment, then reviews 
Sachdev’s [1976] thesis on foreign divestment by British MNCs. 
Having covered foreign divestment from a home country 
perspective, we will then examine it from a host country 
perspective. Hood and Young [1982] have examined the 
rationalisation programmes and investment strategies of foreign- 
owned firms in Scotland. The Scottish researchers focused on 
plant closures, but, not on employee disclosure and consultation, 
which is the main thrust of this thesis.
Undoubtedly, academics have concentrated mainly on US foreign 
divestments, reflecting the fact that America is the world’s 
largest exporter of direct capital, and therefore likely to 
account for most foreign divestments. We begin by reviewing 
previous research on divestment activity by US MNCs.
B: US FOREIGN DIVESTMENT
2.1.: Its Magnitude
At the outset it is worthwhile repeating the warning issued by 
Chopra, et al. [1978]:
"the number of foreign divestments cannot be determined with 
a high degree of precision" [Chopra, et al., 1978, p.14].
Obtaining accurate figures is extremely difficult. Firstly, the 
Securities and Exchange Commisssion (SEC) allows firms to 
withhold the names of certain subsidiaries if - "treated in the 
aggregate as a single unit - they would not constitute a
1 0
significant subsidiary" [Chopra, et al., 1978]. Secondly, many 
divestments are not reported, and finally, identifying divested 
sub-units of subsidiaries, such as plants, proves particularly 
problematic. It can be safely concluded, therefore, that the 
results presented below understate the magnitude of US foreign 
divestment. Nonethless, a sizeable number of cases have been 
identified.
Curhan, et al. [1977], (ie. the Harvard MNE study), traced the 
development of the 187 largest based US multinationals from 1951 
to 1975. These were selected on the basis of their inclusion in 
the Fortune lists of the 500 largest US industrial firms in 1963 
and 1964, controlling manufacturing subsidiaries in six or more 
foreign countries (in 1965 or before).
The Harvard study includes some 13,795 foreign subsidiaries and 
from this sample it is possible to examine the growth and the 
pattern of exits or divestments by US MNCs ( see Table 2.1. 
below). Between 1951 and 1975, 3,152 subsidiaries were divested, 
with 1,359 (or 43%) divestitures occurring between 1971 and 1975. 
While the Harvard Study indicates a total of 2,404 divestitures 
by US MNCs occurring between 1967-1975, Chopra, et al. [1978] 
report a considerably lower figure of 1,519 for the same period. 
According to the latter research team, more than 50% of these 
divestments were implemented between 1973 and 1975, whereas 
this same period accounted for only 35% of divestitures 
identified by the Harvard team.
1 1
Table 2.1.: The Growth and Patterns of US Foreign Divestment
Year ( 
1 
1
Method 
Sold Liquidated
of Exit 
Expropriated
1
Î
Unknown I
Total
1951-55 40 52 1 23 116
1956-60 47 80 54 26 207
1961-65 82 157 24 53 316
1966 41 60 0 8 109
1967 167 151 3 8 329
1968 110 117 2 3 232
1969 125 78 3 1 207
1970 171 103 2 1 277
1971 146 124 3 1 274
1972 148 89 8 3 248
1973 147 124 9 0 2 80
1974 158 112 18 2 290
1975 133 92 42 0 267
1951-75 1,515 1,339 169 129 3,152
Source: Wilson, 1980 
Table 2.2.: Overview
, p • 6.
of US Foreign Divestment Activities
Curhan ,et al. Curhan, et al. Chopra,et al.
Year 1955-1975 1967-1975 1967-1975
No. % No. % No . %
1951-1955 116 4 mmmm
1956-1960 207 7 - — — - — —
1961-1965 316 10 — — —— — — ——
1966 109 3 — — — — -- — —
1967 329 10 329 14 50 3.3
1968 232 7 232 10 66 4.3
1969 207 7 207 9 79 5.2
1970 277 9 277 11 135 8.9
1971 274 9 274 11 185 12.2
1972 24 8 8 248 10 181 12.0
1973 280 9 280 12 242 15.9
1974 290 9 290 12 246 16.2
1975 267 8 267 11 335 23.0
Total 3,152 100 2,404 100 1,519 100.0
Source: Table compiled from Wilson, 1980, p.6; Chopra, et al
1978, p.16.
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Differences in the nature of the sample firms and the definition 
of divestment in each study may be contributing to the disparity 
of results. A comparison of the number of foreign divestments 
detected by the two major surveys is presented in Table 2.2. 
above.
Boddewyn and Torneden [1973] selected the Fortune 500 companies 
as their data base, and their study on foreign divestment by US 
MNCs 1967 to 1971 encompasses 465 (or 93%) of the Fortune 500. 
Their definition of foreign divestment is broad and refers to:
"a reduction of ownership percentage in an active direct 
foreign investment on either a voluntary or involuntary 
basis" [Boddewyn and Torneden, 1973, p.26].
This definition aims to cover operations which employ foreign 
citizens for the production of goods and services and to exclude 
foreign corporations that have no visible business interests in 
the host country.
Chopra, et al. [1978], updating the Boddewyn and Torneden [1973] 
study, examined the period 1972-1975. Once again the Fortune 500 
was the sample and their findings apply to 4 55 (or 91%) of that 
500.
There were at least 1,519 divestments of foreign operations 1967- 
1975 and on an annual basis the number of cases increased seven 
times from over 50 in 1967 to a minumum of 335 in 1975 (see Table 
2.2.).
Another way of assessing the extent of foreign divestment is by 
comparing the number of new foreign subsidiaries with the number 
of foreign divestments for various periods These ratios, 
calculated on the basis of the results of both major studies, are 
presented in Table 2.3. Although the two sets of ratios are out 
of step for the years 1967-69, both show a similar trend and are 
almost identical for the years 1972-75. The drop in these ratios 
during the 1970’s reflects both the impact of a fall in the 
number of new foreign investments and an increase in divestment 
activity. The United Nations Commission on Transnational
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Corporations revealed that in the period 1967-75, while the 180 
largest US based multinationals added some 4,700 affiliates to 
their networks (more than double the number in existence at the 
end of 1966), a total of over 2,400 were divested.
According to Torneden [1975], approximately 78% of the 1967-1975 
decline in net new establishments was accounted for by a 
deceleration in investment flow, and only 22% was attributable to 
divestments. Wilson [1980] observed that whilst the rate of 
increase in new subsidiaries had slowed, this was not accompanied 
by a commensurate decrease in foreign divestment. This suggests 
that disincentive to investment is not necessarily incentive to 
divestment.
Table 2.3.: US Foreign Divestments 1967-1975: Ratio of Entries to 
Divestments and Net Flows
Entries Exits Net
Flow
Ratio Entries/ 
Exits
Curhan. et al. [19771
1967 912 329 583 2.8
1968 1,006 232 774 4.4
1969 945 207 738 4.6
1970 853 277 576 3.1
1971 905 274 631 3.3
1972 646 248 398 2.6
1973 693 2 80 413 2.5
1974 619 290 329 2.1
1975 376 267 109 1.4
1967-75 6,955 2,404 4,551 2.9
Chopra, et al. [19781
1967 912 50 862 18.2
1968 1,006 66 940 15.2
1969 945 79 866 12.0
1970 853 135 718 6.3
1971 905 185 720 4.9
1972 646 181 465 3.6
1973 693 242 451 2.9
1974 619 246 373 2.5
1975 376 335 41 1.1
1967-75 6,955 1,519 5,436 4.6
Source: Spanhel and Johnson [1982]
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It has been seen that a dramatic increase has taken place in the 
incidence of foreign divestment by US MNCs since the early 1950s. 
Between 1967-75 the annual rate of US foreign divestment has 
grown by over 600%. In addition to charting the growth of US 
foreign divestment, the major works have examined various 
features of US divestment such as:- geographic distribution, and 
method of exit. They have examined the characteristics of 
divested subsidiaries and of divesting parent companies. Their 
findings are reviewed in subsequent sections. We begin by 
considering the geographic distribution of US foreign divestment.
2.2.: Geographic Distribution of US Foreign Divestment
Europe has consistently accounted for the bulk of US foreign 
divestment since the early 1950s (see Curhan, et al., 1977; and
Chopra, et al., 1978). Table 2.4. presents the findings of the
Harvard study, and it shows that on a period to period basis,
European divestments have ranged from 31% to 43% of total
divestitures, with an overall rate of 42% for the years 1951- 
1975. Chopra, et al. [1978], focusing on the years 1967-1975, 
found European divestments ranged from 39% to 62% of the annual 
totals, and had an overall rate of 58% for that period (see Table
2.5.).
Divestments in Latin America peaked at 46% of all US foreign 
divestitures during the period 1956-60, and have since declined 
to 25% for the years 1971-75. They accounted for just over a 
quarter of total US foreign divestments between 1951-75.
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Apart from Europe and Latin America, Canada is the only other 
country/region with a relatively high incidence of US foreign 
divestment. It accounted for of the total for the years 1951- 
1975.
Table 2.6.: US Foreign Divestment 1951-1975: Ratio of New Entries 
to Divestments: Geographical Summary.
Country/ Region
51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 Total
51-75
Canada 6.8 8.8 6.3 3.6 1.6 3.6
Latin America 12.2 6.0 8.1 2.6 1.9 3.5
Europe 6.3 12.2 12.1 3.9 2.5 4.5
N. Africa & M. East 7.4 10.7 6.7 3.3 2.1 3.6
E. & W. Africa 16.5 25.0 19.2 13.1 3.6 8.1
S. Asia 5.0 35.0 12.5 2.3 1.7 4.5
E. Asia 14.2 23.5 18.4 7.4 5.2 8.0
S. Dominions 13.7 16.0 11.6 5.4 2.3 5.3
Source: Spanhel and Johnson, [1982]
Table 2.6. presents the ratio of new entries to divestment by 
geographic regions. It indicates that the effect of a decline in 
the flow of new investments combined with an increase in the rate 
of divestment is not a phenomenon confined to certain geographic 
areas of the world. After 1965, virtually all regions showed a 
decline in the ratio, though the effect was particularly 
prominent in Canada, Latin America, and South Asia.
Although Europe was the scene of the majority of US foreign 
divestments, it was fortunate in that for every subsidiary 
divested, another four were established. Europe was still very 
much an attractive location for many US MNCs.
2.1.: Method of Exit
2.1.1.: Involuntarv Divestments
Involuntary divestments are likely to attract a glare of 
publicity, but host-government takeovers represent a very small 
proportion of total divestitures. According to the Harvard study, 
they accounted for just 3»1% of total divestitures for the years
1967-75, with a significant relative and absolute increase 
occurring in the latter years of this period; they accounted for 
of total divestments compared with only 1% in the earlier 
period, 1967-71 [Curhan, et al., 1977]. Chopra, et al. [1978], on 
the other hand, found that the proportion of involuntary 
divestments remained pretty constant throughout the period 1967- 
1975 (see Table 2.7.).
A number of factors have been identified as affecting involuntary 
divestments. These include:- social unrest and general disruption 
of business activities, breakdown of law and order, local 
business groups with considerable political clout exercising 
their power when they are threatened economically by foreign 
firms, civil war, and armed confict.
Table 2.7.: Forms of Disposal
Forms 1967-71 1972-75 1967-71 1972-
Chopra, et al. Curhant et al
Sale 63$ 66$ 58$ 54$
Liquidation 33$ 29$ 41% 39$
Nationalisation
or Expropriation 4$ 5$ 1$ 7$
Source: Chopra, et al., 1978, p.17; Wilson, 1980, p.6.
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2.3.2.: Voluntary Sales
As Table 2.7. shows, sales of foreign subsidiaries as going 
concerns have been the most common form of divestment. This 
method of exit has accounted for almost half (ie 4 8%) of all US 
foreign divestments during the period 1951-75. Prior to 1966, 
voluntary liquidations occurred most frequently, but after 1967 
the number of voluntary sales far exceeded that of liquidations. 
According to Chopra, et al., during the post-1967 period, for 
every liquidation, there were two sales.
Boddewyn and Torneden [1973] reported that voluntary sales 
accounted for 63% of US divestments between 1967-71, and 
voluntary liquidations accounted for 33$. Curhan, et al [1977] 
examined the same period and their results suggest that voluntary 
sales accounted for almost 60% (ie 58%) of total divestments, 
while voluntary liquidations accounted for 41%.
In its examination of the later period, 1972-1975, the Harvard 
study found that the relative frequency of both voluntary sales 
and liquidations had declined, and that the relative frequency of 
involuntary divestments had increased seven times. Chopra, et al. 
[1978] also analysed US divestments during the period 1972-75. 
Their results differed slightly from those of the Harvard study. 
They found that whereas voluntary sales had become more popular, 
accounting for 66% compared to 6 3$ for the period 1967-71, 
voluntary liquidations had become relatively less common, and 
were down from 33$ to 29$.
2.3.3. : Voluntary Liquidations
These merit special reference given that this thesis shall 
concentrate on plant closures, or in other words, the voluntary 
liquidation of the sub-unit of a subsidiary.
Unlike divestment by sale, liquidation results in the dissolution 
of the subsidiary as a legal unit. Often, however, MNCs 
rationalise their subsidiaries, and choose to amputate the 
subunit(s) considered surplus to requirements. In this thesis, it
2 0
will be seen that while a number of foreign-based MNCs have 
retained their UK subsidiary, they have liquidated certain 
manufacturing facilities.
Liquidations prove costly to all parties involved. They are 
expensive to implement and the divesting firm may thereby incur 
heavy losses. The government of the host nation loses revenue and 
may have to increase expenditure on social welfare benefits. 
Employees made redundant, may remain unemployed. Rising 
unemployment reduces the potential membership and bargaining 
power of Trades Unions in the host nation.
It is therefore hardly surprising, that liquidations have aroused 
serious conflict between the management of the divesting MNC and 
the government, employees, unions, and public of the host 
nation, not to mention the media which is likely to lambast the 
divesting firm, if not all MNCs.
Consequently, MNCs wishing to liquidate all or part of a 
subsidiary, will take steps to soften the blow of liquidation, or 
closure, and thereby effect divestment with minimum damage to 
corporate image. According to one study, some MNCs seek to 
minimise the potential shock of liquidation to the host nation
by gradually pruning their investments over a number of years 
[BIC study, 1976]. This notion implies that the decison to 
divest precedes its implementation by several years. It is 
certainly true that liquidation frequently follows a period of 
decline, but one should not assume that run-down is a direct 
consequence of the divestment decision. It may be that run-down 
is a last ditch attempt to turnaround an unprofitable operation, 
and that it is only when this fails that the divestment decision 
is formulated. This issue will be examined in detail in each of 
the case studies reported in this thesis.
2,3,4 1 SjAnmarz
In short, all of the major research studies to date have found 
that voluntary sales and liquidations were far more common than 
nationalizations and expropriations. All of them found that
2 1
voluntary divestments accounted for over 90% of total 
divestitures in the period 1967-1975, and liquidations accounted 
for at least one third of these. Therefore, it would seem fair 
comment to suggest that a large proportion of US foreign 
divestment has led to job losses throughout the world. In the 
section below, we examine the characteristics of foreign 
subsidiaries divested by US MNCs.
Characterlstlcg of Foreign Subsidiaries Divested by PS
MNCs.
2.4.1.: Principal Activities
Manufacturing subsidiaries have accounted for the vast majority 
of US foreign divestment. According to the Harvard data, 
manufacturing subsidiaries represented just under 50% of all 
foreign divestments between 1951 and 1975. During the same 
period, divestments of sales organizations and extractive 
subsidiaries comprised 23% and 5% respectively of all 
divestments.
Table 2.8.: Operations Divested, 1972-75, Categorized by Parent
Company SIC.
Parent SIC Industry Parent Company*s
Category Divestments % of Total
28 Chemicals & 239 23.8%
allied products
29 Petroleum refining 123 12.2%
35 Machinery, except 94 9.3$
electrical
20 Food & kindred 82 8.1%
products
37 Transportation 67 6.7$
equipment
Others 399 39.9$
Total 1,004 100.0%
Source: Chopra, et al., 1978, p. 17.
Chopra, et al. [1978] classified each divestment according ■
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the parent, 01
assumption that the divested operation was generally in the same 
category as that of the parent company. Five SIC categories
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0counted for almost 6 0% of the divesting parent companies (see 
able 2.8.). Divestment occurred most frequently (23.8%) in the 
hemicals and allied products sector followed by petroleum 
efining (12.2%), machinery (except electrical) (9.3%), and then 
ood products (8.1%).
(owever, the value of the above table is questionable. It has 
leen suggested that the wave of divestments in the first half of 
;he 1970s was the result of rash and unsuccessful acquisitions 
lade in the 1 960*s, when many MNCs sought to diversify. 
)iversification often involved entering new areas quite unrelated 
;o the parent company*s central line of business. The assumption 
;hat subsidiaries usually have the same SIC code as the parent 
jompanies therefore appears unwarranted.
Ï.4.2.; Ownership Characteristics
lost divested subsidiaries were wholly-owned by the US parent. 
Chis is consistent with the pattern of foreign direct investment 
)y US MNCs. According to the Harvard data base, 60% of all 
livestments for the years 1971-1975 were of wholly-owned 
>perations; majority-, joint-, and minority-owned subsidiaries 
combined, accounted for only 3 0%; ownership characteristics of 
'he remaining 10% could not be obtained. Other researchers have 
)roduced similar findings.
Boddewyn and Torneden [1973] found that 59$ of all divestments 
Tor the period 1967-1971 involved wholly-owned operations, while 
39$ of the total number of divestitures involved the total 
elimination of the parent companies* equity interest.
Chopra, et al [1978] reported that for the period 1972-1975, 65$ 
3f the total number of divestitures were complete divestments of 
ifholly-owned operations, and another 5$ represented partial 
iisposition. Almost 90$ of all divestments saw the 
SgfflPlete elimination of whatever equity the parent company 
3wned.
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2.4.3.; Size of Divested Operations
Boddewyn and Torneden [1973] and Chopra, et al. [1978] asked 
executives of their subject firms to estimate the sales volume of 
their divested operations. They found that most foreign 
divestments (69$) were of firms with sales up to $10m between 
1967 and 1975 (see Table 2.9.). Relatively large firms (ie. sales 
of over $50m) accounted for only 3$ of divested operations in 
their sample.
Table 2.9.: Divestments Categorized by Sales Volume ($m)
Approximate 
Sales Volume
Operations 
Divested (number)
Average Total 
Sales Volume
1967-71
0-10 330 $ 1,650
10-50 25 1,050
50-100 5 375
100+ 6 600+
No reply 48 n.a.
Total 424 $ 3,675+
1972-75
0-10 654 $ 3,270
10-50 77 2,310
50-100 10 750
100+ 26 2.600
No reply 237 n.a.
Total 1,004 $ 8,930+ '
Overall Total 1,428 $12,605+
Source: compiled from Boddewyn and Torneden, 1973» p.27;
Chopra, et al., 1978, p.17.
The findings presented in Table 2.9 are imprecise, but they still 
provide an order-of-magnitude estimate of the aggregate size of 
divested operations. Companies were often reluctant to divulge 
the relevant information, and a subsidiary's sales and profits at 
time of exit may not be an adequate gauge of its overall value 
and overall performance. Divesting MNCs may, as was seen earlier, 
selectively run down their investments over a number of years 
before final sale or liquidation.
24
2.4.4. Summary
The assumption that subsidiaries usually have the same SIC code 
as their parents, probably produces misleading results. Evidence 
for this is seen in the diversification policies of US MNCs such 
as ITT during the Presidency of Mr. Harold Geneen. Before 
retiring in 1979, he created a massive conglomerate with 
interests in totally diverse fields from insurance to 
electronics.
What is quite clear though is that most US foreign divestments 
have been of wholly-owned operations, and in virtually all cases, 
the firm has totally eliminated whatever equity it owned. 
Assessing the true value of the investment of divested 
subsidiaries is problematic because in many case divestment is 
preceded by a gradua? run-down of operations. Sales volume at the 
point of divestment may not be an accurate reflection of a 
subsidiary's significance. Perhaps this explains why so many 
divested subsidiaries (69$) were relatively small, ie their sales 
volume was less than $10m. Sales volume at the peak of a 
subsidiary's activity would have provided a more accurate 
indication of a subsidiary's significance.
2.5.: Characteristics of DivestloK Parents
2.5.1.: Number of Divestments per Parent
Previous studies indicate that a few firms account for a
substantial number of total divestment activity. Boddewyn and 
Torneden [1973] found that between 1967-1971 only 149 companies 
in the Fortune 500, (ie 31$), had divested abroad (see Table 
2 .10.).
Torneden [1975] reported that of the 460 responding companies in 
the Fortune 500 , 256, or approximately 56$ had not divested
abroad. Of the 204 divesting companies, 78$ made three or fewer 
divestments. As Table 2.11 reveals, a small number (17$) of
divesting firms accounted for almost half the number of
divestments (4 8$).
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Table 2.10.: Number of Foreign Divestments Per Parent Company,
1967-1971.
1
Number
2
of
3
Divestments 
4 5 6 Total
Number and ($)
of 62 35 14 8 11 19 149
Divesting (42) 
Parent Companies
(24) (9) (5) (7) (13) (100$)
Number and 62 70 42 32 55 115 376
($) of 
Divestments
(16) (19) (11) (8) (15) (31) (100$)
($) of Parent
Companies
Divesting
(13) (8) (3) (1) (2) (4) (31$)
Source: Compiled from data in Boddewyn and Torneden, 1973, p.28.
Chopra, et al. [1978], using the same data base, examined the 
period 1972-1975. 203 (47$) of the responding firms in the
Fortune 500 had not divested a foreign subsidiary. It was also 
discovered that a small number of firms, nineteen (8$), accounted 
for almost half (45$) the total number of divestments.
Table 2.11.: Number of Foreign Divestments Per Parent Company, 
1967-1971.
Number of i Parent Companies j Divestments 1
Divestments 1 Number $ of Total 1 Number $ of Total 1
1 90 44.1 90 16.0
2 45 22.1 90 16.0
3 25 12.3 75 13.4
4 10 4.9 40 7.2
5 10 4.9 50 8.9
6 11 5.4 66 11.8
7 3 1.4 21 3.7
8 1 0.5 8 1.4
9 1 0.5 9 1.6
10 8 3.9 112 20.0
Total 204 100.0 561 100.0
Source: Torneden [1975].
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2.5.2.: Average Size of the Divesting Companies
Torneden [1975] found that those companies with most divestment 
experience were relatively large companies among the Fortune 500. 
Table 2.12 shows that, apart from a few exceptions, the number of 
foreign divestments varies directly with the average Fortune 500 
ranking Indeed, he found that 34 firms in his sample accounted 
for almost one-half of all divestment activity. This finding is 
consistent with the notion of organizational learning as well as 
the case literature on divestments which often suggests that a 
parent company finds its first divestment the most difficult. As 
the necessary procedures and analytical concepts are learned, 
divestment becomes much easier to implement both psychologically 
and operationally [Boddewyn, 1981]. Perhaps, too, host nations 
are learning from experience to expect divestment.
Table 2.12.: Average Fortune 500 Ranking of Divesting Companies
Number of Divestments Average Ranking Number of Companies^
0 288 242
1 237 90
2 195 44
3 166 25
4 179 10
5 177 10
6 173 11
7 84 3
8 71 1
9 8 1
10 or more 76 8
Total 24 8^ 445
^Excludes 15 largest retailers 
Average of sample 
Source: Torneden [1975]
A positive relationship existed too during the period 1972-75 
between company size and number of divestments
"with a few exceptions, the average Fortune 500 ranking 
increased with the number of companies divested per parent 
company...Hence, a small number of relatively large US 
multinationals account for a large portion of foreign
divestments" [Chopra et al., 1978, p.17].
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Table 2.13 : Foreign Significance of Parent Companies
Number of Divestments Foreign Significance 
(in percentage)
% of Companies i 
Fortune 500 
Ranking*
0 17 32
1 18 48
2 19 66
3 21 76
4 30 60
5 20 76
6 16 60
7 11 100
8 ? ——
9 60 100
10 or more 38 75
T o t a l 4 5
See Table 2.12 , third column.
Note: Excludes 15 largest retailers. Foreign significance is 
equal to the percentage of foreign sales, the percentage of 
foreign income to total company income, or the percentage of 
foreign assets to total company assets. Selection of one of the 
three measures was accomplished on the basis of industry 
characteristics and data availability. For example, the asset 
ratio was utilized for international petroleum companies.
The question mark indicates foreign significance is unknown.
Source: Torneden [1975].
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2,5,3,;, Importancë_3f. International Opérations.
Torneden [1975] was able to obtain data on the importance of 
foreign operations for 200 of the 445 Fortune 500 companies. In 
most cases he took the percentage of foreign sales as the key 
indicator of international operations in the parent company. He 
claims to have found a positive relationship between the 
percentage of foreign sales of a company and the number of 
divestments during 1967-1971. The number of divestments per 
company increased from zero to four as foreign significance 
increased from 17$ to 30$. However, the relationship between 
foreign significance and divestment experience appears rather 
tenuous: the number of divestments per parent company increased 
from four to seven as foreign significance decreased from 30$ to 
11$ (see Table 2.13). Torneden [1975] explains:
it can be noted that most of the companies that divested 
five or more foreign operations experienced severe earnings 
declines just prior to divestment. The small foreign 
significance of their operations probably provided an 
opportunity for senior management to cut both its losses and 
its headaches. When the companies with serious earnings 
problems are disregarded, a positive relationship between 
increasing foreign significance and increasing divestment 
activity is assured" [Torneden, 1975, p.34].
Chopra, et al [1978] found a positive relationship between these 
two variables for the period 1972-1975. It can be concluded that 
the more extensively a firm is involved in international 
operations, the more it is likely to be involved in foreign 
divestiture.
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2.5.4.: Summary.
Researchers covering the years prior to 1975, conclude that the 
likelihood of a firm divesting is related to the significance of 
its foreign operations. They found too, that a large number of 
the Fortune 500 had never divested abroad; a small number of 
firms were responsible for almost half of all divestments, and 
these MNCs were relatively large. It is suggested that once a 
company gains divestment experience, it will more readily resort 
to divestment in the future. Divestment, like diving into the 
swimming pool, has limited appeal: many never pluck up the 
courage to try it, some do but do not particularly enjoy it, 
while others take pride in their skill which they hope to improve 
with experience. But, as with the sport, it is potentially 
harmful to the participants and demands caution.
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C: UK FOREIGN DIVESTMENT
2,6.; Its Magnitude and the Method of Exit
This thesis will concentrate exclusively on foreign divestment in 
the UK, and therefore the findings on foreign divestment by UK 
MNCs have no direct bearing on this study Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile comparing the pattern and trends in UK and US foreign 
divestment.
Sachdev [1976] concentrated on foreign divestment 1968-74 by 
British MNCs in The Times 1.000 1973-74. He defines foreign 
divestment as:
"a process of elimination of corporate ownership in an 
active direct foreign investment by a multinational 
company, on a voluntary or involuntary basis" [Sachdev, 
1976, p.31].
He detected 628 cases of foreign divestment (see Table 2.14) but 
warned that this figure is an underestimate arising from lack of 
official records kept by any Government department. He therefore 
had to rely on his own investigative talents to compile a 
statistical record of foreign divestment and his efforts were 
hampered by lack of co-operation from companies reluctant to 
discuss this sensitive issue. Sachdev*s results are particularly 
likely to have underestimated the number of involuntary 
divestitures because UK MNCs are only legally bound to refer to 
voluntarv divestments in their annual reports, not involuntary 
ones.
Table 2.14 shows that the period 1968-1974 witnessed a steady 
increase in the extent of foreign divestments by UK MNCs, with 
the exception of 1973 when there was a slight decrease of 3.4$ 
over the previous year. In 1968 there was a total of 39 cases, 
and by 1974 this figure had increased by over 300$, and 123 
incidences of UK foreign divestment were identified by Sachdev.
Even allowing for in-built bias in Sachdev*s methodology in 
determining the number of divestments, voluntary clearly 
outweighed involuntary divestments Table 2.14 shows that between
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1968 and 1974, almost 85$ of the total were "voluntary" 
divestments. Some of these were provoked, however, by 
developments which raised political risk in the host nation to an 
unacceptable level [Sachdev, 1976, p.135].
Table 2.14: Yearly Distribution and Growth of Foreign Divestment
by British Multinationals, 1968-74.
1968
Year of 
1969 1970
Divestment 
1971 1972 1973 1974 Total
No. of Divestment Cases:
(a) Voluntary 28 50 68 88 92 101 105 532
(b) Involuntary 11 11 7 10 26 13 18 96
(c) Total 39 61 75 98 118 114 123 628
G. Total
Percentage of Total :
(a) Voluntary 4.5 8.0 10.8 14.0 14.6 16.1 16.7 84.7
to G. Total
(b) Involuntary 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.6 4.2 2.1 2.9 15.3
to G. Total
(c) Total 6.2 9.7 11.9 15.6 18.8 18.2 19.6 100.0
Year to Year Growth
Percentage
(a) Voluntary Base 78.6 36.0 29.4 4.5 9.8 4.0
(b) Involuntary Base Nil -36.4 42.9 160.0 -50.0 27.8
(c) Total Base 53.8 23.0 30.7 20.4 -3.4 7.9
G-Total = Grand Total 
Source: Sachdev, 1976, p.135.
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2.7.: Geographic Distribution of British Foreign Divestment
Whereas Western European subsidiaries accounted for 40$ of total 
divestments by US. MNCs during the period 1967-75, British 
foreign divestment is much more evenly spread. This is reflected 
in the fact that although Western Europe experienced the largest 
number of divestments by UK MNCs, it accounted for only 22,9% of 
the total (see Table 2.15) On a year to year basis, divestment 
by UK MNCs in Western Europe ranged from 14.5$ to 31.7% of the 
annual total during the period 1968-1974.
A significant number of divestitures were made in African and 
Asian Countries. A high percentage in Africa and in India were 
in response to the policies of the respective host nations* 
governments on "the localization of foreign operations, 
development of indigenous industries, and change in political and 
economic alliances over a period of time" [Sachdev, 1976, p.l46- 
147].
2.8.: Characteristics of Foreign Subsidiaries
2.8.1.: Principal Activities
US foreign divestment, 1967-1975, was concentrated in five SIC 
categories. Sachdev [1976] found four industrial sectors 
responsible for nearly 60$ of the total number of British foreign 
divestitures over the period 1968-1974 Mechanical engineering 
(SIC Order VII) accounted for the highest share (18.2$), 
followed by electrical engineering (SIC Order IX) (14.6$), food 
and drink (SIC Order III) (13.4$), and chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (SIC Order V) (13.1%) (see Table 2.16 below).
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Table 2.15:: Geographical S]pread of Foreign Divestment Cases , 196 8-74
Year I 
of 1 
Divestment|
!
1
1
1 1 
1 Western 
 Europe
2
Asia
3
Far
East
Country
4
Africa
Groups
5
North
(
6
South
America
7
Central
)
Total
1968
No. 6 9 4 15 3 1 1 144
% 15.4 23.2 10.3 38.4 7.7 2.5 2.5 22.9
1969
No. 13 12 6 12 11 5 2 105
% 21.3 19.7 9.8 19.7 18.0 8.2 3.3 16.7
1970
No. 17 18 15 12 10 3 - 103
% 22.7 24.0 20.0 16.0 13.3 4.0 - 16.4
1971
No. 27 15 12 18 19 7 - 142
% 27.6 15.3 12.2 18.4 19.4 7.1 - 22.6
1972
No. 24 19 18 32 17 6 2 83
% 20.3 16.1 15.3 27.1 14.4 5.1 1.7 13.2
1973
No. 18 12 31 23 16 9 5 37
% 14.5 9.7 25.0 18.5 12.9 7.3 4.1 5.9
1974
No. 39 20 17 30 7 6 4 14
% 31.7 16.2 13.8 24.4 5.7 4.9 3.3 2.2
Total
No. 39 61 75 98 118 124 123 628
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Sachdev, 1976, p.145.
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Table 2.16: Standard Industrial Classification of Foreign
Operations Divested
Standard Industrial Activities Number of %
Industrial of Foreign Divestment to
Classification Operations Divested Cases 1968-74 Total
SIC order
III Food and Drink 84 13.4
III T Tobacco Products 17 2.7
IV Petroleum Products and 12 1.9
Oil Refining
V Chemicals and 82 13.1
ph armace uti cals
VI Metal Manufacture 34 5.5
VII Mechanical Engineering 114 18.2
IX Electrical Engineering 92 14.6
XI Vehicles 27 4.4
XII Metal goods (hand tools
and implements, metal cans
and boxes, nuts, wire etc.) 39 6.2
XIII Textiles 34 5.5
XVI Glass, Cement and Building
materials 43 6.8
XVII Timber Products 11 1.8
XVIII Paper and Packaging
Products 26 4.1
XIX Other manufacturing
industries (Rubber and 11 1.8
Plastic goods etc.
Total: 628 100
Source: Sachdev, 1976, p.152-156.
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2.8.2.: Ownership Characteristics
Table 2.17 below shows that most divested subsidiaries have been 
wholly-owned by the British parent. Wholly-owned operations 
accounted for 52% of all divestments in the years 1968-1974.
Absolute divestment accounted for only 60% of the British total, 
in contrast to 90% for US MNCs, and similarly, nearly 40% of 
British divestitures represented only partial diposal of the 
firms* equity, compared to 5% for US MNCs [Sachdev, 1976, 
p.141].
Table 2.17 represents the degree of divestment of 616 cases of 
divestment. Twelve cases could not be classified because of lack 
of information. This table shows that under each of three 
categories the number of absolute divestments has been the 
largest for each year except 1968 A definition of each category 
is given below:
- Wholly-owned = (equity held > 95%)
- Majority-owned = (95% < equity held > 50%)
- Minority-owned = (equity held < 50%)
Absolute divestment = (equity held = Nil)
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Table 2.17: Degree of Divestment for 62 8 cases of Foreign
Divestment
Degree of 
Divestment 1968 *69 *70 ’71 *72 ’73 *74 1968-74
From Wholly-owned to: 
(a) Majority-owned 
No. 8 8 10 6 13 18 95 32
% 20.5 13.1 13.3 6.4 11.9 15.4 15.4 26.4
(b) Minority-owned 
No. 1 7 2 3 4 2 25 6
% 2.6 11.5 2.7 3.2 3.7 1.7 4.1 4.8
(c) Absolute 
Divestment
No. 9 19 14 39 40 49 201 31
% 23.1 31.1 18.7 41.5 36.7 41.8 32.6 25.6
From Majority-owned to 
(a) Majority-owned 
No. 6 3 3 7 3 12 41 7
% 15.4 4.9 4.0 7.4 2.7 10.3 6.6 5.8
(b) Minority-owned 
No. 6 4 12 8 8 8 59 13
% 15.4 6.6 16.0 8.5 7.3 11.2 12.8 10.4
(c) Absolute 
Divestment
No. 4 6 14 13 16 13 79 13
% 10.2 9.8 18.7 13.8 14.7 11.2 12.8 10.4
From Minority-owned to 
(a) Minority-owned 
No. 3 1 6 6 4 28 8
% 7.7 - 1.3 6.4 5.5 3.4 4.5 6.6
(b) Absolute 
Divestment
No. 2 14 19 12 19 11 88 11
% 5.1 23.0 25.3 12.8 17.5 9.4 14.4 9.0
Unclassified * 
No. - - - 4 5 1 12 2
TOTAL No 39 61 75 98 114 123 118 628
% 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
*Unclassified cases are those in which correct ownership 
percentage could not be confirmed. In calculating percentages 
unclassified cases are excluded.
Source: Sachdev, 1976, p.141.
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2.8.3.; Size of Divested Operations
The studies on US foreign divestment illustrated the size of 
the divested subsidiaries by estimating their sales volume. 
Sachdev [1976], on the other hand, took 21 divested subsidiaries 
as a sample group, and he presents their book-value in order to 
portray their size. As Table 2.18 shows, one single divestment 
was for £75m, 54.7% of the total, and so its inclusion in the
calculation of the mean book-value would give a misleading 
result. Excluding this case, the average book-value is £3.1ni in 
each case, compared to £6.5m if included.
Table 2.18: Book-Value of Divested Foreign Operations
Number of
Divestment
Cases
Book-Value 
£ millions
Average 
per case
Total 
£ million
Percentage
6 1.0 1.0 6.0 4.4
2 1.0-2.0 1.5 3.0 2.2
4 2.0-3.0 2.5 10.0 7.2
2 3.0-4.0 3.5 7.0 5.1
3 4.0-5.0 4.5 13.5 9.9
1 6.0—7.0 6.5 6.5 4.7
1 7.0-8.0 7.5 7.5 5.6
1 8.0—9.0 8.5 8.5 6.2
1 75.0 75.0 75.0 54.7
N=21 Total 137.0 100.0
Source: Sachdev, 1976, p.161.
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2.9.: Characterlgtlc3_Qf Divesting Parente
In conformity with studies on US foreign divestment, Sachdev 
[1976] discovered that a few companies accounted for a large 
percentage of the total number of British foreign divestments and 
that these companies tended to be the largest ones. The total 
number of companies involved in 628 cases of foreign divestment 
was 134. More than half (57.5%) of these companies were in the 
top 200 of The Times 1.000. and they accounted for over 70% of 
total divestments.
The average number of divestments by each divesting company over 
the period 1968-74 was 4.7 cases: - this is termed by Sachdev as
the gross divestment rate. Table 2.19 indicates that the 49 
companies in Rank 1 (ie those in the top 100 of The Times 1.OOP) 
each had 7.0 cases of divestment, or almost double the average, 
over the seven year period.
Table 2.19.: UK Company Size and Foreign Divestment
Ranks Position in Times 1,000 Divestment Rate
1968-1974
1 1-100 7.0
2 101-200 3.4
3 201-300 3.0
4 301-400 4.1
5 401-500 3.1
6 501-600 4.6
7 601-700 3.1
8 701-800 4.4
9 801-900 5.0
10 901-1,000 4.6
Source:
2^10.:
Sachdev, 1976, p.138 
Summarv of UK Foreign Divestment
The period 1968-1974 witnessed a steady increase in foreign 
divestments by UK MNCs. In 196 8 there was a total of 39 cases; 
by 1974 this figure had increased by over 300%, and 123 
incidences of UK foreign divestment were identified by Sachdev.
Voluntary clearly outweighed involuntary divestments, accounting 
for 85% of the total number of divestments, and four industrial
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sectors - mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, food 
and drink, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals - were responsible 
for nearly 60% of the total. The geographic spread of UK foreign 
divestment was much wider than for American MNCs, and was 
particularly prominent not just in Europe, but Africa too. As was 
the case with US MNCs, a small number of major companies 
accounted for a large percentage of the total number of British 
foreign divestments.
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SCOTTISH EXPERIENCE
2.11.: ForelKn-Owned Plant Closures In Scotland
In 1975 108,200 people were employed In 280 foreign-owned plants 
in Scotland. During the following six years foreign-owned plant 
openings just outnumbered foreign-owned factory closures. 
However, the new plants tended to be smaller and more capital 
intensive; consequently Scotland suffered a significant net loss 
of 20,000 jobs in the foreign-owned sector. By 1981, although 
there were 288 foreign-owned units, these provided only 80,457 
jobs [Hood and Young, 1982, p.5].
Since 1981 the Scottish Development Agency's "Locate in Scotland" 
unit has attracted new investors, but, despite this, the country 
has suffered a net decline in employment at foreign-owned 
facilities. In 1985, there were 375 foreign-owned manufacturing 
units, almost 100 more than in 1981, but employing only 74,000, a 
drop of 5,000 in four years.
Between 1976 and 1981, 61 foreign-owned factories were shut down
which at their peak level of employment provided nearly 45,000 
jobs. The significance of these plant closures in terms of 
employment is put in perspective:
■the job loss is roomily equivalent to all the employment 
offered in US plants in Scotland in I960. Ptd; anoHier way, 
it is ccHqparable to the total employment in shipbuilding and 
ship repairing (but excluding marine engineering) in 
Scotland in I960, the demise of which attracted so mucA 
attention in the suteoquent decade" [Hood and Young, 1982, 
p.2].
Some of these foreign-owned operations were very small and their 
closure accounted for a low percentage of unemployed, but most of 
the 45,000 jobs lost were due to the run-down and eventual 
closure of a handful of plants:- Goodyear, Massey Ferguson, 
Monsanto, Peugeot, and Singer. These closures are among the case- 
studies prepared for this thesis.
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Tables 2.19.-2.24. present data on the closures of foreign-owned 
units during the period 1976 to 1981. Before commenting on the 
data, it should be pointed out that information is based on 
manufacturing units in separate geographical locations. If a 
multinational company has several plants in the same town or 
city, closure will not be recorded until all the factories cease 
operations, the data, therefore, underestimates the extent of 
foriegn divestment.
In Table 2.19. a distinction is drawn between maximum employment 
during the lifetime of the unit and the most recent employment 
figure available prior to closure. As Hood and Young [1982] point 
out,
"Both sets of figures inevitably pose aome difficulties: the 
former tends to exaggerate the current employment impact of 
closures, while the latter often underestimates it 
substantially, in that unit employment invariably declines 
both prior to closure announcements and prior to closure* 
What is Important is that closure was preceded by a period, 
sometimes a fairly lengthy period, of job attrition, 
representing for the workers concerned, a time of 
considerable anxiety and uncertainty" [Hood and Young, 1982, 
p.31].
Table 2.19.: Overseas-owned Closures in Scotland (1976-81):
By Year
Maximum Latest 
Year No. employment employment
1976 8 2,654 2,049
1977 9 3,473 1,358
1978 9 2,814 441
1979 11 4,030 2,610
1980 14 19,976 1,946
1981 10 11,531 5,504
61 44,478 13,908
Source Hood and Young, 1982, p.30.
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Table 2.20: Overseas-owned Closures in Scotland (1976-81): By SIC
SIC No.
Maximum
employment
Latest
employment
Food, drink and tobacco 
Chemicals & allied industries
3
5 1,473 1,006
Mechanical Engineering 
Vehicles
Metal goods not elsewhere specified
9
2
5
31,777 6,807
Instrument engineering 
Electrical engineering
5
13 6,336 2,657
Textiles
Leather, leather goods & fur 
Clothing & footwear
5
1
3
3,432 2,444
Timber, furniture
Paper, printing & publishing
Other manufacturing
3
4 
3
1,499 994
61 44,478 13,908
Source: Hood and Young, 1982, p.30
Table 2.21.: Overseas-owned Closures 
By Country of Origin
in Scotland (1976-81):
Country No.
Maximum
employment
Latest
employment
USA
Netherlands
Canada
Denmark
Sweden
Switzerland
W.Germany
Other
35
6
7
2
2
2
3
4
27,575
4,630
12,273
5,785
2,017
6,106
61 44 ,478 13,908 '
Source Hood and Young, 1982, p.31
)l o
Table 2.22: Overseas-owned 
By Peak Employment.
Closures in Scotland (1976-81)
No. Peak
Employment
Under 20 4
and 311
20-49 7
50-99 14 991
100-199 10 1,480
200 and over 26 41,696
61 44,478
Source Hood and Young, 1982, p.31.
Table 2.23: Overseas-owned Closures in Scotland (1976-81):
By last Known Employment.
No. Peak
Employment
Under 20 7
+ 692
20-49 17
50-99 12 769
100-199 11 1,488
200 and over 14 10,959
61 13,908
Source Hood and Young [1982]
2.12.: Summary
Upsurge In divestments in EEC countries, by European and US 
multinationals coincided with the deepening economic recession of 
the latjg 1970*8. This is perhaps indicative of the cause of some 
divestments. US MNCs, perhaps contrary to popular belief, have 
not been more more prone to close plants in the EEC than were 
MNCs with headquarters in the Community [Van den Bui eke, 1979].
Some countries and regions within the EEC are heavily dependent 
on foreign direct investment, especially in the high-tech 
industries. Scotland, despite stiff competition especially from 
Eire and Wales, has won major investment projects, but these have 
not compensated for job losses within the foreign-owned sector. 
Many of the major new investments have been in the electronics
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sector, but some of the firms in these high-tech industries have 
been forced to issue redundancies and/or abort plans for 
expansion. "Silicon Glen" is still heralded as Scotland’s 
industrial salvation, but a worlwide glut has forced firms such 
as America’s National Semiconductor to revise their forecasts, 
and cut production at its large Greenock, Scotland, plant.
Countries, such as Scotland, concentrate considerable time and 
resources to boosting the flow and stock of inward investment. 
The next chapter reviews foreign divestment theory, based mainly 
on studies of US MNCs. This has the potential to provide host 
government policy makers with a framework for evaluating the 
security of their inward investment.
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CHAPTER 3 
FOREIGN DIVESTMENT THEORY
3^1. Im trpdw tiP D
A theory has been defined as,
■a set of inter-related concepts, definitions, and
propositions that present a systematic view of phencwena by 
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of 
explaining and predicting the phencwnena" [Kerlinger quoted 
in Boddewyn, 1983, p.1].
Boddewyn [1983] quoting Bagozzi, suggests that explanation is the 
more fundamental of the two purposes of theory. He adds that to 
some metatheorists in the logical-positivist tradition, 
"explanation is conceived as a deductive argument in which the 
phenomena to be explained is deduced through the specification of 
certain types of explanatory factors or premises and their inter­
relationships" [Boddewyn, 1983, p.1].
In the early 1960*s, Hymer wrote his seminal thesis on
foreign direct investment (FDI) and MNCs, and since then the 
theory of FDI has been tackled by many international business 
scholars. Cal vet has concluded that the works of these and other 
scholars points to the rise of the multinational firm as "the 
result of several forces that no single theory can encompass" 
[Calvet, 1981, p.55].
The growth in foreign divestment has prompted scholars to develop
an appropriate theoretical framework. Some progress has been
made, but work on the theoretical aspects is not yet as advanced
as that on FDI. Existing theories of foreign divestment have 
certainly contributed to understanding certain aspects, but many 
"black boxes" remain.
Thus, Boddewyn [1983] believes that no single existing theory has 
fully explained the phenomenon of foreign divestment, and that an 
eclectic theory is necessary. This chapter reviews the major
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developments in the construction of divestment theory.
Existing theoretical models of foreign divestment have been 
classified by Boddewyn [1983] as emphasising primarily either:
(1) the conditions or prerequisites for divestment;
(2) the motivations for divestment;
or, (3) a divestment's immediate precipitating circumstances.
In most cases of foreign divestment, a mixture of internal and 
external factors are blamed for the decision. Companies do not 
operate in a vacuum, and so this combination is only to be 
expected. As the Business International (BI) study [1976] found,
■the survival, growth and profitability of a business are 
the outoone of a stimul us-and-response relationship between 
the firm and its environment" [BI study, 1976, p.11].
The BI study [1976], based on a random sample of 32 MNCs (21 US 
firms, 9 European and 2 from elsewhere) known to have divestment 
experience, noted that divestment was largely due to a
combination of adverse environmental conditions and poor
performance. Of course, the former bears very heavily on the
latter. The other key divestment factors listed are peculiar to 
the firm.
Table 1: Key Factors Triggering Divestment
Divestment Factors Percentage of companies
mentioning
Poor performance and prospects 94%
Adverse environmental conditions 72%
Bad acquisitions 34% '
Lack of strategic fit (peripheral) 34%
Lack of managerial fit (too small) 31%
Lack of resources 22%
Problems elsewhere in the company 19%
Bad Management 13%
Source: Business International study, 1976, p.12.
Before reviewing each model some comments can be made. A theory 
based on condltlonCs) stresses that something is vital to the 
existence or occurrence of something else. For example, a parent 
company cannot divest a subsidiary which it does not own.
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Motivation-based theory emphasises the impulse, desire, drive, 
intention etc., that leads an individual or group to decide on a 
certain course of action. Hence divestment normally occurs when 
someone concludes it would be beneficial. Finally, the 
theoretical model founded on precipitating circumstancefs) 
attaches major significance to elements that produce an outcome 
earlier than expected, needed, or desired. For example, a firm 
may have no plans to divest an operation until approached by a 
potential buyer.
3.2.; Oppdltiotv-Based Theory
In recent years the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
advanced considerably; the theory explains the existence of the 
MNC, expansion of which is by means of controlled foreign 
subsidiaries "internalized" within the hierarchy of the 
multinational enterprise.
According to Dunning's [1979] "eclectic theory" of FDI overseas 
subsidiaries are established when all three of the following 
conditions prevail:
- the MNCs possess competitive advantages;
- it is more profitable to internalize these advantages 
within the firm than sell them to independent parties;
- there are certain benefits to be gained by exploiting the 
advantages outside the home country market.
By reversing the conditions, Boddewyn [1983] has employed 
Dunning's "eclectic theory" to develop a theory of foreign 
divestment. According to his "reverse theory", foreign divestment 
takes place whenever a firm;
;
"1. ceases to possess net competitive advzmtagœ over f l m  
of other œitlonalitles,
2 . or, even If It retains net competitive advantages. It no 
longer finds It beneficial to use them itself rather 
than sell or rent them to foreign firms -that Is, the 
firm no longer considers it profitable to
"internalize" these advantages^
3. or, the firm no longer finds it profitable to utilize 
its Internalized net competitive advantage outside its 
home country —that is, it is now more advantageous to 
serve foreign markets by exports and the home market by
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home production, or to abandon foreign and/or home 
markets altogether" [Boddewyn, I983, p. 3].
Dunning’s [1979] eclectic theory of international production 
demands that all three conditions must exist simultaneouslv for 
FDI to occur. But in Boddewyn's "reverse theory", foreign 
divestment occurs when anv one of the above conditions prevails.
According to Dunning's theory, the foreign investment must 
maintain its ownership or firm-specific advantages, otherwise the 
foreign subsidiary must be divested. However, even if the firm 
continues to possess these ownership advantages, it may decide to 
divest when the incentive to internalize and/or utilize them 
outside the home country has disappeared;
"in oUier words. InternalIzatlon and location advantages can
erode separately" [Boddewyn, 1983, p.348].
Change in foreign business environment were cited as key 
divestment factors by 72% of the respondents to the BI study 
[1976]. These changes include: recessionary conditions in the
home or host markets, spiralling fuel costs, rising nationalist 
feelings, increased government controls, leftist advances, and 
monetary policy alterations which discourage further investment.
Particularly significant given the focus of this study, is the 
claim that the prospect of growing worker participation In 
decision-making encourages divestment [Boddewyn, 1979b]. It will 
be seen in Chapter 7 that European, American, and Japanese 
employer organisations have all predicted, even threatened a 
sharp increase in divestment in EEC member countries should 
various EEC Draft Directives become Community law. They have been 
campaigning vigorously against the Fifth Directive on employee 
participation, and the "Vredeling/Richards Proposals" on employee 
disclosure and consultation. Host-country governments can take 
comfort in the knowledge that MNCs have often resorted to this 
tactic, but have seldom implemented their threats.
Other external factors which may lead to divestment are market 
saturation, and declining demand, technological change leading to 
obsolescence of plant and equipment, changes in industry
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structure arising from mergers, changes in host government 
regulatory policy, and risk and uncertainty about political and 
economic developments [Spanhel and Johnson, 1982].
Wilson [I98O] identified two categories of foreign investment: 
active investment to exploit a competitive advantage, and 
reactive investment to maintain industry stability. He 
hypothesised that divestment would occur when the reasons for the 
original investment had been eroded. Thus manufacturing plants 
which were active investments are likely to be divested as 
market competition increases and competitive advantage is lost, 
and factories set up for reactive reasons the probability of 
divestment grows as the structure of the industry changes.
His hypothesis was corroborated by his finding that those 
industries with mature, homogeneous products had the highest
rates of divestment, while those with differentiated products had 
least divestments. Divestiture was also more common in developed 
countries where competition is stronger.
These environmental factors certainly appear to provoke
divestment, but Boddewyn [1979b] has indicated that environmental 
conditions per se may not be the issue; instead, the uncertainty 
associated with a reduced ability to predict and control the
direction of future change is much more important than the actual 
scale or character of change.
Management also tends to overstate the importance of external
factors, at the expense of factors internal to the firm.
This Is understandable. Shareholders, employees, and the 
community are more likely to meekly accept divestment due 'to 
factors over which management has no control. No compaigr is 
likely to explain away divestment with admissions of bad 
management or poor product.
Although Boddewyn's theory suggests that foreign divestment 
decisions are easier to reach on purely economic grounds than
decisions on FDI, the managerial literature reveals that
executives often find them very difficult to make [Boddewyn,
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1983; Porter, 1976; Spanhel & Boddewyn, 1983; Torneden, 1975; 
Wilson, 1980].
As was seen earlier, the presence of "exit barriers" (such as 
hard-to-sell-assets, integrated units, lack of potential buyers, 
and managerial sentiment) Inhibit divestment and their removal is 
essential if divestment is to take place. These obstacles to 
divestment are examined below.
3.2.1.: Exit Barriers
Thackray [1971] observed that the failure of corporations to 
divest when logic suggests they should was due to managerial 
attitudes/beliefs/sentimentality. Managers often looked upon 
divestment as almost a betrayal of their employees. He 
discouraged this notion arguing that the workforce "should not be 
treated as an insurmountable obstacle to the planning and 
effecting of divestment" [Thackray, 1971, p.57].
He noted that some companies, by their nature, can more easily 
than others effect divestment. Those with the most centralized 
policies, communications, and lines of authority are less likely 
to divest than companies with decentralized divisional
management. He concluded that the rise of the professional
manager combined with the solidification of the EEC will 
stimulate an increase in divestment in Europe.
Caves and Porter [1976] studied domestic divestment in the US 
They identified a number of features associated with unprofitable 
units that inhibited their divestment. The findings of this study 
led Porter [1976] to develop his theory of barriers to
divestment, or exit barriers.
Porter [1976] hypothesises that not only do these "barriers to 
exit" discourage divestment but their impact is such that many 
firms continue to throw good money after bad as they desperately 
try to to restore lossmaking subsidiaries to profitability. 
Often these efforts fail and as a result valuable management time 
and capital has been squandered.
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Mathews and Boucher [1977] suggested that these attempts were 
prevalent because management lacked a "planned exit" strategy. 
They recommended that, at the time of entry into a new venture,
"there should be an equally well-planned exit procedure and 
that key warning signals should automatically trigger 
efforts to evaluate the future of the venture, so that 
management is formally brou^t to consider the possibility 
of exercising Its option to terminate the operation" 
[Mathews and Boucher 1977, p36].
Exit barriers originated from the industry environment, the 
corporate strategy and decision-making process. These can be 
divided into three types:
"Structural (or economic) exit barriers: characteristics of
the technology and the fixed and working capital of a 
business which impede exit.
Corporate strategy exit barriers: relationships between a
business and other businesses in the company as a result of 
a company's corporate strategy which deter exit.
Managerial exit barriers: aspects of a company's decision­
making process itself which inhibit exit from unprofitable 
businesses" [Porter, 1976, p.21].
(a) Structural Barriers
Plant and equipment which lends itself well to manufacturing a 
broad range of products, will appeal to a number of potential 
purchasers, and is likely to fetch a good resale price. Losses to 
the divesting firm will therefore be relatively small. However, 
plants which are suitable for the production of one specific 
product are more difficult to sell. Poor market conditions and 
excess capacity in the industry may make such an operation 
impossible to sell. Management appreciate therefore that their 
only feasible method of exit is divestment by liquidation which 
is very expensive.
Closing a large manufacturing facility takes its toll, not just 
on the subsidiary affected, but also on the profitability of the 
parent which has to "write off" assets, and, if in Europe, has to 
offer compensation to redundant employees. The existence of
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structural barriers (such as specialised plant and equipment, 
specialised inventory, and Intangible assets which are highly 
firm specific), or, durable and specific assets. diminishes the 
value of the divestment candidate to potential buyers, thus 
rendering the operation more difficult to divest.
Two studies have examined the effects of structural barriers, and 
these have produced conflicting results. Porter [1976, p.28], 
utilising "a unique data base assembled by the PIMS Program of 
the Strategic Planning Institute", found that US domestic 
operations with chronically subnormal returns and with high 
levels of durable and specific assets were less likely to be 
divested than those with a lower level of the same assets,
Wilson [1980] in his study of US foreign divestment, examined the 
impact of specific and durable assets by comparing the assets of 
a subsidiary with its sales. If a subsidiary is asset or capital 
intensive, the possibility of having specific assets increases. 
Likewise, subsidiaries with a low assets/sales ratio are less 
capital intensive, and the probability of specific assets is 
less.
Unlike Porter [1976], he did not find support for the hypothesis 
that the presence of specific assets in the subsidiary will 
reduce the likelihood of the subsidiary's divestment.
Wilson's [1980] divestment model (derived from various theories 
of foreign direct investment) was based on the assumption that 
divestment activity was related to the factors which caused or 
supported the original investment decision. He identified ttfo 
categories of investments: active investment to exploit a
competitive advantage, and reactive investment to maintain 
industry stability and thereby protect competitive advantage.
fn both situations, it was hypothesised that divestment would 
occur when the reasons for the initial investment were no longer 
met. Subsidiaries established for active reasons are therefore 
more likely to be divested as competitive advantages are eroded, 
whereas those founded for reactive reasons are more likely to be
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divested as thé nature of the industry changes. These 
developments either, reduce the value of the subsidiary to the 
parent company, increase the value of the subsidiary to a 
potential buyer, or result in a mixture of the two. Once the 
divestment value is greater than the value of the subsidiary to 
the parent, divestment is considered economically Justified.
Table 3.1iSummary of Results of Tests of Hypotheses
Variable
Hypothesised 
Effect on 
Divestment*
Statistical
Results
Case
Analysis
Results
Industry Concentration Deter Uncertain Uncertain
Number of Products Deter Strong Support Uncertain
Intrasystem Sales Deter Strong Support Supported
Assets/Sales Ratio Deter Uncertain Uncertain
Acquisition Dummy Facilitate Moderate Support Uncertain
Subsidiary Sales Deter Strong Support Uncertain
Entry Year Facilitate Uncertain Uncertain
Change in Chief 
Executive Officer
Facilitate Uncertain Supported
Change in Chief 
Operating Officer
Facilitate Moderate Support** Supported
Decrease in 
System Earnings
Facilitate Moderate Support** Uncertain
* Assuming a high value or level for the variable
•• With a one year time lag 
Source: Wilson, 1980, p.74.
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Table 3-2: Comparison of Results with Caves and Porter Study of
Domestic Divestment
Variable
Industry Concentration 
Number of Products
Level of
Intrasystem Sales
Asset/Sales
Ratio
Method of Entry 
Acquisition
Subsidiary 
Sales Level
Time in 
System
Effect on 
Divestment of 
Foreign Subsidiary
Effect on 
Divestment of 
Domestic Businesses
Uncertain
Deterred
Divestment
Deterred
Divestment
Uncertain
Facilitated
Divestment
Deterred
Divestment
Uncertain
Facilitated
Divestment
Deterred
Divestment
Facilitated
Divestment
Deterred
Divestment
n/a
n/a
Deterred
Divestment
Source: Wilson, I98O, p.76.
(b) Strategic Barriers
The most significant difference in the results of the Caves and 
Porter [1976] study on US domestic divestment and the Wilson 
[1980] study of US foreign divestment is the effect of 
intrasystem sales on the probability of divestment (see Table 1).
Caves and Porter [1976] found that units with a higher percentage 
of sales^ within the system were more likely to be divested. They 
reasoned that businesses with sub-normal returns are likely to be 
suffering from production inefficiencies or inferior products. 
Compelling other subsidiaries to purchase from that business 
could transmit the aforementioned ailments to the healthy 
operations, and, therefore, intrasystem sales might provide a 
stimulus for management to divest the poorly performing business.
Boddewyn [1981], on the other hand, suggests that an integrated 
subsidiary may have to be retained, even when its results are 
poor, because it has a vital role to play which has a net benefit
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to the parent. Wilson [19 80] too found that higher internal sales 
reduces the likelihood of divestment. His reasoning was that it 
is more difficult to evaluate the performance of a closely 
integrated unit, and hence formulate a divestment decision.
He also found strong support for another of his hypotheses: 
subsidiaries with a diversified product base, as indicated by the 
number of SIC product codes, were less likely to be divested 
[Wilson, 1980].
(c) Managerial Barriers
These are associated with the nature of a firm’s decision-making 
process. Porter [1976] presented them as being critical, and 
divided them into two major categories: "information related" and 
"conflicting goals".
Information-related barriers may lead to decisions which are not 
in the best interests of the parent company. Tliis problem arises 
most often in cases where financial data is not compiled for each 
unit in a system; eg., vertically integrated systems or systems 
with shared facilities. In such cases, any rotten apple(s) may 
remain undetected. Critical non-financisil information such as the 
market conditions and competitive situation may not always be 
available to decision makers.
Poor communications have featured in many divestment decisions 
[Vignola, 1974]. They proved a key divestment factor in Sachdev’s 
[1976] study. Irrespective of their profit performance, more
than ' one third of the 21 UK MNCs which he examined were having
organizational difficulties in conducting their foreign
operations prior to divestment, but not necessarily with those 
subsidiaries which were divested:
"The main constituents of these difficulties were failure in 
communication channels and some disagreements in the general 
policies of the parent companies towards various foreign
subsidiaries" [Sachdev, 1976, p.121-122].
Sachdev [1976] beleives that structural and organisational
factors are particularly important causes of foreign divestment:
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"Organizational and personal characteristics are equally. If 
not more important to a divestment decision as are the 
objective application of concepts which attempt to maximize 
corporate profits" [Sachdev, 1976, p.265].
A much stronger barrier to exit exists when management’s goals 
conflict with those of the parent. For many managers, the 
decision to divest is the most difficult they will ever make 
[Boddewyn, 1979a,b; Gilmour, 1973; Hilman and Soden, 1971; 
Vignola, 1974; Wallender, 1973]. Managers also fear that their 
superiors and shareholders will view divestment as an admission 
of defeat. They believe divestment bears the stigma of failure. 
Pride is not the only emotion to interfere with decision-making. 
Managers may be reluctant to divest a subsidiary because of their 
sense of loyalty to the business, their concern with the social 
and economic consequences of the decision on the community 
involved, and last but not least, their own interests may be 
adversely affected by divestment.
However, the spate of mega-mergers during the mid-1980s saw some 
predators acquiring firms only to hive off various divisions and 
product lines at a massive profit. Indeed, regulatory bodies 
sometimes only approved certain takeovers on the condition that 
certain divestments were made.
Long-established operations that were instrumental in the 
company’s development, are particularly likely to secure 
excessive identification by managers [Porter, 1976]. Wilson 
[1980] by the use of proxy variables tested Porter’s hypothesis 
that conflicting management goals deter divestment. He found th^t 
subsidiaries established by the parent company were less likely 
to be divested than those acquired from other firms. Aquisitions 
require comparatively little in the way of managerial resources, 
and thus, "greenfield" operations are more likely to invoke 
strong feelings of identification at all levels of the corporate 
hierarchy.
It is understandable therefore that managers, in some situations, 
refrain from divesting even when economic logic suggests they 
should. Changes in top management often facilitate divestment
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becuse these new men do not have any emotional ties to operations 
earmarked as divestment candidates. The motivation and stimulus 
to divestment is considered in detail below.
3.3.: Motivation-Based Theory
In this context, foreign divestment is attributed to poor target 
attainment (eg.. Return on Investment [ROI], market-share growth)
by either the subsidiary or the parent. A number of key
divestment factors have been identified in the literature, and 
these will be examined before considering two theoretical models 
which attempt to explain why certain subsidiaries are divested. 
Grunberg’s [1982] model relates divestment to intra-corporate 
rivalry, and Wilson’s [1980] is derived from Vernon’s [1971] 
Product Life Cycle (PLC) model.
It appears, at least to this author, that the factors which are 
said to trigger divestment by motivating executives to reach a
decision, are often merely a barometer of the business
climate. In other words, management cannot afford to allow a 
steady decline in market share and profits, but while these 
certainly jolt decision-makers into action, the root cause of 
deterioration is more often than not an adverse change in the 
business environment. This section on motivation-based theory 
should surely then be seen aK>re often than not as an adjunct of 
condition-based theory.
3.3.1.: Poor Subsidiary Performance
Whether reflected in unacceptable Return On Investment, profit 
levels or losses, poor subsidiary performance is the most 
frequently cited reason for foreign divestment [BI, 1976; 
Boddewyn, 1979a,b; Chopra, et al., 1978; Sachdev, 1976; Torneden, 
1975].
For example, of the 32 MiCs in the BI study [1976], 94^ mentioned 
"poor performance and prospects" as the key factor triggering 
divestment. Torneden [1975] reported that of 38 divesting firms’ 
executives, 6 0$ listed an unacceptable ROI as the primary causal
factor. Sachdev [1976] also stressed this factor under various 
headings: low profitability and losses; restrictions on fund
transfer; and, inadequate liquidity.
Boddewyn stresses, however, that financial factors should not be 
overemphasized, as, often analyses of these factors were used 
merely to "rationalize" a preliminary divestment decision after 
the fact:
■Thus, other factors and processes were Important, too, so 
that a poor financial situation Is only a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient one to generate divestment"
[Boddewyn, 1979b, p.23].
Moreover, multinationals usually have a global strategy in which 
subsidiaries are integrated and so, for performance evaluation 
purposes a subsidiary should not be assessed as an individual 
component, but rather as a contributor to the whole entity. 
Management must therefore recognise that the value of a 
particular foreign investment cannot always be precisely 
determined if it is linked to other parts of the multinational 
entity.
Boddewyn [1979b] concludes that integration usually renders a 
portfolio view of foreign investments inappropriate as MNCs do 
not simply rank their subsidiaries and get rid of those at the 
bottom of the league. Indeed, the benefits derived from retaining 
what is ostensibly a loss-making operation, may far outweigh the 
costs:
"In other words, maintaining an apparently unprofitable 
Investment in a particular country can be Justified if it 
either reduces the risk to the whole corporate syste^ or 
increases the yield to any part of it" [Boddewyn, 1979b, 
p.23].
3.3.2.; Poor Pre-Investment Analysis
A number of divested subsidiaries had never come up to 
management’s expectations, and in retrospect they should never 
have been established in the first instance. This is particularly 
true of foreign subsisiaries acquired during the 1960s. Poor pre­
investment analysis is, without doubt, a key divestment factor.
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In 1970, Lobb and Ellis predicted that just as the swinging 1960s 
was the greatest decade of mergers and aquisitions, the 1970's 
would be the greatest decade of divestment. The mistakes of the 
psychadelic, flower-power era would be remedied by more ruthless 
executives from a younger generation.
Their thesis has been corroborated by subsequent research [BI, 
1976; Kitchlng, 1973; Torneden, 1975; Wilson, 1980]. It is now 
widely accepted that the significant upsurge in the number of US 
foreign divestments during the 1970s was due to the binge of 
foreign acquisitions that took place in the 1960s.
Boddewyn [1979a] says:-
"Europcan firms appear to be more deliberate, careful and 
cautious in deciding about new investment. US companies, on 
the other hand, "plunge" half—locked into new ventiares/many 
of them poorly analysed. The net result is that US firms 
end up getting involved in more initiatives but also in more 
failures and divestitures" [Boddewyn, 1979a, p.24].
Torneden [1975] observed that the original investment analysis of 
a number of acquisitions failed to detect major financial and 
operating problems. Kitching [1973] found that at least 25$ of a 
large sample of US acquisitions in Europe were subsequently 
judged failures for lack of sufficient consideration of external 
and corporate factors. 34$ of the companies in the BI study 
[1976] mention "bad acquisition" as a key divestment factor.
Many of the acquisitions made in the 1960s were attempts at 
diversification by firms heavily dependent on a single mature 
product. Not surprisingly quite often these efforts only 
exacerbated rather than relieved the firms’ difficulties, for, as 
Bane and Neubauer [1981, p.219] observed,
"It is well known that the process of diversification is 
fraught with difficulties and the risk: of failure and 
furthermore that the process of setting op or acquiring 
foreign subsldaries is also a risky process so that when 
the two are combined the chance of failure is very hi^".
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3_.3-.3-. ;_Struc.tur.â]^ ancl Organizational Factors
Poor managerial performance by both local and expatriate managers 
were mentioned as a reason for foreign divestment by 13$ of the 
respondents in the BI [1976] study. Expatriate managers were not 
always able to adjust to conditions abroad, and often this 
problem was exacerbated by poor communications between head 
office and subsidiary concerning corporate goals and policies.
3-.3-.-4.. ; .froblgmg. in the Parent/Lack of Fit and Resources
Parent company difficulties often leads to foreign divestment. 
Boddewyn [ 1979a] observed that many US MNCs were well- 
established before they made their first foreign investment, and 
consequently their foreign subsidiaries have received less top 
management commitment than domestic operations. A parent company 
in trouble often operates a last in, first out, policy, so it is 
usually a foreign subsidiary that is divested. This is 
understandable: the exit barriers are not so difficult to
overcome, and the parent company escapes the barrage of criticism 
it would receive were it to close a domestic operation.
Torneden [1975] too found that in seven out of eight case 
studies, poor US earnings were associated with foreign 
divestment. In four of these cases the domestic earnings problem 
was compounded by poor foreign subsidiary performance and the 
prospect of a loss for the entire company.
During the 1970s, it became apparent that some companies’ had 
pursued an excessively vigorous growth policy during the 1960s.. 
They subsequently lacked sufficient managerial resources to 
satisfactorily monitor and control operations and were compelled 
to rationalise:
•A number of multinational corporations expanded too fast 
abroad and overextended their international division and 
ultimately this led to corrective action in the form of 
divestment" [Van den Bulcke in Brooke & Buckley, 19 82].
Torneden [1975] found that of sixteen cases, six mentioned 
excessive management time spent on problem foreign subsidiaries
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as the major admitted basis for divestment. Other studies have 
reported poor liquidity or overemployed resources, where foreign 
operations were sold in order to reduce debt or improve other 
balance sheet items of the parent company [Brooke and Reramers, 
1978].
Financial or operating problems in the parent company, or lack of 
managerial and capital resources to sustain foreign operations, 
were cited as reasons for divestment by 41$ of respondents in the 
BI study.
3,3.5.;..-The Internal-External Market Failure Model
Classical economic theory suggests divestment will occur only 
when a subsidiary has failed in the market-place, ie. when it 
fails to achieve certain goals, and, or when, returns are lower 
than those available elsewhere.
Like Torneden [1975], Grunberg [1982] supports Aharoni’s claim 
that classical economic theory is not particularly helpful in 
understanding organizational decision making. His findings 
suggest that this theory does not fully explain the divestment 
phenomenon. He concluded that while there was some support in 
his case-study findings for the market-failure thesis,
"enoagh evidence la In the case atndiea to seriously 
undermine the conventional wisdom as It now stands"
[Grunberg, 1982, p.147]-
Grunberg [1982] explored the causes and consequences of foreign
t.
divestment through three in depth case-studies; British Leyland 
(since renamed simply BL, but now known as Rover) which divested 
in 1975-76 its Italian subsidiary Leyland Innocenti; Litton 
industries, a US conglomerate which divested its British 
subsidiary. Imperial Typewriters, in 1975; and the Chrysler 
Corporation’s attempt to divest its British subsidiary, Chrysler 
UK, in 1975.
The three subsidiaries named above were confronted with an 
unfavourable business climate and intensified international
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competition. While they were able to compete successfully with 
local rivals, they lost ground to foreign rivals which had lower 
operating costs. Moreover, these parents had major weaknesses, 
the most debilitating being their cash problems. This combination 
of factors seemed to provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to account for foreign divestment, but Grunberg [1982] 
says such a conclusion must be tempered.
After all, other firms operating in the British and Italian 
automobile and typewriter industries survived the recession. BL, 
Imperial Typewriters, and Chrysler had subsidiaries that 
performed well at the same time and in the same industry as those 
that did not. Grunberg [1982] concludes, therefore, that,
■the contextual factors (country, industry, and parent 
conditions) do not In themselves fully explain the decision 
to divest" [Grunberg, 1982, p.146].
Classical economic theory assumes that it is possible to evaluate 
the market performance of a subsidiary and determine whether it 
has in some sense failed. Transfer pricing misrepresents the real 
value of a subsidiary to the parent company. But the real 
distortion is caused by subsidiaries lack of Independence and the 
parent company’s monopoly of a whole series of operational and 
strategic decisions:
"The parents seem to have encroached upon the discretionary 
power of subsidiaries to the point at which they have little 
or no independent capacity to determine what products they 
will produce, trom what suppliers they will buy and in what 
markets they will sell their products. Such decisions, in 
addition to the control of financial and research and 
flevelopment resources, have been centralized at parent or 
regional headquarters" [Grunberg, 19 82, p.l47]. ,
Subsidiaries are constricted in their ability to respond to 
market incentives because, as part of a larger group, their 
interests become subordinated to those of the whole group, and 
they must compete with each other to ensure a role in the 
corporate plan which will prolong, if not ensure, their survival. 
Subsidiaries therefore must compete in two environments.
In addition to the external environment (the market) in which
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they compete for sales and revenue, they have the internal 
environment where various management enclaves exert their power 
and influence to protect the interests of their own subsidiary. 
Grunberg stresses that a subsidiary's ability to succeed in the 
internal environment of intra-corporate rivalry is Just as 
Important for its survival as its performance in the external 
environment. Indeed,
•the interaction between performance In the internal and 
external environments (is) such that success in one tends to 
ensure success In the other" [Grunberg, 1982, p.149].
Under such circumstances, the decision to divest reflects not 
just the performance of the subsidiary, but the discretionary 
power of MNCs and the political struggles that take place within 
them. Once a subsidiary fails in either the internal or external 
environment, failure in the other is assured, and when this lack 
of success is identified, its days are numbered. The symbiotic 
relationship between internal and external market also precludes 
easy identification of a divestment's root cause(s).
3.3.6.; Product Life Cycle Models
One theoretical explanation for the occurrence of 
foreign divestment employed the Product Life Cycle (PLC) model of 
foreign direct investment developed by Vernon [1971]. He 
identifies four distinct stages in a product's developmental 
cycle.
New products are normally launched in the domestic market of the
innovating company (stage 1), because, firstly, a new product
>
invariably requires modification, and secondly, as a new 
innovation, it will be relatively price inelastic, and so the 
advantage of proximity to the market outweighs that of low-cost 
production.
A favourable reaction to the new product in the domestic market 
stimulates foreign demand and the firm begins exporting (stage 
2). Local competition in the foreign market is non-existent due 
to strong barriers to entry (e.g., high costs for the production 
and distribution in small foreign markets, and a lack of
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technological expertise in the production process etc.).
As foreign demand rises, the attraction of these foreign markets 
increases, but once local firms close the technological gap
between themselves and the original producer, they can enter
their burgeoning domestic market. The emergence of competitors 
will prompt the innovating firm to commence manufacture in the 
foreign market (stage 3).
As the foreign market expands and more rival producers enter the
market, the foreign subsidiary starts losing its competitive 
advantage and its market share may shrink. The gradual erosion by 
market forces of competitive advantage places all competing 
products on an equal footing, and subsequent price competition 
adversely affects the foreign subsidiary's financial performance. 
As Wilson says [1978]:
■At this stage in the life cycle, a product becomes a 
commodity, a non-differentia ted product. The time frame in 
which this occurs depends upon the products. Some products 
arrive at the commodity status very rapidly, for example 
petrochemicals, ihile other companies attempt to prolong the 
life of their products through upgrading management skill, 
product design changes, heavy advertising, and other 
methods. If a company is successful in these ■holding 
actions^ a product may never reach the commodity stage^. 
[Wilson, 1978, p.13]
Once a product becomes a commodity, many firms choose to withdraw 
from the foreign market rather than continue to inject additional 
resources needed to remain competitive (stage 4).
Boddewyn and Torneden [19731 were the first to relate Vernon's 
PLC model with divestment. They observed that most ventures go 
through a normal "life cycle" in which they grow, mature and 
decline. They pointed out that managers should not consider 
their enterprises as eternal, and as evidence compared the 50 
largest US "trusts", existing at the turn of the century, with 
the then latest Fortune 500 to reveal "a natural disappearance 
process even in the absence of a governmental environment not as 
hostile as has been encountered In recent times" [Boddewyn and 
Torneden, 1973, p.25].
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The PLC model formed the basis of Wilson's [1978] thesis. He 
proposed that the frequency of foreign divestment Is positively 
associated with Increasing competition. Assuming that developed 
countries have more Intensive competition than less developed 
regions, Wilson [1978] hypothesised that the former would have a 
higher rate of foreign divestment. His Initial analysis supported 
this hypothesis, but a later study contradicted It. These
conflicting results led Wilson [1980] to propose that,
the examination of the role of competition in 
disinvestment could be undertaken on a more detailed level. 
Such a study might focus on a specific foreign country and 
examine the disinvestment of subsidiaries by foreign 
parents" [Wilson, 1980, p.78].
It has been seen that the PLC model of divestment suggests that 
divestment is most likely a result of increased competition 
related to mature products. Helle [1976], however, concludes that 
divestment is most likely to occur, not when a product has no 
competitive advantage, but at anv point of transition in the life 
cycle. Anv major change in demand for a product may precipitate a
review of the product's future
Moreover, the PLC model is inadequate in that it fails to take 
account of diversified subsidiaries manufacturing a variety of 
goods in various stages of their life cycle. Neither does it come 
to grips with managerial and structural factors that bear 
strongly on divestment decision-making.
Some of these deficiencies are overcome in a model concerning the 
structure of industries which attempts to explain divestment in 
terms of a set of facilitators. >
3L4.; Precipitating-Circumgtance Efeised Theory
A number of researchers [Bower, 1970; GiLmour, 1973; Torneden, 
1975; Wilson, 1980] have stressed the Importance of the 
appointment of the "new man", psychologically detached from any 
particular operation, who overcomes the "barriers to exit", and 
Is ready to consider divestment. It Is easier for new senior 
executives to Identify and remedy a discrepancy through
66
divestment. They are not personally committed to prior decisions; 
nor are they emotionally tied to particular products or 
divisions, and they are confident that the divestment decision 
will not be Interpreted as failure on their part.
Gllmour [1973], for example, examining three domestic divestments 
by as many US firms, found that In all three cases, the decision 
to divest "dogs" (the Boston Consultancy Group's description of 
poor performers) was only taken once new men were appointed to 
senior management positions. This author would suggest that the 
reverse sequence Is the case. The first phase is when the Board 
recognises divestments can no longer be postponed, and it 
appoints a new man to implement the tough decisions which it 
believes necessary.
Torneden [1975] too emphasizes the importance of organizational 
changes. It was seen earlier that in the cases which he 
reviewed, divestments originated in most instances with new men 
who were not committed to past investment decisions and who were 
quite prepared to consider divestiture when they perceived it as 
beneficial to the parent company. He found that the arrival of 
new men precipitated foreign divestment in six of his eight case 
studies. They were clearly involved in making the divestment 
decision, as well as initially suggesting a divestment study, 
whereas subsidiary management rarely instigated the divestment 
process. He observed that;
•the foreign divestment decision typically reflected a 
shift in power from an international expansion executive to 
a loss termination executive" [Torneden, 1975, p*106].
Wilson [1980] found that a change in Chief Operating Officer 
(COO), second only to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 
corporate hierarchy, was an even more significant spur to 
divestment than the appointment of a new number one.
According to Boddewyn [1979b] the rapid Inflation of the 1970's 
resulted In a shift in the balance of power within corporations 
to the Financial Controller's advantage and he used It to 
pinpoint and divest poorly performing divisions. The
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Controller’s victory in this internal power struggle has resulted 
In a complete U-turn in the corporate strategy of many US MNCs:
■At OS companies that once stressed growth and expansion 
beyond all else, the job of measuring the costs of doing 
business - and cutting them - get the highest priority 
today. Indeed, in a dramatic turnabout from the strategies 
of the late 1960*s and early 1970*s, oorporations today are 
far more interested in improving profit margins than in 
building up market share or new business" [Boddewyn, 1979b, 
p.25].
3.5.: Summary
The divestment literature supports Aharoni’s contention that 
classical economic theory is not particularly helpful In 
understanding organizational decision making. Grunberg [1982] 
concludes that subsidiaries do not just operate In the market­
place. Instead, they must compete with other operations In the 
same parent group for finite resources. This Intra-corporate 
rivalry represents an additional battlefield and subsidiaries 
successful In this Internal market are more likely to succeed In 
the external market. Indeed a symbiotic relationship exists 
between the two.
The PLC model does not, as was seen, take account of diversified 
business units. Similarly, it fails to explain why some plants 
are closed and subsidiaries are divested, when others of the same 
age and with the same product-line are retained. Its value Is 
also limited to explaining defensive divestments.
Divestments made during the 1960s tended to be defensive by 
nature,; subsidiaries were divested only If they were loss-makers! 
By 1975, however, divestment was being acknowledged as a crucial 
aspect of corporate stategy and was offensive by nature:
■Such a development is clearly linked to the emergence of 
stronger planning units and to a more explicit strategic 
view of the company's opportunities and resources- however 
underdeveloped this perspective may still be. At minimum, 
it emerges when a surfeit of acquisitions^ a declining major 
line of business, or a new managment team forces a good look 
at the company's overall course of action" [Boddewyn, 1979b, 
p.24].
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Most research on foreign divestment has focussed on cases 
affected in the late 1 96 Os and early 1970s when MNCS had a very 
limited notion of the potential benefits to be gained from a 
successful divestment strategy. These studies found that most 
divestments were defensive, though a significant proportion were 
for strategic reasons.
^rensive, or strategic, divestments are still less common than 
those precipitated by financial or environmental factors, but 
they now constitute an Important manoeuvre in many firms* overall 
corporate strategy [Boddewyn, 1979a,b; Wallender, 1973].
They are undertaken to restructure the enterprise, or to alter a 
firm's portfolio of businessses. A divestment designed to free 
management and obtain capital for more profitable or new 
technological ventures would constitute such a strategy [Van den 
Bulcke, 1979].
With MNCs, such divestments may serve to facilitate global 
rationalization of production and resources. As noted before, 
these disinvestments represent a change in attitude toward the 
function of divestment from one largely associated with 
managerial failure, to an offensive strategy designed to take 
advantage of new opportunities elsewhere in the firm or in new 
product fflcu'kets [Sachdev, 1976].
Caves and Porter [1976] found that, contrary to classical 
economic theory, some subsidiaries which clearly fail in the 
external market place are not divested because management often 
refuses to acknowledge economic logic. This behavioural pattern 
led Caves and Porter [1976] to suggest that "barriers to exit" 
exist, Torneden [1975] and Sachdev [1976] stress that these may 
be more important in a divestment situation than purely economic 
considerations.
Boddewyn [1983] concludes that none of the existent divestment 
theories are sufficient In themselves to fully explain why and 
when foreign divestments occur. A better theory of foreign 
divestment demands the Integration of the three theoretical
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models which have been examined In this chapter. He tentatively 
suggests that a summary statement for a better theory could be 
worded as follows:
■Foreign divestment takes place when a firm no longer finds 
it advantageous to internalize its remaining competitive 
advantages through a particular foreign Investment, and this 
perception is implemented through either new leadership or 
newly internalized routines" [Boddewyn, 1983» p.6].
The next chapter is related to the major issue of this thesis - 
Employee Disclosure and Consultation during the divestment 
process and considers the time, place, and instigator of foreign 
divestment decision making, and the time lag between formulation 
and employee dlsclosre.
70
CHAPTER 4
THE FOREIGN DIVESTMENT DECISION: 
QfPLOTEE and HOST GOVERNMENT REACTION
4.1.: Introduction
Advocates of increased quantitative and improved qualitative 
disclosure of information by MNCs include governments, trades 
unions and employees, investors (including financial analysts), 
bankers and lenders, the general public, accountants and 
auditors.
Employees and their representatives are interested, first and 
foremost, in information relating to the terms, conditions, 
scale, security and location of emplo3nnent [Gray, 1984, p.32-37]. 
Consumption and lifestyle are determined by present and 
anticipated income, so «nployees are particularly anxious when 
uncertainty surrounds the future of their place of work. In order 
to avoid unexpected redundancies. Trades Unions want meaningful 
information, on the performance of individual plants which will 
allow them to evaluate the likelihood of job losses and total 
closure.
According to the BI study [1976],
"closure, when it takes place against a background of high 
unemployment and especially when it involves a foreign 
ocMspany, is a sure fire recipe for confrontation with 
employees and unions, backed as likely as not by pressure 
from the host government and public opinion" [BI, 1976, 
p.85]
This chapter examines the length of the divestment process, and 
highlights the normal pattern of disclosure within the corporate 
hierarchy, and then to employees and the government of the host 
country. Factors determining timing of disclosure are also 
considered for multinationals divesting In foreign countries are 
walking a tightrope; while they are eager to avoid pre-mature 
disclosure which may upset their plans, they have a vested
interest in being seen as acting with social responsibility.
This ambivalence has been particularly acute In the 1980s. Record 
high unemployment has apparently weakened the Trade Union 
movement In Europe, but organised labour Is determined to halt 
the tide of more major closures. At least one US MNC has been 
threatened with a Europe-wide walk-out should any factory close. 
Firms announcing the closure of a plant may find It occupied by 
armed militants.
The chapter concludes by reviewing three cases In which one EEC 
country allegedly poached inward investment and jobs from another 
by offering Illegal financial Incentives. The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate the value placed on foreign direct 
investment by host country governments and its vital 
contribution to job-creation and employment stability. The 
examples may serve as a warning of the wrath incurred by MNCs if 
host country governments suspect that they are believed to be 
tip-toeing out of the country to take advantage of more 
government aid elsewhere.
; The Divestment Proceg3
The length of the divestment process can be defined as the amount 
of time between the President or Chief Executive Officer's first 
consideration of a possible divestment to the moment when the 
divestment is substantially completed.
The BI ^study [1976], Neos [1978], and Torneden [1975] have 
estimated the average length of the divestment process and their 
results are discussed below. A number of specific cases of 
foreign divestment are then reviewed and an attempt made to 
determine the extent to which employees were kept informed.
Establishing the length of the divestment process Is difficult 
because executives were unable to pln-polnt Its beginning. The 
majority of respondents In the BI study [1976] could only give 
vague estimates:
•the thought process whereby executives and managers start
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considering divestment as a real alternative is not well 
understood — as is true of all major decision-making and 
problem-solving" [BI Study, 1976, p.40].
Of the 32 MNCs reviewed in the BI study [1976], 15 estimated the
first stage as taking 11 months. On average, the second stage. 
Implementing the divestment decision took 9 months. Most 
respondents stressed that results worsened and prospects of 
Improvement receded during the two to four years preceding formal 
divestment analysis. As one executive said,
"It takes three to four years before a problem gets big 
enou^ to be recognised as one that requires drastic action. 
The situation gets worse every year, the subsidiary is on 
"the question list', but everybody keeps hoping it will get 
better" [BI Study, 1976, p.4l].
This quote and the one below underline the "barriers to exit". 
Executives clearly see divestment as a last resort:
"We tried to turn that subsidiary around for some three 
years. After that, it still took us two years to decide to 
divest" [BI Study, 1976, p.41].
Torneden [1975] produced roughly similar findings. In his study 
on foreign divestment by US MNCs, on average the first stage of 
the process,- deciding which plant(s), if any, to divest - took 
15 months, while the second stage, - implementing the decision - 
took 10.5 months.
Nees [1978] in an Investigation of 14 specific divestment cases 
found that the divestment process ranged most frequently from 20 
months to several years (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1.: Estimated Duration of Divestment Decision Process 
Cases Studied Estimated Duration
2 1-10 months
3 11-20 months
4 21-30 months
5 over 30 months
Source: Nees [1978, p.90]
The divestment decision-making process is shorter In companies 
With better Information systems that allow speedy detection of
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problems, and/or, possible divestment opportunities, previous 
divestment experience, or different management style or 
organizational culture [BI Study, 1976, p.40].
Time spent on deciding Is commensurate with the potential and 
size of the subsidiary. Therefore the divestment process of a 
foreign subsidiary serving the entire European market would tend 
to be given prolonged consideration while management ascertain 
that there Is no alternative.
The product range too determines the extent of the divestment 
process, since greater stigma Is attached to management which has 
to acknowledge failure In its own field of expertise. Conversely, 
the divestment process Is carried out with more alacrity In a 
peripheral business where management has comparatively little 
experience.
Ihe_Jk)le of Parent and Sabsidiarv Management
The BI study found that a divestment review is usually conducted 
at the behest of the parent compare and unknown to the foreign 
subsidiary:
"Seldom does the foreign subsidiary itself initiate the 
divestment analysis, although it certainly provides some of 
the necessary data (forecasts, market analyses, plans, 
budgets, reports etc.). Typically it is unaware of an 
investigation or decision bearing on its fate - thus lending 
evidence to the criticism that decisions to close down, 
liquidate or lay off workers are "made in Detroit" rather 
than on the spot" [BI, 1976, p.26].
Parent company executives sometimes seek to postpone Informlhg 
managers of the subsidiary affected by the divestment decision, 
especially If they are natives of the host country, until their 
cooperation Is essential ; they fear that their sentiments towards 
the factory and local community outweighs their «npathy for the 
company. The parent company's perception of subsidiary management 
bears on the handling of the divestment process:
"We kept the local managers In the dark because we felt that 
part of our problems in England reflected their lack of 
skills and leadership. Besides they were operating men who 
did not take a strategic view of their business within the
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corporate context" [BI, 1976, p.26].
Local management will usually comply with directives from parent 
company headquarters. Early disclosure of "bad news" Is 
considered a gamble In that It may shift the balance of 
bargaining power In favour of trades unions and governments by
affording them time to orchestrate Industrial action and mount a 
campaign to reverse the original decision. Companies with other 
plants In the same country as the divestment candidate are
particularly anxious that Industrial production may be disrupted 
at all plants by secondary action In support of colleagues. 
Indeed, Ford was warned In 1985 by Trades Unions that If any 
European plant was closed, then It would face a mass walk-out at 
all Its European operations.
A number of respondents In the BI study attached Importance to 
ensuring that negotiations with host country governments are 
conducted by top executives from the parent company, or In other 
words, by the real decision-makers. Personal contacts with
ministers and other key officials should be established, and 
subsidiary mangement should conduct negotiations with labour's 
representatives [BI Study, 1976, p.83].
4.4;: Jmplanentlpg the Piyestment Decision
Host government promises of financial assistance are unlikely to 
dissuade a MNC Intent on closing a loss-making operation. Most 
respondents In the BI study [1976] rejected offers of this nature 
because the proposals did not seem viable, would merely have 
postponed divestment, or would have exacted restrictive 
commitments to maintaining the existing employment level. 
Executives of one MNC divesting from the UK were particularly 
cynical of Intervention by Government Ministers and senior Trades 
Union officials:
"When the lay-offs start, the unions run to complain to the 
government. Then ministers must be seen talking to 
management, to demonstrate that they are concerned and are 
'doing something' about the situation. Actually, the 
government inquiries are just a lot of whitewash to let the 
union leaders off the hook" [BI Study, 1976, p.82-83].
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According to one executive, once a company announces a closure
decision, unions ostensibly oppose the decision, but, to a large
extent they are merely acting out the role which they believe Is 
expected of them:
"Although we worked closely with the union leaders right up 
to the end, they still had to react In public against our 
decision to close down. At one point they staged a protest
march from the factory to the company offices. In order to
dramatise and get national attention for the Industry's 
pll^t. But they consulted us In advance, and we said It was 
alright with us provided It was orderly — which It was" [BI 
Study, 1976, p.85-86].
The BI study [1976] provides a brief, but detailed, account of 
the strategy used by a US MNC closing a European operation. 
First, It sent a high-powered delegation from HQ to Inform local 
management of Its decision. Shocked subsidiary management proved 
cooperative and made no attempt to obstruct the closure. Indeed, 
It contributed to the carefully designed battle-plan which 
allowed for several awkward eventualities (see Insert A).
4^5;; Notifying Bnployeeg
The assumption, that adverse effects of closure will somehow 
become more palatable If advance notice Is given to public 
authorities and employees, underpins national employment 
protection legislation In the EEC and most other Western European 
countries (as shall be seen In the following chapter). But 
multinationals.are not unduly constrained by such legislation and 
this perception has sparked off demands, especially by 
governments and trades unions, for extensions In accountability. 
Various International Inter-governmental bodies, such as the UN^ 
OECD, and EEC, have produced codes and proposals of conduct which 
aim to bring MNCs Into line.
Employers’ plans for specific factories are seldom. If ever. 
Included In company publications. Annual Reports of hOîCs often 
Include segmental reporting by geographic area and by product, 
but often neither Is narrowly defined, and, therefore, 
Information Is of questionable value to shareholders, Investors, 
and stakeholders, Including employees and Trades Unions.
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INSERT A
"They (parent and subsidiary management) all set to work on 
the details (Including mock questlon-and-answer sessions) of 
the announcement of the plants’ closure to workers,
government and unions. The company did not negotiate with 
these groups but simply told them what It was going to do, 
since It felt there was no viable alternative to closure. 
Besides, the company had found the unions very obstructive 
during a prior dispute. The Ministry of Labour was notified 
first, but its objections were firmly resisted, with the 
company explaining the rationale of the closure as well as
its generous fulfilling of all legal obligations.
By presenting the unions and the authorities with a ’fait 
accompli’, this company was clearly risking an adverse 
reaction- particularly as the subsidiary concerned was a 
major and prestigious (if ailing) local company which had 
been acquired by the US firm a few years previously. The 
reaction was not long in coming. The unions, not placated by 
the company’s offer of generous severence pay (based on 
years of service) above that required by law, appealed to 
the government to mount a rescue operation, and militant 
workers occupied the plant. Press coverage was heavy and
hostile, and commentaries by local politicians played on the 
theme of the hard-nosed multinational corporation 
transferring production abroad in pursuit of its own 
economic advantage at the expense of the local economy and 
workers. In the end, the occupying workers were removed 
after several months by court action (involving sizable 
legal costs for the divestor); and the government, acting on 
the advice of independent consultants, tacitly acknowledged 
the company’s rationale by turning down the appeals for it 
to step in with state financing to keep the business going. 
But the company was left with a lasting blot on its image in 
the host country" [BI, 1976, p.84],
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Information on specific plants tends to emanate from local 
management, but, as was seen in an earlier chapter, the 
divestment decision is normally a centralised one, made by a 
handful of parent company executives, and it is not unknown for 
them to withold from subsidiary management details of decisions 
for as long as they consider expedient.
This time lag between parent decision, and disclosure to 
subsidiary management, may be repeated between subsidiary and 
plant management, and again between plant management and 
employees. Most respondents in the BI study [1976] only consulted 
employees after the closure decision had been made. Firms 
divesting sdl its operations in the host country, and with no 
plans to re-invest in the foreseeable future, are more inclined 
to minimise or avoid consulting employees:
"For most c<»panles, the preferred strategy is to "notify" 
unions and employees after the fact; and then to "discuss" 
with them and employee representatives (works councils, 
etc.) how to minimise the impact of layoffs [BI, 1976,
p.85].
US MNCs believed that the mere fulfilling of legal obligations
(proper notice, severance compensation, payments of all business 
liabilities etc.) satisfies the requirements of good corporate 
citizenship, and were particularly likely to present governments, 
unions, employee representatives, and communities with a "fait 
accompli" [BI, 1976, ch. 10; Boddewyn, 1979, p.25].
According to Boddewyn, European MNCs have "a more pronounced sense 
of ’social responsibility’ towards employees and society at
large" than their US counterparts. He argues that this trait
renders them unwilling to discuss past divestments because they 
have guilt feelings about closures and job losses [Boddewyn, 
1979a, p.22-24].
During the time lag between the divestment decision and 
publicising of same, misleading information may be provided by 
plant and even subsidiary management, unaware that a divestment 
decision has already been made.
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As the BI study says:
"It Is well to realise that the local manager, for all his 
impressive legal title - President-Directeur General,
Geschaftsfuhrer, Managing Director, etc. - is often nothing 
more than the equivalent of a plant manager in the home 
country, who is seldom consulted when divestment is being 
considered. Of course, his symbolic value is much greater 
abroad, and this fact can create serious psychological and 
social (external affairs) problems" [Bl, 1976, p.91]
Prior to announcing divestment proposals, MNCs' Public Relations 
Departments along with several others, notably Industrial 
Relations Departments, are busy preparing for the withdrawal by 
developing strategies and battle plans for dealing with the host 
government, the unions, and the press. The aim Is to safeguard
the Image of the company, or as one executive put It, to allow
the multinational to withdraw "looking beautiful and smelling
like a rose" [Bl, 1976, p.87].
Employees, In contrast,
■often have to prepare their Initial defense in a matter of 
hours, with the purpose of preventing closure and saving
jobs" [Grunberg, 1982, p.27].
The two sections below review the two cases, Involving British 
employees, which Grunberg [1982] examines, plus two proposed 
plant closures In France which became International news because 
of workers* violent opposition.
-4.5.1.: Multinationals* Secresz
In 1975, the ÜK Government, and ÜK employees of the US-based 
Chrysler Corporation, learned from press reports of the Company*s 
intention to close Its UK plants. Employee representatives 
prepared their case aboard the train to London where they had 
arranged to meet the Government.
If Implemented, Chrysler*s proposal would have had a grave effect 
not only on the British economy, but could have brought a 
potential political crisis to boiling point. Economically, It 
would have meant the loss of 55,000 jobs at a time of already
79
high unemployment and it would have adversely affected the 
balance of payments. Politically, the closure of the Scottish 
factory at Llnwood, a traditional Labour stronghold, would have 
provided the Scottish Nationalist Party, at the peak of Its 
popularity, with even more support for an Independent Scotland. 
In the October 1974 General Election the SNP had won 11 seats and 
were second to Labour In 35 out of 41 seats.
The Labour Government felt constrained to save Chrysler and so 
committed Itself to supporting the UK subsidiary up to a maximum 
of £162.5m. The Corporation, for Its part, committed Itself to a 
planning agreement specifically designed to Involve Trade Unions 
and Government alike in talks about the UK affiliate's future.
Despite this commitment and the huge Injection of Government aid, 
Chrysler announced In early August 1978 that Its entire European 
car and truck operations would be taken over by Peugeot-Citroen 
Neither the Government nor the workforce was given prior warning 
of the deal. Only three years later. In the face of massive 
losses for the entire Peugeot-Citroen group, the French MNC 
closed Llnwood.
In 1975 the US MNC, Litton Industries divested Its British 
subsidiary, Imperial Typewriters. At 3.30 pm., on January 17» 
1975, it announced that Its two British plants at Hull and 
Leicester would close on February 21, thereby giving the 
statutory notice. Only three days earlier shop stewards had 
asked the Hull management to elaborate on the future of Imperial. 
Management assured them that "there was no cause for panic" 
[Grunberg, 19 82, p.131]. '
The workers at Hull in North East England fought the closure and 
occupied the factory for five months, but at Leicester In the 
Midlands, where the workforce was sharply divided on racial 
grounds, there was little resistance.
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4.5.2.: Extreme fholovee Reaction to the Threat of Divestment
In principle, no one questions management's prerogative In 
liquidating a losing operation. However, a time of world 
recession with high levels of unemployment creates a highly 
charged atmosphere In which a firm finds It difficult to break 
the bad news without damage to Its own public Image. In some 
Instances bad publicity worldwide has even caused firms to 
rescind their original plans. One such case Involved France's 
Peugeot-Citroen.
Peugeot announced In late 1983 that redundancies would be 
forthcoming at Its Talbot plant at Polssy, near Paris. The 
reaction of the multi-racial workforce was extreme, heightening 
racial tension In the country and allowing more extreme political 
parties to gain momentum. One British newspaper dubbed the events 
at the factory as the "Battle for Polssy". Violent clashes had 
broken out between Immigrants (who formed 80 percent of the 
workforce and whose strike action was backed by the pro-Soclallst 
CFDT union) and the white, indigenous workers (who were backed by 
the Communist-led COT union). The conflict was extensively 
covered by television which showed rival factions armed with guns 
and slings, segregated by riot police who had to resort to CS gas 
to disperse the opposing gangs. The Industrial Editor of the 
Sunday Times concluded that;
"(T.V. coverage) was doing incalculable damage to the
Talbot image.Ezpensive efforts have been made to restore the
Talbot reputation.'Yet now we see the cars being used as
barricades in pitched battles', complained one dealer last
week". fSundav Times. January 8, 1984]
Eighteen months later, at least 100 people were Injured, some 
seriously, when clashes broke out between riot police and 
militant members of the pro-Communist CGT union at SKF's Ivry 
factory on the outskirts of Paris. The Swedish MNCs ball bearing 
plant had been at the centre of a dispute from the time that 
employees were Informed In 1983 of the Company's plans to close 
Ivry with the loss of 639 jobs.
In June 1985 riot police were sent In to clear the plant which
had been occupied throughout the previous eighteen months by the 
CGT and the Communists In a bid to avert closure. Violence 
flared, especially when "a commando of CGT militants made a dawn 
raid" on the factory. Ominously, for other firms contemplating 
plant closure, the CGT appears to have the full support of the 
local population [Betts, June 6, 1985].
The Talbot and SKF cases clearly highlight the potential problems 
of plant closures Involving major job losses. It Is not 
surprising, therefore, that concern In Britain and the other EEC- 
countrles Is very real.
Even before these violent eruptions In France, the ex-Prime 
Minister of Belgium, Mr. Leo Tlndemans Issued a plea for more and 
earlier Information disclosure by MNCs:
"National authorities are usually glad to see multinationals 
come, they are not so glad when they go. But it belongs to 
the essence of multinationals that they constantly adjust to 
varying economic conditions, and that, when they set up an 
establishment somewhere, they want to preserve their freedom 
for the future. Disinvestment policies have therefore 
become a theme which the national authorities and the 
multinationals have to examine more closely. Perhaps, we in 
Western Europe should ensure that the urge for security, and 
stability for all, does not degenerate into the excesses of 
a stultifying paralysis. In the host countries, therefore, 
the national authorities will have to show understanding for 
the possibility of disinvestments. But is it asking too 
much that these national authorities be given adequate and 
ample notice of planned divestments, particularly when the 
enterprises concerned have enjoyed substantial government 
aid?" [Van den Buieke, 1979, p.56-57]
The next chapter will examine national cultural profiles and 
plant closure legislation. It will be seen that executives from 
different countries will have different value systems which may 
be reflected in their management systems. The problems identified 
In this chapter are likely to vary depending on the culture of 
the home country of the firm. National plant closure legislation 
will also be reviewed in order to assess whether it conforms to 
national culture. First though, we review some cases which 
illustrate the efforts of national and local governments to 
attract foreign direct investment.
^6.: Foreign M reot laveatment and Divestment: Host Governments' 
Beactlpg
The investment and divestment decisions of MNCs have major 
economic, social, and political implications for home and host 
country alike. In a time of recession and high unemployment, 
investment (and the jobs it creates) is a prize eagerly sought 
out by national and local governments. Evidence of this can be 
seen in their attempts to outbid each other in financial 
inducements to potential investors.
For example, when, in 1985, General Motors chose Tennessee for 
its "Saturn Project" it could have had any one of 1,000 sites 
throughout the country, inundated as it was by State Governors 
anxious to attract business which would create 6,000 jobs [Hall, 
1985].
Just as General Motors was beseiged, so too was Nissan when it 
disclosed in January 1981 plans to construct a £300m 
manufacturing facility in the UK. No less than 40 councils 
submitted bids for the factory. After three years of 
deliberation, and stern opposition to the project by Nissan union 
president, Ichiro Shioji, Japan's second largest automobile 
manufacturer eventually chose Washington, Tyne-and-Wear, in the 
North East of England. Smaller than originally envisaged, the 
£50m car assembley plant will provide 500 jobs in an area which 
lost a third of its manufacturing jobs within a period of four
years [Gooding, 1984; Hetherington, 1984; McLoughlin, 1984 ; Smith
1984; Vi lies, 1984].
In Europe competition for inward investment is intense between 
nations. Governments and unions are disturbed by the willingness 
of some firms to transfer production abroad simply because more 
financial assistance is available. Whilst resort to violence is
rare, workers are no longer satisfied with just being told that
their plant is unprofitable. They want to know why it is 
unprofitable and what could be done to remedy the situation. They 
want to employ outside consultants to check the firm's figures
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and investment plans. Armed with the support of the community, 
they appeal to the host government to put pressure on the firm 
and on the government of the home country. In recent years, a 
number of notorious examples have surfaced of companies being 
"poached" from one EEC country to another by allegedly illegal 
financial inducements. Below we review three cases involving 
Hyster, Allied Corporation, and Timex.
Hvster
Hyster's 1983 rationalisation strategy involved cutting 
production and numbers employed at its Dutch plant, selling its 
Belgian components operation, and concentrating volume production 
of fork-lift trucks at Irvine whose workforce in 1978 had voted 
overwhelmingly against unionisation [Meredith, 1983]. The 
decision to launch a £40m investment programme at its Scottish 
factory was reached only after 491 of the plant's 502 employees 
agreed to accept a 9.8$ cut in basic pay. Company President, 
James Kilkenny, had earlier warned that unless the workforce 
accepted the loss of earnings and fringe benefits, then the 
investment would go elsewhere:
•We have had other offers from other countries and we will 
have to look at that alternative* [quoted in Hetherington, 
1983].
Qiairman of the workers' consultative committee, Mr. George 
Campbell, accused Hyster of blackmail:
■The workforce are convinced that they have had to buy their 
jobs from their American masters with no tangible 
guarantees* [quoted in McCallum, 1983]. ,
On the Continent suspicions arose that the Government had 
contravened EEC regulations by offering to subsidise the proposed 
investment in Scotland to the tune of £12m. State aid to industry 
must first be approved by the European Commission, and Mr. Frans 
Andriessen, the EEC Competition Commissioner, and himself a 
Dutchman, telexed the British Government demanding details of the 
aid package.
Meanwhile, Unions at the Dutch plant (in Nijmegen) reported
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Hyster to the Commercial Section of the Amsterdam Court of 
Justice which is "empowered to reverse a management decision 
involving a substantial reorganisation, where the Court upholds a 
union claim that the decision is unreasonable". In order to 
prevent Hyster transferring production before the Court ruling, 
an interim injunction effective for three months was issued on
July 14, 19 83.
In November 1983» Dutch unions reached "an amicable settlement"
with the company. The former agreed to accept a number of
dismissals if Hyster could prove that the redundancies were due 
to collapse in world demand and were not a consequence of
strategic restructuring. In exchange, the Portland, Oregan, based 
fork-lift manufacturer agreed to delay for two or three years 
the transfer of production from Nijmegen [Watson, 1984].
Finally, on January 23, 1984, the European Commission endorsed
the UK Government's £20m aid package.
4l.6.2.: Allied Corporation
Ironically, news of Hyster's proposals coincided with two US
MNCs, Timex, and Allied Corporation, allegedly transferring 
production from the UK when other governments offered more 
attractive inducements. These two cases, which are examined in an 
internal Department of Employment document entitled "Two Recent 
Examples of 'Bad Practice' by Multinationals", are reviewed later 
in this chapter.
On the very day that the European Commission began investigating 
the Hyster case. Prime Minister Thatcher initiated investigation 
of the Allied Corporation case, following exhortations by Mr. 
Charles Irving, Conservative MP for Cheltenham [Johnson, 1983a].
On February 3, 1983, Allied Corporation announced the closure of
its its two apparently flourishing Linotype-Paul typewriter 
plants in Cheltenham with the loss of 500 jobs. Employees 
discovered that the Company was transferring production to its 
Frankfurt plant, where corresponding vacancies were being
created. The rationale underlying the Company's decision was 
obscure and lack of communication and consultation with 
employees, lead the UK Government to suspect that the German 
Government had poached the jobs by offering illegal inducements.
Opposition to the decision soon surfaced, and Mr. Signorovitch, 
Allied's Director of Public Affairs, admitted that news of the
divestment decision had been withheld from local management 
[The Echo. February 19, 1983]. Two Directors resigned in protest 
at the decision, one being Mr. Klaus Schloessingk-Paul, Chairman 
and founder of the original firm of K.S. Paul in London in the 
mid-1950s [Johnson, 1983b].
The Secretary of State for Industry, then Mr. Patrick Jenkin,
wrote to the Company "re-emphasising the Government's concern
about their decision and about the lack of prior consultation 
with the workforce" [internal Department of Employment document 
entitled "Two Recent Examples of 'Bad Practice' by
Multinationals"].
1.6,3,; Tlmgy
The second case of "Bad Practice" involved Timex, one of the 
largest private companies in the West, owned by Mr. Fred Olsen, 
a Norwegian recluse, who has a reputation for obsessive secrecy. 
According to his compatriot, journalist Aif Jacobson,
"He wants to keep his dynasty Intact and his businesses away 
trom the public eye. Ho-one really appears to know what he 
plans until It Is too late to object to them - even If one 
could" [Jacobson quoted by Balfour, 1983].
According to a report in The Sundav Times, the Nordic tycoon is 
ruthless in his pursuit of profit, with no consideration for 
national interests:
"A born dealer, Olsen Is always prepared to switch countries 
and trade assets In order to gain favourable tax treatment 
plus government aid" [Gilbert, 1983].
On January 10, 1983, Timex, announced that 1,900 redundancies
were necessary at its Milton plant (in Dundee Scotland) which had
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a 4,200 strong labour force. The loss of 500 jobs was directly 
attributable to the Company's failure to retain the contract for 
the Nimslo International 3-D camera. Estimates of Olsen's stake 
in Nimslo vary from 35$-50$, and the contract went to Fralsen, a 
French firm, wholly-owned by the Norwegian [Balfour, 1983; 
Gilbert, 1983].
The other 1,400 redundancies were due to the decision by Timex, 
the largest watch company in the world, to cease mechanical-watch 
production at Dundee, and instead increase output of quartz 
watches at its Besancon plant in France. The aid package offered 
by the French Government Included £12m in grants and £43m in 
loans. The grants were quite legal but the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department wanted confirmation that the loans conformed 
with EEC rules [Dowle, 1983].
The EEC and Mrs. Thatcher demanded an investigation. The European 
Commission's suspicions had been reinforced by France's apparent 
failure to seek Brussel's approval of the aid package as is 
required by Community law. [Merrit, 1983] On February 7, 1983» 
the Commission initiated its inquiries and put a freeze on the 
French subsidies until the investigation was concluded.
The Prime Minister in a letter to Mr. Gavin Laird, General 
Secretary of the AUEW, noted that although Timex had assured the 
Government that no production was being transferred to France, 
"there is cleahly a great deal of public concern about this 
question" [The Scotsman. March 2, 1983].
On March 29, 1983, local union officials leading the occupation' 
of the Dundee plant released confidential Company documents which 
proved, they claimed, that production had been transferred to 
Besancon. They accused Mr. Olsen of duplicity and 
misrepresentation to mislead the Government [Glasgow Herald. 
March 30, 1983].
By April 5, Timex still had 200 employees in excess of its 
target, a 1,900 reduction in workforce. The majority had left 
voluntarily, but on April 7, the Company issued 197 compulsory
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redundancy notices. This action provoked an immediate response 
from Union officials at the plant and the following day more than 
100 workers accepted their shop steward's recommendation to 
occupy Mil ton in a bid to avert compulsory job losses. On April 
18, 400 workers returning from annual leave reported for sit-in 
duties [Glasgow Herald, April 18, 1983; Millar, April 8,1983].
On May 6, Milton plant management lodged a petition in 
Edinburgh's High Court "to suspend the unlawful trespass and to 
interdict those engaged in the sit-in from remaining on or 
entering unlawfully the company's property" [The Times, May 7, 
1983]. Letters of dismissal for breach of contract we re sent to 
200 of those participating in the sit-in, the other 200 having 
already been made redundant. Another 100 redundancy notices were 
issued to employees even though they had indicated they did not 
support the union's action. Undeterred, union leaders said the 
occupation would continue until compulsory redundancies were 
withdrawn [Glasgow Herald. May 6, 1983; Millar, May 7, 1983].
On May 18, 1983, the six-week sit-in ended with Timex withdrawing 
the threat of compulsory redundancies, but by this stage these 
were largely unneccesary, 1,775 volunteers had already parted 
from the Company. The case brought by Timex to the Court of 
Sessions was adjourned and eventually abandoned.
These three cases involving the governments of Britain, France, 
West Germany, and the Netherlands, all partners in the EEC, 
underscore not just the value attached to foreign investment and 
the underhand methods employed to attract it, but also 
governments' blatant self-interest regardless of the consequences 
to other countries.
Self-interest of this kind is not peculiar to international 
competition. Even within the same country, levels of subsidy on 
capital investment and job-creation vary. Regional development 
agencies and local politicians are not slow to highlight these 
differences if it will help their cause.
Governments have even violated the fair competition terms of the
Treaty of Rome (i.e. Article 93) in their efforts attract inward 
investment. During 1981-82 the European Commission conducted I90 
official investigations into dubious aid packages and ruled 
against EEC governments in 27 cases. During the whole of the 
previos decade, the Commission had examined a similar number of 
cases, and declared 21 incentive packages illegal. These 
contrasting figures bear testimony to the EECs recent clampdown 
on unscrupulous governments. The Dutch and Belgian governments 
were each found guilty of offering illegal incentives to fourteen 
major MNCs. The Commission ordered the governments to withdraw 
these offers, and directed the MNCs to return in full illegal 
payments. The companies involved included Exxon, Shell, Philips, 
ICI, and Polaroid [Merritt, 1985, P.7]«
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Some crucial points have emerged on the divestment decision and 
its implementation. First of all, a divestment review is usually 
conducted at the behest of the parent company and unknown to the 
foreign subsidiary. Secondly, parent company executives sometimes 
seek to postpone informing managers of the subsidiary affected by 
the divestment decision, especially if they are natives of the 
host country.
Thirdly, establishing the length of the divestment process is 
difficult because executives were unable to pin-point the start 
of the process but one investigation of 14 specific divestment 
cases found that the process ranged most frequently from 20 
months to several years. Another investigation found that on 
average 20.5 months is the length of the divestment process for 
US MNCs
The fact that the divestment decision is centralised and 
enshrouded in secrecy, sometimes results in the parent witholding 
from subsidiary management, details of decisions for as long as 
they consider expedient. This time lag is repeated down the line 
until the decision reaches employees. MNCs withdrawing 
completely from a host country are likely to disregard employee 
disclosure and consultation.
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According to Boddewyn US and European MNCs have different ideas 
of what constitutes good behavior. US MNCs believe that the mere 
fulfilling of legal obligations satisfies the requirements of 
good corporate citizenship. European MNCs, on the other hand, 
were said to have a more pronounced sense of ’social 
responsibility* towards employees and society.
This theme, the impact of home country culture on corporate 
divestment, is explored in the next chapter which examines 
national cultural characteristics. National profiles have been 
constructed which indicate whether or not national culture 
encourages or minimises employee disclosure and consultation.
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PART II
CHAPTER 5
HOME COUNTRY CULTURE and COLLECTIVE DISMISSALS LEGISLATION
5.1.: Introduction
This chapter begins by presenting profiles of national cultures, 
as compiled by Hofstede [1983, 1985]. His work and that of Gray
[1985] allow us to identify those countries whose culture 
encourages employee disclosure and consultation, and those whose 
culture prohibits revelation. This suggests "conditioning" and 
the behaviour of firms reflects home country culture, even when 
those firms operate outwith their domestic environment.
Numerous definitions of culture abound, but according to 
Hofstede, the essence of culture is that it is collective mental 
programming:
•It is that part of cor oonditloning that we share with 
other members of oar nation, region, or group, but not with 
members of other nations, regions, or groiq>s" [Hofstede, 
1983].
As Hofstede says, national differences are determined by culture 
which itself is resistant to change because it has become,
•crystallised in national institutions such as: government,
legal systems, industrial relations systems, family 
structures, religious organisations, sports clubs, 
settlement patterns, literature, architecture, and even 
scientific theories" [Hofstede, 1983, p.76].
Thus, if national legislation reflects national culture it j^s 
logical to expect foreign firms divesting from the UK to be 
influenced by the legal framework with which they are most 
familiar, that of their home country.
5.2.: National Culture
Hofstede [1980, 1983, 1984] has carried out extensive research on 
international differences in work-related values in the context 
of a MNC. This may provide insights into employee disclosure and 
consultation by MNCs from different home countries.
Q 1
Having conducted a questionnaire on employee attitudes in 50 
countries, Hofstede [1983] had sufficient data from 40 to allow 
systematic analysis. Thus, he was able to identify four value 
dimensions. These are examined by Gray [1985] who provides brief 
definitions of each:
"1. Power distance — which is the extent to which people in 
a society accept the unequal distribution of power in 
institutions and organisations.
2. Uncertainty avoidance - which is the degree to which 
people in a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and 
ambiguity, leading them to prefer beliefs which promise 
certainty and to support institutions defending conformity.
3* Individualism - fdiich is a preference for a loosely knit 
social framework idiere individuals tend to be responsible 
only for themselves, (xmpared to collectivism which is a 
preference for a ti^tly knit social framework where 
individuals are part of a larger family of relatives, or 
clan, or other group, «dio look after them in ex<diange for 
unquestioning loyalty.
4. Masculinity - whidi is a preference for achievment, 
assertiveness and material success, compared to femininity 
which is a preference for caring relationships, the quality 
of life and sympathy for the unfortunate* [Gray, 1985, p.8].
5.2.1. Large or Small Power Distance
The basic issue probed in this dimension is how societies respond 
to mental and physical inequality. Some societies create 
inequality in power and wealth by offering high rewards to the 
talented; in others, physical and mental attributes are not a 
source of inequality but inequality is enshrined by hereditary 
rights; while in others, efforts are made to iron out 
inequalities in power and wealth. [Hofstede, 1983, P-81]
92
Table 5.1: Value of four indices for fifty countries (with rank numbers)
Country
Power Uncertainty Individualism Masculinity
Distance Avoidance
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Argentina 49 lb-19 86 36-41 46 28-29 56 30-31
Australia 36 13 51 17 90 49 61 35
Austria 11 1 70 26-27 55 33 79 49
Belgium 65 33 94 45-46 75 43 54 29
Brazil 69 39 76 29-30 38 25 49 25
Canada 39 15 48 12-13 80 46-47 52 28
Chile 63 29-30 86 36-41 23 15 28 8
Columbia 67 36 80 31 13 5 64 39-40
Costa Rica 35 10-12 86 36-41 15 8 21 5- 6
Denmark 18 3 23 3 74 42 16 4
Equador 78 43-44 67 24 8 2 63 37-38
Finland 33 8 59 20-21 63 34 26 7
France 68 37-38 86 36-41 71 40-41 43 17-18
Germany 35 10-12 65 23 67 36 66 41-42
G. Britain 35 10-12 35 6- 7 89 48 66 41-42
Greece 60 26-27 112 50 35 22 57 32-33
Guatemala 95 48-49 101 48 6 1 37 11
Hong Kong 68 37-38 29 4- 5 25 16 57 32-33
Indonesia 78 43-44 48 12-13 14 6- 7 46 22
India 77 42 40 9 48 30 56 30-31
Iran 58 24-25 59 20-21 41 27 43 17-18
Ireland 28 5 35 6- 7 70 39 68 43-44
Israel 13 2 81 32 54 32 47 23
Italy 50 20 75 28 76 44 70 46-47
Jamaica 45 17 13 2 39 26 68 43-44
Japan 54 21 92 44 46 28-29 95 50
Korea S. 60 26-27 85 34-35 18 11 39 13
Malaysia 104 50 36 8 26 17 50 26-27
Mexico 81 45-46 82 33 30 20 69 45
Netherlands 38 14 53 18 80 46-47 14 3
Norway 31 6- 7 50 16 69 38 8 2
New Zealand 22 4 49 14-15 79 45 58 34
Pakistan 55 22 70 26-27 14 6- 7 50 26-27
Panama 95 48-49 86 36-41 11 3 44 19
Peru 64 31-32 87 42 16 9 42 15-16
Phillipines 94 47 44 10 32 21 64 39-40
Portugal 63 29-30 104 49 27 18-19 31 9
S, Africa 49 18-19 49 14-15 65 35 63 37-38
Salvador 66 34-35 94 45-46 19 12 40 , i;^
Singapore 74 40 8 1 20 13-14 48 24
Spain 57 23 86 36-41 51 31 42 15-16
Sweden 31 6- 7 29 4- 5 71 40-41 5 1
Switzerland 34 9 58 19 68 37 70 46-47
Taiwan 58 24-25 69 25 17 10 45 20-21
Thailand 64 31-32 64 22 20 13-14 34 10
Turkey 66 34-35 85 34-35 37 24 45 20-21
Uruguay 61 28 100 47 36 23 38 12
USA 40 16 46 11 91 50 62 36
Venezuela 81 45-46 76 29-30 12 4 73 48
Yugoslavia 76 
Source; Hofstede
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[1983b]
88 43 27 18-19 21 5- 6
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Inequality exists in all societies, to a greater extent in some 
than in others. Among EEC countries, France (68) heads the list 
of Large Power Distance countries, followed by Belgium (65), 
Greece (60), and Italy (50). Small Power Distance countries tend 
to be the Anglo, Germanic, and Nordic countries. Austria (11) 
and Israel (13) Denmark (18) were found to have the least 
inequality. Germany and the UK (35) tied in terms of inequality. 
The, Netherlands (38), Canada (39), and the US (40) were found to 
tolerate greater inequality.
In organisations, the Power Distance score reflects the degree of 
centralisation of authority and the degree of autocratic 
ownership. [Hofstede, 1983, p.81] Table 1 below, therefore, 
suggests greater centralisation in MNCs whose home base is in 
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, than in those based in Sweden, 
Switzerland, Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Canada and the US.
5^2.2. Strong or Weak Uncertainty Avoidance
This dimension focusses on how societies react to the uncertainty 
of the future. Some socialise their people into calm acceptance 
of this uncertainty - "que sera sera". Citizens of these Weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance societies are less industrious and are 
averse to taking risks, but, are more tolerant of deviant 
behaviour and views than countries of Strong Uncertainty 
Avoidance which programme their people to conquer the future. 
These people exhibit higher anxiety, manifest in nervousness and 
aggressipn. Weak Uncertainty Avoidance countries include, Canada, 
the Netherlands, the UK and US. Strong Uncertainty Avoidanpe 
countries include France, Germany and Switzerland.
^2.3. Individualism vs Collectivism
Countries characterised by Individualism are more likely to 
provide information since external influences bear on them more 
strongly than on collectivist societies where family loyalties 
are paramount. Hofstede found a positive relationship between a 
country’s Individualism and its wealth. Affluent developed
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nations are Individualist and poor under-developed countries are 
Collectivist, From his sample of fifty countries, the US ranked 
as the most Individual, followed by Australia, the UK, and in 
Joint fourth came Canada and the Netherlands, France and Germany 
ranked ninth and fourteenth respectively (see Table 1).
Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama were very Collectivist, and 
Greece, with a score of only 35 on the Individualism scale, is 
the only Collectivist country in the EEC. The result of this 
value dimension suggests that EEC countries - apart from Greece - 
should be amenable to disclosure.
5.2.4. Masculine vs Feminine
According to Hofstede [1983], Masculine societies attach great 
importance to making money, whereas in Feminine societies human 
relationships are accorded priority; - the strong take care of 
the weak, and the environment is treasured with other factors 
which improve the quality of life.
Hofstede*s results point to Japan as the most Masculine country, 
with Germany, Switzerland and the UK among the top ten, while the 
US ranked fourteenth. The four most Faninine countries are 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.
Having compiled indices on each of the above dimensions, Hofstede 
was able to identify clusters of countries which may be termed 
culture areas. Eight culture eu'eas were identified - More 
Developed Latin, Less Developed Latin, More Developed Asian, Less 
Developed Asian, Near Eastern, Germanic, Anglo, and Nordic. Table 
2 reveals the membership of each. '
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Table 5.2: Culture Areas
More Less More Less
Developed Developed Developed Developed
Latin Latin Asian Asian
Belgium Colombia Japan Indonesia
France Mexico Taiwan
Argentina Venezuela Thailand
Brazil Costa Rica Hong Kong
Spain
Italy
Chile
Guatemala
Panama
Peru
Portugal
El Salvador
Uruguay
Singapore
Hear Eastern Germanic Anglo Nordic
Arab countries Austria Australia Denmark
Greece Israel Canada Finland
Iran — UK Netherlands
Turkey Germany Ireland Norway
Yugoslavia Switzerland New Zealand 
USA
South Africa
Sweden
Source: Gray [1985, p.27]
Gray considers the relationship between Hofstede*s value 
dimensions and accounting values. He suggests that there are **at 
least four significant accounting value dimensions which impact 
on financial reporting ,.**. These values are professionalism, 
uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy [Gray, 1985, p.11].
Our concern is with secrecy, which may be defined as,
"where there is support for confidentiality and ihe
restriction of infonaatlon about the business only to those 
who are closely Involved with its management and financing"
[Gray, 1985, p.12].
^3.; Culture and Secrecy
The Secrecy value dimension appears to have a strong positive
relationship with uncertainty avoidance, given the desire to
eschew conflict and competition and to maintain security. France, 
and Germany to a lesser extent, are Strong Uncertainty Avoidance
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countries.
The Secrecy value is moderately supported by the Power Distance 
relationship in that in hierarchical societies, outsiders arouse 
anxiety and are not to be trusted with information about the 
business, and by the Masculinity dimension as the machismo ideal 
may espouse confidentiality, unlike the feminine line which may 
encourage information disclosure, at least on social issues. 
Countries whose culture is characterised by Collectivism, Large 
Power Distance, Strong Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity 
accept inequality, hold material success in high esteem, and 
loathe uncertainty, are least likely to produce managers willing 
to disclose information to employees and others.
Conversely countries characterised by Individualism, Small Power 
Distance, Weak Uncertainty Avoidance, and Femininity should 
generate firms and management which are "open", and willing to 
provide interested parties with details on the enterprise.
The case studies presented in this thesis will examine foreign 
divestment in the UK by Canadian, Dutch, French, German, and US 
MNCs. Only the Netherlands possesses all four charactistics 
conducive to disclosure, namely Individualism, Small Power
Distance, Weak Uncertainty Avoidance, and Femininity. Canada 
could almost be described as possessing 3.5 features, given its 
borderline score of 52 on the Masculine-Feminine dimension. "Hie 
US and UK are considered Masculine countries, (Britain being the 
more Masculine), and thus they possess only three of the four 
features associated with "openness". France and Germany bear only 
two features. The former is a High Power Distance and High 
Uncertainty Avoidance country, while the latter is High
Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculine. Both countries are thus 
characterised by the feature most closely associated with 
secrecy, namely. High Uncertainty Avoidance.
National culture is not only reflected, but is moulded by a
country’s legislation. It seems reasonable, therefore, to expect 
an examination of redundancy and employee disclosure legislation 
to reinforce the above findings. The Netherlands, followed by
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Canada are most likely to impose the most onerous obligations on 
firms, then the US and UK, with France and Germany least likely 
to have employee information disclosure legislation.
Cultural influences should be reflected in these countries’ 
stance on the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
in their response to the "Vredeling Proposals". Culture should, 
according to Hofstede and Gray, be reflected in managerial style. 
One would therefore expect MNCs from Holland to be most 
forthright, Just pipping management of Canadian MNCs, followed by 
US counterparts. Executives of French and German MNCs would be 
expected to withhold information.
5.4.; Convergence or Divergence?
Hofstede’s views on the stubbornness of national cultures are not 
universally accepted. Indeed, the assumption underlying the 
marketing strategies created for major clients by the world’s 
leading advertising agencies is that the needs and desires of 
people throughout the world are converging. The advertisement 
hoardings above Time Square, at Picadilly, or in downtown Tokyo 
are emblazoned with brand names which are recognised the world 
over.
Hardly surprising then that "Global Marketing" is a concept 
currently in vogue in international business. Advertising 
agencies confidently proclaim that the same products should be 
sold in the same way everywhere. The phenomenal success of Coca- 
Cola, Levi’s, and McDonalds in global marketing strategy, has 
long been the envy of other MNCs. However, the "world car" 
concept declined in popularity following unsuccessful attempts by 
Ford and Cavalier to produce a model popular on both sides of the 
Atlantic.
Nonetheless, since 1963 global marketing has attracted the 
attention of academics and feature writers. Indeed its current 
popularity owes much to the US marketing guru, Theodore Levitt of 
Harvard, whose book, "The Marketing Imagination", carried this 
message to MNCs:
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"A powerful force drives the world toward a converging 
comnonaility, and that force is technology. It has 
proletarianlsed communication, transport and travel. ... The 
result Is a new commercial reality - the emergence of global 
markets for standardised consumer products on a previously 
unimagined scale of magnitude. ...Gone are accustcwned 
differences in national or regional preference. ...The 
globalisation of markets is at hand. With that, the 
multinational commercial world nears its end, and so does 
the multinational corporation.
The multinational and the global corporation are not the 
same thing. The multinational corporation operates in a 
number of countries, and adjusts its products and practises 
in each - at high relative costs. The global corporation 
operates with resolute consistency - at low relative costs - 
as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a 
single entity; it sells the same things in the same way 
everywhere.
The world's needs and desires have been irrevocably 
homogenised. This makes the multinational corporation 
obsolete and the global corporation absolute. ...Different 
cultural preferences, national tastes and standards, and 
business institutions are vestiges of the past" [Levitt, 
1983, p.92-93]
An opposing school of thought is led by Philip Kotler, who is 
vociferous in his condemnation of Levitt’s hypothesis. He 
believes companies would be foolish not to cater for specific 
markets and take account of important national/regional 
differences. He stresses that advertising has to be tailored to 
the local culture. Indeed, cultural differences remain the 
biggest hindrance to global marketing [Fisher, 1985, p.63].
Levitt’s Harvard colleague, Michael Porter issues the caveat, 
however, that, "Ignoring country differences can be suicidal to 
international companies", but failing to identify or create 
common worldwide demand for a standardised product "can be 
equally devastating". MNCs would do better to concentrate more on 
similarities and less on idiosyncracies [Lorenz, July 16, 1984].
Kotler’s and Porter’s argument reinforces the conclusions of 
Hofstede that culture programmes are almost ingrained in the 
individual and can be changed only by isolating the Individual 
from his or her culture. This realisation has compelled 
organizational scientists to reconsider one of the basic tenets
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which underlay managerial theory in the 1950s and 1960s 
[Hofstede, 1983, p.76],
During this period it was widely held, at least in Europe and the 
US, that management was something universal. Principles of sound 
management existed which were to be applied regardless of product 
or national environment. Consequently, executives successful and 
expert in one product-range were expected to match previous 
performance when transferred to another in which they had little 
or no experience. Small wonder so many diversification policies 
foundered. Secondly, deviation from these principles was not 
tolerated. National or local management had to abandon practices 
which it had evolved, and rigidly adhere to the imposed doctrine. 
Universal application of a single managerial style and practise 
was expected to have profound effects on society by eroding 
national differnces and culture;
•In the future, the universality of sound management 
practises would lead to societies becoming more and more 
alike" [Hofstede, 1983, p.75].
This philosophy, which dominated the 1950s and 1960s, is-known as 
the "convergence hypothesis". By the 1970s, it was no longer 
tenable as it became clear that there was an eil ter native set of 
management principles adhered to by numerous Japanese firms which 
had put paid to Western domination of key industries. Japan, only 
a century earlier a feudal country, had become capitalism’s star 
performer. Its unique national culture had fostered a people, 
apparently highly compatible with modern industrial production 
methods, - and whose value system was conducive to economic 
progress. In Western boardrooms, agnostic executives realised 
that their previous faith had been neither one, nor true, nor 
catholic. The key to solving their problems lay in the east, in 
Japan where an obvious relationship existed between management 
and national culture.
This perception spawned a wave of bestselling books on management 
which prescribed "Japanese" cures for America’s malaise - for 
example, "The Art of Japanese Management" by Pascale and Athos 
[1981] and "Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese
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Challenge" by Ouchi [1981].
According to Hofstede,
"It slowly became clear that national and even regional 
cultures do matter for management. The national and regional 
differences are not disappearing; they are here to stay. In 
fact, these differences may become one of the most crucial 
problems for management - in particular for the management 
of multinational, multicultural organisations, whether 
public or private" [Hofstede, 1983, p.75].
Industrial relations practises vary from one country or culture 
to another. Multinationals are renowned for introducing host 
countries to home country customs. American employee incentive 
and assessment schemes, plus negotiation procedures have been 
transferred to host nations especially since 1945 when US FDI 
grew dramatically. In more recent times, Japanese firms have 
overcome their caution, and established manufacturing operations 
overseas. Companies such as Hitachi, NEC, Nissan, and Sony, have 
introduced British workers to Japanese industrial relations. 
Initial results suggest that either the two radically different 
labour traditions can fuse successfully, or, alternatively, these 
firms have been able to superimpose their work ethic on British 
employees. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to deny that a clash 
of cultures has been known to occur. In the past few months, the 
Japanese firm, Hitachi has asked its British workers to volunteer 
for redundancy if they are over 35 years of age, and employees of 
Tatung, a Taiwanese computer company, have been banned from 
laughing at work.
The British experience clearly indicates that home country 
culture is reflected in the management style of foreign 
subsidiaries. This thesis seeks to assess its impact on the 
divestment process. This will be achieved by evaluating conduct 
against Hofstede’s model, but according to Hofstede [1983], 
national culture is reflected in national legislation, and so we 
examine whether mass dismissals legislation is consistent with 
dominant national cultural values.
101
5.5.: Plant Closure Legislation and Culture
Hofstede’s Strong or Weak Uncertainty Avoidance dimension of 
national culture measures a people’s view of uncertainty and the 
future. Members or a Weak Uncertainty Avoidance society "have a 
natural tendency to feel relatively secure". In contrast, the 
population of some countries are manifestly anxious because "the 
future remains essentially unpredictable" [Hofstede, 1983, p.81]. 
These Strong Uncertainty Avoidance countries which strive to 
create security have three instruments at their disposal:
technology; religion/or ideology; and, law. Technology is used to 
protect society from "Acts of God" and war. Marx’s observation of 
religion’s function is well known. Hofstede, like Marx, believes 
religion "helps us to accept the uncertainty of today because we 
interpret experiences in terms of something bigger and more 
powerful that transcends personal reality". Society’s pass laws 
to outlaw deviant and unacceptable behaviour as a shield against 
unpredictable behaviour. Where the Courts cannot offer this 
service, committees of experts serve as a substitute because 
their knowledge is accepted, and so too are their findings, thus 
reducing uncertainty [Hofstede, 1983, p.83].
Chapters 9-13 comprise case studies of MNCs from five countries 
Canada, and the US, and from Continental Europe, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. Hofstede [1983] 
marked these countries and from this small sample Britain’s score 
(36) indicates that it is more Weak Uncertainty Avoidance, than 
the US (46) in second place, then Canada (48), and the
Netherlands (53). Germany with a score of 65 is a high
Uncertainty Avoidance society, but much less so than France with
(86).
The figures for Uncertainty Avoidance suggest that France, and 
then Germany are most likely to have tough redundancy laws, while 
the two North American countries and the Netherlands should have 
fsirly similar employment protection policy. The Netherlands, 
however, scored as a Feminine country and as such is expected to 
show special concern for social welfare and discriminate in 
favour or the underdog. This trait may outweigh the weak
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Uncertainty characteristic, and thus the Netherlands may have 
legislation similar to French and German legislations even if the 
root motive for it differs.
The UK is least likely to have stringent dismissal regulations. 
Before analysing national redundancy law in these countries a 
brief synopsis of the benefits to employees and costs to 
companies of disclosure are considered.
Giving advance notice can confer significant benefits on those 
effected. Workers are offered time to brace themselves 
psychologically and financially for the readjustment which 
closure demands. They can seek alternative employment and are at 
an advantage over applicants who are unemployed for research 
confirms the common belief that firms prefer to recruit people 
already in employment. They can also obtain references and 
counselling from the divesting company during the advance notice 
period [Carroll, 1984, p.133].
Advance notice has its drawbacks however for the firm. It may
weaken the confidence of financial institutions and customers, 
thus precipitating a spiral decline in production, and it may
have an adverse effect on employees* motivation. According to 
Carroll,
"Employee morale, pride in work, and productivity declines 
can be expected. Absenteeism may increase as workers begin 
to seek other employment. In addition, there is the
likelihood of vandalism, pilfrage and neglect of property as 
employees lose interest" [Carroll, 1984, p.134].
Ironically, providing advance notice can have precisely the 
opposite effect! One executive interviewed by the author
attributed closure partly to the indolence of the labour force 
and very poor labour relations, but as soon as news of the
divestment decision was disclosed the plant became a hive of 
activity and labour could not have been more co-operative.
The following sections examine how much advance notice, if any, 
employers must give employees about to be made redundant by plant 
closure. But before doing so, it may be worthwhile considering
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Milton Friedman's view of "corporate responsibility":
There is one and only one social responsibility of business 
- to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition, without deception or fraud... Few trends could 
so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free 
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social 
responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
stakeholders as possible" [Friedman cited in Rivlan, 1983, 
p.153].
5.5.1.: United States
Bluestone and Harrison [1982], authors of "The 
Deindustrialisation of America", conclude that during the 1970s, 
32 to 38 million jobs were lost due to plant and business 
closings. Divesting firms are being confronted with increasingly 
hostile reaction from affected communities:
"union, employee and community anger .. is reaching 
unprecedented heights". [Carroll, 1984]
Nonetheless, among developed industrialised nations of the West, 
the US is unique in that employers serving redundancy notices 
have no legal obligation either to compensate, or consult with 
employees. Most American employees have contracts permitting a 
single week's notice [The Economist. April 17, 1976, p.85]. There 
is no national (ie. Federal) legislation requiring advance notice 
or severance pay:
•American corporations ... continue to have, by European 
standards, an extraordinary freedom to lay off workers when 
orders shrink" [The Economist. April 14, 1979, p.80].
The first major effort to introduce plant closure legislation was 
undertaken in 1976 by Representative William D. Ford and co­
sponsor Senator Walter Mondale, defeated Democratic candidate in 
the 1984 Presidential election. The National Employment 
Priorities Act of 1974, HR 13541, "made little progress in 
Congress but subsequently plant closure bills have been regularly 
introduced in Congress and various state legislatures" [Sweet in 
Cross, 1985, p.21].
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Ford's pioneering work succeeded in placing employment protection 
legislation on the political agenda and in 1983 he introduced a 
revised bill, National Employment Priorities Act (NEPA), HR 2847, 
which covers firms with fifty or more employees, [cited by Sweet 
in Cross, 19 85, p.21]
NEPA would allow the Government to delay, but not prevent, plant 
closure. It has met with a hostile reception on Capitol Hill, 
particularly by the Reagan administration. It calls for advance 
notice when job losses in an establishment in any 18-month period
equals or exceeds the lesser of 100 employees or 15 per cent of
the employees. The notice given must be not less than six months
where fewer than 100 employees are involved and one year where
there are more than 100.
In 1982, twelve states considered collective dismissals 
legislation - California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Wisconsin. Two years advance notice was a key provision in 
the 1980 Corporate Democracy Act, which Maine and Wisconsin, the 
only states which have plant closure legislation (and even then 
it is loosely enforced), included in their legislation [Carroll, 
1984, p.133; Sweet in Cross, 1985, p.25]
Just as enticing financial inducements are offered to potential 
investors by legislators at national and state level, legislation 
discouraging to employers is avoided. They fear investors will 
gravitate to those states with minimal legislation. Connecticut's 
proposed legislation was abandoned altogether because of anxiety 
on this score.
In 1982, Philadelphia became the first city to enact legislation 
requiring firms to present employees with advance notice of 
closure. 60 days notice, or pay in lieu of notice, must be given.
In addition to advance notice, employees hope to receive 
severance payments which will serve to facilitate readjustment, 
and minimise financial hardship, [cited by Sweet in Cross, 1985, 
P.25]
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s.s.2.: Canada
Under Federal jurisdiction, employers in Canada must provide 
advance notice of collective dismissals. In cases involving 100 
or more redundancies, twelve weeks notice must be provided, 
rising to sixteen weeks when 300 or more employees are dismissed.
Table 5.3.: Canadian Pre-notification Requirements for Group
Terminations
Minimum layoff Workers Length of
Jurisdiction period laid off pre-notification
Federal 4 weeks 50-100 8 weeks
101-300 12 weeks
over 300 16 weeks
Manitoba same as Federal
Newfoundland 4 weeks 50-199 8 weeks
200-499 12 weeks
over 499 16 weeks
Nova Scotia 4 weeks 10-99 8 weeks
100-299 12 weeks
over 299 16 weeks
Ontario 4 weeks 50-199 8 weeks
200-499 12 weeks
over 499 16 weeks
Quebec 2 months 10-99 2 months
100-299 3 months
over 299 4 months
Source: Cross, 1985, p.19
Incidences of foreign divestment involving 500 or more 
compulsory redundancies in the UK, will be examined later in case 
studies. These involve MNCs from just five countries - the US, 
Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. We have looked at 
legislation in the US and Canada, and now a brief review of 
legislation in the three European countries.
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5.5.3.: Europe
Most European countries have legislation which imposes obligation 
on employers to inform and consult employees in the event of 
collective redundancies. As is shown in Table 5.4., of the 
seventeen European countries, only Spain and Switzerland do not 
attempt to define a "mass dismissal". The majority specify a 
number and a time period for triggering off legislation. In 
seven of the countries the meaning of "mass dismissal" varies 
according to the size of the company's labour force [Van den 
Bulcke in Brooke and Buckley, 1982].
Eleven of the above seventeen European countries require that 
companies consult employees' representatives on collective 
redundancies - Spain, Greece, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Germany 
are the exceptions. In Switzerland this procedure is recommended, 
while Luxembourg and Germany require companies to consult the 
workers' council. Consultations with workers' councils are 
compulsory in nine of the seventeen countries [Van den Bulcke in 
Brooke and Buckley, 1982].
Advance notice of collective redundancies is mandatory in most 
European countries, and varies from fifteen days to six months, 
one month being the average notification period. Pay in lieu of 
notice to employees is permitted in most countries.
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Table 5.4.: Definition and procedure of mass dismissals in
European countries
Countries Definition
Size of company 
(number of 
employees)
Number of
dismissed
persons
Time period
Austria - 'considerable 
number'
'short period'
Belgium 20-59 6 or more 60 days
60 and more 10$ or more 60 days
Denmark 20-100 10$ or more defined in
101-300 10$ or more collective
Finland
300 and more 30$ or more 
30 or more
agreements
France less than 50 a) less than 10 a) 30 days
50 or moreb b) 10 or more
c) 10 or more
b) 30 days
c) 30 days
Germany 20 to 49 5 or more 4 weeks
50 to 499 25 or more 4 weeks
500 and more 30 or more 4 weeks
Greece 50 or more 2 to 10$
Ireland 21-49 5 people 30 days
50-99 25 or more 30 days
100-299 10$ 30 days
Italyd
300 or more 30 people 30 days
Luxembourg 10 or more 30 days
Netherlands 'substantial 
portion'
'short period'
Norway 10 or more 1 month
Portugal a) 50 or less a) 2 or more 
10 or more
3 months 
3 months
b) over 50 b) 5 or more 3 months
Spain - - -
Sweden 5 to 25 
26 to 100 
more than 100
Switzerland — - -
United Kingdom 10 or more 30 days
100 or more 90 days
lotes
a Mostly to the Labour Office
b Procedure differs according to the size of company 
c If more than two years of employment
d Special rules; no compliance yet with EEC's Mass Dismissals directive 
e Recommended
Source: Van den Bulcke in Brooke and Buckley, 1982.
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Table 5.4. cont.: Definition and procedure of mass dismissals in
European countries
Countries
Procedure
Consultation 
with workers
Consultation Prior Special
with notification indemnity
works council period®
Austria X X 30 days
Belgium X X X X
X X X X
Denmark X 30 days
X 30 days
X 30 days
Finland X
France 15 days X
X 30 days X
X X 30 days X*
Germany X 4 weeks
X 4 weeks
X 4 weeks
Greece 1 month
Ireland X 30 days
X 30 days
X 30 days
X 30 days
Italy 25 to 40 days
Luxembourg X 6 weeks
Netherlands X X 3 months
Norway X 2 months
Portugal X X 60 days
X X 90 days
X X 90 days
Spain
Sweden X X 2 months
X X 4 months
X X 6 months
Switzerland e e
United Kingdom X X 60 days
X X 90 days
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In Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, 
employees fulfilling certain conditions (ie. length of service) 
are entitled to severance or redundancy payments. Among EEC 
member states, Belgian law is unique in that it stipulates a 
specific level of compensatory payment due by employer to 
employees "collectively dismissed", namely, half the difference 
between the previous gross monthly earnings (up to a maximum of 
68,675 fr.) and State unemployment benefit entitlement. The 
payment is made for four months commencing from the dismissal 
date, but the period is reduced where notice entitlement exceeds 
three months. Severance payments are mandatory only in cases of 
mass dismissal [European Industrial Relations Review. February 
1983].
As Table 5.4. reveals, it is ludicrous to attribute blame to 
labour immobility for Europe's stagnation, as Newsweek did in its 
cover story, "Europe in Decline". Readers of this article are 
told that in Europe firing workers is "practically impossible" 
[Sullivan, April 9, 1984, p.11]. Current levels of unemployment, 
due in no small part to large-scale redundancies, suggests that 
employers have had little difficulty firing labour.
5.5.4.; EEC Legislation ; Mass Dismissals Directive
A United States of Europe had been the dream of European 
statesmen who witnessed two World Wars. Their drive for unity was 
inspired by a desire for lasting peace. They appreciated too, the 
economic benefits of political unity which would allow unfettered 
movement of capital, goods, and labour between member states.
After the publication in 1776 of Adam Smith's "The Wealth of 
Nations" it was recognised that the key to boosting productivity 
was the division of labour. But the Scottish political economist 
had warned that "the division of labour is limited by the extent 
of the market". In the late nineteenth century, the United States 
of America firmly established itself as the world's leading 
manufacturer, superceding Britain in the wave of new industries 
of the "second Industrial Revolution". America was undoubtedly a
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huge market and with the pioneering work of Frederick Taylor in 
"scientific management", the division and control of labour was 
greatly increased.
In the early twentieth century, as America's output in key
industries continued to outstrip that of European rivals, 
Friedrich Naumann concluded that European nation states would 
continue to lose ground in world markets as they were no longer 
large enough to maintain their position in manufacturing [Swann, 
1978].
The constitution and legislative powers of the EEC are enshrined
in the Treaty of Rome which was first signed by the original six
members of the EEC in 1957, and by the six other countries which 
have joined the Community. The signatories of the Treaty of Rome 
hoped that the EEC would reverse this trend and fulfill the
desire for peace. There has been peace since 1945, but economic
and political unity have not been fully realised. According to
the European Regional Editor of Newsweek, the EEC,
"has failed lamentably to live up to its early promise as a 
stimulator of European unity and progress" [Sullivan, April 
9, 1984, p.15].
Some British Socialists have been highly critical of the EEC
which they see as the multinationals' poodle:
"Far fr<» allowing greater control over multi-national
corporations, the EEC and its treaties have given them 
greater freedom. ... The EEC was set up by capitalism to 
protect itself during the period lAen it was developing more 
and more towards internationally organised capital. It was 
not set up to (xxnbat the multinationals; it was set up by 
them" [Balfe et al. The New Statesman, date of publication
not known].
Indeed, Europe's modern industries were increasingly dominated by 
US MNCs which had established a huge presence in the continent. 
In 1967, French journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's
bestseller "Le Defi Américain" ("The American Challenge")
contained an apocalyptic warning to European politicians and 
executives :
"Fifteen years from now it is quite possible that the
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world's third greatest industrial power, just after the
United States and Russia, will not be Europe but American 
industry in Europe" [Servan-Schreiber, 1968].
By 1983, the failure of politicians to fulfill the European dream 
of a strong united continent able to repel American and Japanese 
challenges had exhausted the patience of a number of notable 
European businessmen. Executives from seventeen companies, led 
by Volvo's Pehr Gyllenhammer, founded the "Roundtable of European 
Industrialists". The group which met in Paris in April 1983 for 
the first time had grown to twenty-two by December 1984. This 
elite body will concentrate on three areas of action
infrastructure, education, and capital formation and financing 
[Eales, 1985].
A large single market has yet to materialise and stubborn 
national differences remain. Their removal hinges on 
harmonisation of national legislation. Frustrated "Euro-philes" 
believe that such obstacles will only be overcome by redrafting
the cornerstone of the EEC - the Treaty of Rome.
At present, unanimous support is necessary from representatives 
of member-state governments at the Council of Ministers before a 
draft Directive can become Community legislation. Friction is 
caused by members belief that a minority - perhaps of even just 
one - has used the veto to protect national interests, at the 
expense of the common good.
On the eve of the Milan Summit, in June 1985, Commissioner 
Delors, in a passionate appeal for reform, argued that progress 
in EEC legislation depended on abolishing the veto and accepting 
the majority view. Such a proposal was anathema to some member 
states which feared that Brussels would supercede national 
parliaments, and that national culture would disappear under a 
superimposed foreign culture.
Although the EEC has failed to become one single cohesive unit, 
some harmonisation has been achieved. One such example is the 
Mass Dismissals Directive of 1975 which established minimum 
notification and consultation rights for employees in the event
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of collective redundancies.
The Draft Directive on Collective Dismissals had been published 
in November 1972. It proposed firstly, compulsory consultation 
with workers' representatives on collective dismissals; secondly, 
compulsory notification of impending redundancies to public 
authorities; and, thirdly, powers for public authorities to 
postpone or prohibit dismissals in certain circumstances.
The Draft Directive met with a hostile reception from the then 
British Government. This partly explains the Draft Directive's 
long and tortuous progress through the EEC's legislative 
channels. Members States' Governments tended to argue at great 
length over the substance of the proposals and the extent of the 
harmonisation requirement to be imposed.
The UK Government was particularly opposed to the prospect of 
public authorities prohibiting dismissals and in June 1974 it 
effectively placed a temporary veto iç)on the Draft Directive. The 
December 1974 meeting of the Council of Ministers saw a 
compromise being reached. It was agreed that Member States 
should be allowed to choose whether or not their public 
authorities be granted veto power over Collective Dismissals.
Finally on February 17, 1975, the Council Directive on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
Collective redundancies was enacted. Its four sections deal with 
Definitions and Scope; Consultation Procedure; Procedure for 
collective redundancies, and. Final Provisions. The Directive is 
reproduced in Appendix I. Under Article 6 (1) Member States were 
given two years to create "the laws, regulations, and 
administrative provisions needed in order to comply with the 
Directive". The Mass Dismissals Directive did not affect the 
right of Member States to apply or to introduce laws, regulations 
or administrative provisions, more favourable to workers.
The legisation enacted by France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
is examined below. It will be seen that Hofstede's scoring and 
ranking or countries on the Strong and Weak Uncertainty dimension
113
is of limited value. Strong Uncertainty France and Germany, as 
expected, have rigorous legislation, but so too does Weak 
Uncertainty Netherlands
France; In France, the works’ council must be consulted, 
informed, and allowed time to submit its case before permission 
can be obtained from the Labour Inspectorate to effect a 
collective dismissal, the Labour Inspectorate first having 
received a a copy of the minutes of Company-Union meeting at 
which employees representatives were consulted. This legislation 
is considered very stringent and in its 1985 review of the French 
economy, the OECD criticised France’s rigid employment 
legislation which it described as "virtually unique in Europe". 
The OECD suggests that employers are reluctant to take on 
additional staff because they have no guarantee they will be 
allowed to issue redundancies should market forces demand it 
[Marsh, August 13, 1985].
According to one disgruntled French manufacturer: "It’s easier to 
get rid of a wife of 25 years than a worker hired a few months 
ago" [Boyer, August 20, 1984, p.164]. The Patronat, the French
employers’ federation, claims companies have even gone bankrupt 
awaiting government approval for redundancies [Groom, July 3, 
1985, p.12].
Not surprisingly, once the Socialist Government was defeated at 
the polls in the General Election in March 1986, change was 
imminent. The right-wing Chirac Government announced that, 
despite opposition from President Mitterand, it will introduce 
legislation allowing firms to issue redundancies without 
permission from the local labour [Housego, May 15, 1986, p.44].
Germany: In Germany, employers must notify and consult the works
council, which can demand, under the Works Constitution Act of 
1972 a "social plan" to minimise hardship to employees. Should 
management and works council fail to agree on the plan, the 
Arbitration Commission, (whose membership must include an equal 
number from each side and an appointed chairman accepted by both 
sides), is responsible for drafting the plan [Bosch in Cross,
1 14
1985, p.179].
The Netherlands: It was seen in the previous chapter that the
Dutch Government has frequently flouted the Treaty of Rome in its 
attempts to boost inward foreign direct investment, and yet, 
almost paradoxically, Dutch employment legislation, even more 
demanding than that of France, acts as a major disincentive to 
investors, according to Mr. Patrick Sheehy, Chairman of B.A.T. 
Industries [Sheehy, 1984].
Not only must the Labour Office authorize redundancies, but it 
can declare notification void if it deems that unions and works 
council received insufficient information and consultations were 
inadequate. The Dutch government is currently considering 
relaxing legislation and speeding up redundancy procedures 
[Groom, July 3, 1985, p.12].
The obligations imposed on employers proposing dismissals in 
these countries are more onerous than those imposed by UK 
legislation which will be examined below.
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5.6.: ÜK Plant. Clpgare LeKlolatlon
The Employment Protection Act 1975 (EPA 1975), passed in November 
of that year, comprises five Parts and 129 Sections. Part one is 
entitled Machinery for Promoting the Improvement of Industrial 
Relations; Part II, Rights of Employees; Part III, Regulation of 
Terms and Conditions of Employment; Part IV, Procedure for 
Handling Redundancies; and Part V, Miscellaneous and 
Supplementary Provisions.
Although there was some controversy over the periods of 
consultation and notification necessary before collective 
redundancies could take place. Part IV of the 1975 Act had a 
relatively easy ride through both Houses of Parliament. Despite, 
or, perhaps because of, its smooth passage through Parliament, 
Part IV lacks clarity and precision.
The major innovation during the Bill’s reading in Parliament was 
the inclusion of the paragraphs which form Section 107. This 
section grants the Department of Employment (DoE) the power to 
modify or exclude Part IV where a collective agreement exists 
which is "at least as favourable to those employees as the 
foregoing provisions of this Act" [Section 107].
The provisions of Part IV relate to two issues: firstly, the
obligation to consult with trade union representatives; and, 
secondly, the requirement to notify the DoE of proposed 
redundancies. Given the focus of this thesis, we are mainly 
concerned with the former duty which is "much the weightier" of 
the two aspects of Part IV [Freedland, 1976, p.28].
Establishing Part IV’s dictates is of crucial importance for the 
findings of this study, because the relevent sections of Part IV 
form one of owo key yardsticks for assessing the behaviour of 
firms, the other being the "Vredeling Proposals".
116
R.fi.1.!Part IV of the EPA 1975 Act
(a) Definition and Scope: The term "collective redundancies" is
not defined because, unlike the EEC’s Mass Dismissals Directive, 
Part IV is applicable to all redundancy situations regardless of 
the number of employees involved. Part IV even offers protection 
to the individual.
"Trade union representative" is defined as,
"an official or other person authorised to carry on 
collective bargaining with the employer In question by that 
trade union" [Section 99 [2)].
(b) Consultation Procedure: The duty to consult with Trade Union 
Representatives arises when an employer proposes to dismiss as 
redundant "an employee of a description in respect of which an 
independent trade union is recognised by him" [Section 99 (1)]«
The consultations required by Section 99 (3),
"shall begin at the earliest opportunity, and shall in any 
event begin -
(a) Where the «mployer is proposing to dismiss as redundant
100 or more employees at one establishment within a period
of 90 days or less, at least 90 days before the first of
those dismissals takes effect; or
(b) where the employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 
10 or more employees at on establishment within a period of 
30 days or less, at least 60 days before the first of those 
dismissals take effect" [Section 99 (3)1•
Section 99 (5) states that the employer must disclose the
following information to Trade Union representatives for the
purpose of consultation:
"(a) the reasons for his proposals;
(b) the numbers and descriptions of employees whcmi
It Is proposed to dismiss as redundant;
(c) the total number of employees of any such
description employed by the employer at the 
establishment In question;
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(d) the proposed method of selecting the employees who may 
be dismissed, and
(e) the proposed method of carrying out the dismissals, with 
due regard to any agreed procedure. Including the period 
over ïrtilch the dismissals are to take effect" [Section 99 
(5)].
Having disclosed the above information, the employer is then 
required under Section 99 (7) to
"(a) consider any representation made by the trade 
union representatives; and
(b) reply to those representatives and. If he rejects any of 
these representations, state his reasons" [Section 99 (7)]*
Freedland [1976] has questioned whether adherence to Section 99, 
paragraphs (3), (5), and (7) represents effective consultation.
Section 99 (8) appears to imply that it does. This paragraph
which represents an escape clause reads as follows:
"If In any case there are special circumstances which render 
It not reasonably practical for the anployer to ccmiply with 
any of the requirements of subsections (3), (5) or (7)
above, the employer shall take all such steps towards 
compliance with that requirement as are reasonably
practicable In those circumstances" [Section 99 (8)].
This escape clause only applies, however, to the particular 
aspects of consultation referred to in Section 99 (3), (5) and
(7), and not to the fundamental obligation to consult - "which 
may well not be exhaustively defined by subsections (3), (5) and
(7)" [Freedland, 1976, p.30].
It is important to be clear that the timetable presented in 
Section 99 (3) is subject to the overriding rule that
consultation must begin "at the earliest opportunity"! [author’s 
emphasis]. No guidance is offered, however, on what constitutes 
"the earliest opportunity".
Similarly, the above timetable is for dismissals within one 
"establishment", but no definition is offered of this imprecise 
concept.
Furthermore, The instructions contained in Section 99 (3) are, as
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Freedland [1976] argues, based on a rather vague concept:
■at what level of management must the proposal be made, and 
what degree of definition must the proposal have? .. the
problem Is rendered partly theoretical by the fact that the 
consultation has In any event to be ccxoputed backwards from 
the date of the first dismissal concerned, so that the
employer may have no Incentive for keeping a tentative 
proposal secret, but a contrary Incentive to begin 
discussion early. On the other hand, the more tentative the 
proposal, the greater may be Its disruptive effect upon 
Industrial relations. This Is a paradox Impossible to 
resolve" [Freedland, 1976, p.30].
In situations where the above timetable applies, then it applies,
as Freedland states, "only to give the minimum periods, and not
to define the "earliest opportunity" [Freedland, 1976 p.30].
Unscrupulous employers can escape meeting these minimum 
requirements, however, by simply identifying particular employees 
for proposed redundancies and beginning consultations with them 
in advance of notifying another batch of employees. By reducing 
the number of redundancies in each group, the number of days 
notice required before effecting redundancies can be reduced.
(c) Procedure for Collective Redundancies: Where an employer is
proposing to dismiss as redundant 100 or more employees at one 
establishment within a period of 90 days or less, he will notify 
the Secretary of State in writing of his proposal, at least 90 
days before the first of these dismissals takes effect [Section 
100 (1)].
Where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 10 or more 
employees at one establishment within a period of 30 days or 
less, he shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of his 
proposal, at least 60 days before the first of these dismissals 
takes effect.
In both instances, he shall also notify representatives of the 
union acting on behalf of the employee(s) in question. In order 
to satisfy these requirements the employer must send a completed 
RP1 form to the DoE and to the unions in question. He must 
provide the date when consultations began, and name the unions
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involved [Section 100 (31.
Section 100 (6) provides the employer with a loophole, however. 
"If in any case there are special circumstances rendering it not 
reasonably practicable",he does not have to comply with the above 
requirements, though he is obliged to "take all such steps ... as 
are reasonably practicable in those circumsatnces" to meet them 
[Section 100 (6)].
(d) Sanctions: Most employers are entitled, under Section 30 (1)
of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, to a 41$ rebate on
redundancy paid to employees. Those entitled, but who fail to 
notify the Secretary of State of proposed redundancies, may find 
their rebate reduced "by such proportion (not exceeding one- 
tenth) as appears to be appropriate in the circumstances"
[Section 104 (i;].
Where the Secretary of State reduces the rebate, the employer may 
appeal to an Industrial Tribunal. The Secretary of State is also 
empowered to fine those firms which fail to notify him of
proposed redundancies. The employer "shall be liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding £400" [Section 105 (1)]. The
Secretary of State is not permitted to impose both penalties. He 
can either reduce the rebate on redundancy payments, or impose a 
fine. The reduced rebate is clearly a potentially stiffen
"sentence".
Where an appropriate Trade Union believes an employer has failed 
to comply with any of the requirements of Section 99, it may 
complain to an Industrial Tribunal. If the Tribunal finds the 
complaint to be well-founded, "it shall make a declaration to 
that effect and may also make a protective award" [Section 101 
(31.
The protective award bestows entitlement to remuneration to the 
employees affected for periods not exceeding 90, 60, or 28 days,
depending upon the total number and concentration of the 
dismissals or proposed dismissals concerned.
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5.7.: SummarY
Any firm in the UK proposing collective redundancies is legally 
obliged to provide advance notice to employees’ representatives 
and the Department of Employment. In cases involving 100 or more 
collective redundancies, employees are entitled to a minimum of 
90 days notice. Although employers are also bound to begin 
consultations "at the earliest possible opportunity", the 
Department of Employment overlooks this stipulation, and is 
quite satisfied as long as firms provide the minimum notice.
As a major host nation, Britain has attracted investment from 
countries with a different culture and view of employment 
legislation. Foreign subsidiaries have to adjust to host country 
business practises, but in some areas, notably labour relations, 
such firms expect their foreign workforce to adapt to the methods 
and ideals of their home country (see Chapter 4).
In this Chapter particular attention has been paid to the 
national cultural profiles and redundancy laws of the five 
countries which are the home base of the companies examined in 
Chapters 9-12: Canada, and the US, and France, Germany, and the
Netherlands. It was seen that all three European countries had 
stiff legislation on collective dismissals, but that the national 
culture or France and Germany was quite different from that of 
the Netherlands. It was concluded that if a country’s culture had 
any bearing on the conduct of domestic firms then Dutch companies 
would be more open and display greater concern for their 
workforce than the secretive, less socially conscious French and 
Germans.
In North America, Canadian culture bore a strong resemblance to 
the Netherlands’ but its redundancy laws were considerably 
milder. Although the US was culturally very similar to the UK, 
America has no Federal legislation requiring firms to provide 
employees with advance notice of redundancies. It is not just 
redundancy legislation which US executives find difficult to 
swallow. Popular US magazines have regularly highlighted the 
tremendous differences in labour laws between the "new" and the
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"old world".
Based on national cultural profiles, one can expect that among 
foreign firms divesting from the UK, the Dutch should set the 
standard Oi good behaviour, closely followed by the Canadians, 
then the US, and finally, at the other end of this league table, 
the French and the Germans.
Some non-European MNCs have accepted that European redundancy 
legislation is unlikely to be abolished, and this acknowledgement 
has led them to reconsider their position. Although more flexible 
labour legislation is advocated by many MNCs, it would seem that 
labour leaders, and some MNCs themselves, believe that the MNC 
itself must prove flexible. As Mr. Henri Debuisser, Rank Xerox’s 
International Personnel Director, says,
’Hfe have to live with the labour laws as they are. I can't 
be happy with any rigid system, but we are a multinational 
and we can't change these things. Flexibility is not 
management doing what it wants, when it wants, where it 
wants with the workforce. It's an attitude of mind in a 
corporation. Management itself must be mentally flexible" 
[Groom, June 28, 1985, p.20].
It appears that some western MNCs now believe that substantial 
benefits are to be derived from adopting the Japanese "job-for- 
life" approach. In 1983, the Dutch firm, Daf Trucks, lowered the 
average working week to 36 hours in order to avoid sacking 
employees for the first time since its foundation. Daf believes,
"dismissals are expensive, disturb internal relations, and 
are inappropriate to European culture" (author's emphasis) 
[Groom, June 28, 1985, p.20].
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CHAPTER 6
THE OECD'S GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
6.1,;Introductlop
The OECD evolved from the OEEC (Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation) which was founded in 1948 as part of the 
Marshall Plan. OEEC was designed to ensure that countries 
devastated by war worked in a spirit of harmony and cooperation 
to achieve economic recovery. This objective had already been 
attained when, in acknowledgement of the common interests and 
growing interdependence among industrialized countries of the 
West, the United States and Canada joined with the original 18 
members oi che OEEC in signing a convention in Paris on December 
14, i960, bringing OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) into being in September 1961. Subsequently Japan 
(1964), Finland (1969), Australia (1971) and New Zealand (1973), 
became full members of the OECD, Yugoslavia participates in the 
body as a partial member.
All members are, therefore, from the rich, industrialized 
"North"; poor, developing countries from the "South" are 
conspicuously absent (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Members of the OECD
Australia France Japan Spain
Austria W. Germany Luxembourg Sweden
Belgium Greece The Netherlands Switzerland
Canada Iceland New Zealand Turkey
Denmark Ireland Norway UK
Finland Italy Portugal US
The contract, signed on December 14, I960, states that the OECD
shall promote policies designed to:
- achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment, and a rising standard of living in Member 
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus 
contribute to the development of the world economy:
- contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as 
non-member countries in the process of economic development:
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- contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, 
non-discriminatary basis in accordance with international 
obligations.
OECD member countries account for only 20$ of the world’s 
population, but 60$ of its industrial output, and 70$ of its 
trade. In 1976, 5,087 multinationals were operating in the 21
most industrialised OECD countries and employed almost 46 million 
people. The summer of that year, saw the OECD’s attempts to 
formulate a Code of Conduct for MNCs.
These voluntary Guidelines suggest a code of procedure in dealing 
with: Disclosure of Information, Competition, Financing,
Taxation, Employment and Industrial Relations, and Science and 
Technology.
The Guidelines were part of the "Declaration and Decisions on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises", a
package designed to foster an environment favourable to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and MNCs, the vast majority of which have 
headquarters in OECD member countries.
"Declarations" are not included among the legal instruments of
the OECD, but "Decisions" of the OECD Council are "legally 
binding on the member states of the Organisation by virtue of its 
constituent treaty". The June 21 package included "Decisions" on 
"National Treatment", "International Investment Incentives and 
Disincentives", and "International Consultation Procedures". The 
Guidelines themselves, however, form an appendix to the 
"Declaration" and as such are not legally binding. Indeed the 
introduction states that "Observance of the Guidelines is
voluntary and not legally enforceable" [OECD, 1976, p.12].
OECD countries are united, not by geographic location but by a 
common bond of affluence, by commitment to the capitalist 
economic system, and by common responsibility to the less 
fortunate developing Third World which has no share in that 
affluence but has more than a fair share in chronic poverty.
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The oil crisis of the early 1970s and subsequent depression were 
severe set-backs to the capitalist economies which are still in 
1985 battling to control inflation and somehow deal with a 
growing army of unemployed. But the OECD’s problems were not 
confined to "within". The lesser developed countries (LDCs) were 
becoming increasingly disenchanted with the rich "North", and 
particularly with its large MNCs whose profits were allegedly 
culled by exploiting the backwardness of the Third World. It is 
suggested that this dissatisfaction rendered some LDCs malleable 
to the Soviet block which was anxious to spread its sphere of 
influence and the "Marxist" political and economic theory.
Some argue that the OECD’s Guidelines for MNCs were introduced to 
safeguard the economic system and prosperity of OECD member 
countries and to combat the trends outlined above by presenting 
"the acceptable face of capitalism" to quell demands from lesser 
developed countries for stringent legal controls on the 
activities of MNCs [Robinson, I983].
This chapter will proceed with an examination of this hypothesis 
before reviewing the administration of the Guidelines. By 
focusing on cases of alleged breach of the Guidelines, it will 
contrast the views of Trades Unions involved and those of the 
OECD’s Committee on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises (CIME). The latter is responsible for clarifying the 
Guidelines. This exercise should illustrate what steps should be 
taken by firms contemplating closure. The Guidelines, as we have 
noted, are not legally binding, but neither are they to be 
ignored by those to whom they are addressed.
Unfortunately, it would appear that Trades Unionists have 
experienced firms who do just that. A number of MNCs have been 
accused of contravening the Guidelines, and many of the cases 
referred by the Unions to CIME have arisen from divestments 
involving major job losses. Paragraphs 3, 6, and 9 of the chapter 
on Employment and Industrial Relations are directly relevant to 
the plant closure situation, but these have proved ambiguous and 
required clarification by CIME.
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Since this thesis focuses on employee disclosure and consultation 
in the context of plant closure, the primary aim of this chapter 
is to present readers with a clear outline of the Guideline’s 
directions to firms proposing divestment. The author’s ability to 
do so is dependent, of course, not only on the precision of 
paragraphs 3, 6, and 9, but also on the quality of CIME’s
clarifications. It must be stressed that in order to be effective 
the Guidelines must be meaningful, for if meaningless, they are 
worthless.
Our analysis commences with an overview of the Guidelines’ 
origins.
6.2,; The Gnldellnea» Paternity
By the early 1970s, the carnival atmosphere surrounding 
celebrations for political independence, gained in the previous 
decade, seemed a distant memory as developing countries 
discovered that political independence did not automatically
produce economic independence. It was disheartening for the 
peoples of the new, often monocultural nation states, or "banana 
republics" as some were wont to call them, to discover that 
political independence was a damp squib; the pace of economic 
growth and development was still largely determined by decisions 
made in boardrooms of distant continents. (Their predicament is 
actually glorified in an advertising campaign which depicts a 
figure in radiant white, "the man from Del Monte", descending 
from the skies to consent to the gathering of the crop and to 
offer life to those worthy of salvation).
This "remote control" posed a threat to the future prosperity of 
many Third World countries. With the break up of Empires of the
old colonial powers, political independence was achieved 
theoretically, but in order to became a reality, the LDCs had to 
break the umbilical cord of economic dependence. Until they did 
they were at the mercy of the industrialised powers, and it was 
this realisation which prompted them to approach the United 
Nations demanding legislation to control the activities of MNCs:
"The Word "multinationals" became amongst other things a
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rallying cry for those seeking to ensure the economic 
counterpart to political autonomy. Economic independence 
appeared to be equated with increased public interventionism 
and in particular with public control of multinationals"
[Robinson, 1983, p.116].
At the United Nations' New York Headquarters, delegates focused 
on international economic imbalance and the role played by MNCs 
in creating, or in mitigating that imbalance. But it was obvious 
tnat a tactical change was essential if LDCs were to strike a 
chord with politicians in OECD countries. Mr. Helmut Schmidt, one 
of Europe's post-war statesmen, was one of the very few - if not 
sole - prominent political figure to address this issue. In 
September 1973, Mr. Schmidt, then Germany's Minister of Finance, 
called for "an international Code of Conduct for the 
multinationals which would ensure that they will not shirk their 
obligations to the countries of residence" [quoted by Mr. Sydney 
Dell, Executive Director, United Nations Centre on Transanational 
Corporations, 1984].
The developing countries therefore launched a dual-pronged 
attack. They decided to divide their attention between the United 
Nations in New York, and the OECD in Paris, the city which 
centuries earlier had spawned revolution under the slogan 
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity". This was home to "the rich 
man's club", the OECD.
Their supplications to the OECD to introduce legislation making 
MNCs more accountable to host country governments fell on deaf 
ears. The OECD countries pointed to the economic theories of Adam 
Smith and Ricardo to justify their apparent lack of concern for 
the rest of the world, while adherence to Keynesian policies and 
the market conditions of the time produced steady economic 
growth. The OECD had no desire to risk incurring the displeasure 
of MNCs whose investment decisions had major economic and 
political implications for OECD member countries.
The OECD countries had, it seems, convinced themselves that 
international economic development would progress if only "the 
Western system was freely allowed to radiate its beneficial 
influence, multinationals and all, throughout the less developed
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countries” [Robinson, 1983» P.116]. But just as mid-Victorian 
Britain had failed to convince its rivals of the benefits to be 
derived from universal adherence to "laissez-faire" and the 
theory or comparative advantage, so too did the OECD countries 
fail to impress the LDCs.
Until a real economic dimension was added to the political 
argument, the LDCs were unlikely to secure any concessions from 
the OECD to control multinationals. This vital economic dimension 
was suddenly present in the far-reaching ramifications of the 
1973 oil crisis which made a mockery of political manifestos and 
budget forecasts. Western politicians and executives were panic 
stricken as their best laid strategies crumbled. Oil prices 
quadrupled and in the major international stock exchanges share 
values plummeted. As the terms of trade moved, for once, in 
favour of the less developed countries, the industrialised world 
sprang into action to appease their demands. This sudden haste 
was in stark contrast to years of masterly inactivity. The 
economic balance or power had swung violently in favour of the 
developing countries and the LDCs siezed the opportunity to 
advance their ambition [Robinson, 1983, ch.8].
Results were immediately forthcoming. The United Nations’ Sixth 
Special Section, in Autumn 1974, called for a new international 
economic order in which multinationals were to play a strictly 
defined role. Before the end of the year, the United Nations’ 
Economic and Social Council called for a code of conduct on 
transnational corporations. The following September, the US 
Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger, "put forward the idea of 
a Code as one of the main themes of his address to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations" [Mr. Sydney Dell, Executive 
Director, United Nations Centre on Transanational Corporations, 
London, 1984].
The developing countries hoped that the United Nations would 
introduce a legally binding Code of Conduct on multinational 
companies, and this wish was shared by Trade Unions and sections 
of the Media within the OECD itself. By the mid 1970’s it was 
clear that as a result of the oil crisis, the LDCs had the OECD
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countries "over a barrel".
The world’s industrialized countries were quick to retaliate:
rocked by the economic crisis and recognizing the need 
to respond to the demands it provoked, they acted pre­
emptively. ...just as the ILO [i.e. International Labour 
Office] was beginning the drafting ot guidelines for MHC 
"social" behaviour in developing countries, OECD ministers, 
at the urgings of the US Government, adopted their own 
multinationals' package, including a 'code' taking the form 
of voluntary guidelines addressed to MNCs. The speed with 
which the Guidelines moved from conception to decision was 
dramatic, and was a direct product of the rich world's 
belief that it had to go into the UN negotiations on 
multinationals with a coherent and apparently progressive 
position with which to confront the developing countries 
clamour - articulated by the so-called Groiq>-77 of LDCs
- for more radical and compulsory control" [Robinson, 1983, 
p.117].
It had taken only eighteen months to negotiate and adopt the OECD 
"Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" together with two 
declarations on national treatment of MNCs and international 
Incentives. There is little evidence, as yet, to counter the 
claim that the OECD adopted its Guidelines in order to thwart 
ambitious plans of LDCs for compulsory regulation of MNCs, and in 
the hope that they would serve as a model which the UN could 
duplicate. The OECD member countries adopted the Guidelines, it 
has been argued, to put a brake on social change rather than to 
propel it [Robinson, 1983, ch.8].
Seen in this light, the introduction of the Guidelines, 
particularly during a depression seems less at odds with the 
interests of the OECD and its members. Nor is it surprising that 
the whole process was rushed through in what can only be called 
indecent speed, "totally uncharacteristic of the normal plodding 
rhythm of international diplomacy" [Robinson, 1983, p.115].
The OECD initiative cannot however, be explained simply by 
external pressure. Groups within OECD countries were becoming 
extremely concerned about the increasing "power" of MNCs. For 
example, the activity of Lonrho, a British MNC, in Africa, was 
denounced by the then Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, 
as the "Unacceptable face of capitalism" and the US MNC,
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Lockheed, had been caught bribing senior members of the Japanese 
Government.
The image or US MNCs had been severely tarnished by their 
involvement in the Chilean coup of September 11, 1973. The US
MNC, ITT, and other foreign multinationals had supported the 
Chilean armed forces in overthrowing the democratically elected 
left-wing Allende Government.
In 1975, America, still reeling from Watergate, suffered another 
bodyblow when it was revealed that throughout the world 
approximately 500 US public corporations were implicated in "a 
web of questionable and illegal activities" [Cressey and Moore, 
1983, p.53].
These scandals reinforced arguments from within that MNCs had too 
much power, and they abused it:
■corporate officials were beginning to be perceived as 
'little more than manicured hoodltms'" [Cressey and Moore, 
1983, p.533.
Appeals for greater governmental control of business grew and 
began to find popular support. Some prominent businessmen warned 
that unless corporate executives presented an image of integrity, 
"the public might 'sour on business as a whole* and precipitate a 
situation which could 'threaten the survival of the free 
enterprise system' itself" [Cressey and Moore, 1983, p.53].
Indeed, in the late 1970s pressure groups within the OECD 
countries were more vocal than the LDCs in their criticisms of 
MNCs and more forceful in their demands for a curb on MNCs' 
excesses. But some of this criticism arose from motives of self- 
interest. US labour was becoming increasingly anxious about the 
"export of jobs" and European trade unions were allegedly denied 
access to the real decision makers who were often based on the 
other side of the Atlantic. Such a situation rendered national 
employee disclosure and consultation legislation meaningless, and 
thereby eroded workers' rights. This problem was particularly 
acute in cases of projected plant closure.
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The decisions of MNCs have not only serious economic 
consequences, but as Robinson [1983, p.1] says, "multinational 
business is now international politics". Investment protects and 
creates jobs, joos mean votes, and votes mean power. Divestment 
by liquidation, on the other hand, triggers off a chain of events 
which can have the opposite effect. It loses votes as 
unemployment rises and unpopular cuts are introduced. It is, 
therefore, not just in the interests of employees and the local 
community to attract further resources to their plants, the 
Government of the day also has a vested interest in producing an 
economic, social, and political climate favourable to MNCs. Some 
would argue, therefore, that these firms wield power over society 
and that this represents a threat to democracy. This is the 
fundamental concern that has encouraged a number of Governments 
to seek novel ways of dealing with MNCs.
One way xs oy Codes of Conduct. After the OECD's hastily drawn up 
code, the United Nations Draft Code appeared and, in 1977, the 
International Labour Office (ILO) issued its "Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy".
In this section, it has been seen that the early 1970's oil
crisis and its effects, coupled with mounting interneil and 
external pressure, forced the OECD to appear at least to be
concerned by the activities of MNCs. There was a real danger
that the United Nations might introduce legislation and in order 
to minimize this possibility the OECD quickly adopted its
voluntary Guidelines to dissuade the UN from imposing onerous 
legislation that would curb the excesses of MNCs.
Supporters of minimal regulation of MNCs, led by the US, with 
Britain, Japan, Switzerland, and West Germany in tow, thus scored 
a significant victory over a rival faction comprising Canada, the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian states who did not share these 
ulterior motives and who wanted the maximum regulation possible 
[Hamilton, 1984, p.6] The latter group attached great importance 
to helping national based unions in their negotiations with
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international management:
"Thus two sections on Disclosure of Information and on 
Bnployment and Industrial Relations were included in the 
Guidelines. The notion of information and consultation was 
an expressly European wish of which the US, because of their 
laissez-faire system of management/worker relations, were 
highly suspicious" [Hamilton, working paper, 1984, p.?].
This divergence of opinion between OECD member countries as to 
"voluntary" versus "legally binding" measures provides insight to 
how each group views industrial relations. In later sections of 
this chapter it will be interesting to note if those in favour of 
the voluntary approach are vigorous in seeing that enterprises
within their sphere of influence adhere to the Guidelines in all 
dealings with employees and their representatives. For if they do 
not, then they must accept the charge that they merely pay lip- 
service no the control of MNCs.
In the following section we examine the functioning and
effectiveness of the key OECD institution, vis-a-vis the 
Guidelines, namely, the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (CIME). Within CIME, the "Levy Group", 
(named after its chairman) has a supervisory function. 
Establishing CIME's remit is of major importance in understanding 
the principles underlying the Guidelines, and it is to this we
direct our attention.
1 ; Th? GqldeliRb? * Administrators
6.3.1: The Committee on International Investment-ari<LM«ItInafci 
lonal Enterprises.
The Executive Committee of the OECD first proposed the 
establishment of a Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (CIME) at its 8th Special Session on 
November 25 and 26, 1974. It hoped that CIME would strengthen
Co-operation between Member countries on issues pertaining to 
foreign direct investment and the practises of multinational 
enterprises. On January 21, 1975, the Council adopted the
Resolution and CIME came into being.
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By June, 1976, CIME had prepared the "Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises" which 
included the "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises". The 
Council or Ministers adopted the Declaration and the Guideline 
took effect .
The main function of CIME is to offer clarification on the
Guidelines;
"The Cbmmittee shall be responsible for clarification of the 
Guidelines. Clarification will be provided as required"
[OECD, 1979].
This might be necessary when the Trade Union Advisory Committee 
(TUAC), representing labour's interests, refers a firm to CIME 
for "breach" of the Guidelines. In such a situation CIME will 
issue a statement offering its interpretation. CIME has no
judicial function . The 1979 Review of the Guidelines sets out 
this principle:
"the Oonmittee shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of 
individual enterprises" [OECD, 1979].
This restriction, therefore, protects business from public 
denunciation of its behaviour. Indeed, Committee members are 
forbidden to refer to individual MNCs in internal discussions.
It must be stressed that CIME does not concern itself simply with 
alleged "breaches" of the Guidelines. Despite its limited
function the Committee has, nonetheless, "become the central
international forum in the Western World for governments and 
unions to air grievances on particular instances of MNC 
behaviour" [Robinson, 1983, P.120].
It is an eloquent testimony to the power of MNCs, however, that 
an entity as powerless as CIME is responsible for policing 
international business ostensibly to ensure justice for society 
and labour.
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6 .3.2.: The National Contact Points
These were established in all 24 OECD member countries, following 
CIME's recommendation in its 1979 review of the Guidelines. The 
National Contact Points (NCPs) perform CIME's function at a 
national level, but should they feel unable to meet a request for 
clarification of the Guidelines, they refer the case to Paris- 
based CIME:
"As the name suggests the national contact point is very 
much a focus for enquiries and approaches from both sides of 
industry and other government departments. This often 
involves a question of interpretation of the guidelines but 
the role of the contact point in this context is mainly to 
ensure that the parties concerned are fully aware of the
content and nature of the guidelines, including the 
interpretations which have been issued by the OECD, and of 
their relevance to the matter in hand. Consistent with the 
role of the CIME, the UK National Contact Point is not an 
adjudicator, and does not as a rule form judgements on
compliance with the guidelines in particular cases" [letter 
to author, from the Department of Trade and Industry,
February 29, 1984].
The four main elements of activity by NCPs are:
"(i) to disseminate, promote and explain the Guidelines to 
the business community and workers'organisations.
(ii) to gather information on experience with the
application of the Guidelines.
(iii) to provide a forum for discussions with interested 
parties on particular problems which imay arise.
(ivj to engage in bilateral contacts with other National 
Contact Points in particular to exchange information"
[letter to author, from the Department of Trade and 
Industry, February 29, 1984].
The UK National Contact Point believes that the level of
observance of the Guidelines is high. As evidence, it cites the 
limited number of approaches made to it although it admits that,
•this is not necessarily an infallible indication of
compliance" [letter to author, from the Department of Trade 
and Industry, February 29, 1984].
In its submission for the 1Q82 Mid-Term Report. TUAC passed to
CIME the British TUC's criticisms of the UK National Contact
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Point. The TUC had found the Contact Point disappointingly 
passive. Firstly, the UK Government had not consulted the TUC on 
the establishment of the NCP. Secondly, the NCP had not met with 
or consulted the TUC. Thirdly, the NCP had acted with apparent 
indifference to those cases brought to its attention. The TUC was 
aggrieved at the failure of the NCP to resolve cases which had 
been referred to it under the Employment and Industrial Relations 
section of the Guidelines. Fourthly, the TUC was also critical of 
the NCP's failure to take the initiative, and concluded that,
■the NCP cannot be seen as a watchdog or protector of the 
Guidelines at the national level. ...trade unions have not 
received support from the NCP in promoting knowledge of the 
Guidelines, nor has this been offered by the NCP" [TUC 
quoted in Blanpain, 1983, p.74].
The TUCs exasperation with the NCP is clearly illustrated in its 
response to the OECD Questionnaire:
"The Contact Point has done little more than act as a post­
box between unions and management, and has not initiated any 
moves between the parties towards constructive use of 
Guidelines. The Contact Point has failed to bring any formal 
or informal pressure to bear on MNEs that do not abide by 
the Guidelines, and the attitude of the Contact Point seems 
to have been one of grudging and minimal involvement" [TUC 
quoted in Blanpain, 1983, p.78].
Trade unions in other OECD countries, including France, Germany, 
and Italy, were equally critical of their NCP. But the most 
damning indictement came from trade unions in Ireland who 
"reported difficulties in even locating the NCP" [TUAC quoted in 
Blanpain, 1983, p.87].
TUAC singled out five countries in which the unions had been 
actively assisted and consulted by the NCP. These were:- Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Sweden [TUAC quoted in 
Blanpain, 1983, p.87].
The status and Effectiveness of the Guidelines
The Guidelines, as the name suggests and as the OECD text 
explains, are voluntary recommendations to multinationals. 
Although they do not constitute rules whose infringement can lead
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directly to legal sanction, they have, nevertheless, developed 
the status of what is known as international "soft law".
According to Robinson [1983],
■Soft law - politically agreed guidelines for behaviour 
which cannot be directly legally enforced but cannot either 
be legitimately infringed - is a new and, for many in 
international business, a disturbing concept. Soft law is 
disturbing because of its very open-endedness. For just as 
with soft law business is safe from legal sanction, so also 
companies accused by their adversaries... of contravening 
the OECD Code cannot definitely prove their innocence" 
[Robinson, 1983, pill].
He argues that the price of contravening the Guidelines is high 
because they were finalised only after consultations with the 
Trades Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) and the Business 
International Advisory Committee (BIAC) who accepted them as 
'the* rules of conduct which society as a whole requires MNCs to 
observe:
■In this sense they are morally binding: they indeed relate 
to societal principles of right and wrong in behaviour, 
which constitutes the essence of morality* [Blanpain, 1979, 
p.59-60].
MNCs view the Guidelines as,
■an expression of moral pressure by the Western political 
establishment* [Robinson, 1983, p.114].
Trade Unions regard the Guidelines as a step in the right 
direction, but they are of the view that legislation is the only 
effective means of restraining MNCs.
Governments of the OECD member countries realize that the 
Guidelines represent "official sanctification of the need to 
control MNCs" [Robinson, 19 83, p.114]. The current UK 
government, led by Prime Minister Thatcher, supports the 
Guidelines because their voluntary nature is appropriate to 
British principles of industrial relations. The next chapter 
will examine the British Government's view of the controversial 
"Vredeling Proposals" which someday may become legislation in EEC 
member countries.
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This chapter continues by analysing some examples of alleged 
breaches of the Guidelines. At the time of writing (ie June 
1985), TUAC has referred some 30 cases to CIME, the majority of 
these have been in connection with the Employment and Industrial 
Relations chapter of the Guidelines, and on paragraphs 3, 6, and 
9 in particular.
6 ;5 Challepgeg. to Me.JSuldellpes.
Campbell and Rowan [1983] and Robinson [1983] believe unions have 
been anxious to seek interpretation of the Guidelines, and 
Robinson [1983] says that this is particularly true of European 
unions :
■[they] have shown themselves energetic in eiqplorlng their 
application to the fullest extent* [Robinson, 1983, p.122].
On March 30, 1977, less than a year after the OECD adopted the
Guidelines, twelve cases were submitted to CIME by the 
International Metalworkers* Federation (IMF), through TUAC. IMF 
prepared a document highlighting the difficulties encountered by 
unions in their dealings with MNCs. The paper*s "Table of 
Contents" reveals the issues about which the IMF had a grievance:
■Violation of trade union rights by Motor Iberica. Spanish 
subsidiary of Massev Ferguson;
Refusal of trade union recognition by the multinational 
subsidiary of Black and Decker Limited in Great Britain;
Refusal by central manageaient of Philips to grant permission 
for leave of absence for participation at an international 
trade union sa»inar on developments within Philips, and 
continued refusal to meet with trade unions at world level;
Lack of information by Poclain in a situation of economic 
difficulties, mass dismissals and possibility of takeover;
International structural reorganisation within Bendix leads 
to confusing policies and the loss of employment despite job 
guarantees based on state subsidies;
Closure of mmAnm plant in Belgium and break-off of order 
and employment commitments between the Government and 
Sianens in Belgium;
Policy of Warner-Tambert to close down its operations in
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Sweden;
Production transfer with plant closure In Sweden by 
Litton Industries;
Failure of the Philips Company to inform the trade unions 
and cooperate with them on plant closures in the Federal 
Republic of Germany;
Changes in company structure by International Telephone and 
Telegraph Corporation (ITT) in the Federal Republic of 
Germany to evade representation, direct information and 
participation by trade unions;
The need for meetings with Multinationals at the decision­
making level" [IMF, March 11, 1977].
The filing or these complaints attracted publicity which these 
firms could certainly have done without; other MNCs feared that 
all would be "tarred with the same brush":
The Guidelines, although voluntary, were obviously not 
intended to be Ignored. Yet, that the implementation of the 
Guidelines should involve 'cases' of alleged infractions by 
individual enterprises alluded to a judicial or 
quasi judicial function that the IME Ccmmittee [i.e. CIME] 
clearly did not have" [Campbell and Rowan, 1983, p.7].
The power of CIME, as has already been shown, is limited. It was 
at first reluctant to express even interpretations of the 
Guidelines in cases of alleged infringements by individual 
enterprises. However, once member governments lent their support 
to unions' claims of alleged breaches of the Guidelines, CIME had 
little choice out to act.
On only five occasions have host countries supported claims of 
contravention of the Guidelines by MNCs. The governments of 
Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Finland, and Sweden have referred 
Badger, Hertz, British-American Tobacco, Philips, and British 
Oxygen's subsidiary, Viggo, respectively, to CIME [letter dated 
March 9» 1984, to author from Mr. John Blair, BIAC].
The Badger Company, a Belgian subsidiary of the US MNC Raytheon, 
and the Danish subsidiary of Hertz Rentacar, were the first cases 
to be challenged under the Guidelines. The complaints were taken 
up not only by TUAC, but also by the host country governments, 
and referred to CIME on March 31» 1977. The Badger and Hertz
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cases have become 'causes célébrés', but the focus was on aspects 
of the Guidelines which this thesis does not address. 
Nonetheless, they demand brief consideration, not only because 
of their notoriety, but because they represent the height of 
trade union success with the Guidelines.
The Badger Co. was reported for having committed a breach of the 
Guidelines (Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Introduction). The complaint 
was made uy TUAC and the Belgian Government. In February 1977, 
the plant had been closed with no compensation to employees 
because parent company refused to meet the redundancy payments on 
behalf of the subsidiary whose available assets did not cover its 
liabilities. The major issue at stake was parent company 
responsibility over a foreign subsidiary limited in liability.
Intergovernmental contacts, continuing union pressure, and debate 
within CIME, resulted in the parent company finally agreeing a 
settlement with the Belgian Government in April 1977. The unions 
hailed this case as "a victory for the OECD Guidelines, declaring 
that they nad led to the unions' success" [Hamilton, 1984, p.8].
The second case arose when, during a strike at Hertz in Denmark, 
the Company sought to overcome its staff shortage problem by 
temporarily transferring employees from other EEC countries to 
Denmark. TUAC, acting on behalf of the Danish LG union 
confederation, argued that this action infringed paragraph 8 of 
the Employment and Industrial Relations section which stated that 
enterprises should not adopt practises "in order to unfairly 
influence negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a right to 
organise" [OECD, 1976,p.17].
CIME concluded that behaviour of this nature was not in 
contravention of the Guidelines, but recommended that paragraph 8 
be amended. Accordingly, the 1979 Review of the Guidelines 
expanded paragraph 8 to read that MNCs must not "transfer 
employees from the enterprises' component entities in other 
countries to influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder 
the exercise or a right to organise" [OECD, 1979» p.20].
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Since the Bauger case, about 30 others have been referred to CIME
and most of these have been in relation to the chapter on
Employment and Industrial Relations. In its
1984 Review of the Guidelines. CIME wrote:
"To date, this is one of the chapters of the Guidelines to
which the Ommmittee has devoted most time and effort,
reflecting the importance and complexity of the subject
matter of these Guidelines, the special concern of employees 
with them and the wishes in particular of employees (as 
represented by TUAC) to seek further information or
clarification on the scope and intent of these Guidelines” 
[OECD, 1984, p.38].
It is to this chapter which we now turn our attention, and
examine CIME's clarifications of paragraphs 3 (and to a lesser
extent, 2b), 6, and 9. Under these paragraphs the issues at stake 
in the proposed plant closure situation are;- firstly, the 
provision or information for a true and fair view of the 
performance of the entity, or enterprise, as a whole, and 
secondly, "reasonable notice" of closure, and finally, access to 
the decision makers.
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6.6.: The Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines
Given the title of this section it is hardly surprising that it 
has proved the most controversial part of the Guidelines. The 
Employment and Industrial Relations Section is Reproduced in full 
below.
Paragraph 2b requires that enterprises provide employees' 
representatives with information "which is needed for meaningful 
negotiations on conditions of employment", while paragraph 3 
requires that enterprises "provide to representatives of 
employees, where this accords with local law and practise, 
information which enables them to obtain a true and fair view of 
the performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the 
enterprise as a whole" [OECD, 1976, p.16].
6-»6.t1.? ParaKr^ph .26. 3.Î-..cplleotlyg BargainlnK and A True and, fair
liSK
Most industrialised countries have national legislation covering 
disclosure of information to employees, but host governments find 
these laws unenforceable, and therefore useless in cases where 
parent company management withholds information thus precluding 
the meeting of legal obligations by foreign subsidiaries.
TUAC in its submissions to CIME has demanded that, before final 
decisions are reached, information on the enterprise as a whole 
should be provided so that Unions can influence corporate 
decisions. In March 1977» it referred a number of cases to CIME 
for alleged breach of paragraphs 2b and 3 of the Employment and 
Industrial Relations chapter of the Guidelines. Bendix, 
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), Litton Industries, 
Philips, Siemens and Poclain, made up the rogues gallery. A brief 
look at the last case reveals the difficulties trade unions have 
experienced. We can also examine CIME's clarification of 
paragraphs 2b and 3.
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aiPLOYMEHT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and 
prevailing labour relations and employment practices, in each of 
the countries in which they operate,
1. respect the right of their employees to be represented by 
trade unions and other bona fide organisations of employees, 
and engage in constructive negotiations, either individually 
or through employers* associations, with such employee 
organisations with a view to reaching agreements on 
employement conditions, which should include provisions for 
dealing with disputes arising over the interpretation of 
such agreements, and for ensuring mutually respected rights 
and responsibilities;
2.a) provide such facilities to representatives of the employees 
as may be necessary to assist in the development of 
effective collective agreements,
b) provide to representatives of employees information which is
needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of 
employment;
3. provide to respresentatives of employees where this accords 
with local law and practice, information which enables them 
to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the 
entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole;
4. observe standards of employment and industrial relations not 
less favourable than those observed by comparable employers 
in the host country;
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5, iîî tbelr opérations, to the greatest extent practicable, 
utilise, train ;aad prep .are for upgrading members of the 
local labour force in oo-operation with representatives of 
their employees and, where appropriate, the relevant 
governmental author!ties;
6, in oonsidering changes in their operations which would have 
major effects upon the livelihood of their amployees, in 
particular in the case of the closure of an entity envolving 
collective lay-offs or dismissals, provide reasonable notice 
of such 'Changes to representatives of their employees, .and 
where appropriate to the relevant governmental aut&orities, 
and oo-opereate with the employee respresentatives and 
appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate to 
the maximum extent practicable adverse effects;
7. iaplement their employment policies including hiring, 
discharge, pay, promotion and training without 
discrimination unless selectively in respect of employee 
char.act eristics is in furtherance of established 
governmental policies which specifically promote greater 
equality of employment opportunity;
8. in the context of bona fide me,gotiations with representative 
of employees on condition of employment, or while employees 
are exercising a ri^t to organise, not threaten to utilise 
a capacity to transfer the whole or part of an opm%ting 
unit from the country concernée nor transfer employees Tr€m 
the enterprises component entities in other countries in 
orderto influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder 
the exercise of a right to organise.
Sonree: OIGD, 1979.
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Confronted with severe adverse market conditions for its main 
products, hydraulic excavators, cranes, and other construction 
machinery, Poclain cut back on production as orders dried up and 
losses mounted. Mass dismissals were introduced at its factories 
in France and its two operating units in Spain, while the Belgian 
factory escaped unscathed [International Metalworkers' 
Federation, 1977, p.6-7].
In its submission to CIME , TUAC alleged that
"The trade unions have been kept completely in the dark 
about the financial and economic situation, prospective 
orders, work on hand and management's basic intentions. 
Requests for information about the latest state of accounts 
were refused. The works council and the trade unions were 
confronted with the announcement of large scale dismissals, 
without being able to assess their justification and then 
negotiate about the need for such dismissals. These rights 
accorded by French legislation to works councils were 
ignored.
There is no information at all given to the workers and 
their trade unions in the two subsidiary plants in Spain. 
The workers and the trade unions in the Belgian plant also 
have no way of obtaining information about the situation of 
the parent plant in France and the state of affairs of the 
whole group" [International Metalworkers' Federation, 1977, 
p.6-7].
On January 29, 1979, at a meeting with the Working Group of CIME, 
TUAC once again stressed its interpretation of paragraphs 2b and
3. It stated that meaningful information, must include
information on the enterprise as a whole, and that in order to 
give a true and fair view of the entity or the enterprise, 
information on future plans must be included.
1979 Review of the Guidelines devote three paragraphs to
"Provision of information to employees":
”63. Provision of information to employees is usually dealt
with under national systems of labour relations or, more
recently, by legislation and is an area where national 
diversity is great. Given this diversity, the Guidelines, 
nevertheless, make some very relevant recommendations in 
this area.
64. Attention, is drawn in particular, in this connection to 
paragraph 2b which calls for the provision to employees of 
'information which is needed for meaningful negotiations on
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conditions of employment'. The word 'meaningful' has to be 
applied, of course, to the circumstances of each case; but 
it is a term which will be of operational value to persons 
experienced in labour relations. Again, paragraph 3 speaks 
of the provision of information, where this accords to local 
law and practise, enabling representatives of employees to 
obtain a true and fair view. A list of items which would be 
covered by this wording would not be practicable as it would 
differ from one country to another. This is particularly the 
case where information on future plans of the enterprise is 
concerned. As is known, this is still a very controversial 
area of industrial and social policy in a number of OECD 
Member countries. Consequently, recourse has to be made to 
the Introduction to the Guidelines referring to the 
framework of national laws, regulations and practices. 
Within such a framework, however, and subject to legitimate 
interests of business confidentiality, management is 
encouraged by this paragraph to adopt an open and co­
operative attitude to the provision of information to 
employees relevant to the objective of this paragraph, which 
could include information on future plans.
Reference is made to paragraph 8 of the Introduction to the 
Guidelines in which the responsibilities of the various 
entities within a multinational enterprise are described. If 
an entity in a given country is not able to provide 
information to the employees in accordance with paragraphs 
, 2b and 3, the other entities of the enterprise are expected 
to co-operate and assist one another as necessary to 
facilitate observance of the Guidelines. Since 
representatives of employees may experience difficulties in 
obtaining such information at the national level, this 
provision of the Guidelines introduces a useful 
supplementary standard in this respect" [OECD, 1979, p.36-
37]
In recent years, many OECD countries have witnessed campaigns for 
greater disclosure of information to the public at large. In the 
UK, for example, the Liberal Party has campaigned strongly for a 
"Freedom of Information Act", based on the US model. Mr. Clive 
Ponting, a former civil servant, is regarded by some as a 
national hero because he disclosed to the public - via the media 
- Information which the Government wished to suppress for the 
time being.
"Accountability" indeed appears to be a major issue throughout 
the Western world, and it has been particularly prominent in 
industrial relations. National employee disclosure legislation 
varies greatly, however, from one country to another. The 
Guidelines may in some cases be supplementary to national 
legislation. For example, few countries have legislation
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requiring firms to provide employees with a true and fair view of 
the group as a whole.
The Guidelines, unlike national legislation, ostensibly adopt an 
international perspective, and, as CIME stresses, the parent 
company must ensure that subsidiaries receive sufficient 
information in due time in order to be able to fulfil their 
obligations under national law and practice, and the Guidelines.
6.6.2 Paragraph 6; "Reasonable notice" in case of major change
Paragraph 6 has been one of the most invoked paragraphs of the 
Guidelines. TUAC has accused a number of MNCs when closing a 
plant of failing to provide "reasonable notice". These were 
Badger, British-American Tobacco, Firestone, and Ford, among 
others.
The key term in paragraph 6 is "reasonable notice". It needs to 
be clearly defined because it is open to wide interpretation and 
could therefore be a source of conflict between employer and 
employee, and of course the important third party, the government 
involved. Accordingly in 1979 the OECD's Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises issued the 
following statement;
"66. The management decisions to which the term 'changes in 
their operations', in paragraph 6 refers, would cover, in 
addition to the closure of an entity, which is specifically 
mentioned in the text, other measures 'which would have 
major effects upon the livelihood of employees'. The key 
notions in this paragraph [i.e. 6] are the 'reasonable
notice' to be given of such changes and actions by 
management and co-operation with employee representatives 
and appropriate governmental authorities 'so as to mitigate 
to the maximum extent practicable adverse effects'.
67. It has seemed to the Committee that there is a link 
between these two notions. The notice given has to be 
sufficiently timely for the purpose of mitigating action to 
be prepared and put into effect : otherwise, it would not
meet the criterion of 'reasonable'. It would be in 
conformity with the general intention of this paragraph, in 
the light of the specific circumstances of each case, if 
management were able to provide such notice prior to the 
final decision being taken" [OECD, 1979» p.37].
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In order, therefore, to adhere to paragraph 6, enterprises should 
inform employees of their intention to close plants before their 
decision is final and irreversible. The wording 'in considering 
changes' seems to imply this interpretation.
Professor Blanpain, the Belgian representative on CIME, has 
inside knowledge which makes his comments on the interpretation 
of the Guidelines especially valid. As regards paragraph 6 he 
writes :
"Co-operation with employee representatives and Governmental 
authorities does, following the drafters of the Guidelines, 
not include negotiations in the strict sense but means 
consultation. Mitigation to the maximum extent practicable 
of the resulting adverse effects, includes looking for 
alternative solutions (e.g. no overtime, work sharing), 
dismissing of less people, postponement of dismissals, terms 
of notice, golden handshakes, retraining, re-employment and 
the like. This does, of course, not take away that in 
certain countries national legislation and practise 
prescribes negotiations on the decision as well as on the 
social consequences thereof (e.g. Sweden)" [Blanpain, 1979, 
para. 190].
6.6.3.: Paragraph 9; Access to Decision Makers
Lack of access to decision-making management has proved another 
major area of complaint against MNCs. In its 1979 Review of the 
Guidelines. CIME devoted two paragraphs (i.e. 71 and 72) to
"Access to decision makers":
"71. When negotiations or collective leadership are 
proceeding in the context of any parent subsidiary 
relationship, there is clearly a possibility that the 
subsidiary may not be fully empowered to negotiate and to 
conclude an agreement. There may be special problems in the 
case of a subsidiary which is situated in one country whilst 
the parent company is situated in another. The purpose of 
the text of paragraph 9 was to lay stress on the access of 
employee representatives to management representatives 'who 
are authorised to take decisions on the matters under 
negotiation'. This is the key consideration and the 
management of an MNE should see that it is observed in the 
circumstances of each case.
72. There is also paragraph 8 of the Introduction to the 
Guidelines which is germane to the matter discussed under 
paragraph 9 of the Employment and Industrial Relations 
Guidelines. This text recalls that 'the Guidelines are 
addressed to the various entities within the multinational 
enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities)
147
according to the actual distribution of responsibilities 
among them on the understanding that they will co-operate 
and provide assistance to one another as necessary to 
facilitate observance of the Guidelines’. Parent companies, 
therefore, are expected to take the necessary organisational 
steps to enable their subsidiaries to observe the 
Guidelines, inter alia, by providing them with adequate and 
timely information and ensuring that their representatives 
who carry out negotiations at the national or local level 
have sufficient authority to take decisions on the matters 
under negotiation" [OECD, 1979, p.38-39].
Some MNCs are highly centralised, while others prefer a 
decentralised organisational structure. Trade Unionists may 
experience difficulty in ascertaining the extent of local 
management's authority. Industrial relations may deteriorate when 
they discover that local management is no better informed than 
they are themselves of the parent company's plans, and indeed may 
only be informed about strategic decisions which affect the 
subsidiary they manage after such decisions are taken. Even the 
suspicion that subsidiary management is being kept in the dark 
is likely to prompt demands by unions for meetings with head 
office management.
It was seen in an earlier chapter that the foreign divestment 
decision is invariably taken at parent company headquarters by a 
few top men. This view is also commonly expressed in trade union 
publications, and it would appear that employees' representatives 
have been unimpressed by the claims of some MNCs that the 
divestment decision was made by local management.
Paragraph 9 aims to overcome these problems and ensure that 
employees' representatives receive timely information and access 
bo the decision makers. Blanpain [1979] a member of CIME, 
concl udes :
It is self-evident that headquarters must provide local 
management with appropriate information so that they can 
inform the employees, unless top management itself prefers 
to inform the employees directly" [Blanpain, 1979, 
para. 138].
Under paragraph 9 MNCs must either delegate local management with 
bhe authority to conduct negotiations or send duly authorised 
Representatives from headquarters for negotiations with the
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employees. But as Blanpain [1979] says,
"What is meant by 'to conduct negotiations on collective 
bargaining or labour management relations issues' is to be 
determined by national law, regulations and practice, which 
is prevalent in the entity, affected by the decisions"
[Blanpain, 1979, para.138].
6.6.4; "The Chapeau Clause"
The Employment and Industrial Relations chapter is qualified by 
the "chapeau clause". It commends adherence by Enterprises,
"within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing 
labour relations and employment practises, in each of the 
countries in i^ich they operate". [OECD, 1976]
CIME, however, in its 1982 mid-term report stated that although 
the "chapeau clause" underlines the importance of the framework 
of national law, the Guidelines "where relevant can serve as a 
valuable supplement". [OECD, 1982]
The upshot of the "chapeau clause" is that in the past TUAC has 
had to challenge the principle that if national legislation 
exists on items covered by the Guidelines, and if the enterprise 
has not violated this legislation, then it has automatically 
respected the Guidelines" [TUAC quoted in Campbell and Rowan, 
1983, p.146].
The "chapeau clause" is very important and its effect on the 
interpretation of the Guidelines has been significant. Only in 
1980, one US Government representative commented:
"The guidelines dealing with employment and industrial 
relations boll down to compliance with local law, tempered 
by the observance of standards 'not less favourable than 
those observed by comparable anployers in the host 
country....Since it is clear the guidelines do not override 
national laws, they provide no new rights or obligations 
either for enterprises or employees'" [quoted in Campbell 
and Rowan, 1983, p.238].
Nonetheless, Trades Unionists insist on judging firms' conduct
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against each paragraph of the Employment and Industrial Relations 
Guidelines, and in so doing have failed to grasp the fundamental 
impact of "the chapeau clause" and its neutralising effect.
Some firms have been accused of breaching one or more of 
the directives contained in paragraphs 3, 6, and 9. Firestone was 
accused by TUAC of not providing Swiss employees with "reasonable 
notice" and "access to the decision makers". Ford was accused of 
violating all three paragraphs during the divestment process of a 
plant in Holland.
fi.7.: The Ford Amsterdam
On January 13, 1981, the Works Council at Ford's Amsterdam plant 
was informed by local management that the unprofitable "buffer" 
factory would close with the loss of 1 ,200 jobs. This was 
followed by an announcement on April 24, 1981, that it would 
close on September 30, 1981. Infuriated employees occupied the 
plant, but on July 7, 1981 a court order was issued outlawing 
workers’ occupation of the plant. The court injunction also 
stipulated, however, that the company await the outcome of an 
inquiry into its divestment decision before implementing it 
[Campbell and Rowan, 1983, p.146-9].
Ford retaliated, threatening to cease subsidising the alleged 
loss-making operation with effect from November 30, 1981 , and 
Issuing dismissal notices which stated the assembly plant would 
close in late November.
On October 28, 1981, a Dutch court lifted the injunction against 
o^rd, thus giving the go-ahead for closure. On November 24, 1981, 
the plant was closed, and in the following month, the Industrial 
Enterprise Chamber of Amsterdam returned a verdict clearing Ford 
 ^ the unions’ charges of mismanagement [Campbell and Rowan, 1983 
P.146-9].
On March 22, 1982, TUAC referred the case to CIME. In addition to 
1-1-sglng breach of paragraph 3, TUAC claimed "reasonable notice" 
not been provided, but instead "notice was given only after a
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decision which proved to be final was taken", [quoted in 
Blanpain, 19831. TUAC also believed that the divestment decision 
had not been made, as Ford claimed, by local management, and that 
negotiations were meaningless as the unions were denied access to 
the decision makers, the US Board. Ford countermanded these 
charges claiming it had fully complied with the Guidelines.
TUAC concedes that Ford respected Dutch legislation on employee 
disclosure and consultation, but it stressed that the Guidelines 
must be seen as supplementary to national legislation, and was 
critical of the Dutch Contact Point which implicitly equated the 
two:
"If an enterprise respects national law and practise, it 
seemingly cannot act contrary to the Guidelines. However, it 
is possible that even if a subsidiary of a multinational 
enterprise has lived up to national legislation e.g. in 
terms of information and consultation with the 
representatives of the employees, the enterprise as a whole 
has not fulfilled its obligations under the Guidelines" 
[TUAC quoted in Campbell and Rowan, 1983, p.146].
TUAC was unimpressed by the Contact Point’s logic, and the 
Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (Federatie Nederlandse 
Vakbeweging -FNV) holds that its handling of the case was 
unsatisfactory. It would appear that TUAC has referred this case 
to CIME with a view to instigating an inquiry into the 
functioning of NCPs rather than obtaining clarification of the 
Guidelines. TUAC proposes a much more active, pragmatic role for 
NCPs. It believes they should:
"go beyond only making references to either OECD documents, 
8u<A as the 1979 Review Report, or national legislation, and 
should engage itself actively assisting the parties 
concerned to find solutions". [TUAC quoted in Campbell and 
Rowan, 1983, p.152].
The European Trade Union Confederation has used this case to 
illustrate the inadequacy of voluntary measures, and the need for 
legislation, during its impressive performance in debating 
"Vredeling" before the European Commission.
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6.ft.: The Firestone Cas^
The Firestone case was introduced by TUAC on behalf of the Swiss 
Trade Union Centre. It referred to the closedown of an allegedly 
profitable plant at Pratteln. The Swiss unions argued that they 
had not received from the Company the maximum cooperation which 
is called for in paragraph 6 of the Employment and Industrial 
Relations section, the redundancies being unnecessary as the 
plant was allegedly profitable. They also argued that the same 
paragraph calls for:
"an open consultation between management and representatives 
of employees • Long term decisions involving collective lay­
offs etc. should be told to the employees as soon as the 
decision at central level is made" [Submission by the Swiss 
Trade Union Centre quoted in Blanpain, 1979, para.135].
But the chief bone of contention was lack of access to the real 
decision-makers by employees’ representatives. The unions were 
particularly adamant that Firestone had flagrantly failed to 
comply with paragraph 9. Not only had employees’ representatives 
been constrained to negotiate with local management, powerless to 
reverse the divestment decision, but in retrospect it appeared 
that the parent company had kept local management in the dark 
about its divestment plans, or, the latter had consciously given 
misleading information to union officials and public authorities.
The Mayor of the town, for instance, had been assured by factory 
management that closure was out of the question, and that the 
activities of the subsidiary were "more or less normalised". A 
number of statements had also been issued indicating that the 
factory would remain open. Yet the collective agreement between 
the Corporation and the trade unions stipulated that,
"collective lay-offs or dismissals following a lack of 
orders ...as well as closure of enterprise’s should be 
discussed with trade unions and the workers’ committee prior 
to any move" [Submission by the Swiss Trade Union Centre 
quoted In Blanpain, 1979, para.135].
These discussions never materialised and despite requests in the 
three years previous to the announcement for a negotiating 
meeting with the "authorised representative of the Firestone
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Group (International)”, it was only after "a decision of closure 
was announced suddenly and unilaterally” that Firestone 
international management declared its willingness to receive a 
Swiss delegation at its US Headquarters. The unions argument 
could be summed up thus:
"decision-makers should be ready to pass the necessary 
Information, discuss It, negotiate on conditions of 
employment and/or closure, before the final decision Is 
made" [Submission by the Swiss Trade Union Centre quoted in 
Blanpain, 1979, para.135].
On April 11, 1978, BIAC replied to TUAC’s accusation that
Firestone had failed to comply with paragraph 9:
"In regard to the last Employment and Industrial Relations 
Guideline (9) BIAC would just reiterate that collective 
bargaining procedures and labour relations Issues are 
matters to be settled between the management of the 
affiliate and the authorized representatives of Its 
employees In the country concerned In accordance with 
national law and practice" [Position of BIAC quoted in 
Blanpain, 1979, para.136].
6.9.; Conclusion
The Guidelines were drawn up by the OECD in response to criticism 
of MNCs, both within the rich countries of ”the North" and the 
under-privileged countries of "the south”. The speed at which 
they were formulated was in anticipation of more rigorous 
controls which the UN might impose; the motives of OECD were 
therefore suspect right from the start.
The limitations imposed on the Committee for International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) did little to 
inspire confidence in the OECD’s initiative, CIME, watchdog of 
the Guidelines, was denied any judicial function and barred from 
commenting on the conduct of an individual enterprise. CIME’s 
prime function is confined to clarifying, on request, sections of 
the Guidelines.
The Employment and Industrial Relations section, the key chapter 
cf the Guidelines, was introduced only to placate "progressive” 
OECD member states, after their appeals for legislation had been
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rejected by the US and its supporters. Even then, this vital 
section of the Guidelines was liberally scattered with ambiguity, 
clearly denoting an absence of precept. And finally the inclusion 
of "the chapeau clause" neatly protects the interests of MNCs. 
This clause commends that MNCs accord with paragraphs 1-9 "within 
the framework of the law, regulations, and prevailing labour 
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in 
which they operate". It is significant that this clause prefaces 
only the section of the Guidelines which bears most heavily on 
protecting the interests of employees.
Trade Unionists have apparently not grasped the fundamental 
impact of "the chapeau clause", and have thus failed to hammer 
home the point that the Employment and Industrial Relations 
Guidelines do not override national laws, and therefore fail to 
provide new rights or obligations to either employees or 
enterprises. The so-called union victories under the Guidelines, 
- in the Badger and Hertz cases -, were achieved, not because 
sections of the Guidelines were breached, but because national 
legislation had been contravened incurring the wrath of the host 
governments which fully supported the Unions in their dispute 
with these two firms.
"The chapeau clause" precludes the consideration that the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines are a supplement 
to national law. Firms which comply with appropriate national 
legislation have automatically respected this section of the 
Guidelines. Some members of CIME may genuinely wish them to be 
regarded as supplementary, but the fact is, that until "the 
chapeau clause" is removed they will remain only complementary to 
national legislation.
Thus employers’ organisations have readily accepted the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines. Mr. Hans Kroger, 
the Head of Department of Legal and Fiscal Affairs for UNICE (ie. 
Union des Industries de la Communauté Europeene) underlined the 
Importance of the "chapeau clause" when he explained UNICE’s 
opposing views of the section of the Guidelines and revised 
Vredeling Proposals", paragraph 6 and article 4 respectively.
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which bear most heavily on the plant closure situation:
"The '(diapeau’ of section 6 is of utmost importance because 
it says that enterprises should apply section 6 within the 
framework of law, regulations and prevailing labour 
relations and employment practises, in each of the countries 
in which they operate. There is nothing comparable to this 
in article 4." [letter dated April 19, 1984, from Mr. Kroger 
to the author].
The Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines do nothing to 
inhibit those MNCs who regard minimum legal requirements as a 
ceiling; for those MNCs which aim to respect not just the letter, 
but the spirit of the law, they are irrelevant.
This was the thinking underlying the controversial 1980 EEC Draft 
Directive on "Proposal for a Council Directive on procedure for 
informing and consulting employees of undertakings with complex 
structures, and in particular transnational undertakings" 
commonly known as the "Vredeling Proposals". The author would, 
however, dispute the contention that "without the OECD’s 
Guidelines, and in particular the industrial relations section, 
it is more than likely that the Vredeling move would never have 
seen the light of day" [Robinson, 1983» p.112]. Quite the 
reverse, "Vredeling" would not only have been published earlier, 
but its journey through the EEC’s legislative process would have 
been smoother, and quicker. For because of the Guidelines, 
European Trade Unions and some politicians ignored their 
instincts and dithered for four years awaiting proof that the 
Guidelines would solve the inherent contradiction in seeking 
protection from national legislation in tackling problems with 
international dimensions.
Throughout the "Vredeling Proposals" debate. Employers’ 
Organisations have argued that further legislation is 
unnecessary. Often they present the Guidelines and "Vredeling" as 
^ternatives which differ only in legal status, while fully aware 
that legalities apart, "Vredeling" threatens to impose much more 
onerous obligations. Consequently, Trades Unionists have fallen 
^or this ploy and have devoted crucial time and resources 
haggling over the extent of compliance to the Guidelines, and the 
Employment and Industrial Relations chapter in particular. This
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Is a futile exercise, for the nine paragraphs of the Employment 
and Industrial Relations section are not independent. "The 
chapeau clause" prefaces them, and thus considerably dilutes 
their recommendations. These Guidelines only commend adherence to 
national legislation. They are therefore an irrelevance in the 
"Vredeling" debate. The key criterion in establishing the need 
for "Vredeling" should be first, the effectiveness of national 
legislation, and secondly the quality and validity of the Draft 
Directive’s proposals.
Campbell and Rowan [1983] have concluded that the relatively 
small number of alleged infractions of the Employment and 
Industrial Relations Guidelines referred by TÜAC to CIME 
"provides testimony to the generally good comportment, and thus 
good reputation of multinational firms" [Campbell and Rowan, 
1983, p.12]. It would be satisfying to think this true, but sadly 
the small number of cases referred to CIME warrants a more 
mundane conclusion, namely, the majority of MNCs respect national 
legislation. But, if Trade Unionists have small regard for the 
protection offered by national legislation, then MNCs will have 
to exceed legal requirements if they hope to boost their public 
esteem.
This thesis will focus on foreign-owned plant closures involving 
500, or more, employees in the UK, since 1976 when the Guidelines 
were introduced. It has been seen that by prefacing the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines with "the chapeau 
clause", the net result has been to recommend that MNCs do no 
more than respect appropriate national employment legislation. It 
should therefore come as no surprise if Management and Trades 
Unionists, interviewed by the author for the case studies, 
ignored or paid scant attention to these Guidelines during the 
divestment process. There was no need to, for firms complying 
with UK legislation automatically respected the Employment and 
Industrial Relations Guidelines.
Tt follows, therefore, that the Guidelines have no place in our 
analysis of firms’ conduct. It will be worthwhile considering, 
though, whether they constitute a framework for Management and
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Trades Unionists during the divestment process.
In the case studies attention will focus on the extent to which 
the MNCs under review satisfied their legal obligations. The 
European Parliament has approved the "Vredeling Proposals", so 
MNCs are now aware of the standard of behaviour which these 
elected representatives consider appropriate. The need for 
"Vredeling" hinges, therefore, on the extent of compliance with 
national legislation and the requirements contained in the EEC's 
Draft Directive.
Our focus now transfers from the Paris-based OECD, to the 
Brussels-based European Community (EC) and to the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg as we examine the "Vredeling Proposals".
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CHAPTER 7
THE EEC'S "VREDELING» PROPOSALS
7.1,; Introduction
On October 23, 1980, the European Commission approved the
"Proposal for a Directive on Procedures for Informing and 
Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, 
in particular Transnational Undertakings". The shorthand title 
for this Eurospeak is the "Vredeling Proposals/Directive", after 
its author, the then Commissioner responsible for Labour and 
Social Affairs, Mr. Henk Vredeling, a Dutch Socialist.
This proposed Directive immediately provoked not only a heated 
debate between unions and business, but it also led to the latter 
mounting an expensive campaign decrying it. Once again, Henk 
Vredeling was surrounded by controversy.
In 1974, he had rocked the Dutch Cabinet - yet retained his 
seat - with an incredible newspaper interview in which he 
castigated almost all his ministerial colleagues. The Minister 
for Development was described as a "student union prig" - and he 
escaped relatively lightly.
The Dutch Socialist believed that the economic climate of the 
late 1970's demanded regulation of the activities of firms. It 
should be remembered that the "Vredeling Directive" was 
introduced just as the effects of the world economic crisis were 
beginning to hurt, and multinationals were being forced to 
restructure their operations. Subsidiaries were sold, plants were 
closed, manning levels cut, and in many cases production was 
transferred to more competitive locations.
The unions argued that when decisions of this magnitude were 
taken, workers should be informed and consulted before an 
irreversible decision was reached. They objected to being
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confronted with the "fait accompli".
The European Commission, for its part, recognised that whilst 
employees* information and consultation rights were determined by 
national legislation, the Internationalisation of business and 
the tendency towards centralised decision-making had rendered 
national legislation ineffective for many employees. Workers in 
the host country had no access to the decision-makers at company 
headquarters in the home nation, and relied on each link in the 
chain of the corporate hierarchy relaying information down to 
employee representative level.
The Commission in its introduction to "Vredeling" therefore 
reached the following conclusion:
"A legal framework for the disclosure of information to and 
consultation with employees will therefore constitute a 
stepping stone to the creation of a uniform operating 
environment for all undertakings in the Ccmnnunity. The 
current economic climate, idiich has necessitated fai>- 
reaching and structural changes in industry and has had very 
serious social repercussions, highlights the importance of a 
Community initiative in this field. Against this background, 
the requirement that all firms should inform and consult 
their anployees on the basis of their overall operations 
assumes particular importance" [Com. 80 (423 final].
The "Vredeling Proposals" called for the regular provision of 
information - half-yearly at least - covering the following 
subjects: structure and manning; the economic and financial
situation; current and likely development of the business, 
production, sales, and employment; production, investment, and 
restructuring plans; current and proposed manufacturing and 
working methods; and, finally, all procedures and plans liable to 
have "a substantial effect" on employees * interests.
Employees had to be consulted when a proposed decision was liable 
to have "a substantial effect" on employees’ interests, eg. the 
closure of a plant.
These proposals were strongly supported, for obvious reasons, by 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), but drew 
vociferous criticism from the umbrella organisation. Union des
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Industries de la Communauté Europeene (UNICE). Both bodies 
launched extensive campaigns to publicise their viewpoint, and 
throughout Europe, unions debated the issue with employers’ 
organisations. The multinationals, especially US-based ones, 
argued vehemently against the need for and desirability of the 
"Vredeling Proposals" [Fryer, 1982].
On October 12, 1982, after intensive lobbying by the business
community, the European Parliament voted in favour of a number of 
amendments to the "Vredeling Proposals". Supporters claimed that 
these amendments weakened the original text. In total, 37 changes 
were proposed.
In November 1982, the successor to Henk Vredeling, the British 
Commissioner, and former Labour MP, Mr. Ivor Richard, announced 
that he did not find acceptable all of the amendments suggested 
by the Assembly.
The revised version was published in June 1983. It was a much 
watered down version of the 1980 proposals, and it is commonly 
referred to as "the Richard’s Proposals/Directive".
In late 1983, the "Richard’s Proposals" were passed by the
Commission and the European Parliament. The proposals had
therefore reached the final hurdle. In order to become Community 
law, they must now secure unanimous approval by the Council of
Ministers composed of representatives from all ten EEC
Governments.
The major stumbling block to the Directive’s progress is the UK 
Government. The re-election in June 1983 of the Thatcher 
Government, totally opposed to the principle of legislation in
this field, makes it unlikely that the "Richard’s Directive" will
win the necesary support at the Council of Ministers before 1988. 
The question is, will it then be too late?
The superstitious may blame the tortuously slow progress of the 
"Vredeling/Richard’s Proposals" on Mr. Vredeling’s accident in a 
Strasbourg hotel when he broke a mirror, but it would be more
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accurate to attribute lack of progress to lack of power possessed 
by the European Parliament compared to that held by the pro­
business lobby. Add to this the shift to right since 1980 of 
Member Governments.
7.2.: "Vredeling/Richard’s" Historical Backgroond and Legal Basis
Multinationals with plants in more than one EEC country hold 
national negotiations with their employees. Disparities in 
income, culture, ideology and social history, especially labour 
tradition, among workers from different nations continue to
impede the formation of a central body to represent workers 
worldwide. Thus, attempts to develop transnational collective 
bargaining have failed.
Instead, European Unions have concentrated on the more realistic 
goal of being regularly consulted and informed of central 
management decisions. As the level of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has risen in EEC member countries. Unions have become
increasingly aware that national legislation is inadequate in 
dealing with an issue of international dimensions.
Workers believe that current national employment legislation has 
failed to take cognisance of the internationalisation of
business. For them, a Corporation is primarily an employer and 
employees are particularly concerned about the perceived ability 
of MNCs to reallocate resources to areas outwith a national Trade 
Union’s sphere of influence [Gray, 1984, p.33].
The resource allocation decisions of MNCs - sometimes in conflict 
with national interests - inevitably create tensions between 
corporations and governments and trade unions. Introducing
legislation to extend accountability and information disclosure 
has come to be seen as a means of regulating the activities of 
MNCs.
Restructuring of a MNC frequently involves divestment, and as was 
seen earlier, the divestment decision is not only a centralised 
decision, but one that is usually taken by the Chief Executive
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Officer (CEO). Employees therefore no longer have access, when it 
is most needed, to the real decision makers. Instead, they are 
dependent on the various layers in the corporate hierarchy 
transmitting the information down to their representatives.
This situation is considered unacceptable by the unions, and has 
led them to demand legislation which will require international 
management to initiate transnational consultations with their 
employees. So far, MNCs have not responded favourably.
Of all the international trade union organisations, the 
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) are most determined to 
escalate national consultation between management and workers to 
an international level. At the 13th World Congress of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in Oslo 
during the week commencing June 23, 1983, a resolution was 
passed, deploring "the resistance of most transnational 
corporations to requests for meetings between ITSs and the 
management at the headquarters of TNCs" [Hamilton, 1983, p.2].
European unions in particular have campaigned vigorously for 
legislation and have appealed to the EEC for positive action. 
They have done so in recognition of the EEC’s efforts to 
eradicate the disparities which exist among Member States, 
culturally, economically, and socially.
1971, a popular view of the time was expressed by Tugendhat in 
his introduction to The Multinationals. He warned:
"The time has oome for governments everywhere to decide what 
to do about the great multinational companies that have 
grown up in the last twenty-five years. Their emergence is 
one of the most dramatic developments of the period, and of 
more than just economic and industrial significance. Their 
position profoundly affects the role of governments in the 
exercise of their responsibilities, and the relationship 
between states" [Tugendhat, 1971, p.19l*
His advice certainly did not go unheeded by the EEC, and long 
before "Vredeling", the EEC had expressed alarm about MNCs and 
had introduced legislation to regulate their activities. As early 
as 1973 the Commission had approved a report by an Italian
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Commissioner, Spinelli, which declared:
"The opportunities possessed by multinational companies to 
affect employment in the various countries in which they 
exercise an activity causes much anxiety amongst workers. 
The CcMimissionn considers the setting up of a trade union 
counterweight as essential for a balanced solution to this 
problan but feels that its task is to encourage this 
initiative, not to organize directly" [European Commission 
(Bulletin Supplement) 15/73, p.10].
A year later, "The Commission Communication on Multinational 
Undertakings and Community Regulations" stated that workers are 
"extremely concerned about the power of multinational companies 
to affect employment in the various countries in which they 
operate". The Commission therefore considered the setting up of 
a Trade Unions counterweight as "essential for a balanced 
solution to this problem; however it is not its task to organise 
this but certainly to encourage it". The Communication also 
refers to the problem of informing and consulting workers in 
firms which have branches outside the Community [OJ C 116 of 
September 30, 1974].
In reply to this document, the Committee put forward several 
recommendations as a means of increasing the transparency of 
multinationals’ activities. These included the regular disclosure 
of comprehensive information; workers’ participation in the 
activities of the undertaking which would allow them to express 
their views and take a stand on matters of most concern to them; 
regular meetings between representatives of workers employed in 
the various establishments belonging to the the same 
multinational and located in Member States [European Industrial 
Relations Review (EIRR). August 1983].
The additional "Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on 
the Commission Communication to the Council on Multinationals and 
Community Regulations" constitutes the basis of the final 
Committee Opinion on this Communication. The additional Opinion 
contains the following passage:
"Lack of knowledge about the way multinationals are 
organised and their activities is a source of concern for 
the workers they employ and for their trade unions. 
Employees — especially those in countries other than that in
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which the multinational is based - may know nothing about 
the way in which the multinational is organised and its 
decision making procedures; the production programmes of the 
parent company and of establishments and subsidiaries in the 
various countries in which the multinational operates; on­
going technological research; application of patents and 
utilisation of the results obtained;
or, above all the potential impact of projects and research 
on employment, occupational skill requirements, working 
conditions and the like". [CES 237/74/ fin of May 16, 1974]
It also stated that:
"It is often because of this failure to provide information 
and lack of knowledge about the situation that workers and 
their unions tend to see the dark side of multinationals 
rather than their positive social aspects, that is to say, 
the valuable contribution which they can make towards not 
only the economic, but also the social goals of the 
community" [CES 237/74/ fin of May 16, 1974].
In its "Resolution of 12 December 1974 on the Commission 
Communication on Multinational Undertakings and Community 
Regulations", the European Parliament supported the Commission’s 
view that the establishment of a trade union counterweight would 
make a major contribution towards the solution of many social 
problems by ensuring better dissemination of information on the 
operations of multinational undertakings.
This support was translated into legislation in February 17,
1975, when the Mass Dismissals Directive was passed. This 
Directive created an obligatory procedure for informing and 
consulting workers’ representatives when collective labour 
redundancies were being contemplated. It applied to both 
uninational and multinational firms alike. This Directive was 
enacted in the UK. with the introduction of the Employment 
Protection Act, 1975.
According to Mr, George Trevelyan, a senior bureaucrat at the 
Economic and Social Affairs Office, the "Vredeling Proposal was 
the logical outcome of this Directive:
"The Vredeling Directive is a direct descendant of the Mass 
Dismissals Directive" [Letter to author, dated February 24, 
1984].
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On February 14, 1977, another Directive was passed in Council 
which provided a procedure for informing and consulting the 
representatives of workers affected by a transfer to another 
country as a result of a legal transfer or merger.
On April 10, 1979, the "Committee’s Opinion on Worker
Participation and Company Structure in the European Community" 
was published. In the accompanying Sub-Committee Renort [OJ C 94 
of 10 April, 1979] many members stated that:
"... Community provisions must lay down minimum rules on 
the rights of access to information rights of consultation 
and rights of participation in decision-making to be 
assigned to the employees' representative institutions. 
These minimum rules should, as the Commission suggests, be 
based on common principles to be derived from the law and 
practice of the Member States" [OJ C 94 of 10 April, 1979].
The Report goes on to say:
"The Community provisions should impose fairly stringent 
requirements as to information, specifying a minimum which 
must be given and requiring it to be given in sufficient 
time for a proper discussion of the issue to be held before 
any decision is taken. The minimum would have to include 
information about the company's medium-term development and 
investment plans and their implications for jobs, training 
qualifications, pay and conditions" [OJ C 94 of 10 April, 
1979].
It was seen in the previous chapter, that the OECD Guidelines 
were introduced just as the member countries began to suffer from 
the effects of the 1973 oil crisis. By 1980, when the original 
"Vredeling Proposal" was issued, the world was in the midst of a 
deep recession; European industry had been ravaged, and EEC 
member countries faced levels of unemployment unknown since the 
1930’s with concomitant social problems.
The history of inter-war Germany served as a sombre warning to 
Government’s which failed to tackle unemployment. The popularity 
of Fascism and Hitler’s rise to power, was based to a large 
extent on the promise to produce jobs.
A number of commentators argued that close parallels could be 
drawn between the economic and social climate of the late 1920’s
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and the late 1970’s. This view was substantiated by reference to 
the "Kondratiev cycle". Kondratiev had argued that a study of 
economies suggests that 50-year economic cycles can be 
identified, alternating between periods of boom and depression. 
So events tend to repeat themseves every 50 years. As in the late 
1920’s/ early 1930’s, fifty years on when "Vredeling" was 
drafted,
"European industry was entering the depths of the recession 
with the threat of widescale industrial and social 
disruption" [Hamilton, 1983, p.8].
For example, in 1979 Britain experienced the former, and in 1981 
it was scarred by the latter. During the "winter of discontent", 
a rash of politically damaging strikes prepared the way for a 
Conservative victory at the polls over a Labour Party dogged by 
internal wrangling.
During its first two years in office, the Government’s monetarist 
economic policies had failed to achieve their prime objective of 
reducing inflation, and industry was also burdened with record 
high interest rates and a very strong pound which depressed 
exports. These national factors combined with the world 
recession, resulted in rising unemployment which eventually 
exceeded three million.
The Prime Minister’s espousal of Victorian values, especially the 
"self-help" philosophy, was not particularly popular among the 
hard-core unemployed in the more deprived areas of England’s 
major cities, and in the summer of 1981 rioting broke out. The 
televised "highlights" stunned the nation: scenes at Toxteth, 
Liverpool had been particularly ugly. Four years later such 
scenes were repeated at Handsworth, Birmingham, and defeated 
miners returned to work after a year long strike in which pickets 
and police fought pitched battles.
Vredeling appreciated that when market conditions are so stacked 
against the interests of labour, a counterweight is necessary to 
mollify the European workforce facing these difficulties. He and 
his allies argued that the Guidelines for Multinational
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Enterprises adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles adopted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
had failed to appease labour precisely because of their voluntary 
nature. Vredeling and Davignon therefore believed that only the 
EEC, with its legislative powers, could redress the balance in 
favour of employees:
"Because they (the OECD and ILO Codes of Conduct) are not 
backed up by laws and penalties, they do not lead to the 
sought-after transparency (in multinational operations) and 
the guarantee to workers that they will be informed of the 
affairs of the whole enterprise and not just of the problems 
of their plant and subsidiary in the local national 
situation" [Vredeling and Davignon quoted in Hamilton, 
1983, p.8].
Henk Vredeling himself has concluded, however, that the main 
reason the Commission approved the "Vredeling Proposal" when it 
did was the need to obtain the political support of the European 
Trade Unions for the EEC as an institution [Hamilton, 19 83, p.9]«
Bearing in mind that, prior to Britain’s joining the Common 
Market, the TUC had been assured that the EEC could shackle the 
multinationals, the Commission saw "Vredeling" as "the ideal 
sweetener for the British TUC’s hard line on EEC membership" 
[Hamilton, 1983, P.9]. The TUC had not forgotten that,
"in the debate ten years ago on the question of Britain's 
membership of the EEC, the trade union movement was urged to 
support entry on the grounds, inter alia, that the EEC would 
make the multinational companies more accountable. It has so 
far achieved nothing in this specific field in those ten 
years". [TUC, April 2, 1981].
The EEC had been subject to fairly regular criticism from 
European Unions. Within the ETUC, the British TUC had opposed the 
EEC and was campaigning for a reconsideration of ETUC policy 
toward the Community as a whole. Even the pro-Europe an, German 
Trades Union Federation, warned the Commission that unless it 
secured some tangible benefits for European Labour which proved 
that EEC membership was worthwhile for the workers, then Labour’s 
role within EEC institutions would be jeopordised:
"The prospect of an exodus of European unions from the EEC
167
with their governments In tow pushed the Commission to offer 
a concrete proposal to the ETUC and, in particular, to the 
British group" [Hamilton, 1983, p.9].
7.1.: Thg. FonttHlatlPn Pf the "Vredeling Proposals"
From its formation in 1973, the ETUC had urged the Commission to 
introduce legislation which would compel the creation of a body 
within each MNC operating in the Community to be responsible for 
informing and consulting workers’ representatives in all its 
member countries. On February 6, 1975 this proposal was passed by 
the ETUC’s Executive Committee.
The early draft provoked heated discussions within the Commission 
between Viscount Davignon, then reponsible for Directorate 
General III -Internal Market, and its author Henk Vredeling who 
then headed Social Affairs. This draft represented a considerable 
victory for the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
[Hamilton, 1983, p.2].
Henk Vredeling aided by Mme. Françoise Blanquet, a French legal 
expert, drafted a proposal to create Europe-wide Works Councils 
in MNCs operating within the Community. According to Hamilton 
[1984] this draft proposal required the management of MNCs to 
inform and consult employees representatives in all EEC member 
countries on issues affecting the firm as a whole and not just 
the individual nationally based plants:
"This requirement would have given workers the opportunity 
to discuss the multinational's global strategy regularly 
with the responsible managers. This proposal offered a legal 
framework for multinational bargaining and a stimulus to the 
creation of multinational trade unionism" [Hamilton, 1984, 
P.3].
In a press conference held in Brussels on October 2, 1980, Mr. 
Henk Vredeling, EEC Social Affairs Commissioner, stated that the 
draft Directive which he had co-authored was to some extent 
founded on existing but voluntary codes of conduct prepared by 
the ILO and the OECD. It was also built, he said, on existing 
Community Law granting employee representatives information and
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prior consultation rights in collective redundancy and company 
transfer situations. It was also evident that it was considerably 
influenced by legislation already in force in several Member 
States - particularly in France, West Germany and the 
Netherlands. Mr. Vredeling anticipated the proposals’ critics, 
indicating that progressive employee disclosure and consultation 
legislation had apparently not deterred foreign direct investment 
in these countries FEIRR. November 1980].
Vredeling’s plan was to introduce European-wide bargaining groups 
with direct access to multinational headquarters. This concept 
proved too radical for Davignon. He insisted that the proposal 
should only allow for multinational consultations as an option 
when workers felt that the negotiations with local management had 
failed.
The first draft also attracted criticism from other quarters:
"Legal experts believed that European works councils could 
not be created within eadi multinational until there was an 
EEC law whidi covered company groups. Also, some employers 
objected to the fact that the proposal applied only to 
multinationals" [Hamilton, 1983, p.3]
Thus, when the "Vredeling Proposal" was adopted by the Commission 
in September 1980, it had been amended according to these 
objections, and it did not create European works councils; it 
allowed only for transnational consultations as an option, and it 
included all multi-plant companies, not just multinationals.
Is-4.; The October 1980 Proposal
The "Vredeling Proposal" required international and local 
management to inform its workforce regularly about a wide range 
of issues affecting the company as a whole. Management was 
obliged to consult its workforce before taking key decisions. 
Multinational or multi-plant companies which failed either to do 
so or to provide information would face legal sanctions.
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7.4.1.; The Requirement to Inform Workers
Management of a Dominant Undertaking was required, at least every 
six months, to "forward relevant information to the management of 
its subsidiaries in the Community, giving a clear picture of the 
activities of the Dominant Undertaking and its subsidiaries as a 
whole" (Article 5,1).
Specific information had to be provided on the following:
"a) structure and manning,
b) the economic and financial situation,
c) the situation and probable development of the business and 
of production and sales,
d) the employment situation and probable trends,
e) production and investment programs,
f) rationalisation plans,
g) manufacturing and working methods, in particular the 
introduction of new working methods,
h) all procedures and plans liable to have a substantial 
effect on employees interests". [Article 5,2]
The Commission planned to make direct contact between 
international management and trade unions the exception rather 
than the rule, so instead of this information being communicated 
directly from international management to the local workforce, it 
was to be relayed via local management which, on receiving the 
information from the Dominant Undertaking, would then communicate 
it "without delay to employees* representatives in each 
subsidiary" [Article 5.3].
Workers were entitled to demand information from the management 
of the dominant undertaking and "by-pass" subsidiary management 
only when the latter did not have or was unwilling to 
communicate the information to employees [Article 5.4].
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7.4.2.; The Obligation to Consult
As with the obligation to inform, the dominant undertaking was
obliged to consult only when local management had failed to
provide certain information or to enter into consultation over 
certain proposed decisions with local employees. After these 
failures, employees * representatives were "authorised to open 
consultations, through authorized delegates, with the management 
of the dominant undertaking with a view to obtaining such
information, and where appropriate, to reaching agreement on the
measures planned with regard to the employees concerned" [Article 
6.4].
Decisions which could not be taken without prior consultation 
included:
"a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major 
parts thereof
b) restrictions, extensions or substantial modifications to 
the activities of the undertaking
c) major modifications with regard to organisation
d) the introduction of long-term cooperation with other 
undertakings or the cessation of such cooperation" [Article 
6.2]
At least 40 days before making a decision on such matters, the 
dominant undertaking had to forward precise information to the 
local management giving details of:
"a) the grounds for the proposed decision
b) the legal, economic and social consequences of such a 
decision for the employees concerned
c) the measures planned in respect of these employees" 
[Article 6,1]
Hamilton [1984] points out that consultation did not 
automatically take place over the decision itself. Rather as 
Article 6.3 puts it,
"The management of each subsidiary shall be required to 
communicate this information without delay to its employees’
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representatives and to ask for their opinion within a period 
of not less than 30 days" [Article 6.3].
Article 6.4. detailed the next step in the consultation process:
"Where in the opinion of the employees’ representatives, the 
proposed decision is likely to have a direct effect on the 
employee’s terms of employment or working conditions, the 
management of the subsidiary shall be required to hold 
consultations with them with a view to reaching agreement 
on the measures planned in their regard" [Article 6.4].
This particular section of Article 6 was ambiguous:
■First, there was no provision made in the Directive for 
action in the event of non-agreement once the consultation 
had taken place. In that case, management could face 
sanction from national law. Second, it was not clear whether 
the Commission was envisaging consultation or something 
more, e.g. participation in decision making, when it called 
for consultations with a view to readiing agreement on the 
measures planned.
Some argued that workers were being given the right to 
interfere with management's decision-making prerogative 
under this clause. Others interpret it as meaning that 
consultation would take place on the decision once the 
decision had been taken, with the workers being in reality 
faced with a 'fait accompli'" [Hamilton, 1983, p.5]
1,4,1.: Penalties for Non-Compliance
"Vredeling" was the first international initiative to propose 
legislation to regulate international relations between employers 
and workers within MNCs. Others, such as the OECD Guidelines and 
the ILO Multinational Declaration of Principles, are voluntary. 
The OECD and ILO cannot penalise those firms which choose to 
disregard their codes of conduct for MNCs. Indeed, the previous 
chapter shows that the OECD is expressly forbidden from even 
commenting on an individual MNC’s behaviour. The "Vredeling 
Proposal" was unique, therefore, in that its implementation would 
impose legislation on MNCs (and multi-plant companies). It was to 
be obligatory.
Article 6.6 gave full power to member states to enact appropriate 
penalties for failure to fulfill the obligations stipulated 
therin:
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"... in particular, they shall grant to the employees’ 
representatives concerned by the decision the right of 
appeal to tribunals or other competent national authorities 
for measures to be taken to protect their interests" 
[Article 6.6].
In recognition of the problems involved in exerting the little 
power it had to impose penalties on the headquarters of MNCs 
outside the Community, the Commission, under Article 8, placed 
legal responsibility to comply with the Directive provisions on 
"the management of the subsidiary that employs the largest number 
of employees within the Community."
In this way, legal responsibility was imposed on the MNC even if 
its headquarters were outside the EEC. This article became known 
as the "hostage" clause. A "hostage" company could be threatened 
with legal sanctions in order to ensure good behaviour from the 
parent company.
As already noted, the draft Directive does not give details of 
any specific sanctions to be applied to those in breach of its 
provisions. It will be up to each Member State, when preparing 
its own national legislation, to determine what fines etc should 
be attached to particular offences. The draft Directive does 
state however, that national employment legislation must provide 
a right of appeal for employee representatives with regard to 
disputed company decisions affecting their members.
1±,4.4.; Summarv of 1980 Proposal
Heinz Vetter, MEP, former Vice-President of the German 
Mineworkers and head of the German trade unions, described the 
"Vredeling Proposals" as:
"a first attempt in international social history to submit 
multinational ceapanies to supranational legal discipline"
[quoted by Ms. Anne Clwyd, MEP, in letter to The Times, 
September 7, 1983]
Despite reactions of horror from business internationally, this 
proposal did not satisfy the ETUC. "Vredeling" ^uired the 
sscalation of information and consultation to an international
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level only under certain circumstances. Central management was 
still considered too inaccessible. Moreover, it did not create 
"the institutional machinery in which these pan-European-type 
consultations could have taken place. No European works council 
was created through which the workers could be informed and 
consulted by management from the firm’s headquarters" [Hamilton, 
1983, p.6]
It did, however, allow for the creation of "a body representing 
employees of the dominant undertaking and its subsidiaries within 
the Community ... by means of agreements to be concluded between 
the management of the dominant undertaking and the employees’ 
representatives" [Article 7.3]. Should such a body exist it 
would receive the information provided for in Article 5.
Hamilton [1983] thus concludes:
"Taken together these provisions represented a halfway house 
in the creation of multinational trade unionism. 
Nevertheless, they were a radical legal departure in an 
unlegislated area of international relations.
However, the EEC was not in the best position to fill this 
legal void. Without the "hostage" approach, it could not 
adequately create the framework for consultations between 
management and workers at the multinational level to take 
place. Many of the HQs of MNCs lay outside the Community and 
outside the direct jurisdiction of the Commission. In the 
final analysis the Commission did not have the power to 
enforce the disclosure of information and the holding of 
consultations on the part of the Headquarters Board outside 
the EEC to workers’ representatives inside the Community" 
[Hamilton, 1983, p.7].
1^5.; The Watering Down of The Text
Before the text could be redrafted and submitted to the Council 
of Ministers for approval, it had to go through the EEC’s various 
legislative channels. This involved obtaining the approval of the 
European Assembly and then the Commission.
The European Parliament in Strasbourg was highly critical of the 
1980 "Vredeling Proposals". However, its power was, and still 
remains, limited to sugges11ng changes in EEC legislation. The 
main responsibility for this lies with the ten member governments
174
which have failed to yield the powers and resources necessary for 
the Parliament to develop. The claim that in June I979 it was 
transformed, by being directly elected, therefore seems highly 
questionable.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have organised 
themselves in cross-national groups as opposed to national 
delegations. In the 1979 election 431 MEPs were returned, and 
all but ten members attached themselves to one of the seven 
political groups. The largest of these, the Socialists, with 124 
MEPs, was the only one which could claim members from all ten 
countries. The other six groups, in declining order of size, were 
the Christian Democrats (117), the European Democrats (i.e. 
British and Danish Conservatives) (63), the Communists (48), the 
Liberals (39), the Progresive Democrats (ie. French Gaullists and 
Ireland’s Fianna Fail) (22), and the Technical Co-ordination 
group, (i.e. "a motley collection of small, mostly left-wing 
parties which have combined merely to take advantage of financial 
and administrative privileges afforded to recognised political 
groups") (11). The four right-of-centre groups therefore had a 
clear majority together accounting for 241 of the 434 members 
[The Economistf October 30, 1982].
On July 12, 1982, the Parliamentary Committee’s rapporteur,
British Conservative MEP., Mr. Tom Spencer, presented his report 
to Parliament on behalf of the Committee on Social Affairs and 
Employment, It concluded that the OECD’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, "while worthwhile, are not 
satisfactory alone" [Document 1-324/82/B].
On October 12, 1982, after a three hour voting marathon on 300
draft amendments, 37 of which were passed by Parliament, a 
"Vredeling Directive", diluted by these amendments won 
Parliament’s approval. All but two of the original 18 articles 
were altered.
Despite the importance of the Draft Directive and the interest it 
bad aroused, only 219 MEPs, just over half the total number, 
participated in the voting! The amended Directive was passed by
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166 votes to 42 with 11 abstentions. The Socialist group, which 
had intended to abstain, was absent, in protest at the insertion 
of amendments which, it argued, had rendered the 1980 text 
toothless [The Week. Strasbourg, October 11-15, 1982].
The most important amendments passed:
1. Excluded all firms with fewer than 1,000 employees and
subsidiaries with fewer than 100.
2. Gave managers broad scope to classify information as
confidential.
3. Prevented workers from by-passing unhelpful subsidiary 
management and requesting information from decision-makers.
4. Reduced the amount of notice that had to be given to
employees of proposed changes, and also the length of the 
period for consultation.
5. Allowed employers to decide at what level in the firm
consultation would take place.
6. Demanded that all employees* representatives who receive 
information must be elected by secret ballot.
Parliament’s approval of almost forty amendments represented a 
major draw back to the unions who, earlier in the year, had been 
confident that they had secured sufficient parliamentary support 
to see the directive passed unscathed. The Socialists and 
Communists, a good number of the 117 Christian Democrats, and 
even a handful of Conservatives, Liberals, and Gaullists had 
pledged support. A handsome majority against the amendments had 
therefore seemed the most likely outcome FThe Economist. October 
16, 1982].
However, intense pressure had been brought to bear on dissidents 
to tow the party line. For example, a Belgian Social Christian, 
Mr. Raphael Chanterie who had expected to be joined by many other 
Christian Democrats in opposing the amendments, expressed 
disappointment at finding himself almost alone FThe Economist. 
October 16, 1982].
MEPs also faced the most expensive lobbying campaign in the 
Parliament's history, led mainly by US MNCs. At the forefront
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were Caterpillar, Ford, and the Mars Corporation. Caterpillar, 
for example, wrote to a number of MEPs representing 
constituencies where it had a manufacturing operation [Fryer, 
1982].
Parliament's amendments succeeded in deleting from the Directive 
the principles of multinational consultation, espoused by 
Vredeling and the Trades Unions. The pro-business lobby in the 
Parliament had certainly scored a notable victory. Responsibility 
for the Proposals lay with the British Commissioner, Ivor Richard
who had succeeded Vredeling, and he had to reluctantly accept
that the international aspects of the proposal could not be 
redrafted back into the text.
Although Parliament had approved the Draft Directive, it refused
to vote on its Resolution. Until the Resolution was passed, the 
Commission could not re-consider its own ideas and forward a 
final text to the Council of Ministers for formal approval and 
adoption. It threatened to withoId the required Resolution unless 
the Commission agreed to accept all its amendments to the text.
On November 17, 1982, Mr. Richard, the Social Afairs
Commissioner, gave his reactions to Parliament's 37 amendments to 
the 1980 "Vredeling Proposals". He indicated that about half of 
the proposed changes would be incorporated in the revised draft 
to be submitted to the Council of Ministers, Amendments numbered 
2 and 6 above, were only two which he refused to accept. He also 
proposed that unions should have recourse to a tribunal if they 
believed that firms were holding back information without 
reasonable justification [Richard, Com(82) 758 final].
Parliament had exercised its very limited power to block 
"Vredeling's" progress through the legislative channels of the 
EEC. This tactic proved effective, and both sides reached a 
compromise, with the Commission accepting some of Parliament's 
amendments, even though it was not bound to do this by Community 
Law.
On December 14, 1982, the European Parliament debated "The
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Spencer Report" which had examined the need for EEC legislation 
on employee disclosure and consultation. Mr. Chanterie, (MEP), 
presented a rogue's gallery of firms implementing major decisions 
without consulting their employees, and in some cases even 
failing to inform them. He recounted how the 2,170 workers at 
British Leyland's plant in Seneffe, Wallonia, had first learned 
of the Company's decision to close the plant from a report in the 
British press. He also singled out a number of US MNCs for 
criticism, plus Peugeot-Citreon for giving its 905 employees at 
its Vorst Forrest factory only two weeks notice of plant closure
[OJ No.1-292/89].
At the end of the debate Parliament approved by 161 votes to 61 
the principle of placing more onerous obligations on large 
companies to consult their workforce on a range of decisions.
Mr. Richard could now concentrate on persuading groups not 
directly connected to the EEC that regulation was needed to 
increase the transparency of firms to employees.
The text of a speech given by Mr. Richard at a luncheon sponsored 
by the US Bar Association and the Bar Association of the District 
of Columbia, exemplifies the Commissioner's argument;
"I would recall that a fundamental aim in the minds of those 
who originated the proposal was that of improving industrial 
relations during the period when they were likely to come 
under particular strain in the face of the imperative need 
for restructuring and accelerated introduction of new 
technologies. That aim is still perfectly valid.
I need not, I think, enumerate the examples we have seen in 
the Community in the last few years - some of them real 
horror stories - of the failure of certain multinational 
companies, among them some very prominent ones, to provide 
information to their workforce on decisions of vital 
interest to them.
I firmly believe that it is management's responsibility to 
manage and that the directive will leave that responsibility 
with them ....
To stay for a moment with Article 6 (of the original 1980 
text) there has, as you know, been some controversy 
concerning the stage at which consultation should take 
place. The parliament proposed that consultation of 
employees should take place during the last 30 days before
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implementation of the decision. I am not happy with this 
not only since it smacks of a take it or leave it attitude, 
but also because it effectively prevents the unions coming 
forward with constructive alternative ideas. The 
Commission' 8 view is that consultation should take place 
before the final decision is taken management (author's 
emphasis). This is the same approach as the one taken in the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinationals which the US has approved" 
[Ivor Richard, February 14 19 83, Washington DC].
7.6.: "The Richard's Directive; Adoption by the Commission
In May 1983, adoption by the Commission was delayed by "last 
minute internal disagreements" [Wyles,1983]. The West German, 
Internal Affairs Commissioner, Heinz Narjes had raised a major 
point of principle over the election of worker representatives. 
He supported Parliament's amendment calling for the election of 
representatives through secret ballot. At the same time, the 
international lobbying campaign by multinational companies - 
allegedly masterminded by the British Government - was stepped up 
hoping to sink the "Richard's" and Fifth Directives [Palmer, 
1983].
Finally on June 15, 1983, the Commission adopted the "Richard's
Proposals". The UK. Government was immediately singled out as the 
major opponent, and Mr. Richard made it clear that he hoped that 
the British Secretary of State for Employment, then Mr. Norman 
Tebbit, could be persuaded to support the Directive. This was 
vital, for one Employment Minister from any of the ten EC 
countries could use his veto at the Council of Ministers to 
prevent the "Richard's Directive" becoming Community law.
2.7.: The Revised Text
Its structure has been greatly simplified in respect of the 
original 1980 text by merging the old sections II and III, which 
dealt separately with multinationals and "complex undertakings" 
operating within one Member State. The new Article 2 is designed 
to embrace both situations, and the subsequent Articles then 
apply equally without the need for duplication. The presentation 
of the text has also been improved by the addition of a more 
detailed preamble which responds to the scale of recent
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developments in Community Legislation on labour law and company 
law, and the need to specify the objectives of the present 
proposal more clearly against this background.
7.7.1.: International Aspects in the Revised Text
The most important change in the revised text was that the 
international dimension of consultation and information had been 
deleted.
Ivor Richard had made clear his intention to eliminate the "by­
pass" clause, in accordance with Parliament's wishes, prior to 
the publication of his revised draft. He said in Washington on 
February 14, 1983:
■I accept the view that it (the "by-pass" clause) would have 
presented great temptation to workers' representatives to 
try to climb the management ladder —  going beyond the 
management of the subsidiary to that of the parent company 
—  until they obtained information or decisions of which 
they approved" [Richard, February 14, 1983].
Thus Richard took away the entire legal basis for the development 
of Multinational Trade Unionism within the EEC. Supporters of 
;j the 1980 "Vredeling Proposals" argued that withdrawing the "by­
pass" destroyed the raison d'etre of the Directive, "and 
; Vredeling himself was bitterly disappointed that the Commission 
had eliminated from it the possibility of transnational 
consultation between workers and management" [Hamilton, 1983, 
p.16].
Richard defended his decision to scrap the "by-pass" clause. He 
argued that it was legally unenforceable. The Community's 
jurisdiction did not extend to many of the Multinationals' 
0  headquarters, outside the EEC, which would have been compelled to 
comply with the Directive's provisions. Its inclusion would 
only serve to attract further criticism of the already 
highly controversial proposals.
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7.7.2.: Threshold Number of Employees
The Commission's revised proposal no longer took into account the 
number of workers employed in each subsidiary. Instead, Article 
2 applies to any parent company and its subsidiaries which as a 
whole employs at least 1,000 workers in the Community. It also 
specifies that if the management of the parent company is located 
outside the Community, the subsidiary concerned in the Community 
will normally be resposible for the obligations imposed by the 
directive on information and consultation.
7.7.3.: Disclosure of General Information
In recognition of Parliament's amendment, the Commission under 
Article 3 proposed that information should be disclosed annually 
and not every six months as under the "Vredeling Proposals" (but 
with up-dating if such information is given to shareholders or 
creditors). Again, in line with the European Parliament, the list 
of information to be provided annually had been somewhat reduced 
from the Commission's original concept, but on the other hand the 
revised text required specific sectoral and geographical 
information. It is arguable whether this addition compensated for 
the Commission scrapping the requirement for firms to disclose 
their "rationalization plans".
The right to approach the parent for information not received 
from the subsidiary had been limited to an "approach in writing".
!Li7t4.; Disclosure of Specific Information Consultatlon
Article 4 sets out the procedure to be followed where information 
disclosure and consultation is made necessary by the proposed 
decision of a parent undertaking "which is liable to have serious 
consequences for the interest of the employees of its 
subsidiaries in the Community".
Unlike the original text, it specifies that the disclosure and 
consultation procedure does not apply to all employees in the 
Community but only those directly affected by a decision. Prior
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consultation is required only if the decisions in question are 
liable to have serious consequences for the interests of 
employees:
"The Oommlssion believes that in principle consultation 
should take place before the final decision is taken, and 
that it should take place between parties iAich are 
empowered to take decisions".
The Commission, however, did not intend to establish a right of 
codetermination.
In keeping with the Parliament's amendment, the "by-pass" clause 
was removed. Instead, the revised text imposes an obligation on 
the management of the subsidiary to delay implementing those 
decisions as in paragraph 1, until "the opinion of employees' 
representatives is received or failing that before the end of the 
period granted according to paragraph 3 [ie. 'at least 30 days']".
A change from the 1980 "Vredeling Proposals" was that the 
consultations would be automatic. In the original version, 
consultations depended on whether the employee representatives 
considered them necessary. The categories of management 
decisions which required consulting employees' representatives 
were essentially those in the 19 80 text, plus, the introduction 
of new technology, and measures relating to workers' health and 
safety.
X1.7.5.Î Confidential Information
A major difference from the original text concerned the 
disclosure of confidential information. Under Article 15 of the 
original text, workers were "required to maintain discretion" 
when given confidential information".
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According to Article 7 of the Commission's revised text,
"The management of an undertaking shall be authorized not to 
communicate secret information. Information may only be 
treated as secret which, if disclosed, could substantially 
damage the undertaking's interests or lead to the failure of 
its plans."
Here the Commission had accepted the principle that not all 
information should be disclosed to the workforce.
7.7.6.; The Hostage Clause
Whereas under the 1980 text, cases where "the decision-making 
centre of an undertaking is located in a non-member country", its 
subsidiary with the largest workforce in the EEC was held 
responsible for the failure of the dominant undertaking to comply 
with the Directive's provisions, now an authorized agent of the 
parent company within the Community is held accountable. In the 
absence of such an agent, the management of each subsidiary In 
the EEC will be held responsible for complying with the 
Proposal's obligations. (Art. 2.(2))
7^6.; The View of Bmployer&
No initiative of the Commission has created more opposition from 
employers than the "Vredeling/Richard Proposals". In Britain, the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and the Institute of 
Directors (loD) have presented unwaivering opposition to the 
proposals. UNICE, the organization representing employers in 
Europe, was initially not prepared even to participate in 
amending the Proposals, but instead chose to reject them 
outright.
The Keidanren (the Japanese Employers Federation) which is known 
for its support of employee participation has said in a statement 
on 'Vredeling':
■The directive if put into effect, could have a restrictive 
effect on the growth of Japanese investment in Europe and 
future industrial co-operation between our two regions"
[quoted by the Institute of Directors, 1984].
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Similarly, the US Council of the International Chamber of 
Commerce has said:
■we believe that the proposed directive is counterproductive 
to the Community's plan for providing an economic 
environment conductive to growth and technological 
innovation, and that it would cause as yet immeasurable harm 
to business competitiveness, industrial relations, 
international law and internal trade" [quoted by the 
Institute of Directors, 1984].
When UNICE and other employers' organisations began to change 
their position (under pressure from Conservative Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) and from some in their own ranks) and 
propose amendments, their lobbying practises attracted criticism 
from all sides.
For example, the Mars Corporation, among others, was accused of
paying fees to MEPs while the Vredeling Proposal was being
discussed by the European Parliament. Amedee Turner, MEP and Vice
Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee who proposed amendments
to the Vredeling Proposal, acted as a political consultant to the 
Mars Company during Parliament's deliberation on "Vredeling" and 
received that company's suggested amendments to the Proposal. Two 
Socialist MEPs, Allan Rogers and Richard Caborn, wrote to the 
President of the Parliament, Piet Dankert, seeking an inquiry 
into Turner's relationship with Mars.
Zi.8.1.: The Reaction of British Employers
Given the number of amendments to the original text, it is 
worthwhile to focus exclusively on employers' reactions to the 
revised text, the "Richard's Directive", rather than consider 
criticisms of the first draft which are now redundant.
For example, the Director General of the Engineering Employers' 
Federation, Dr. James McFarlane, has described the Vredeling 
Directive as "a creeping and insidious form of paralysis leading 
to expropriation". While admitting that the revised text is less 
formidable than the original, he warned Federation members that 
"the teeth are still there" [Wintour, 1983].
1 84
The response of British employers is particularly important 
because of the influence they can exert on the Conservative 
Government, chief opponent of "Vredeling". Indeed, it is 
crucial, as the CBI and the Institute of Directors not only offer 
considerable moral and financial support to the current UK. 
Government which is seen as the major stumbling block to the 
enactment of the "Richard's Directive" into Community law, but 
they can also influence its policies.
The strategic importance of converting British employers' 
organisations to a favourable view of the revised text has not 
been lost on Ivor Richard, himself. On November 6, 1984, he
addressed the annual conferance of the CBI, at Eastbourne, urging 
it to support his proposals. His effort was in vain, and a motion 
condemning "social engineering" by the EEC was overwhelmingly 
approved.
On November 9» 1984, the Departments of Employment, and Trade and 
Industry jointly issued a statement that "The Government was 
seeking the views of industry, commerce, the professions and 
trade unions on European Commission proposals on employee 
participation and company law harmonisation". Comments were to be 
received by the end of February 1984.
1.8.2.; The Institute of Directors (loD)
In the introduction to its document, "Draft I.of D. Response to 
the Draft European Communities Directive on Procedures for 
Informing and Consulting Employees - The 'Vredeling' Directive", 
it wrote:
"The Institute welcomes the opportunity to comment in detail 
on the 'Vredeling' directive. It would be wrong however to 
interpret a willingness to question individual parts of the 
directive as any acceptance of the underlying concept of the 
legislative approach to employee involvement. While sharing 
the Government's commitment to voluntary consultation and 
exchange of information in the work place we remain 
implacably opposed to legislation in this area.
The Institute's opposition can be summarised as follows:
The 'Vredeling' proposals are totally against the reality of 
industrial relations practice in this country and will bring
1 85
into the process of collective bargaining subjects which 
ought to be dealt with by discussion not negotiation.
Far from helping the growth of genuine employee involvement 
the directive will impose formal and inflexible requirements 
on companies many of which have their own successful but 
different schemes.
The proposals will act as a disincentive to overseas 
investment in the EEC.
The rights and ability of management to take decisions will 
be fundamentally affected by the detailed requirements to 
consult on proposed decisions on such issues as closures, 
changes in working practices, the introduction of new 
technology and long-term co-operation with other 
undertakings.
Decisions will inevitably be delayed.
The confidentiality of the organisation's affair will be put 
at risk by the directive's requirements and by removing from 
management the right to determine what information is or is 
not secret" [Institute of Directors, 1984].
7.8.3.; The Confederation of British Industry (CBIl
In his submission to the House of Lords Committee on the European 
Communities, the spokesman for Britain's leading employers' 
organisation, Mr. Murphy, argued that "Vredeling" was 
unnecessary, because very few cases referred to the Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) for 
clarification of the OECD's Guidelines had upheld the unions' 
"complaint":
"What we are talking about over a period of five years is 
about. • five cases. •• idiich posed a particular problan. It 
seems to me to introduce the kind of bureaucratic machinery 
that is being talked about to deal with instances of cases 
on average about one per year and tying up the whole of 
Western European industry on that basis seems to be smmewhat 
in the nature of taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut" 
[House of Lords, Session 1980-81, 37th Report].
By early 1983, the then unpublished revised text was fairly 
predictable, as Mr. Richard had revealed his plans for the new 
text in his speech to Parliament on November 17, 1982, and at
meetings in Europe and the OS. In February 1983, the ŒI's 
general objections to the draft Directive were outlined in a 
confidential internal document. These objections apply equally to
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the "Richard's Proposal" and they read as folows:
"a. The Commission has failed to demonstrate that the 
Inadequacy of present legislation and voluntary guidelines, 
and of national practise in relation to employee information 
and consultation, makes an EEC Directive necessary.
b. The requirement on companies to provide a considerable 
amount of information, and to expose them to judicial 
proceedings in respect of the adequacy or confidentiality of 
information about future prospects and plans, will put EEC 
employers at a serious disadvantage in relation to their 
overseas competitors.
c. It should be left to member states to order their 
arrangements for employee information and consultation in 
accordance with their own industrial relations system and 
traditions, which in the UK are voluntary, not legislative"
[CBI Confldéntlal C 9 83. To the Council For The Meeting On 
16 February 1983].
The revised text was published and approved by the Commission on 
June 1983. Shortly afterwards, on July 1, the CBI's Working Party 
on EEC legislation on employee Involvement met and, according to 
a letter from the Head of Social Affairs Legal Policy Department, 
to Secretaries of Member Employers Organisations, It reached the
following conclusion:
"that althoujÿb some improvements had been made to the Draft 
Durective it remained unacceptable in principle to employers 
and that opposition to it should continue" [Letter from Miss 
Gabrlelle Hanley, July 8, 1983].
In February 1984, the CBI responded to the Government's 
Consultative Document on the "Vredeling" Directive and also the 
Fifth Directive on the Harmonisation of Company Law. It was 
"unequivocally" opposed to both the draft "Vredeling" and Fifth 
Directives :
"They are not only unnecessary but, if implemented, would be 
irrelevant to the needs of industry; counter-productive to 
the achievement of widespread and genuine employee 
involvement; (and) damaging to competitiveness and largely 
impractical".
As was seen In Chapter 5, national culture constitutes a 
significant variable Impacting upon Individuals and 
*^ganlsatlons. Some cultures promote disclosure of Information, 
while others encourage secrecy. Similarly, Individuals socialised
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In one culture may have opposite perceptions of certain social or 
technological developments from those influenced by another. 
Tricker seeks to explain the British employer’s opposition to 
«Vredeling" by reference to culture:
"His (ie. the British employer's) education, religious and 
political orientations, business training and experience, 
commercial and professional practices, indeed his entire 
cultural conditioning may have led him to have business 
expectations that are threatened by some of the proposals he 
hears for reformulating corporate governance and that are 
significantly different from those of a continental European 
executive" [Tricker, P.30, in Bromwich and Hopwood, 1983].
7.9.: The Unions' View
The European Trade Union Confederation represents some 41m 
members in 19 European countries, and its affiliates Include all 
the significant trade unions within the EEC except the French 
CGT. It comes as no great surprise, therefore, to discover 
that,
"Of all the pressure groups which knock at the doors of the 
EEC none is assured of a more attentive reception than the
ETUC" [The Economist. April 24, 1982].
The ETUC had not been hoping to achieve International collective 
bargaining with company headquarters. This was considered an 
unrealistic target. It focussed, therefore, on a more modest 
objective, namely consultalon after decisions were made In 
principle, but before they were Implemented [Hamilton, 1983» 
P.10].
It has already been noted that the locus of decision-making In 
MNCs Is often outwlth the national boundaries of the country or 
countries affected by certain decisions of these companies. It 
has been alleged that unions In countries like Denmark and 
Germany, where employers are legally required to provide 
extensive Information to their workers, and to consult them 
before taking decisions that could affect their jobs, have long 
since resented the fact that foreign-based MNCs have been able to 
ignore these rules of the host country.
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The ETUC’s campaign for a Community-wide improvement in 
employees’ disclosure and consultation rights was therefore 
likely to provoke some reaction.
During the Economic and Social Committee’s debate of January 27, 
1982 on "Vredeling", union members, for the most part, did not 
set out to analyze or suggest revisions to the provisions of the 
draft Directive in the same way as the employers’ group. 
Instead, they restricted themselves to general comments about the 
benefits of the proposal and reserved any detailed criticism for 
the remarks made by UNICE.
Thus, they gave their "unqualified approval" to the drafts 
disclosure provisions and "repudiated the objections" to the 
consultation provisions. They stressed that these requirements 
should apply not only to transnational undertakings, but unl- 
natlonal firms too. In order to avoid "unjustified
discrimination" which would create a competitive Imbalance FEIRR, 
March 1982].
It Is widely agreed that during at least one debate the ETUC 
argued Its case much more convincingly than UNICE. Its greatest 
success came when It Invited former employees from a number of 
firms to address the Committee and describe their experiences of 
plant closure. A sad picture of minimal notice and no
consultations emerged [Social Affairs Committee Meeting,
Brussels, October 21, 1981].
In Its reply to the Government’s consultative document, the
General Council of the British TUC, expressed disappointment that
the 1980 text hud been diluted, though It acknowledged Its
awareness of the Intense pressure which had been brought to bear 
on the Commission.
"Nevertheless they (ie. the General Council) believe that 
ttie introduction of the draft Directive would represent a 
significant advance in the rights of workers and trade 
unions. They also believe that this in turn would
contribute directly to the process of structural change and 
adaptation with which the European economies will be
increasingly faced". [TUC, February 1984]
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The TUC argued that employers had already accepted in principle 
the need for employee disclosure and consultation:
"The voluntary codes of conduct in existence for 
multinational companies - the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and the ILO Tripartite Declaration 
on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy - already 
require employers, as good practice, to inform and consult 
their workforce. The codes carry the support of Governments 
and employers as well as unions, and they are applicable to 
national companies as well as multinationals. Therefore the 
principles of the draft Directive are the same as those in 
the codes which the British Government and employers have 
already accepted".
The TUC based its argument for improved rights to information and 
consultation on grounds of equity and efficiency. The equity 
argument is quite simply that those who invest their labour in an 
enterprise "have a right to be informed and consulted on issues 
which intimately affect their livelihood. It is unjust that 
those on whose lives a decision will have the greatest impact 
should have no opportunity to shape and influence it" [TUC, 
February 1984].
The efficiency argument is that sustained economic growth will 
not be achieved unless employees have confidence in decisions 
taken, and indeed participate in the process.
Unlike employers* organisations, the British TUC found the 
voluntary codes of conduct inadequate:
"The General Council have taken the view that it is iK>t 
enough to rest cq>on the fact that tiie voluntary codes of the 
OECD and ILO support the ri^ts of uzd.ons to information and 
consultation. These codes cannot be enforced; companies 
cannot be "found guilty" of breaching them — despite a 
lengthy and legalistic follow-iç procedure; and effectively 
only unions take up issues under than. Even unions have 
become disillusioned by the failure of the codes to provide 
a procedure for solving industrial relations problans — 
which must be the ultimate test of the usefulness of such 
arrangements" [TUC, February 1984].
It believed that,
"only statutory rights to information and consultation can 
remedy this, by providing unions with a trigger to actually 
bring into operation the procedures with %diich all have 
stated their agreement in principle, but have done little or
190
nothing to bring into being" [TUC, February 1984].
7.10.: The PS Dimension
Transatlantic reaction since 1980 has bordered on panic. This can
be explained by the general failure to appreciate just how long
it normally takes a Draft Directive to become Community Law.
By June 19 82, British publications were reporting on the reaction 
of American executives and editors. The Wall Street Journal found 
its articles and editorials being described as "increasingly
hysterical". The New Statesman offered its readers an insight of 
the celebrated paper's reporting on "Vredeling":
"How much information can a manager be expected to give the 
leaders of Communist-controlled labour organisations ? He's 
not going to give confidential information to people who are 
just as likely to slip it off to Ifoscow as to the local
employees" [Quoted by MacShane, 1982, p.15].
While the future of the "Richard's Directive" remains uncertain, 
three Bills are also under discussion in the United States' 
Congress, specifically aimed at limiting the Directive's impact 
on US MNCs operating in Europe.
The most important of these Bills is aimed at providing 
"protection from requirements and prohibitions imposed upon 
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the US by foreign nations, 
concerning the disclosure of confidential business information, 
and for other purposes".
The US is also attempting to influence the impact of the 
Vredeling initiative via pressure from the US Industry Co­
ordinating Committee which represents Chambers of Commerce of the 
US, the US Council for International Business, the National 
Foreign Trade Council, and the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the American Chambers - Europe and 
Mediterranean (EUROMED).
In March 1983 the Co-ordinating Committee issued a statement 
containing "four major criticisms of the entire concept" of
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"Vredeling":
- it was based on an "incomplete understanding" of corporate 
decision-making processes and industrial relations 
practises;
- it would impair the worldwide competitiveness of Community 
industry;
- existing national law and practise in member states 
rendered it unnecessary;
- furthermore, firms already adhered to the voluntary 
guidelines adopted by the ILO and OECD" [US Industry Co­
ordinating Committee, 1983].
7.11.: The View of Britain's Polltioal Instltotlong
Three of the four major political parties have expressed sipport 
for the "Vredeling/Richard's Directive":
"The Labour Party, the Social Democratic Party and the 
Liberals have all made policy statements which to varying 
degrees favour legislation on Involvement" [CBI Confidential 
C 9 83. To the Council for the Meeting on 16 February 1983].
The Labour MP, and Shadow Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr. 
John Smith, confirmed that this was certainly true of his Party:
"The Labour Party strongly siq)ports the "Vredeling" 
Initiatives although we note that they have been greatly 
watered down In the course of consideration by the European 
Ommmlsslon and by the European Assembly" [letter to author, 
dated February 21, 1984].
The President of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and former 
Labour Cabinet Minister, Mrs. Shirley Williams has castigated 
Labour MEPs half of whom did not vote for "Vredeling", because 
"they did not want to enhance the credibility of the Community". 
[Williams, 1984].
In 1981, The House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Community, heard the arguments of both the unions and employers, 
and against, the "Vredeling Proposals", and,
•reluctantly came to the conclusion that a directive Is 
necessary" [House of Lords, Session 1980-81, 37th Report].
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though It found the original text "too detailed and doctrinaire”. 
7.12.2 The ÜK Conservative Government's View
The United Kingdom Government has never made any secret of its 
opposition in principle to the "Vredeling Directive". Its 
opposition has not been tempered by the amended version, the 
"Richard's Directive". In fact, the UK Government's spokesman has 
even suggested that the amended proposal is in some respects 
worse than the original [Multinational Service. November 17,
1983].
The UK Government, in its consultative document, criticises the 
draft Directive, and implies that Community legislation should 
only be introduced when it contributes to the establishment of a 
common market in goods and services. In fact the preamble to the 
Treaty of Rome affirmed as a central objective the constant 
improvement of living and working conditions. Article 117 of the 
Treaty states clearly that improvements in living standards "will 
ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, but
also from the procedures provided for in the Treaty and the
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation and 
administrative action". The EEC considers that "social action and 
improvement" is both an objective of the Treaty and a legitimate 
object of legislation in itself [EIRR, August 1983].
On November 9, 1983, the Conservative Government's Employment
Secretary, Mr. Tom King, commented on both the "Richard's" and
Fifth Directives:
"It is difficult to see how legislation that imposes the 
rigid set of procedures set out in the draft 'Vredeling' 
(ie. the revised text) and Fifth Directives contributes to 
the creation of a 'common market' of goods and servies. 
Instead of strengthening trade links between Member States 
these Directives look likely to reduce the competitiveness 
of industry in the Community.
The Government welcomes moves to promote the involvement of 
employees in the enterprises for which they work, but it 
believes that the main initiative is best left to employers 
and employees, who are in the best position to judge what 
best suits their particular circumstances. European 
Community law in this field would be cumbersome, would
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increase costs for employers and would harm industrial 
relations by disrupting the many flexible and effective 
arrangements which have evolved in the UK voluntarily.
That is not the only risk in these proposals. The draft 
'Vredeling' Directive in particular has not only aroused 
much concern from business interest within the UK and other 
Member States but also from those outside the Community, 
especially in the USA and Japan. The Government believes 
that if these proposals were to become law they could 
discourage investment in the Ocwmnunity. There are, in any 
case, alredy OECD and ILO voluntary guidelines on informing 
and consulting employees and the Ocmmission has produced no 
evidence that these are not working satisfactorily.
I am very dubious of the value in the European Community 
issuing Directives which conflict with well established and 
perfectly legitimate differences in industrial relations 
policy and practive between Member States.
There is evidence of significant growth in recent years of 
employee involvement under the voluntary approach preferred 
in the UK, and the Commission has not even attempted to show 
why this approach should now be discarded" [Press Notice 
issued jointly by the Department of Employment and the 
Department of Trade and Industry, November 9, 1983]*
The Government's voluntarist approach to employee involvement and 
its total rejection of legislation in this field, is in complete 
contradiction of its views on trade union reform. This alleged 
inconsistency has been exploited by the British supporters of the 
Directive.
Although the Conservative Government is opposed to extending 
employee involvement legislation, in December 1983 the Party's 
own trade union organisation, the Conservative Trade Unionists, 
supported a radical European workers programme calling on EEC 
governments - as a priority - to cut unemployment and introduce 
worker participation in industry with curbs on MNCs [Taylor,
1984].
Some Conservative MEPs, do believe, however, that further 
employee involvement legislation is necessary. Apart from Mr. Tom 
Spencer, Mr. Fred Tuckman, MEP, has concluded that "Britain's 
voluntary arrangements are no longer successful" [Tuckman, letter 
Ibfi-Economiflt, May 8,1982].
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7-13.: The RevlaedText and Proposed Plant Closures In the 
Cbmmonltr
This section examines the obligations companies would face should 
the "Richard's Directive" be enacted, and compares these with 
those currently imposed by the 1975 Employment Protection Act, 
Part IV,
Article 4 of the revised text assumes that all major decisions 
are centralised. It lays down the information disclosure and 
consultation requirements in the proposed plant closure 
situation. These are as follows:
Stage 1.: the management of a parent company proposing to close a 
plant in the Community is required to:
"forward precise information to the management of the 
subsidiary concerned in good time before the final decision 
is taken with a view to the (xmmuni cation of this 
information to the employees' representatives in the manner 
provided in paragraph 3 (i.e communicate in writing)" 
[Article 4.1].
Employees' represenatives would therefore receive information on: 
"- the grounds for the proposed decision;
- the legal, economic and social consequences of such 
decision for the employees concerned;
- the measures planned in respect of such employees" 
[Article 4.1].
Stage 2.: the management of the subsidiary concerned is then
required "to communicate in writing without delay", the 
information listed above, to employees' representatives, "with 
the exception of secret information as defined in Article 7*1, to 
the omployees' representatives" [Article 4.3]*
Secret information is defined as information which, if disclosed, 
■could substantially damage the undertaking's interests or lead 
to the failure of its plans" [Article 7*1]»
^tage 3,; in its written communication subsidiary management are
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to ask employees' represenatives for their opinion of the 
proposed decision,
■granting them a period of at least 30 days from the day on 
which the information is communicated”. [Article 4,3]
Stage 4; the management of the subsidiary concerned are to
■hold consultations with them (i.e. employees' 
representatives) with a view to attempting to reach 
agreement on the measures planned in respect of the 
employees”. [Article 4.4]
Stage 5.: the plant closure decision can only be implemented once 
the opinion of the employees' representatives has been received 
or failing that once the minimum 30 days period allowed for in 
Stage 3. has expired.
Where companies fail to fulfill the obligations referred to in 
.and. 3,,,
■Member States shall ensure that employees' representatives 
have the ri^t to appeal to a tribunal or other competent 
national authority for measures to be taken within a maximum 
period of 30 days to compel the management of the subsidiary 
to fulfill its obligations”. [Article 4.6]
In order to prove successful all legislation must be clearly 
defined. For example, everyone knows that motorists in the UK. 
exceeding a certain level of alcohol in the bloodstream can be 
charged with drunk driving. In contrast. Article 4 of the 
"Richard's Directive" is often vague and a number of its terms 
are open to a variety of interpretations. Of the five stages 
outlined above, four contain key terms which are imprecise.
The term "final decision" in Stage 1. lacks precision, as 
disagreement may arise over what constitutes a "final decision".
In ^age 2. the management of the subsidiary concerned is 
instructed to communicate information in writing "without delay”. 
Does this mean that subsidiary management must dispatch a letter 
to employees' representatives on immediate receipt of information 
fnom head office? Or, is subsidiary management complying if it 
informs employees' representatives only once it has completed
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duties arranged before receiving the information from the parent 
company?
It is only when Stage 3. is reached that the Directive's 
instructions are unambiguous.
Stage 4 requires the management of the subsidiary involved in a 
proposed closure to "hold consultations with them (i.e. 
employees' representatives)" and that this should be done "with a 
view to attonptlng to reach agreement on the measures planned In 
respect of the employees" [Article 4.4]. This section is 
particularly imprecise and problematic.
The requirements contained in Stage 5. appear satisfactorily 
clear.
It can be concluded that the "Richard's Directive" implies five 
distinct stages to be followed when a company is proposing to 
take a decision to close a plant. The requirements in these 
sequential steps in the information disclosure and consultation 
procedure are often imprecise. Legislation which, like the 
revised text, is riddled with ambiguities is more likely to 
engender rather than solve problems,
1 ,^14.; The Reaction of the CBI and TUC to Article 4
Article 4 has aroused concern and criticism from both employers' 
organisations and trade unions. The views of the CBI and the TUC 
on this Article of the revised text are considered below.
According to the employers' organisation,
"the Instances of Imprecision In Article 4, both 
definitional and substantive, might create or exacerbate 
disputes over compliance with Its provisions. A major source 
of uncertainty arises from the provisions of paragraphs 1 
and 5 which fall to make clear whether employees' 
representatives are to be consulted "before a final decision 
Is taken" or simply on the method of Implementing that 
decision" [CBI, 1984],
The former was not considered acceptable:
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■The CBI would strongly object to any requirement to hold 
consultations with employees' representatives "before" 
decisions are taken" [CBI, 1984].
The CBI objects to Article 4.3, and 4.4, because they would, it 
argues, by delaying the implementation of decisions "have a 
deleterious effect on a company's competitive position and 
ultimately on the employment prospects of its employees". It 
argued that it would be "impossible" to comply with Article 4.5 
because since "it is not always possible to identify accurately 
the time or level at which a decision has been taken, and that in 
many cases decisions evolve over time", therefore, "it would be 
Impossible to determine in these circumstances at what point in 
time consultations with employee's representatives should begin".
The TUC General Council was also rather critical of Article 4 
which states that consultation should take place "with a view to 
reaching agreement". This was described as "a vague and clumsy 
formulation conveying little meaning" [TUC, February, 1984].
Il 15.; Conclusion
Despite the elimination of the more controversial features of the 
"Vredeling Proposals" , the "Richard's Directive", the revised 
bext, has little chance of seeing an early implementation by 
member states of the EEC. The Council of Ministers must 
Manimp^^jy approve the Proposal before the Directive becomes law 
and then each member state's government must enact it in its own 
national legislation. By June 1984, three governments had 
announced that they could virtually accept the Draft Directive - 
France, Italy, and Greece -, afid Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and West Germany had accepted it in principle, 
while having "technical reservations". The Danes remained 
negative and the British overtly hostile [Wyles, 1984].
In the second half of 1984, under the Irish presidency, an "ad 
hoc" working group led by industrial relations expert. Dr. Mary 
Redmund, was formed. It offered a "new approach" to the 
D irec tive  which was based on the principle of workers' rights
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rather than companies’ obligations. Britain and Denmark were 
unimpressed, and their opposition remained firm.
The British Government is not so much against the contents of the 
Directive, but against the principle of legislation in a field 
where it believes that voluntary action is preferable. "Its 
problem, however, is that the CBI has tended usually to offer 
voluntary inaction". For example, employees of Dunlop were not 
informed by the Company that it was selling some of its European 
subsidiaries to its Japanese rival, Sumitomo Rubber, but instead 
learned of the Company’s plans from press leaks. This incident 
allegedly proved an embarrassment to the Government, the CBI, and 
other opponents of the "Richard’s Directive". The Company's top 
man. Sir Campbell Fraser, was also, at the time, the President of 
the CBI and as such was in the midst of a campaign against the 
EEC's attempt to improve employee disclosure and consultation 
rights. Dunlop was subsequently "reported" by the TUC to the UK 
Contact Point for allegedly breaching the OECD's Guidelines.
The "Richard's Proposals", as presently drafted, have failed to 
achieve precision and, like individual paragraphs of the OECD's 
Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines, it is open to 
various interpretations. Under these circumstances, one can 
hardly expect from firms a uniform standard of employee 
disclosure and consultation. In the highly charged plant closure 
situation, it is essential that where legislation exists, parties 
concerned have a clear understanding of the obligations which 
that law imposes. The "Richard's Directive" does not offer this, 
but instead fuels an already difficult situation.
Mr, Ivor Richard's determination to see through a Directive 
extending employees' information and consultation rights incurred 
the wrath of Mrs. Thatcher and she refused to re-nominate him for 
3 second term on the European Commission. Britain has two 
Commissioners, - by a gentleman's agreement, a Conservative, and 
a Labour Party nominee. Mr. Richard's had been the original 
choice of Labour's leader, Mr. Kinnock, but his selection proved 
unacceptable to the Prime Minister, and Mr. Stanley Clinton 
Davies, a former Labour MP and Junior Minister, was appointed as
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junior to the new Consevative appointee, Lord Cockfield, 
replacing Mr. Christopher Tugendhat [Dowle, September 11, 1984; 
Humphries, September 11, 1984].
The "Vredeling Proposals" have been cast aside, temporarily at 
least, until 1989 when discussions on the Directive will re­
convene. Talks will concentrate on European Commission reports on 
national legisalation.
Since the mid-1980s, the EEC has clearly adopted a much more 
conciliatory approach to multinationals, but Europe continues to 
lag behind its two main rivals, America and Japan. The 
politicians have apparently conceded that only the leaders of 
Europe's largest firms can mastermind the "old world's" recovery. 
Instead of wanting to control MNCs the EEC and member governments 
now seem happy give them a free hand. For example, national 
governments stand by as the battle for control of corporate 
resources rages throughout Europe. Giants such as Britain's 
Distillers, France's Generale Biscuit, and Germany's AEG- 
Telefunken have been acquired by other "national champions" 
aiming to become global players.
The past two chapters have shown that employees and their 
representatives seeking greater disclosure and consultation 
would be foolish to pin any hopes for on either the OECD's 
Guidelines and the "Vredeling Proposals". In Part 3» the issues 
raised in Parts 1 and 2 are examined in the context of plant 
closures in the UK. The causes of foreign divestment are examined 
in four industrial case studies which concentrate on 13 major 
plant closures. This study of "close downs, close up" allows a 
careful analysis of when the divestment decision was taken, by 
whom, and how it was implemented. One can thus assess the extent 
of conformity with UK legislation, as in Part IV of the 1975 
Employment Protection Act, and identify whether firm's behaviour 
adheres to the culture of the home country.
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PART III
CHAPTER 8
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
8.1.; Introduction
All research in the social sciences is based on either the 
"scientific” or "naturalistic" approach, and several fairly 
recent contributions to the accounting literature (eg. Abdel-
Khalik and Ajinka, 1979» Colville, 1981] not only distinguish 
between the two approaches, but discuss the relative merits of 
each [Maclnnes, 1983, p.14].
As the name suggests, the "scientific" approach "represents an
attempt to translate the principles and methodology of the
natural and physical sciences into the realm of the social 
sciences" [Colville, 1981, p.121].
This approach has been criticised by several leading social 
scientists. Mills [1959] argued that instead of the problem 
determining the methodology, the reverse was the case, and only 
those problems compatible with the methodology were considered 
worthy of scientific analysis. Glaser and Strauss [1967] argued 
that by pre-supposing the categories of relevance, it blinkered 
researchers who consequently failed to take account of "those 
aspects of data which do not fit the conceptual category of the
deductive theory" [Maclnnes, 1983, p.15].
Morgan and Smircich [1980], Colville [1981] and Tomkins and 
Groves [1981] identify a number of "naturalistic" research 
approaches which can be considered alternatives to the 
"scientific" approach. Tomkins and Groves [1981] state that such 
a research approach,
■does not aim to provide a predictive mechanism although its 
output mav be useful for such purposes; it alms to 
understand the dynamic process of reality and why things 
happened. In such research one must ... commence from 
■SPeclflG real-world situations: the main intention is to
answer the question 'irtiat is going on here* not to provide 
generalisable conclusions for all society" [Maclnnes, 1983,
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p.17].
Having thus concluded that the "naturalistic" approach is the 
more appropriate methodology for this study, the next step was to 
decide on the most suitable means of organising and presenting 
data. The experiences of previous authors all pointed to one 
particular method - the case study.
Compiling aggregate statistical data on foreign divestment 
whether from a home or host country has proved extremely 
difficult. But identifying divestments was often only a means to 
an end, as some authors ultimately wanted to conduct a small 
number of probing in-depth case studies. Persuading executives to 
divulge their experiences from past divestments was no easy 
task.
Despite assurances of confidentiality, Sachdev [1976] received 
little co-operation from the companies which he approached in 
this divestment research. Of the 138 MNCs - 22 responded 
positively in the initial stages, but 6 of these subsequently 
withdrew their offer. 87 refused, and 29 ignored the request 
[Sachdev, 1976, p.122]. The 16 MNCs which finally agreed to 
participate in the study proved extremely anxious that their 
personal identity, and that of their firm was disguised, thus 
ensuring confidentiality.
Torneden [1975], too, was unable to persuade many companies to 
lend their assistance. Himself a former executive of a US MNC, he 
received a reply from only 38 of the 189 US MNCs contacted.
The small number of firms which eventually conditionally agreed 
to participate in the above studies, exacted a high price for 
their co-operation from the authors. As with virtually all other 
®ajor divestment studies, the exception being Grunberg [1982], 
the authors were obliged to conceal the identities of the firms 
under investigation. Corporate executives only agreed to 
participate in these research programmes on the understanding 
that the identity of themselves and their firm was disguised, 
thus protecting confidentiality.
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According to Grunberg [1982], lack of data and companies' 
obsession with shrouding their divestment experience in secrecy, 
precluded a study based on aggregate data. His experience, 
however, convinved him that, given the general scarcity of 
detailed studies of foreign divestment, the case study approach 
was the most appropriate:
The virtual nonexistence of aggregate data on divestments 
and the protectiveness and discomfort that multinationals 
exhibit when researchers delve into what they se» to 
consider their private domain compelled me, of necessity, to 
concentrate on the case-study approach. As the research 
progressed, I became convinced that in the current primitive 
state of our knowledge, the case study was in fact the most 
appropriate and fruitful approach* [Grunberg, 1982, p.24].
Goode and Hatt [1952, p.331] define a case study as "a way of 
organising social data so as to preserve the unitary character of 
the social object being studied". They claim that,
"this orientation encourages the researcher to pay attention 
to the multiplicity of factors which contribute to that 
situation and to describe and examine the nature of their 
interdependence" [Goode and Hatt, 1952, p.331» quoted in 
Maclnnes, 1983, p.18].
Katz [1953, p.75] argues that the great advantage of the case 
study "is its inductive procedure, its potentiality for 
discovering significant variables and basic relations that would 
never be found if we were confined to research dictated by a 
hypothetical-deductive model". Katz [1953] saw the case study as 
the social sciences' bastion against "the sterility and 
triviality of premature model building" [Maclnnes, 1983, p.19].
Another advantage in the case study method is that, as Grunberg 
[1982] noted:
"A plurality of cases invites comparative analysis by 
bringing into relief similarities and differences on several 
dimensions and leads toward generalization" [Grunberg, 1982, 
p.24]
Such comparisons are only possible, however, if one's 
investigations bear fruit. As the author commenced his long 
Search, the words of Grunberg [1982] bore heavily on his mind:
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"researching divestments by multinational companies is 
extremely difficult. Multinational companies have erected a 
remarkably prickly shell to protect the details of their 
divestment behaviour. It seems that few topics are as 
sensitive and secretive in the business world" [Grunberg,
1982, p.23]
8.2. Identification of. Forelgn-Owned Plant closure Announcements
The author had originally hoped a Government agency would possess 
a complete list of foreign-owned plant closures in the UK. The 
Departments of Employment and Trade and Industry, were contacted 
first, but none had compiled a list of foreign-owned plant 
closures. The response from the Invest in Britain Bureau, 
Department of Industry, was fairly typical:
"I do not know of any central government register or indeed 
any statistics recording disinvestments by foreign 
multinationals" [letter dated May 31, 1983, from Mr. Shelley 
Ian Charik to author].
Having obtained no information from the public authorities, the 
author approached the Trades Union Cbngress, and individual 
Trades Unions. The TUG, perhaps rather surprisingly, does not 
maintain a record of foreign-owned plant closures [letter dated 
December 22, 1983, from Mr. A. Cave, Assistant Secretary,
Economic Department, of the Trades Union Cbngress, to the 
author].
The Job Survey Unit of Independent Television News was unable due 
to shortage of manpower to assist the author in identifying 
foreign-owned plant closures. Each Friday ITN's "News at Ten" 
broadcasts details of the week's job losses and gains, based on
the findings of the Unit. Unfortunately, this data has not yet
heen aggregated, and the staff considered that photocopying 
weekly scripts was too time-consuming.
Nor had Britain's national newspapers compiled a list of
r^edundancies or closures, and at this stage, it seemed that the 
chances of finding such a list were becoming increasingly remote. 
The author widened his search and a number of 
organisations/individuals were contacted but they neither
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possessed nor had knowledge of the whereabouts of the information 
requested. Although this is by no means an exhaustive list, the 
following were contacted
- the London and Edinburgh offices of the Commission of the
European Communities [letter dated February 22, 1984, from Mr.
George Scott, Head of UK Offices, to the author; letter dated 
April 19, 1983 from Mrs. Henderson to the author];
- Mr. Norman Scott, Director, Trade and Technology Division,
Economic Commission for Europe - an offshoot of the United 
Nations [letter to the author, dated May 4, 1983 from Mr.
Norman Scott, Director, Trade and Technology Division, Economic 
Commission for Europe];
- the Brussels-based Editor of Multinational Service. Mr. 
Jonathon Todd [letter from Mr. Todd to author];
- the United Nations* Centre on Transnational Corporations
[letter dated April 26, 1983, from Edith Ward, Transnational
Corporations Affairs Officer, Information Analysis Division, to 
author].
- K. Gleichmann, Directorate, Approximation of Laws, Freedom of 
Establishment, Freedom to provide services, Commission of the 
European Communities, wrote telling the author that "Whilst the 
Commission follows cases of disinvestment featured in the media 
as well as reported elsewhere, it does not however maintain a 
comprehensive list of such cases" [letter to author May 16, 
1983]
- Mr. Hans Gunter, Chief Bureau of Multinational Enterprises, at 
the International Labour Office, who wrote explaining that the 
ILO "do not keep systematic records on disinvestment by 
foreign-owned companies in the United Kingdom or any other 
countries" [letter dated May 12, 1983, from Mr. Gunter, 
International Labour Office, to author].
- the Geneva-based Institute for Research and Information on 
Multinationals.
Having contacted all of the above agencies, plus many others, it 
appeared that no one had compiled a list of foreign-owned plant 
closures. The author began the painstaking task of scrutinising 
the Financial Tim**, but unfortunately this most likely source of 
information was not indexed until 1981.
Indexing of the Financial Times was introduced in 1981, and for 
the period 1981-1984 inclusive, the author was able to compile a 
list of redundancies in the UK, and by reference to 
Whnm, proceeded to identify cases of foreign-owned plant
205
closure in the UK. However, unlike those of previous years, the 
Financial Times 1985 Index has no entry for "United Kingdom: 
redundancies". Obviously, such a change was unforeseen, and was 
only discovered in the final stages of writing this thesis. It is
possible, therefore, that the closure announcement of a plant
affecting less than 500 employees, which may have been reported 
in the Financial Times, has been overlooked.
This newspaper was the primary source of information, but it too
has not escaped the squabbles between proprietors and Unions
which have dogged Fleet Street in recent years. Between I976 and 
July 1984, industrial action prevented the publication of the 
Financial Times on no fewer than 104 occasions (see Table 1), and 
so, as a substitute data base, the author checked The Times, and 
The Guardian.
Table 8.1.: Financial Times not Printed due to Industrial Action. 
Dates Number of Publication Days Lost
March 18, 1976 1
November 16, 1976 1
January 5, 1977 1
August 5-23, 1977 inclusive 19
May 29-30, 1979 inc. 2
September 6-7, 1979 inc. 2
April 29, 1980 1
May 7-8, 1980 inc. 2
May 14, I98O 1
July 4, 1980 1
December 8-13 1980 inc. 6
May 31, 1983 to August 5, 1983 inc. 67
TOTAL 104
Source letter dated July 17, 1984, from Mr. John Caveney,
Editorial Information Service, Financial Times, to the author.
The author met with some success in tracing closures from 1979» 
hut then he was advised to contact Durham University*s Geography 
Department. Mr. Frank Peck, Research Fellow, in that Department 
provided the author with a list of all foreign-owned plant 
closures in the UK which had been reported in the Financial Tlme^ 
1976-81 .
This data base also revealed the parent company, its country of
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origin, the date of the closure announcement, and the number 
employed on that date.
The author was able to cross-check his own findings and those of 
Durham University's Geography Department, against those of 
Labour Research which carried a special feature on "Redundancies: 
Tories 4 year record" in its May 1983 issue. This article listed 
all redundancies reported by the Financial Times. Sundav Times, 
and Independent Television News since Mrs. Thatcher's first 
General Election victory on May 3, 1979.
The author's next task was twofold: firstly, to verify whether
firms had actually carried out their intentions, and closed all 
these; and, secondly, data collection on actual closures.
4.3.: Data Collection
4.3.1.: Verification of Plant Closure
At this stage in the proceedings, the author wrote to all those 
foreign-owned firms which had allegedly closed a UK operation. 
Parent Company Annual Reports were obtained from corporate 
headquarters and, where possible, confirmation of some closures.
The author wrote to Libraries throughout the UK requesting 
cuttings from local newspapers, and any other information on 
foreign-owned plants which had closed in the locality. This 
proved a fruitful exercise. Most libraries gave their full co­
operation, and posted any relevant material to the author.
Local newspaper reporting was more extensive - for obvious 
reasons - than that of national newspapers, and the author was 
able to identify key dates and events in each plant's history, 
and also the leading Company and Union protagonists involved in 
the divestment process.
The libraries of Greater London Council, the Scottish Development 
Agency, the Glasgow Herald. and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation's Glasgow headquartes were all able to provide the
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author with valuable source material.
Where local libraries failed to unearth sufficient newspaper 
articles the author made direct approach to the newspapers 
themselves. It soon became apparent why in some cases there was 
such a paucity of material. Mr. Barry Cîough, Editor of the 
Cannock Advertiser, explained that his newspaper had been unable 
to devote much attention to the closure of Fafnir Bearings’ 
Hednesford plant:
•after the Initial announcement of the factory closure, the
firm was extremely reluctant to make any other comment, so
that much of what you require is simply not on record"
[letter dated June 1, 1984, from Mr. Gough to author].
The author wrote to those Members of Parliament (MPs.) who
represented constituencies in which foreign-owned closures had
occurred. MPs representing neighbouring constituencies were also 
contacted, and both groups were asked to provide any
documentation, private correspondence, company statements, trades 
union papers, minutes of meetings, etc. which would shed light on 
the closures.
A large number of these MPs were unable to comply with the 
request because in principle, they did not involve themselves in 
the affairs of other constituencies. A small number treated the 
information requested as confidential. Mr. Kenneth Warren 
(Conservative), MP. for Hastings and Rye, was contacted regarding 
the closure of ITT’s plant at Hastings. He confirmed that he had 
"several discussions with the company’s senior management, but .. 
such discussions and constituency correspondence are 
confidential" [letter dated April 25, 1984, from Mr. Warren, MP., 
to author].
However, a more disturbing reason for witholding information came 
from Mr. Harry Greenway (Conservative), MP. for Ealing North. He 
Had been actively involved in preventing the closure of Hoover's 
Perl vale factory, but the US MNC still employed 600 people in his 
constituency. This precluded his releasing documentation to the 
author, for, as he explained, "I could not conceivably do 
anything to jeopardise their situation" [letter dated April 26,
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1984 from Mr. Greenway, MP. , to the author]. It is surely a cause 
for concern that an elected Member of Parliament perceives a MNC 
operating in his constituency as a potential threat, and one 
which influences his decisions and actions in the interests of 
his constituents.
A number of MPs. claimed they were unable to provide any 
assistance because they had destroyed the relevant documentation, 
or because "most of the contact was with the trade unions and 
that was verbal" [letter dated May 2, 1984, to the author from 
Mr. Clive Soley (Lab.), MP. for Hammersmith, who was involved in 
the Firestone, Brentford, closure].
A small number of MPs. advised and helped the author to contact 
former shop stewards at closed operations. Some MPs. proved 
extremely helpful, and provided the author with their own file on 
closure of the plant with which they were involved. Mr. Norman 
Buchan (Lab.), MP. for Paisley South - Talbot, Linwood; Mr. 
Donald Dewar (Lab.), MP. for Garscadden, - Goodyear, Drumchapel; 
Mr. Sean Hughes (Lab.), MP. for Knowsley South - Nabisco, Huyton.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs.) also assisted the 
author, notably. Dr. Gordon Adam (Lab.), and Ms. Joyce Quin 
(Lab.). Both provided valuable source material for the 
Caterpillar, Birtley case.
Having obtained this background material, the author discovered 
that, on a number of occasions, the national press had reported 
an announcement of plant closure, but closure had been averted. 
Sometimes plants facing imminent divestment were purchased as 
going concerns by another company (eg. Associated Weavers Ltd., 
Bradford, a subsidiary of US MNC, Champion International 
Corporation, was due to close until the Chairman of the British 
operation stepped in with an offer for the plant; similarly.
Marathon Oil was able to sell its Clydebank plant to Union
Industrielle et d’Enterprise of France).
Unlike the Durham University study, this author defined a plant 
33 foreign-owned, if the foreign firm held a majority stake.
209
R a n k - Toshiba closed two plants in the South West of England, but 
as they were joint ventures they do not meet the criterion for 
inclusion in this study.
Prior to management issuing public closure announcements, threats 
of closure tend to be scoffed at by the labour force, but once 
the company "goes public", employees appreciate the gravity of 
the situation, and are willing to accept terms and conditions 
which they would previously have rejected. In the case studies 
that follow, this pattern is repeated time and time again. The 
author is surprised that executives have not appreciated the long 
term advantages to be gained from "staging" closure 
announcements, and then withdrawing the threat once the exercise 
has achieved a dramatic favourable shift in the company’s 
bargaining power. The following example reveals the benefits a 
Company can reap from such a situation - though, the author would 
not wish to imply that the threat to close was a masquerade.
In December 1984, Borg-Warner decided to close its Kenfig Hill 
plant, but in 1985, local management was able to exact cost- 
saving concessions from labour, and the divestment decision was 
revoked. The radical deal, concluded with the Amalgamated Union 
of Engineering Workers (AUEW), saw the plant’s 600 employees 
accept a six year pay deal [Lloyd, July 24, 1985].
Occasionally, the press had accidentally misrepresented corporate 
announcements, and reported that an entire facility was being 
closed when only a certain department or product line was being 
terminated. Such mis-reporting is the nightmare of Public 
Relations Officers, as Heinz’s PR man, Mr. Peter Watts explained:
"The Flnapo.j a1 Tf mea announcement of 1982 that we were 
closing the London factory was not true and caused us some 
embarrassment. We think the rumour came about because we 
closed the baked bean department" [letter dated June 14, 
1984, from Mr. P.H. Watts to author]
Material received from a local newspaper revealed a case where 
closure had been implemented without any compulsory redundancies. 
In 1979 Heinz announced its decision to terminate operations at 
Standish, Wigan. The plant was closed in 1981, and production
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was transferred to the nearby, modern, Kitt Green facility, and 
local MP, , Mr, Roger Stott, CBE, confirmed that the move was 
achieved without any compulsory redundancies:
■Negotiations took place with the workforce and everyone who 
wanted a job at Kitt Green was given one. There were no 
compulsory redundancies and the only people who were made 
redundant were those ^ o  chose this option.
I had extensive negotiations with the company and the shop 
stewards at Heinz regarding the closure of this plant, but 
unlike other closures that have resulted in redundancy and 
unemployment, this was not the case with the closure at 
Standish and consequently this closure was smooth and went 
ahead without any aggravation or hassle" [letter to the 
author dated May 15, 1984, from Mr. R. Stott, CBE, MP.].
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Table 8.2.: Plant Closures by Foreign Multinationals in the UK,
1978-1985
Date
of closure 
announcement
Company Divesting Country 
[name of parent Co. of 
if Different] Origin
Locationof
Plant
Closed
Number 
of Jobs 
Lost
1978
1. Sept 9. Hoover US Carfin 135
2. Sept 9. Hoover US Hamilton 135
3. Nov 8. Massey Ferguson Canada Kilmarnock 1,000
4. Dec 8. Goodyear US Boston Spa. 50
5. Dec 8. Goodyear US Barnsley 50
6. Dec 12. Harris Economy US Bridgend 240
[American Hoist]
Total 1,610
1979
7. Feb 16. Pye Eng. Services Netherlands Cambridge 200
[Philips] 
8. Feb 21. Goodyear US Drumchapel 700
9. March 2. Morris & Co.Ltd. Ireland Kidderminster 300
10. March 15
[Youghal]
. Akzo Chimie UK Netherlands Kirkby 100
11.March
[Akzo] 
Pye TMC NetherlandsLivingston 475
12. May 9.
[Philips]
Adv. Textile Mills US Crook 450
13. May 9.
[Monsanto]
Adv. Textile Mills US St. Helens 110
[Monsanto] 
14. May 9. Monsanto US
Aukland
Cumnock 50
15. May 9. Monsanto US Dundonald 830
16. June 25. Fafnir US Hednesford 600
17. July 20.
[Textron]
SCM US Porthmadog 100
18. July 27. ITT Corp. US Kearsley 360
19. July 27. STC US Hastings 550
20. Aug 9.
[ITT Corp.]
Mather & Platt Ltd . Australia Radcliffe-Globe 60
21. Oct 13.
[Wormald International] 
Singer US Clydebank 3,000
22. Nov 15. Firestone US Brentford 1,500
1980
23. Jan 15 Heinz US Standish
9,385
none
24. Jan 22. Steel Div. Swedish Bentham 70
25. Jan 30.
[Sandvic]
Automatic Trn. Div,. US Letchworth 750
26. Feb 11
[Borg-Warner] 
Massey Ferguson Canada Knowsley 390
27. Feb 15, Pickering Foods US Coleraine 300
28. March 1
[Heinz]
Ballymoney Manuf. US Ballymoney 260
29. March 11
[Ames Textiles] 
MFE Corp. US Livingston 47
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Table 8.2. cont.: Plant Closures by Foreign Multinationals in the
UK, 1978-1985
Date Company Divesting Country
of closure [name of parent Co. of 
announcement if Different] Origin
Location of
Plant
Closed
Number 
of Jobs 
Lost
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
March 12
March 12
March 25
March 25
April 10,
June 13.
June 13.
June 30 
July24 
July 28 
Aug 15
Aug 21 
Sept 3.
Sept 4. 
Sept 9.
Sept 9. 
Oct 2. 
Oct. 13 
Oct 20. 
Nov 28.
Dresser Wayne US
[Dresser International] 
Dresser Wayne US
[Dresser International]
Demag plastics 
[Mansmn Dem]
, Pye Elect-Devices 
[Phillips]
Berger
[Hoechst]
Ilford
[CIBA-Geigy]
Ilford 
[CIBA-Geigy] 
Grundig 
AM International 
Domtar
Cutting Tool Div 
[Sandvic]
Firestone
Cambrian Castings
[Clayton Dewandre]
Honeywell
Eaton Axles
[Eaton Corporation]
Weyroc
ITT
Philips
Hoechst
Kingston Lamp Co. 
[Philips]
Manchester 142
Bracknell 239
W. Germany Craigavon 120
Netherlands Peterborough 14
W. Germany East Kilbride 46
Switzerland Brentwood 1,700
Switzerland Basildon 800
W. Germany 
US
Canada
Sweden
US
US
US
US
Sweden
US
Netherlands 
W. Germany 
Netherlands
Dunmurry 1,000
Hemel Hempstead 650
Sunderland 
West Drayton
Wrexham
Aberdare
Uddingston
Darlaston
Weybridge
Rhyl
Lowestoft
Limavady
Hull
400
80
600
240
200
443
60
81
1,100
350
73
10,055
1981
50. Jan 7
51. Feb 2.
52. Feb 6,
53. Feb 6.
54. Feb 11.
55. Feb 12.
56. March 6.
57. March 18
58. April 10
59. April 18
Yale Security Div. US Livingston 163
[Scovill]
Smith-Corona US West Bromwich 230
Sedddon Atkinson US Bamber Bridge 132
[International Harvester]
Sedddon Atkinson US Walton le Dale 472
[International Harvester]
460Inger-Rand US Manchester
Talbot Motors France Linwood 4,800
[Peugeot-Citroen]
300Clayton Dewandre US Lincoln
[American Standard]
RCA US Washington 270
. Star Aluminium Switzerland Wolverhampton 450
[Alusuisse]
300STC US Enniskillen
[ITT]
213
Table 8.2. cont.: Plant Closures by Foreign Multinationals in the
UK, 1978-1985
Date
of closure 
announcement
Company Divesting Country 
[name of parent Co. of 
if Different] Origin
Location of 
Plant 
Closed
Number 
of Jobs 
Lost
60. April 22.
61. June 18.
Sandvik
Assoc. Communic­
Sweden Hillington 84
ations Corp. Australia 
[Bell Group Ltd.]
M i t Cham NA
62. June 23 Talon Textron 
[Nucon hlds]
US Treforest 380
63. June 26. Fiat-Allis 
[Fiat Auto]
Italy Oakham 460
64. June 27 ITT Creed 
[ITT]
US Treforest 425
65. July 16 Br. Enkalon Ltd. 
[Akzo]
Netherlands Antrim 850
66. July 18 Alcan Design 
[Alcan Aluminium]
Canada Wellingborough 60
67. July 18 Alcan Design 
[Alcan Aluminium]
Canada Earls Barton 30
68. Oct 23. Hoover US Perivale 1,100
10,966
1982
69. Jan 28. Sperry New Holland US Aylesbury 550
70. April 3. Scholl US Northampton 150
71. July 23. International
Harvester
US Bradford 514
72. Aug 12. General Motors US Peterhead 350
73. Aug 12. General Motors US Wellingborough 230
74. Aug 28. Alcan Aluminium Canada Skelmersdale
75. Oct 14. SKF Sweden Irvine 200
76. Nov 11. Smurfit
[Jefferson Smurfit]
Ireland St. Helens 200
77. Nov 12. Trico-Folberth US Northampton 130
78. Dec 11. Kraft Foods US Trafford Park
16079. April 15 Monsanto US Fawley
80. Dec 21. Michelin France Mallusk 2,000
4,484
1983
81. Jan 28. Sunbeam Electric 
[Allegheny Corp.]
US East Kilbride 233
82. Feb 4. Linotype Paul 
[Allied Corp.]
US Cheltenham
500
83. Feb 4. Linotype Paul 
[Allied Corp.]
US Cheltenham
84. Feb 15. Mrs. Smith’s US NA NA
Frozen Foods 
[Kellogs]
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Table 8.2. cont.: Plant Closures by Foreign Multinationals in the
UK, 1978-1985
Date Company Divesting Country Location of N umber
of closure [name of parent Co. of Plant of Jobs
announcement if Different] Origin Closed Lost
85. May 5. Black & Decker US Harmondsworth 450
86. May 6. International US Carr Hill 104
Harvester [Doncaster]
87. May 24. Cam Gears US Hilain 250
[TRW Group]
88. July Goodyear US Craigavon 800
89. Aug 27. Fisher Controls US Cowdenbeath 258
[Monsanto]
90. Aug 27 Fisher Controls US Rochester 400
[Monsanto]
91. Aug. 31 Caterpillar US Birtley 960
92. Sept 6, Nabisco US Huyton 930
93. Sept 6. Nabisco US Leicester 300
4,185
1984
1985
94. Feb 15. Lévi-Strauss US Bothwell 227
95. Feb 15. Lévi-Strauss US Inchinnan 195
96. Nov 14. General InstrumentsUS Glenrothes 150
572
TOTAL JOBS LOST 41,257
Source: derived from the Financial Times
Table 8.2. reveals that Monsanto has closed seven plants in the 
UK, more than any other single firm. ITT has closed six, Philips, 
five, Goodyear and International Harvester, four, and Hoover and 
Sandvic, three.
It must be stressed that Table 8.2. fails to convey the adverse 
effect on UK employment which these closures had. According to 
the table, between I978 and 1983, over 41,000 jobs were lost in 
the 96 foreign-owned plant closures which were reported in the 
Upancial This total is derived from the number employed
when the closure announcement was made, and thus represents the 
number employed at these plants. It thus disguises the
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true effect of foreign divestment on UK jobs. For example, Singer 
Clydebank alone at its peak employed over 16,000, and the Linwood 
car plant closed by Peugeot once had 8,000 employees. At their 
peak, these two plants alone employed 24,000. In general, by the 
time closure was announced, employment had usually already been 
halved, at least. Even this may be a conservative estimate. The 
number employed at Singer, for example, when closure was 
announced was less than a fifth of the peak employment level.
Given that the US is the world’s main exporter of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), and that a significant percentage is to the UK, 
it should come as no surprise that US MNCs account for a large 
percentage of the wave of foreign divestments. As Table 8.3. 
shows, since 1978, US MNCs have closed twice as many plants in 
the UK, as all other foreign firms put together, and nine times 
as many as the second largest divestor, the Dutch MNCs which 
closed seven plants.
Table 8.3.: UK Foreign-Owned Plant Closures by Home Country
Country Number
Australia 2
France 2
Ireland 2
Italy 1
The Netherlands 7
Sweden 5
Switzerland 3
W, Germany 4
Canada 6
United States 64
Total 96
Having identified 96 plant closures by non-UK MNCs, it was 
decided to restrict the choice of case studies to the 23 cases 
which involved 500 or more compulsory redundancies.
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Table 8.4.: Plant Closures by Foreign MNCs in the UK, involving 500
or more compulsory redundancies, 1978-1985 inclusive.
Date Company Divesting Location Number
of closure [name of parent Co. of Plant of Jobs
announcement if Different] Closed Lost
08.11.78
21.02.79
09.05.79
25.06.79
27.07.79
13.10.79
15.11.79
30.01.80
13.06.80
13.06.80
30.06.80
24.07.80
21.08.80  
13.10.80 
12.02.81
16.07.81
23.10.81
28.01.82
Massey Ferguson
Goodyear
Monsanto
Fafnir [Textron]
STC [ITT Corp]
Singer
Firestone
Automatic Trn. Div,
[Borg-Warner]
Ilford
Ilford
[CIBA-Geigy]
Grundig
AM International
Firestone 
Philips 
Talbot Motors 
[Peugeot-Citroen] 
Br. Enkalon Ltd. 
[Akzo]
Hoover
Sperry New Holland
Kilmarnock 1,000
Drumchapel 700
Dundonald 830
Hednesford 600
Hastings 550
Clydebank 3,000
Brentford 1,500
Letchworth 750
Brentwood 1,700
Basildon 800
Dunmurry
Hemel
Hempstead
Wrexham
Lowestoft
Linwood
Antrim
Perivale
Aylesbury
1,000
650
600
1,100
4,800
850
1,100
550
23.07.82
21.12.82
25.07.83
31.08.83
06.09.83
International
Harvester
Michelin
Goodyear
Caterpillar
Nabisco
Bradford
Mallusk
Oaigavon
Birtley
Huyton
514
2,000
800
960
930
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Table 8.5.: North American Foreign-Owned Plant Closures in the 
UK, involving 500 or more compulsorv redundancies, I978-I985 
inclusive.
Date Company Divesting Country
of closure [name of parent Co. of
announcement if Different] Origin
Locationof
Plant
Closed
N umber 
of Jobs 
Lost
1978
1. Nov 8.
1979
2. Feb 21.
3. May 9.
4. June 25'
5. July 27,
6. Oct 13.
7. Nov 15.
1980
8. Jan 30.
9. July 24
10. Aug 21.
1981
11. Oct 23.
1982
12. Jan 28.
13. July 23.
1983
14. July 25.
15. Aug. 31
16. Sept 6.
Massey Ferguson Canada
Goodyear US
Monsanto US
Fafnir Bearings US
[Textron]
STC US
[ITT Corp.]
Singer US
Firestone US
Automatic Trn. Div. US 
[Borg-Warner]
AM International US 
Firestone US
Hoover
Goodyear
Caterpillar
Nabisco
US
Sperry New Holland US 
[Sperry]
International US
Harvester
US
US
US
Kilmarnock
Drumchapel
Dundonald
Hednesford
Hastings
Clydebank
Brentford
Letchworth
1,000
700
830
600
550
3,000
1,500
750
Hemel Hempstead 650 
Wrexham 600
Perivale
Aylesbury
Bradford
Craigavon
Birtley
Huyton
1,100
550
514
800
960
930
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Table 8.6.: European-Owned Plant Closures in the UK, involving
500 or more compulsory redundancies, 1978-1985 inclusive.
Date Company Divesting Country
of closure [name of parent Co. of
announcement if Different] Origin
Location Number 
of Plant of Jobs 
Closed Lost
1980
1. June 13. Ilford
[CIBA-Geigy]
2. June 13. Ilford
[CIBA-Geigy]
3. June 30. Grundig
4. Oct 13. Philips
1981
5. Feb 12. Talbot Motors
Switzerland
Switzerland
W. Germany 
Netherlands
France
[Peugeot-Citroen]13-
6. July 16 Br. Enkalon Ltd. Netherlands 
[Akzo]
1982
7. Dec 21. Michelin
Brentwood 1,700
Basildon
France
Antrim
Mallusk
800
Dunmurry 1,000
Lowestoft 1,100
Linwood 4,800
850
2,000
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R.M.: Company/Union Co-operation
Cinema buffs will remember the unsympathetic journalist played by 
Johnathon Pryce in the highly acclaimed British film, "The 
Ploughman’s Lunch", who, in the midst of the Falklands War, is 
writing a book on the 1956 debacle, the Suez Crisis. In order to 
ingratiate himself with his informants and advisers, he becomes a 
political chameleon, changing his colours to suit his company. 
This trait Is highlighted in the anti-hero, in order to symbolise 
a decline in Britain’s morals, but, this author felt compelled to 
adopt the same strategy, passing himself off as anything and 
everything from an avowed Socialist to a ’wet’ Conservative, as 
many Trade Unionists and those sympathetic to their cause, were 
just as anxious as any executive, to "sound out" the author’s 
politics. By appearing sympathetic to his interviewee’s views, 
the author was convinced that interviewees were more forthcoming 
with information and opinions.
The author wrote to the Chairman/Managing Director of the UK 
subsidiary of each MNC featuring in the following four case
studies. The Trades Union officials involved in each closure were 
also contacted. During personal and telephone interviews, the 
authors questions fell into three broad categories: the
divestment decision; employee disclosure and consultation; and,
the OECD’s Guidelines and the "Vredeling Proposals". The 
interviews centred on the first two topics, because Union 
officials and Management were particularly knowledgeable In these 
areas. Indeed, early on In the research, the author learned that 
any questions about the third subject area should not be raised 
with Trades Unionists until all other topics had been exhausted. 
It appeared that most officials were not well Informed about the 
Guidelines, and normally Interviews were brought to a quick end 
once the author posed questions about their use and
effectiveness.
The purpose of the interviews was to extract the following 
information:
- who made the divestment decision?
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- when was the decision made?
- what were the grounds for closure?
- was closure a surprise to UK Management and/or the Trades 
Unions and the workforce?
- was UK management involved or excluded from the decision­
making process?
- when did UK subsiary and plant management first know of the 
divestment decision?
- when were Trades Unionists and employees first informed?
- who was responsible for the divestment process?
- what was discussed at Company-Union meetings before and after 
the closure announcement?
- did UK management ever mislead the workforce, and if so was 
this deliberate policy, or was it too deceived by yet more 
senior management?
- did UK subsidiary management withold information from plant 
management?
- Were the OECD Guidelines used or referred to by either 
Company or Union in the course of the divestment process?
- If not, why, and if they so, to what effect?
- Is there a need for further employee disclosure and 
consultation legislation In the UK, or is the 1975 Employment 
Protection Act satisfactory?
- What effect would the enactment of the "Vredeling Proposals" 
have on employee disclosure and consultalon.
Before providing specific details of the help received from these 
sources, some general explanation and description is given of the 
author’s experience with Trades Unions and Management.
■8^ 4t1.; Access to Trades Union Officials
Newspaper articles on closures Invariably quoted a Trade Union 
spokesman, and the author was able to identify the Union most 
actively involved in the closure, and also the national, 
regional, local, and branch officials. Having received material 
f'rom Union officials, the author met them in personal-interview
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or spoke to them by telephone.
The national headquarters of the AUEW was able to provide the 
author with a complete list of names and addresses of its 
District Secretaries throughout the UK. Letters were dispatched 
to all District Secretaries in the appropriate areas. As the case 
studies reveal, many co-operated. The few who did not reply were 
contacted by telephone, and this normally elicited a promise to 
pass on material.
Mr. David Handley, Education Officer of the Association of 
Professional, Executive, Clerical & Computer Staff (APEX), listed 
the four closures which "directly affected APEX members". These 
were:- AM International, (Hemel Hemstead); International 
Harvester (Bradford); Massey Ferguson (Kilmarnock); and Singer 
(Clydebank). He kindly sent letters of Introduction to the Area 
Secretaries Involved, who in turn furnished the author with 
useful documentation and suggested other sources of Information.
The author also wrote to the Regional Secretary’s of the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU). They were able to 
recommend District Secretaries who would be able to enlighten the 
author. In one instance, the District Secretary worked from a 
number of offices and attempts to contact him during working 
hours failed. Fortunately, he had an uncommon surname, Boston, 
and eventually the author was able to locate him at home by 
studying the telephone directory, but only after a succession of 
"wrong numbers". Where Trades Unions were unable to provide an 
address for a former shop steward, the author resorted to this 
means and it proved successful on a number of occasions.
Interviews with Management
According to Sachdev,
"before each Interview the author was virtually asked to 
take a pledge not to make any Information public or give any 
Indication whereby a company could be Identified" [Sachdev, 
1976, p.121].
At the outset of many Interviews, Sachdev found that executives
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were clearly suspicious of him [Sachdev, 1976, p.124]. Torneden 
[1975], too, found his interviews an unpleasant experience, 
describing the atmosphere during the interviews as "frequently
tense and diffused". His previous work experience proved an
advantage, in that he was personally acquainted with some of his
interviewees, former business associates. On the other hand, 
interviews with strangers "generally produced incomplete and
superficial findings" [Torneden, 1975, p.39].
Grunberg [1982], however, without providing the firms with such a 
safeguard was able to assess in three cases the causes of foreign 
divestment in Europe, though not only do the interviewed 
executives remain anonymous, designations and specific job titles 
are witheld. This author has "named names" in all cases except 
Goodyear, where job titles are given, and Grundig where the
author agreed not to disclose the identity of his informant 
within the German MNC’s UK subsidiary.
Limitations were imposed on the research methodology of this
thesis by the fact that Parent Company executives were not
interviewed. If, as is said, all foreign divestment decisions are 
made at Headquarters, it would have been most illuminating if one 
had been able to interview forthright managers, willing to 
specify when exactly a closure decision was finalised, and when 
subsidiary management was informed. Possession of such 
information would enable researchers to assess if UK management 
had consciously misled employees, or if they, too, were given 
false assurances from distant boardrooms.
Despite this limitation the findings of this research are not 
invalidated. Indeed, while assistance from management when 
forthcoming proved most useful, it was possible to compile 
detailed case studies without such help (eg. the Hoover, 
Firestone, and Michelin cases).
Like Grunberg [1982], the author refrained from using a tape 
recorder as he believed it would serve only to exaggerate anxiety 
and caution. Instead, notes were taken, and executives were more 
than willing to facilitate this task by repeating themselves when
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requested.
The author was aware of inhibition on the part of one or two 
executives, but as Sachdev noted, interviewees ( and interviewer) 
relaxed as the meeting wore on. On only one occasion was the 
author conscious of a cold reception by an executive, but it 
would be wrong to assume that this was wholly attributable to his 
reluctance to discuss divestment.
The author interviewed UK executives from two US MNCs who were 
eager to determine his politics and in particular his views of 
MNCs. But the author’s own experience of conducting interviews 
with Management was quite different from Sachdev’s. Like Grunberg 
[ 1982],
"the Issue of confidentiality rarely came primarily, I 
suspect, because my previous legwork had rendered the issue 
inapplicable. Occasionally during an interview, I was asked 
to note something "off the record", and this I did.
Otherwise no assurance of confidentiality was offered and 
none sought" [Grunberg, 1982, p.26]
Overall, the executives interviewed were exceptionally helpful, 
hospitable, and kind - laying on transport to and from the 
nearest railway station.
One executive interviewed allowed the author to inspect files on 
two closures in which his firm had been involved. The author 
selected documents and the Director gave the author a photocopy 
of each document, except for one. This document was considered 
particularly sensitive, but the author was allowed to take notes 
from it. As requested by this Director, personal names of
managers have been withheld.
8.5.; The Case Studies
The author decided to concentrate on four industries, for two 
reasons. First of all, in each case study one can assess the
behaviour of different MNCs to essentially the same external
environment. Secondly, each case study comprises two or more MNCs 
from two countries, and thus allows an evaluation of the impact
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of home country culture on corporate behaviour. It was thus 
decided to ignore those sectors which witnessed only one closure 
(eg. the automobile industry and the Peugeot, Linwood, closure). 
The four industries chosen account for 15 of the 23 closures, and 
involve a total of 12 MNCs, eight from the US, one from the 
Netherlands, and one each from Canada, France, and West Germany. 
Within each industry case study, each firm is dealt with 
separately following [where applicable] the following framework:
1. Introduction.
2. Origins and Internationalisation of the Company.
3. A review of the parent company’s situation.
4. New Men.
5. Implications for the plant to be closed.
6. Timetable of run-down.
7. The Closure Announcement
8. Company/Union Meetings After the Announcement.
9. Management’s View.
10 Union’s View.
11. Epilogue
8f5,1.: Man-Made Fibre Industry
This case study focuses on the Man-Made Fibre Industry. Two plant 
closures are examined. The first, Monsanto, a US MNC, closed its 
plant in Ayrshire, Scotland; the other, British Enkalon Ltd., a 
subsidiary of the Dutch MNC, Akzo, closed its unit at Antrim, 
Northern Ireland. The author was fortunate enough to receive 
considerable assistance from both Management and Trades Union 
officials in both cases, but especially from those involved in 
the Antrim closure.
Unfortunately, the Chairman at the time of the closure of 
Monsanto’s UK subsidiary is no longer with the firm. Now 
Chairman of the UK firm. Cable and Wireless, Sir Eric Sharp, was 
unavailable for interview. After a long and protracted search, 
the former Minute Secretary was located, and he was able to give 
the author the original Minutes of the Monsanto branch of the 
TGWU. Unlike the Hoover and Singer Minutes, there was no record
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of meetings with Management,and the Minutes proved unhelpful.
8-R.P.: The Domestlg-J^DPliance /Consumer Electronics Induatrv
The first case study examines closures in the Domestic 
Appliance/Consumer Electronics industry, and features two US 
MNCs, Hoover and Singer, plus one European MNC, Grundig. Hoover 
refused to participate in the study, and Singer explained that 
none of its present staff were able to help. However, Singer’s 
former UK subsidiary manager was traced, and he proved most 
helpful. The author was also fortunate enough, to unearth copies 
of Minutes of meetings between Hoover’s UK Management and Shop 
Stewards at the Perivale plant. Copies were also obtained from 
the Shop Steward’s own Minute Book. Clydebank Central Library 
holds the original Shop Stewards’ Minutes Books, dating back to 
the early 1960’s and these too were consulted.
A senior Grundig executive was interviewed by the author and in 
accordance with his request, his identity has been witheld. Since 
closing its plant in Northern Ireland, the German firm has been 
acquired by the Dutch giant Philips. It was decided not to 
include the Philips’ Lowestoft closure in the main text, due to 
considerable problems in data selection. Some newspaper articles 
were collected, and the Company sent the author a copy of its 
closure statement. Mr. Cohen, Industrial Relations Manager, was 
prepared to meet the author, but believed it most unlikely he 
would be able to be of much assistance. The major stumbling 
block, however, proved to be the local Union official who was 
most involved in the case.
Mr. H. McKenna, Norfolk and North Suffolk District Secretary of 
the AUEW, was contacted regarding the Philips, Lowestoft closure, 
and he informed the author that the Electrical Electronic 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU) was the convening 
anion at Lowestoft, and that Mr. L. Chittock, as Area Official 
af the EETPU, would have received redundancy notices. Mr. 
Chittock replied negatively to the author’s request for
information:
"I am not at liberty to divulge the business of this Union
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to a third party, notwithstanding your good intention. I 
regret, therefore, that I an unable to be any assistance to 
you" [letter to author dated June 25, 1984, from Mr. L.
Chittock, EEPTU Area Official].
8.5.1.: The Tvre and Rubber Industry
The Tyre and Rubber industry has witnessed five major foreign- 
owned plant closures since 1978, all of which are examined in the 
third case study. The two US MNCs, Firestone and Goodyear each 
closed two plants, and Michelin of France closed its large 
Belfast operation.
Goodyear was exceptionally responsive to requests for 
information, and on two occasions the author met with the 
Director of Personnel for several hours at the Company’s UK 
Headquarters in Wolverhampton. In stark contrast, the former 
Company Secretary of Firestone (which has ceased all production 
in the UK) felt obliged to seek prior approval from the US Board 
in Akron before participating in this study. Approval was not 
given by his superiors, nor did Michelin’s UK management agree to 
participate.
The Transport and General Workers’ Union had been the convening 
union at all five plants. The author arranged to meet the 
National Officer (responsible for this industry) at the Union’s 
headquarters. Smith Square, London. Due to unforeseen 
circumstances the official was two hours late in arriving for the 
interview, by which time the author had to leave to keep an 
appointment with the Chairman of Monsanto’s UK subsidiary. The 
visit was not a complete waste of time, though, as the Official 
had telephoned his secretary instructing her to allow the author 
to examine his files.
The Trades Union response to requests for assistance was very 
mixed. District Secretaries of the TGWU involved in the Firestone 
(Wrexham) and Goodyear (Drumchapel) closures were extremely 
helpful. Officials involved in the two Ulster closures were less 
f'orthcoming.
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R.5.4.; Farm and Construction Equipment
The final case study examines the Farm and Construction Equipment 
industry. The author was unable to elicit co-operation from the 
Sperry New Holland and the few former employees who were 
eventually traced had destroyed any relevant documentation. 
Aylesbury was a non-unionised plant, and the local District
Secretaries of the AUEW were also unable to assist the author. 
Lack of data precluded including the closure of Sperry New
Holland’s Aylesbury plant in this industry case study.
In depth analysis is offered, however, of three closures which 
involved one Canadian (Massey Ferguson) and two US MNCs
(International Harvester and Caterpillar). This Chapter is 
particularly important in that it offers a history of the sole 
case referred to the UK National Contact Point by the TUC which 
accused the firm of violating sections in the Employment and 
Industrial Relations chapter of the OECD’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.
The compilation of this case was facilitated by co-operation from 
virtually all sources contacted. Senior UK Management of all
three Companies allowed themselves to be interviewed by the 
author. The interviews took place at each firm’s UK Headquarters, 
and on average lasted two hours. The Managers provided the author 
with crucial documentation, some of which may be judged 
sensitive. The number of executives interviewed ranged from one 
at Caterpillar to three at International Harvester.
Before and since the interviews, the author has received valuable 
assistance from executives of all three firms. Considerable help 
by officials attached to three Trades Unions was given to the 
author in researching this case study: - APEX, the AUEW, and the
General Municipal and Boilermakers Union.
The AUEW was the main Union at the plants examined in this case. 
On only one occasion, involving Bradford District Secretary, was 
help not forthcoming. His letter of reply, designed ostensibly to 
offer assistance in the future, left the author in no doubt of
228
Mr. Walker’s intentions. He had been contacted in connection with 
the closure of International Harvester’s Bradford plant, but he 
was able to give only the name and address of the Convener, prior 
to the closure;
"We have, in our upstairs* storeroom, a large number of 
files which we no longer refer to and I am in the process of 
sorting these out. As you will appreciate the job of 
straightening out the files, which contain details of 
factories which have closed, is quite a lengthy task and due 
to pressure of work it is unlikely that this will be done in 
the near future. However, if you are still interested when 
this is done please do not hesitate to contact me" [letter 
to the author, dated July 2, 1984, from Mr. P. Walker,
Bradford District Secrtetary of the AUEW].
More than six months later when the author telephoned Mr. Walker 
in early 1985, the situation remained the same - "We’re behind 
with the present, never mind the past". Gladly, the author 
received assistance from the Glasgow and Kilmarnock District 
Secretaries, but above all from Mr. Joseph Cellini, Gateshead 
District Secretary.
The regional official of APEX provided the author with the names 
and addresses of his Union’s three branch officers at the 
Bradford plant, just prior to closure. Only the Chairperson 
replied to the author’s letter. She was able to provide copies of 
the Minutes of Company-Union meetings.
The author located some Minutes of Union meetings at the Massey
Ferguson Kilmarnock plant in Glasgow’s Mitchell Library, but 
these were not particularly enlightening. Apparently, alternative 
Minutes exist which would be much more helpful. These were taken 
at the meetings of an Action Committee especially established to 
oppose closure. Unfortunately, the person alleged to have these 
Minutes in his possession denies it. The author’s research of 
this case was hampered by the obvious friction existing between
former Shop Stewards at the plant. In other cases, a clash of 
personalities between former Shop Stewards was obvious, but the 
problem appeared to be more deep-rooted among ex-Massey Stewards.
When the author met the Convener of the Caterpillar, Birtley
plant in May 1984, he had just destroyed the Shop Stewards’
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Minute Books. However, he had kept his own Minute Book and he 
kindly presented it to the author.
Summary
Incredible as it may seem, no UK Government department monitors 
and records a list of foreign-owned plant closures in Britain. 
From the Financial Times, and in its absence, other national 
newspapers, the author identified 96 foreign-owned plant closures 
during the period 1978-85. The author decided to concentrate on 
the largest plant closures, those involving 500, or more, 
compulsory redundancies. From this list of 23 closures, it was 
decided to examine foreign-divestment in four industries. These 
four cases account for 16 plant closures, and involve 13 firms, 
from five different countries. This international industrial 
framework constitutes the basis for analysing three major issues: 
the causes of foreign divestment; current employee disclosure and 
consultation practice in the UK and; the impact of home country 
culture on foreign subsidiaries.
It is to the first case study that we now turn our attention, the 
man-made fibre industry.
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UiAPTER 9
THE MAN-MADE FIBRE INDUSTRY
9.1.: IntrodttctlQiL
It was seen in Chapter 5 that the Netherlands' national culture 
can be characterised as Individualist, Small Power Distance, 
Feminine, and Weak Uncertainty Avoidance. Unlike France, Germany, 
the US and Canada, the home countries of the multinationals 
examined in this thesis, the Netherlands alone bears all four of 
these features. Thus, Dutch culture conditions its citizens to 
adopt a particularly open disclosure policy.
This examination of the Man-Made Fibre industry allows comparison 
with the Dutch MNC, Akzo, and the American firm, Monsanto. 
American culture falls between the openness of the Dutch and 
the strong secrecy dimension treasured by the French and Germans. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 5 suggests that if home 
country culture impacts upon a nation's corporations, the Dutch 
MNC should display greater concern for employees, and communities 
than any of the other firms from other countries examined in this 
thesis. Chapter 6 reinforced this view of Dutch culture when it 
was revealed that the Netherlands was one of the few nations 
which wanted the OECD to pass legislation to control MNCs, rather 
than issue mere Gidelines. Within the EEC the Dutch have also 
been at the forefront of the campaign to increase MNCs' 
accountability. The driving force behind this controversial move 
has been a Dutchman, Henk Vredeling, whose ambitious proposals 
were analysed in Chapter 7.
This study begins by a brief review of the industry's problems 
which have surfaced since the 1974 oil crisis.
^2,; The Industry*3 Problems
During the 1960s the man-made fibres industry enjoyed boom 
conditions, and nylon was a particularly popular material; nylon
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shirts for men were even considered "U". Between I963 and 1973, 
synthetics had increased from about 40% to 70% of total textile 
mill consumption. Producers responded to the market and launched 
a huge construction programme. This greatly increased the UK 
industry's capacity, and output increased significantly from 
550,000 tonnes in 1969 to a peak production level of 750,000 
tonnes in 1974 [Monsanto, May 9, 1979].
This success was totally overshadowed by the effects of the 
dramatic price increase in the industry's basic raw material. In 
the course of 1974 oil prices quadrupled. This sent shock waves 
throughout the industrialised economies of the world which were, 
in the main, net importers of "black gold". The ramifications of 
this price increase cannot be overestimated, in regard to its 
effect on the nylon industry - dependent on oil.
The industry's problems were exacerbated by increased capacity as 
new plants, born of the 1960's boom conditions - including 
Dundonald -, came on stream. The decline in demand was so severe 
that many plants stood idle. By 1978, UK production of man-made 
fibres was a third down on the level reached in 1974 and in 1979» 
the synthetic fibres industry in the UK and the Continent 
operated at only 70% of capacity [Monsanto, May 9» 1979].
As the synthetic fibre industry declined, nylon suffered 
disproportionately. Whereas, it had accounted for 43% of total 
synthetic production in 1965, by 1978, nylon accounted for only 
24%. Between I968 and 1973, production of nylon filament textiles 
had grown by 3.7% and nylon filament carpet by 2 8%. But between 
1973-78 the former actually fell by 5.3%, and the letter's rate 
of growth shrank to a mere 1.3% These figures reveal the true 
scale of the nylon fibres industry's slump. From 1974 the man- 
made fibres industry had been crippled by a steady and continuing 
decline [Monsanto, May 9, 19791.
This slump had grave consequences for the man-made fibre 
divisions of AKZO and Monsanto, and the UK subsidiaries of both 
f'irms did not escape the dramatic slump in demand. Our analysis 
begins with the US firm.
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MONSANTO
Q.I.: Origins and Company Baokground
In 1982 Monsanto, the fourth largest US chemical company, 
revealed its new corporate strategy which has since redirected 
the Company from mainly commodity petrochemical-based products 
towards higher value-added, higher profit speciality products and 
processes. The Company is currently concentrated in three broad 
business areas: "Life Sciences", "Qiemical Sciences", and
"Engineered Materials and Products". It is comprised of six 
operating units "Agricultural and Nutritional Products", "Fibres 
and Intermediates", "Industrial Chemicals", "Polymer Products", 
"Engineered Products", and "Fisher Controls" [Monsanto, 1Q84 
Annual Report, p.?].
Like Akzo, Monsanto claims to be very aware of its social
responsibility. In the mid-1970s Monsanto formally proclaimed 
that it will "conduct our business, at all times, in an ethical, 
lawful and socially responsible manner". In 1976, a Social
Responsibility Committee composed of managers was formed, and in 
1981, a board level Corporate Social Responsibility Committee was 
established. In 1984, a publication issued by the Company - whose
motto reads "To be the best in whatever we choose to do" -
concluded a page-long feature on social responsibility as 
follows:
"Socially responsible activities at Monsanto have been 
institutionalised as part of every manager's job. Effective 
social responsibility must be an attitude that extends frcmi 
the boardroom to the boiler room and attends the manufacture 
and sale of every product. Through its attitude and actions, 
Monsanto provides evidence of strong ccMnmitment to its 
employees, the public, and the world" [Monsanto, 1984,
p.26].
This case assesses the conduct of Monsanto during the divestment 
process of its nylon plant at Dundonald, Ayrshire, Scotland. 
Monsanto entered the nylon fibres business in 1965, and in the 
next seven years its UK subsidiary’s performance fulfilled 
expectations. The Dundonald plant, on the outskirts of Irvine New
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Town, when built in 1966 was seen as "a lynchpin of the local 
economy and appeared to have a settled future" [Glasgow Herald, 
May 10, 1979].
Construction and start up costs explain initial losses, but 
between 1968 and 1974 inclusive, total UK operations returned 
moderate profits, or broke even. The UK subsidiary enjoyed six 
years of profitability following the Yom Kippur War, but in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s heavy losses were incurred (see Table
9.1).
Table 9.1.: Performance data on Monsanto PLC, 1974-1982
Year 
Ended 
Dec. 31
Turnover
£000
Net Profit 
Before Tax 
£000
Net Profit 
After Tax 
£000
1974 121,291 17,192 8,183
1975 122,829 5,713 2,827
1976 180,810 13,992 6,588
1977 202,727 5,562 2,246
1978 211,743 2,610 2,866
1979 255,982 (4,196) (3,942)
1980 232,901 (29,344) (29,547)
1981 306,116 (4,832) (5,412)
1982 296,589 41 84
Source: Extel Statistical Services
In Monsanto’s 1978 Annual Report, Chairman and President, John W. 
Hanley, informed shareholders that the European nylon plants had 
posted "unacceptable losses" and that programmes were being 
launched to rectify the situation. Indeed, during the late 1970s, 
foreign operations were draining corporate profits (see Table
9.2).
Dundonald’s fate was sealed when the US MNC decided to withdraw 
completely from the European nylon market. The large Ayrshire 
complex, and a much smaller one at nearby Cumnock were closed. 
Another two plants were closed in Durham, England, and a further 
two on the Continent at Echternach, Luxembourg, and at Wittlich, 
West Germany, were closed. Dundonald was closed in 1979 with the 
loss of 850 jobs. As a direct consequence of a single corporate 
decision, almost 2,300 jobs were lost, 1,500 in the UK, and 790 
on the Continent. But it must be stressed that terminating loss
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operations can, and may, enhance job security elsewhere in the 
corporation.
Table 9.2.: Performance data on Monsanto Company ($ms)
Year Sales Net Income Employees
1985 6,747 (98) 56,103
1984 6,691 439 50,754
1983 6,299 402 50,889
1982 6,325 352 52,199
1981 6,948 445 57,391
1980 6,574 210 61,836
1979 6,193 487 63,926
1978 5,019 632 62,851
1977 4,595 610 61,519
1976 4,270 668 61,903
1975 3,625 547 59,242
1974 3,498 550 60,926
1973 2,648 406 58,277
Source: Corporate reports, and Fortune.
The Implications for Monsanto
The Company had relatively modest nylon fibres plants and a small 
market share. Its factory at Dundonald in Ayrshire, Scotland, 
had the smallest capacity of any nylon fibres facility in the UK, 
and Monsanto had only 9% of the UK market, and 4% of the Western 
European market. The UK nylon fibres market was dominated by 
I.C.I. with 4 8%, followed by Courtaulds with 25%, and Enka 18% 
[Monsanto, May 9, 19791.
Although Monsanto had responded quickly at the onset of the 
slump, the decline continued unabated. In December, 1974, the 
workforce at Dundonald was reduced as part of a cost-cutting 
excersise. Advanced Textile Mills (Durham) Ltd. was acquired with 
a view to protecting the Company’s position in nylon texturising. 
This purchase gave the company a nylon facility at Crook, and an 
acrylic yarn spinning plant at St. Helen’s Auckland. According 
to Monsanto, these acquired plants were "closely interdependent" 
with facilities at Dundonald and Cumnock, and with the exception 
of Cumnock each received further investment "in order to improve 
the strongest segments of Monsanto’s nylon business". 
Nevertheless, in 1978 the UK subsidiary’s results reached a 
tr’ough and a pre-tax loss of £3.5 million was reported [Monsanto,
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May 9, 1979]«
Clearly, attempts to arrest decline were failing - an indication 
of the scale of the problem. Monsanto was unlikely to allow these 
losses to continue. A remedy had to be found, and total 
withdrawal from nylon production could not be ruled out.
9.5.; Precedents to Dundonald*g Closure
October 1978: Management and Unions discussed the Man-Made Fibre 
Sector Working Party report. It had highlighted the difficulties 
confronting manufacturers in the UK synthetic fibre industry. 
Produced by a tripartite group consisting of senior 
representatives of Government, Trades Unions, and Industry, the 
report pinpointed the three major adverse factors which had 
afflicted the industry since 1973: the dramatic increase in the 
price of basic raw material, oil; the upsurge of imports; and, a 
stagnant market for the final product.
These factors knocked flat what had been a booming UK synthetic 
fibre industry. The abrupt change in market trends caught 
manufacturers off-guard and in addition they had to come to grips 
with "massive overcapacity in Western Europe" [Man-Made Fibre 
Sector Working Party quoted in Monsanto publication. May 9, 
1979].
The Working Party could not foresee any upturn and issued the 
following warning:
•The problems arising from the cyclical nature of the 
industry will become more severe",
and that consequently there would be,
"a danger of idle capacity and redundancy" [Man-Made Fibre 
Sector Working Party quoted in Monsanto publication. May 9, 
1979].
April 25, 1979: Monsanto announced its first-quarter results. 
Consolidated net sales were 2 1% up on the same period in 1978, 
snd net income showed a 19 % improvement. There was, however.
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ominous news for the Company’s nylon producing operation which, 
of course, included Dundonald. The Company’s Chairman and 
President, Mr. Hanley said:
"... we continue to be concerned about the performance of 
two of our major European operations. As mentioned 
previously and as reflected in our 1978 Annual Report, we 
are in the process of completing a series of comprehensive 
studies aimed at examining all possible approaches for 
reducing the significant losses that are being generated by 
our nylon operations in Europe and by our subsidiary in 
Spain which participates in the plastics business. Both of 
these operations continued to suffer losses in the first 
quarter" [Monsanto, Public Relations Department, Brussels, 
Press Release, April 25, 1979].
The proposal to close Dundonald was effectively made public in 
the following three sentences:
"We anticipate that these complex studies could be completed 
for our nylon operations in early May.... Appropriate 
actions will be implemented as soon thereafter as 
practicable. Certain of the approaches which are under 
consideration could have a negative impact on Monsanto's 
1979 earnings" [Monsanto, Public Relations Department, 
Brussels, Press Release, April 25, 1979].
May 3, 1979: a number of Scottish newspapers (Daily Record; 
Evening Times: and. The Scotsman) reported that Monsanto was in 
the process of reviewing its operations. One reporter told his 
readers that it was expected that Monsanto’s decision on the 
future of its European nylon fibre operations would be announced 
on May 9th [Baggot, May 3,1979].
Apparently the study had been ordered following the previous 
week’s presentation of results for the first quarter. These had 
revealed large and increasing losses in nylon operations. The 
employees at the plant did not view Dundonald’s future with 
optimism. Factory Convener, Mr. Alex Williamson, was reported 
saying:
"We are becoming more and more convinced that Monsanto are 
planning to close the plant down" [Caven, 1979].
Indeed, the Shop Stewards at the plant were so certain that 
closure was impending that an Action Committee was formed 
[Eyening May 7, 1979]
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Q.6.; The "Proposal" To Close Dundonald
May 9, 1979: The Chairman of Monsanto Ltd., Mr Eric Sharp, issued 
a statement announcing the closure of the Dundonald plant, with 
the loss of all 830 jobs:
"Monsanto Ltd. announced today that It is commencing 
consultations with Trades Unions representing employees and 
with Government representatives with a view toward an early 
withdrawal from its nylon fibres operations because of 
substantial losses during the past four years and poor 
prospects for long-term profitability" [Monsanto, May 9, 
1979].
Two key divestment factors were identified:
"Company officials explained that Monsanto's unfavourable 
cost-competitive position and relatively small share of the 
nylon market were two key factors behind the announcement.
In the past four years Monsanto (ie, its UK subsidiary) has 
suffered pre-tax losses of £8.9 million from nylon fibre 
operations and long-term prospects remain poor" [Monsanto, 
May 9, 1979].
The statement also reveals that the decision to close Dundonald 
plus two other plants had only been taken after a number of 
options had been considered, and after efforts had been made to 
stem the decline in the fiercely competitive man-made fibres 
market:
"Comprehensive management studies examined various 
strategies to improve Monsanto's position but none of these, 
including further investment, provided a viable business 
approach to solving the difficult problem.
Recent attempts to halt the rising losses have been 
unsuccessful. These included cost reduction programmes, a 
restructuring of marketing, technical and sales 
organisations, and some investment programmes for equipment 
and modernisation" [Monsanto, May 9» 19791.
The Company’s problems were not confined, however, to the UK. At 
the same time, Monsanto was also consulting the relevant 
government authorities, trades unions, and employee 
representatives on the Continent "with a view toward seeking a 
solution to similar problems affecting the Companies unprofitable
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nylon operations there". These included a nylon plant at 
Echternach, Luxembourg, and an associated fibre processing plant 
at Wittlich, West Germany, which together employed 790 people 
[Sharp, May 9, 1979].
On the day of the closure announcement, Dundonald employees were 
presented with a small, well-produced informative pamphlet, 
entitled "Monsanto Ltd.: Nylon Operations in the UK", which 
outlined the economic rationale behind the decision to cease 
production in the UK.
In its statement to employees the Company explained that a number 
of alternatives had been considered, and rejected:
"The first option is to continue as we are now. if that were 
done, the losses would get worse.
A second option is investment in new technology and 
equipment. Losses would continue and Monsanto would not 
regain profitability. Under these conditions Monsanto would 
not regain the money spent to re-equip the plants.
A third option is to cut back operations and concentrate 
investment on the company's strongest products. The 
workforce would be reduced and the associated siq)port staff 
would be cut back significantly. Once again, losses would 
continue and the company would not get close to breaking 
even.
A fourth option is to maximise European production in the 
UK This would include selective upgrading of production 
facilities in the stronger segments of Monsanto's business. 
The results are the same - continuing losses" [Monsanto, 
May 9, 1979].
The statement continued:
"The situation facing Monsanto today is this: the company 
has small plants, a small market share and a poor cost- 
competitive position in an industry beset by overcapacity 
and stagnant growth. A prolonged study of the company's 
current performance and future possibilities reveals no 
chance for regaining profitability.
The regrettable conclusion is that Monsanto Ltd. must close 
its nylon fibre plants.
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This is a severe blow to everyone in the company. In 
consultations during the next few weeks, the facts that made 
the action necessary will be thoroughly discussed together 
with the implications. Monsanto is talking with the 
Department of Employment and large, local employers to 
explore opportunities for finding new Jobs.
All of us face a difficult situation and there are many 
problems to be solved during the coming weeks. We have 
approached your local full time officials for discussions on 
Tuesday May, 15" [Monsanto, May 9, 1979].
One employee was clearly bitter, however:
"I think the firm has been very underhand in the way they 
have done this. They have known for months they were closing
the place" [quoted in the Glasgow Herald. May 10, 1979].
May 14, 1979: the Scottish Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr.
George Younger, asked Mr. Sharp, Chairman of the UK subsidiary, 
whether Monsanto would reconsider its decision if Government aid 
was forthcoming, but he was told that financial assistance would 
not solve the main problem - lack of demand [The Scotsman. May 
15, 1979].
May 15, 1979: the Scottish Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr. 
George Younger , agreed to the Monsanto shop stewards' suggestion 
that he should contact Parent Company Management at St. Louis, 
Missouri, to see whether the closure decision could be reversed 
[Russell, May 16, 19791.
May 17, I979: One of the local MPs, Mr. Lambie, accused Monsanto 
of failing to consult its employees before reaching its decision 
which was taken, he alleged, by the US Board. The allegation was 
denied by a spokesman at the Company's St. Louis headquarters who 
claimed that the divestment decison had been made in London by UK 
subsidiary Management [The Scotsman. May 15, 1979].
May 18, I979: a meeting was held in Ayr's Municipal Buildings to 
discuss the proposed closure. Three Labour Members of Parliament
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were present. Mr. David Lambie (Central Ayrshire), Mr. George 
Foulkes (South Ayrshire), and Mr. William McKelvey (Kilmarnock). 
Strathclyde Regional Council, Kyle and Carriok District Council, 
Cunninghame District Council, Kilmarnock and Louden District 
Council, and Cumnock and Doon Valley District Council, were all 
represented at the meeting.
Following this meeting a request was made to Parent Company 
Management to receive five envoys, composed of one councillor 
from each local authority. It was hoped that they would be able 
to persuade the US Board to allow "reasonable consultation" to 
take place before the plant was closed F The Scotaman. May 19, 
1979].
May 30, 1979: Shop Stewards met with four Monsanto
representatives, including Mr. Sharp, Managing Director of the UK 
subsidiary. Mr. Sharp reviewed the factors which had led Monsanto 
to reach the conclusion to cease nylon production in Europe, He 
revealed that,
"our European nylon business has been causing concern to 
management ever since 1973» and has been the subject of 
almost continious review. The latest study had taken some 
time to complete and had been very detailed and exhaustive, 
with all possible options and alternatives considered and 
researched. However at the end of the day, the sad 
conclusion was that there was no prospect or feasibility of 
turning the UK nylon business around. Similar study has 
shown an even bleaker situation for Continental nylon 
operations, and the Company had therefore decided that it 
has no option other than to withdraw from its entire 
European nylon business" [Report of Meeting Held in 
Conference Room, Dundonald Plant, at 11 am. on Wednesday, 
30th May, 1979].
The Union representatives were then given an opportunity to 
discuss and question recent developments. Proceedings got 
underway with three unions representatives criticising Monsanto 
for issuing notice of redundancy and announcing its intention to 
close Dundonald:
"Mr. MnCreadie: Are the company prepared to withdraw the 90
day notice, to allow discussions to proceed normally, since 
the Trade Unions feel that they are being asked to consult 
under duress?
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Mr. McOonnachle: We feel that the company have departed from 
their normal method of dealing with their employees, and are 
behaving differently from other Companies who have recently 
faced similar problems. Massey Ferguson and S.K.F. both 
consulted with the Unions for some time before they issued 
Section 100 notices, and ample time was given to see if an 
alternative could be found, or buyers sought or alternative 
uses devised" [Report of Meeting Held In Conference Room, 
Dundonald Plant, at 11 am. on Wednesday, 30th May, 1979].
Another Union representative argued that by commencing the 90 day 
period on the very day that the closure decision was announced, 
Monsanto had failed to provide the Trade Unions with "sufficient 
time to examine and discuss the company's proposals with 
Government Ministers and other bodies. It might be that at the 
end of the day the unions would have to accept that closure was 
inevitable but more time was needed to give the problem the 
attention it deserved" [Report of Meeting Held in Conference 
Room, Dundonald Plant, at 11 am. on Wednesday, 30th May, 1979].
Mr. Sharp replied for the Company:
"The Employment Protection Act provisions relating to the 
consultative periods was introduced to prevent Companies 
from implementing decisions to cause large scale 
redundancies without any warning. Hie critical state of the 
UK synthetic fibre industry has been well known to all the 
trade unions involved for a long time. The heavy losses 
being incurred at both Dundonald and in Europe had been 
regularly communicated to all employees. The decision to 
make a total and early withdrawal from the business was not 
hastily arrived at nor made without full appreciation of its 
serious effects on the Company and its employees. The 
Company were willing to examine and consider any proposal 
which offered a return to profitability. For these reasons, 
we feel that sufficient time is being made available and are 
therefore unwiling to withdraw the Section 100 
notification" [Report of Meeting Held in Conference Room, 
Dundonald Plant, at 11 am. on Wednesday, 30th May, 1979].
Factory Convener, Mr. Alex Williamson, asked Mr. Sharp if he had 
the authority to withdraw the redundancy notices. Mr. Sharp's 
reply was affirmative, and in addition he claimed that the UK 
Board had made the final decision to close Dundonald.
The meeting concluded with Mr. Williamson expressing some 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the proceedings:
"Mr. Sharp, we have to say that we are very disappointed at
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the outcome of today's meeting. You have refused to lift the 
90-day notice and you have told us nothing new" [Report of 
Meeting Held in Conference Room, Dundonald Plant, at 11 am. 
on Wednesday, 30th May, 1979].
May 31, 1979: Mr. Sharp met four District Councillors in London,
as the request had been referred to him by Monsanto's US Board.
9.7.: The Closure Announcement
June 20, 1979: Monsanto announced that it had rejected the 
representations made by trades union representatives on behalf of 
the Dundonald workforce:
"After weeks of consultation with employees and trade union 
representatives, no proposals have emerged that would cause 
a variation in the Company's decision to withdraw from 
the nylon fibres business in the OK" [quoted in Trotter, May 
15, 19791.
July 27, 1979: The Dundonald factory closed with the loss of 830 
jobs.
1.8.: The View of the Comnanv
The Chairman of Monsanto's UK subsidiary, Mr. Mason, was 
interviewed on December 13, 1984. The interview focussed on three 
topics: the divestment decision; employee disclosure and
consultation; and, employment legislation and codes of conduct 
for MNCs.
I18.I.: The Divestment Decision
It was seen in Chapters 2-4 that a number of researchers had 
observed that the divestment decision was taken in isolation by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and then handed down. According 
to Mr. Mason the decision to close the Dundonald plant "was not 
made in the US, in splendid isolation, by the President". On the 
contrary, the decision was only taken after several years of 
work, and the management of the UK subsidiary was, he says, 
%eavily involved". The Scottish plant had been under review for 
"at least two years" prior to the proposed closure announcement
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on May 9, 1979. Mr. Mason did agree, however, that the 
divestment decision is the most difficult a manager has to make. 
During its study of Company operations, Monsanto was not 
preparing a plan for closure, but instead was hoping to come up 
with something which would allow, at least, a positive cash flow 
situation to be achieved,
Mr. Mason explained that prior to closing a plant a company 
has discreetly investigated whether it can be sold. It is 
absolutely vital that neither competitors nor customers discover 
that divestment by sale is being considered. Whoever finds out 
will approach the other and the outcome will be loss of business 
for the firm contemplating the sale. The competitor sees a golden 
opportunity to increase his market share, whilst the customer 
will act to ensure continuity of sLÇ>plies.
Mr. Mason described the process whereby the decision to close 
Dundonald was made. Firstly, the Board of Directors of the 
Parent Company was advised that "there was no alternative but to 
go to closure". Consequently, on May 9, 1979, the proposal" 
(author's emphasis) to close Dundonald was presented to the 
plant's workforce. This announcement represented the commencement 
of the consultation process, and employees were issued with 90 
days notice of redundancy.
This "proposal" had been ratified by the Executive Board only, 
and prior to being implemented it required the ratification of 
the entire Board. Non-Executive Directors were in the majority 
and so there was no guarantee that they would lend their support 
to the "proposal" to close Dundonald.
Finally, and only after the consultation procedure had been 
exhausted, the proposal was ratified by the entire Board.
The decision to close Dundonald was based on a recommendation by 
UK subsidiary management. In recent years, Monsanto responded 
to its ailing fortunes by introducing greater centralisation of 
its operations.
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Although Mr. Mason insists that the announcement of May 9, 1979
should be seen as a to close Dundonald, and that no
irreversible decision had been taken, he admits that the Company 
was certain the Unions would be unable to find a way of making 
Dundonald viable. Closure was inevitable, therefore, in that only 
an upturn in the nylon fibre market could save the plant, and 
that was outwith the sphere of influence of any labour 
organisation. As Mr. Mason said, "an upturn in demand was out of 
the question".
Mr. Mason denies that issuing redundancy notices on May 9, 1979, 
when employees first learned of the proposed closure of 
Dundonald, placed trades union representatives under duress. 
After all, he says, the notice could have been withdrawn if they 
had presented a solid case for retaining the plant.
9.8.2.; Disclosure of Information
On being asked when employees were first made aware of Monsanto's 
problems, Mr. Mason, consulting the Company's pamphlet of May 9» 
1979, replied October 1978.
He said that by 1979, Monsanto had no choice but to cease nylon 
fibre production in Europe and close Dundonald and its other 
plants on the Continent. Other man-made fibres had superceded 
nylon, and cheap imports from Third World countries had 
devastated the entire European textile industry.
He believes that Monsanto regularly informed its employees of the 
increasing problems associated with nylon production, and their 
effects on the Company.
He explained that management involved in the plant closure 
situation face a dilemma. Whilst wishing to keep employees fully 
informed, they must also safeguard the interests of their 
company. The premature release of certain information could 
damage the enterprise and its employees. It is therefore, he 
argues, in the best interests of all, if certain information 
remains secret.
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As regards the OECD's Guidelines, Mr. Mason said that they 
included "nothing very exceptional". Although they had formed a 
general frame of reference when closing Dundonald, Mr. Mason 
admitted that "we don't read them and say 'we must do this'". 
Premature disclosure of information could have undesirable 
effects, he believes. For example, if a firm announced that it 
was proposing to close a plant, then the likelihood of this being 
the eventual outcome becomes all the greater. As he put it, "the 
minute something becomes public, it's almost self-fulfilling".
Mr. Mason was highly critical of the "Vredeling Proposals". He 
believes that their enactment as Community legislation would 
prove a set-back rather than a gain for employees. They would 
produce, he believes, the opposite effect of that desired by 
supporters of the proposed Directive.
Monsanto instead of being more open would be "very, very careful 
about what we disclose". His observations of social behaviour 
have led Mr. Mason to conclude that once certain conduct becomes 
compulsory, individuals and groups resent the fact and rebel by 
ceasing to do what was once done voluntarily.
He also believes that the "Vredeling Proposals" are based on a 
popular misconception, that all decision-making in MNCs is 
centralised "with some mystical God .. in complete isolation 
pulling the strings". The truth of the matter is that decisions 
are often made at the local level and then passed up the 
corporate hierarchy.
Mr. Mason refused, unfortunately, to give the author sight of the 
minutes of C o m p a n y - U n i o n  meetings. He c o n s i d e r e d  these 
confidential.
^9.; The Trade Oglon Represenatatlygg* YlSlf
Grunberg [1982] highlighted the racial divisions in his case 
study of the closure of the Leicester plant of Litton Industries. 
He saw a divided workforce as an important factor in explaining
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the lack of employee resistance to closure.
The Minute Book kept by Mr. Rennie, Minutes Secretary at 
Dundonald, is of little value to the historian. It reveals though 
that the Union had internal problems with fellow members involved 
in skirmishes. Friction among the official, duly elected Shop 
Stewards and an alternative, perhaps more militant group, 
certainly existed. Mr. Rennie was highly critical of some of his 
former colleagues. He believes that there were "too many 
Communists" involved in Union business. He said , the official 
Shop Stewards committee had been edged out by a breakaway group 
which lacked experience in negotiating. He believes its members 
failed to appreciate tell-tale signs that all was not well. For 
example, in 1978 a delegation of US Managers from the Parent 
Company visited the Plant. Shortly afterwards a newspaper, 
published on the Continent, ran a feature indicating that 
Monsanto would cease all nylon production in Europe.
In early 1979, one of the local MPs is said to have met a Shop 
Steward at a social function and divulged that Dundonald would be 
closing in the near future. One MP is said to have met a Shop 
Steward at a social function and divulged that Dundonald would be 
closing in the near future. Rumours spread but these were not, 
Mr. Rennie claims, taken seriously by employees, and Plant 
Management scotched them.
Shortly before the closure announcement, Mr. Rennie had been the 
sole Dundonald Shop Steward present at a two-day seminar on 
multinationals, (organised by the TUC), in which Codes of Conduct 
were examined. He was therefore familiar with the OECD's 
Guidelines for MNCs.
He spoke very highly of Monsanto, saying they had been very 
amenable to Trades Unionists, offering every facility for Union 
business. He believed that the closure announcement could have 
been more sensitively handled, and criticised Plant Management 
for continuously denying that closure was being considered.
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AKZO
9.10.: Introduction to Akzo
This Dutch MNC was formed when AKU and Koninklijke Zout-Organon 
merged in 1969. It is comprised of seven divisions, including 
"Enka" which is responsible for man-made fibre production.
Akzo publicly supports the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. The "Vredeling Proposals" are not, however, held in 
the same regard, though the Company "recognises the importance of 
good communications and activities with those who are directly or 
indirectly involved with the Group" [Akzo, 1982 Annual Report. 
P.1].
In representations to the European Parliament Akzo has confirmed 
its "willingness to duly provide all relevant information on 
reorganisations and to make every effort in consulation with 
employees to restrict the social consequences of such 
reorganisations" [Akzo, 1982 Annual Report, p.13].
This move followed allegations by Trade Unionists that employee 
disclosure and consultation was inadequate and unsatisfactory 
during the rationalisation of Enka's fibre operations at Breda, 
Holland and Kassel, West Germany. Akzo considered the criticism 
unjustified and presented evidence to refute the Unions' claim 
and "to reinforce a plea to the effect that corporate management 
be allowed to adopt a flexible and offensive strategy aimed at 
viable business activities without being trammeled by further 
directives" [Akzo, 1982 Annual Report, p.133.
In addition to closing Breda and Kassel, Enka announced in 1981 
the closure of its British Enkalon Ltd. plant in Antrim in 
Northern Ireland. Extensive Company/Union consultation produced 
n plan of action unique among the cases examined in this thesis.
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g.11.; BackKTOttnA
In 1961 Enka announced its plan to build a factory in the small 
town of Antrim with a population of just 3,000. On opening in 
1963, the plant produced only nylon textile yarn, but its product 
range was widened the following year. By 1966 the labour force 
exceeded 1,000, and the future prosperity of plant and town alike 
seemed assured. Antrim was designated a new town. Plans for an 
expanding town with a potential population of 30,000 were 
undertaken by a Steering Committee hopeful of the town attracting 
further investment, since dependence on one industry could be 
disasterous should the multinational "pull out" 
[Ballymena Observer. July 23, 1981, p.5].
By the early 1970s the projected population growth was on course 
for reaching the 1981 target of 30,000. Meanwhile, Antrim had 
failed to attract new industry and the Ministry of Defence had 
closed its factory, leaving BEL the sole major employer in the 
area. The only consolation was that the plant’s future appeared 
secure. The factory was profitable during its first ten years in 
operation - a minor loss was returned for only one year during 
that period - and the plant was expanded [Ballvmena Observer. 
July 23, 1981, p.5].
Then on June 1, 1974 disaster struck. The supplier of Antrim’s
raw materials, Nypro (UK), Felixborough was destroyed in a huge 
explosion at the plant. At the time the basic raw material was 
in short supply and Nypro’s parent company, DSM in Holland, were 
unable to supply BEL. Production at Antrim continued, but only 
after supplies of caprolactam had been purchased at inflated 
prices in the world market. Thus, almost overnight, Antrim became 
a high-cost operation. Costs were eventually cut-back, but 
significantly the Antrim plant’s peak employment level of over 
3,000 had been reached in early 1974. In the second half of the 
year a loss was returned, and Antrim never again returned to 
profitability [interview with Mr. Schierbeek, CEO of BEL, 
February 25, 1985].
The blow to the Ulster plant coincided with the onset of an oil
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crisis which decimated Europe’s man-made fibre industry. The 
cheap energy policy pursued by successive US Governments had 
allowed American producers to flourish and by 1979 they had 
cornered the European market with cheap imports. Enka’s sales 
revenue dropped and massive losses followed (see Table 9.3).
Table 9.3.: Performance Data on Enka (in Hfl million), 1970-84.
Year Sales Operating Income 
(Loss)
1984 5,035 302
1983 4,526 151
1982 4,359 (19)
1981 4,678 33
1980 3,782 (170)
1979 3,852 74
1978 3,567 10
1977 3,598 (88)
1976 3,804 (142)
1975 3,707 (326)
1974 4,528 223
1973 4,398 390
1972 3,798 231
1971 3,840 371
1970 3,561 325
Source: Corporate Accounts
Enka like other manufacturers in Europe was suffering from excess 
capacity and struggling to preserve its share of a declining 
market. Nonetheless, employees at Antrim received the following 
assurance from BEL’s Dutch Chief Executive, Mr. Schierbeek, "we 
are having difficulties like everyone else, but we are holding 
our own" [Ballvmena Guardian. August 2, 1979, p.1].
9 .^12.: Decision to Modernise Revoked
In July, 1979, the Dutchman explained that Antrim would be 
streamlined, in an attempt to stem losses, by increasing 
productivity. In the process 100 redundancies would be issued 
[Ballvmena Guardian. August 2, 1979, P.H. BEL and the
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU) reached 
agreement on the procedure for voluntary redundancies.
Enka still believed that the plant could, with further 
investment, return to profitability and in May, 1980 a £33ni
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modernisation programme for the 17 year old plant was announced 
[Ballymena. Quar^lan, July 3 , 1980, p.l]. This decision was
rescinded later in the year due to sterling’s continued 
appreciation against the US dollar and the Dutch guilder.
On July 2 3, 1980, BEL’S results for the 1979 financial year were
published revealing a loss of £2m. By early autumn it was 
apparent that Enka’s management had underestimated the extent of 
the industry’s problems, and those of Antrim in particular. 
Employees were advised of the gravity of the situation. Far from 
being a low cost unit Antrim had the highest production costs in 
the Enka Group [interview with Mr. Schierbeek, CEO of BEL, 
February 2 5, 1985].
June 27» I98O: the Site Manager, Mr P.L. Lemmens, wrote to
employees explaining that the Company had never faced such 
adverse market conditions since it arrived at Antrim in 1963 and 
that short-time working would be introduced:
"As you must all be aware, by now, the market situation for 
our products is worse than it has been since the factory 
(ie. in Antrim) opened. The sales situation and forecasts 
for the ccmiing six months indicate little or no improvement, 
and this, coiq>led with an nnacceptably high finished product 
stock level has necessitated immediate action.
It is necessary, therefore, to commence a reduction in the 
working week in L.D.T. Drawtwist and Warping and in H.D.T. 4 
Shift After treatment, to take effect from Monday, 30 th June, 
1980. The degree of reduction in each department will depend 
on both the production level and the anual holiday 
situation.
We have applied to the Department of Manpower for their 
Temporary Short-Time Working Compensation Grant to reduce 
loss of income to a minimum. The exact details of this 
scheme will be given to Shop Stewards on Wednesday next.
Initially the situation will apply to the three departments 
mentioned above over the holiday period July/August. The 
situation will be cautiously reviewed as more details of 
programme requirements become known. It is envisaged, 
however, that if the forecasts are correct, a reduction in 
the working week will apply to most, if not all departments, 
after the holiday period.
The main objective is to preserve as many jobs as possible, 
under very difficult circumstances, and so the full co­
operation of all employees is essential to the future of the 
Company. There will be differences in working patterns
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betw©6n departments and, subject to orders, this nay change 
from week to week.
Trade Union Representatives and all employees will be kept 
aware of the changes in the situation as and when these 
become known to Management" [Company Brief, signed by P.L. 
Lemmens, Site Manager, June 27, 1980].
June 30, 1980: Short-time working introduced. Employees were
told, however, that this move was temporary and that 
modernisation would go ahead as planned [Ballymena Guardian. July 
3, 1980, p.n.
9.13.; Closnre Warning Issued
November, 1980: Mr. Schierbeek told Shop Stewards that closure
was inevitable unless a 10$ reduction in production costs was 
achieved immediately. He outlined to Shop Stewards the measures 
necessary to meet this target. Shortly afterwards the 
Ballymena Observer reported that "management proposals have 
implications for all sections of the factory, and there are 
already indications that some sections of the workforce regard 
the cuts as "unworkable*" [Ballymena Observer. November 20, 1980, 
p.1]. Indeed, the workforce rejected the proposals, confident 
they had called the Company’s bluff.
December 22, 1980: the Group Personnel Manager, Mr H.J. Selby
met for consultation with Ballymena District Secretary of the
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union (ATGWU), Mr R. 
Hanna. After the meeting Mr. Selby wrote to Mr. Hannah confirming 
that there would be 150 redundancies at the plant.
December 23, 1980: a new agreement between the Company and Unions 
on "Method of Selection on Personnel for Redundancy" was reached 
which superceded all previous agreements. It read as follows:
"In principle every attempt will be made to effect the
redundancy through volunteers. Where there is a shortfall, 
then nominations will be based upon overall Ommpany service, 
by Department"
1980 had been a disastrous year for BEL The strong pound and
double figure inflation and interest rates compounded the
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Company’s problems sales revenue declined and BEL incurred a loss 
of almost 210m [Ballymena Guardian, March 19, 1981, p.5],
January 19, 1981: the Company announced that production of
industrial yarns plus Polyamide and Polyester textiles be 
significantly reduced, if not abandoned. 800 jobs would be lost, 
leaving a depleted workforce of 1,100. The press release 
(embargoed until 4.30 p.m. and "on no account" to be released 
before that time) read as follows:
The continuing unfavourable trading environment for the 
synthetic textile and carpet yarn industries in the whole of 
Western Europe has had a serious adverse impact on the
trading position of the operations of Akzo N.V. in this 
sector, comprising the Enka Group ("Enka"), including
British Enkalon Limited ("British Enkalon") which continues 
to incur substantial losses. As a result measures have been 
announced within the Enka group of companies to adjust 
capacity in certain product areas and to concentrate 
production in those centres which can be economically 
Justified.
The general trading position of British Enkalon has also 
been seriously affected by the considerable increase in the 
strength of sterling, the recession in the United Kingdom 
textile industry, greatly increased imports especially from 
the United States and high interest rates. Consequently 
British Enkalon*s position has deteriorated very
substantially since the plan for modernisation of the
Company’s production facilities, supported by Enka, was 
announced in May 1980 and there is no foreseeable prospect 
of improvement. Accordingly, the Board of British Enkalon 
announces with regret that the future of the Antrim plant 
has had to be reviewed. The production of Polyamide and 
Polyester textile yarns will In any case be significantly 
reduced almost immediately and in all possibility phased out 
completely, as will the production of Industrial yarns over 
a period of time.
However, the possibility of continuing and somewhat 
increasing carpet yarn production in Antrim is being
examined and discussions are taking place in the Government 
of Northern Ireland in view of the important social
consequences of a complete shutdown of the plant, having
regard to the overall economic situation and existing high 
unemployment in this area.
In any event a substantial reduction in employment at Antrim 
and the Company’s Head Office in Leicester is envisaged and 
some 800 jobs out of a total of 2,000 are expected to be 
affected in the near future. Discussions with employees and 
unions will take place taking into consideration the
personal and social aspects involved.
253
A further announcement will be made in due course"
[Schierbeek, January 19, 1981].
Antrim would now cease producing polymide and polyester textile 
yarns, and so its sole remaining product was carpet yarn. Despite 
these 800 further redundancies, Mr. Schierbeek remained 
"optimistic" [Ballvmena Observer. January 22, 1981, p.1].
January 26, 1981; Mr Selby, Group Personnel Manager wrote to Mr
Hanna of the ATGWU confirming that the Company would be making a 
large number of its Antrim employees redundant;
■As required under Article 49 of the Industrial Relations 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1976 (as amended), and following 
the meeting on Monday, 19th January, 1981, we must 
regretfully confirm, that, due to the reasons then outlined 
(ie. World recession, fibre production, over^ capacity, 
strength of Sterling, cheap imports, etc., etc.) we are 
reluctantly compelled to embark upon a large-scale 
redundancy programme.
You will understand that, until we are notified of the 
Government’s reaction to our request for assistance, it is 
impossible to accurately determine the number and/or 
description of those affected (other than as already 
communicated, ie. 800 personnel).
We shall, however, indicate at the earliest possible mcmient, 
contact you to arrange for consultation on selection 
procedures , etc., and trust you will appreciate that it is 
not reasonably practicable for us to be more specific at 
this point in time" [letter from Mr H.J. Selby to Mr R. 
Hanna, dated January 26, 1981]
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9.14.1 BEL Issues Ultimatum to Government
Early 1981: Having had its proposals for cost-reduction rejected
by employees, BEL announced that the factory would close on June 
19, 1981, unless the Government provided a 28.5m subsidy. Mr.
Lemmens, Site Manager, informed employees of the situation:
"without financial assistance we have no future and, 
therfore, as a precautionary measure we are obliged to 
herewith formally advise you, together with all other 
employees, that your employment will terminate with effect 
from June 19» 1981" [Statement issued by Mr. Lemmens, Site
Manager, "To All Employees"].
Although it had refused to accept Management’s proposals, the 
workforce was commended for its "tolerence and cooperation" and 
Mr. Lemmens said he would inform employees of developments "as 
they arise" [Statement issued by Mr. Lemmens, Site Manager, "To 
All Employees"].
May 20, 1981: the Chief Executive and Chairman of British
Enkalon, Mr R.L. Schierbeek, met union representatives who had 
requested such a meeting, because thay were concerned "over the 
lack of definite news about the future of the plant" [Ballvmena 
Guardian, May 2 8, 1981, p.2].
Mr Schierbeek explained that the discussions with the Department 
of Commerce had lasted longer than the Company anticipated. The
two sides had failed to reach agreement, and the Governmental
Department had decided to commission a firm of Management
Consultants to review the Company’s plans and request for 
financial assistance. The Department had received the
Consultants’ report in early May, and discussions had continued 
throughout the month [Ballvmena Guardian. May 28, 1981, p.2].
He told employees a conclusion would not be reached for several 
weeks, and, that accordingly, BEL was extending its deadline 
until August. The factory would close on August 31 unless the 
28.5m financial aid package was forthcoming. 200 redundancies 
would be issued in June to workers in the textile section of the 
plant, regardless of level of Government assistance:
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"in order to allow the talks to take their proper course and 
enable every avenue to be explored, the Parent Company 
(which of course is subsidising our losses and guaranteeing 
our trading liabilities) has agreed to continue those 
operations forming part of the survival plan for another two 
months after the 19th June.
Whilst the major part of our textile operations will close 
as scheduled in June, the continuation of the remaining 
operations until August means that the period of notice 
for those employees associated with the Survival Plan has 
now been extended until 28th August for hourly paid 
employees and until 31st August for monthly paid staff" 
[Schierbeek, Company Statement, May 20, 1981].
Despite massive unemployment in the Province, the Department of 
Commerce refused to fully meet BEL’s request. It now remained to 
be seen whether BEL would carry out its threat.
lg,-AnP9bnog^
July 15, 1981: BEL announced that Antrim would close on August 
31, 1981. It revealed that "the discussions with the Department 
of Commerce have not resulted in any viable proposal for the 
continuation of carpet yarn production" and, therefore, a 
decision had been taken to terminate carpet yarn production. By 
announcing this, the Company decreed that the plant would close. 
The Company staement said,
"It is with great regret, particularly in view of the 
important social implications, and the positive attitude of 
all personnel during the past difficult months .. [that] 
British Enkalon has no alternative but to close down the 
remainder of its fibre business" [Joint Announcement by Akzo 
NV (AKZO) and British Enkalon Ltd. ("British Enkalon"), May 
25, 1981].
BEL had asked for 2 8.5m and the editorials of the Province's 
leading newspapers were highly critical of the Government's 
failure to subsidise with this "not .. extraordinary amount" 
[.Belfast Telegraph quoted in Ballvmena Observer, July 23, 1981, 
P.5]
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g.16.; Enka Reverses Divestment Decision
Monday August 3, 1981: senior officials of the ATGWU led by the 
Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr John Freeman, met the Chairman of 
Enka, Dr. Hans-Gunther Zempelin. The possibility of retaining a 
reduced manufacturing facility was discussed.
The close-down process begun on July 15, was by mid-August at an 
advanced stage. The plant was virtually at a standstill and raw 
material stocks were very low. Then as Mr. Lemmens, Site Manager, 
explained:
"out of the blue.«..cane the chance to salvage some 800 jobs 
for a reduced production plant" [statement issued by Site 
Manager, Mr Lemmens, September 1, 1981].
August 12, 1981: A further meeting took place between Dr. H.G.
Zempelin and the same union officials. After the meeting. Dr. 
Zempelin wrote to Mr. Freeman confirming that the plant would 
continue production until March 31, 1982, at least. He informed 
Mr. Freeman that the final decision would be based on an 
assessment in early 1982 of the plant's performance and market 
trends:
"as promised during our meeting in Wuppertal (i.e the 
headquarters of Enka) this afternoon, I am confirming the 
proposal we put to you for your consideration.
Before doing so, however, I would like to reiterate once 
again the fact that from a business point of view Enka has 
to prefer to see the closing down of Antrim as decided by 
the end of the month.
The following proposal is really only being made because of 
our concern for the social and economic consequences of a 
complete closure in the space of 10 months as so eloquently 
presented by you and your colleagues.
During our discussion we finally proposed to continue after 
the end of August on the basis of the alternative plan 
presented by the Union and the Work Force until March 31» 
1982. This would only be possible on the condition that the 
British Government is willing to compensate BEL for the 
losses incurred during that period up to a maximum of 1.5 
Mio L. (sic. ie. £1.5m)
We have conceded that we shall reassess the future chances 
of the remaining Antrim plant based on the above-mentioned 
plan in January/February 1982. A reconsideration of the
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closure decision is only possible if this reassessment leads 
to the conclusion that a positive result of the existing 
production programme can be achieved in the 2. quarter of 
1982 and thereafter.
We understand that Enka will be given the opportunity to 
remove machinery and equipment not being needed for the 
alternative plan as and when required in other Enka plants.
Finally we should like to repeat that - since we are all 
under pressure of time - we are expecting your definite 
answer by Monday, August 17th, I98I"[letter dated August 
12, 1981 from Dr. Zempelin, Chairman of Enka, to Mr.
Freeman, Irish Secretary ATGWU]
The Company had agreed to accept the Survival Plan drawn up by 
the Unions and in return received a package of Government aid 
totalling 21.5m. Although the news was welcomed in most quarters, 
Mr. Sean Gibbons, secretary of the ATGWU's BEL branch, was highly 
critical of the officials of his own Union for offering the 
Company certain guarantees without consulting the actual 
workforce which would have to honour them [Ballvmena Observer, 
August 27, 19 81].
According to Mr. Gibbons' the leaders of his Union had committed 
the very offence which Union officials often level at companies:
■The leaders of my union negotiated in private with the 
company and the Government. Then they turned to the workers 
with a deal and said: 'Take it or leave it'.
There was no prior consultations with us, and no discussions 
at any level about the survival plan. Yet that is what trade 
unionism is supposed to be all about.
The union officials in the factory were kept completely in 
the dark, and then left to pick up the pieces and try to 
explain what was happening to the workers.
Now the factory is in turmoil and people are blaming the 
unions. Instead of being pleased about the reprieve for 
Enkalon, the workers are totally disillusioned and unhappy.
Employees will be grossly overworked here as a result, and 
many are going to accept redundancy rather than put their 
health and future at risk.
The wrong people are being praised for saving Enkalon. The 
union leaders got all the credit that should have gone to
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the workforce. .. The only people I am criticising are the 
union hierarchy. They have sacrificed their principles, and 
they don't seem to care who they trample on in the process" 
[Mr. Sean Gibbons, ATGWU Branch Secretary, quoted in 
Ballvmena Observer. August 27, 1981].
Details of the new Survival Plan which would keep the plant in 
operation until March 1982, at least, were revealed to employees 
on September 1. The Plan required Antrim to manufacture the 
several products in addition to carpet yarn.
Mr Lemmens told employees that,
"If it can be shown that we have achieved our cost targets 
with a consistency likely to be maintained and further 
improved in the future and if the market situation suggests 
that sales and prices have improved sufficiently to break 
even in the second quarter, then it is possible that we 
could continue operating beyond March 1982" [statement 
issued by Site Manager, Mr Lemmens, September 1, 1981].
He said that the vitally important performance evaluation would 
be made during February 1982.
December 24, 1981: The Personnel Manager, Mr. R. P. Dalton, sent 
the following letter to Mr. Hanna, District Secretary of the 
ATGWU:
Following our telephone conversation, and discussions with 
the senior shop steward here on site (i.e. Mr. Bryson), I 
wish to confirm our agreement that it will not be necessary 
to issue protective notice to all employees. We jointly 
agree that as we have been in consultation constantly over 
the past year, with regard to the Company situation, we are 
in compliance with conditions relating to protective notice. 
This has been confirmed Iqr the Labour Relations Agency. We 
hre also in agreement that the issue of such notice would be 
detrimental to morale, at a critical time for the Company.
Our overall future will be reviewed in January/February and 
so we will delay the issue of individuals' notices, possibly 
to the end of January 1982, if necessary" [letter from Mr. 
Dalton, Personnel Manager, to Mr.Hanna, ATGWU District 
Secretary, dated December 24, 1981].
Mr. Schierbeek in his Christmas message to employees said that the 
performance targets had been met but that market conditions 
remained very unfavourable and it was these external factors 
"which will eventually be the deciding influence". The employees
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at Enkalon, of course, had no control over these factors. It was 
clear that an up-turn in the man-made fibres market before 
February was necessary if the Antrim factory was to stay open 
[Mr Schierbeek quoted in the Ballvmena Observer. December 23,
1981].
December 31, 1981: Mr. Dalton sent another letter to Mr. Hanna. 
It read:
■As you are aware our 7-month extension period obtained by 
the Unions, concludes on 31st March, but as yet we have not 
any indication as to the future of the Plant beyond that 
date. It is unlikely that we will have any indications as to 
continuance or otherwise before end of February/early March, 
1982.
We have been in constant consultation on this matter for 
some 12 months now and all employees as well as Union 
officials are fully aware of the above facts and therefore 
it is concluded that under Article 49 of the Industrial 
Relations (NI) Order 1976 we must re-confirm the possibility 
of closure and therefore redundancies by the end of March.
We shall, as we have been on a regular basis, remain in full 
consultation with yourself and with the Irish Secretary of 
AT & GWU as to the ultimate outcome and seek your continuing 
involvement and assistance* [letter from Mr. Dalton, 
Personnel Manager, to Mr.Hanna, ATGWU District Secretary, 
dated December 31» 1981].
February 5, 1982: the Site Manager, Mr. Lemmens, wrote to 
employees reminding them that decision-day was approaching, and 
that,
"in view of this continuing uncertainty and in consideration 
of your contractual right to notice we are obliged to place 
you on notice to finish your employment on or by 30th April, 
1982, i.e. the last working day or shift on or before that 
date.
This communication should be taken as your official letter 
of notice. However, it is our sincere wish that the decision 
will be positive and that the factory will continue to 
provide employment after the end of March. Should this be 
the case, we will be in a position to rescind your notice 
without delay and notify you accordingly.
Your efforts over the last five months have been greatly 
appreciated and have helped us to reduce our losses. I must 
ask for your continued efforts, co-operation and assistance 
as the plant results are one of the factors that could 
imfluence the pending decisions.
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It is my Intention to keep you all informed of developments 
as they arise" [letter issued by Mr Lemmens to employees on 
February 5, 1982]
February 16, 1982: BEL issued its "Reassessment Plan" which 
focused on market conditions. According to Management’s 
market forecasts for textile and carpet Yarns, demand was still 
slack. Antrim manufactured two textile yarns - polymide and 
polyester, and demand for the former had "decreased 
substantially", implying "a rather serious market risk". However, 
polyester sales had exceeded even the workforce’s expectations of 
August 19 81.
Management’s market predictions for carpet yarns were bleak for 
both the domestic and export markets. The Antrim factory relied 
primarily on Shaw, and three other carpet manufacturers, Caird, 
Homfray, and Lancaster. In 1981, Shaw had accounted for 50% of 
Antrim’s output. According to BEL, these were customers "in a 
more or less distressed financial situation", and that "about 
half of the UK sales are potentially threatened and are 
principally at risk". Much of BEL's exports had gone to COMECON 
countries, but their financial difficulties, the USSR excepted, 
"were further accentuated by the crisis in Poland" leading to 
"drastic reductions in purchases, particularly from the GDR".
Based on these predictions, Enka proposed to cut the 830 
workforce to 640. According to Enka, the workforce had been 
informed in August 19 81 that the plant would stay open if it 
could "obtain positive results" from its existing operations for 
the 2nd quarter of 1982 and thereafter - without further 
assistance from the Department of Commerce - and, thus, be 
financially self-supporting. It became clear that Antrim was on 
the verge of closure when Enka forecast annual losses of £2.4 
million at the Ulster factory. The Unions, in turn, argued that 
the plant’s losses could not possibly exceed £2 million [Enka, 
Reassessment Plan, February 16, 1982].
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g.17.: Final Décision Reached
By the end of February the Antrim plant's future had been 
decided. The beginning of Spring proved the factory's fall.
March 1, 1982: the Board of British Enkalon Ltd. announced the 
closure of the Antrim plant:
"The Board of Enka has announced that the Company will 
discontinue its operation at its Antrim factory by the end 
of March 1982.
This decision bad originally been taken with great regret in 
July of last year but had been suspended until March 31st, 
1982 as an outcome of arrangements between the Department of 
Commerce in Northern Ireland, the Unions and the Enka Group, 
British Enkalon*s majority shareholder.
In accordance with these arrangements Enka has now reviewed 
British Enkalon*s performance at the Antrim factory and it 
has become clear, that in spite of the considerable efforts, 
improvements and achievments effected by the Management and 
the Workforce, the Company would still run into further 
losses. After discussions with the Department of Commerce 
and the Unions, the Board has concluded there is no viable 
future for the continuation of the factory.
Approximately 850 Antrim employees will be affected"
[British Enkalon Limited, Press Announcement. March 1,
1982].
March 10, 1982: Senior Shop Steward, Mr M. Bryson, telexed Enka's 
Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Zempelin, with news that "local 
influential politicians" would be urging the Government to keep 
Enkalon open. He asked whether the closure decision would be 
reversed if the Government were prepared to cover all losses for 
the next three years.
March 12, 1982: Dr. Zempelin in his telexed reply explained that 
Government aid would not alter the Company's decision:
"In May/June 1981 we negotiated a survival plan for the 
Antrim Plant with the British Government without success.
In order to aleviate the social consequences of a total 
closure, we conceded to continue production at Antrim until 
March 31st, 1982, on a smaller scale. From the very
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beginning we clearly stated that in our opinion a chemical 
fiber plant of this size has no medium or long-term survival 
chance taking into account the existing and future 
international competition in this field.
Therefore, a take-over of all future losses of BEL can 
economically not be justified. This has also been expressed 
by Mr#Butler (i.e. Northern Ireland's Secretary of State for 
Industry) in our last negotiations.
We see no chance for further negotiations and, therefore, 
regard our decision as final" [Telex from Dr. Zempelin, 
Chairman of Enka, to Mr. Bryson, Senior Shop Steward].
March 23, 1982: the BEL workforce "telexed" Dr. Van Den Bos, 
Chief Executive Officer of Akzo, who had attended the discussions 
with the Unions in August 1981 and February 1982. The five page 
message rebutted the Company's arguments for closing the plant. 
Its conclusion was critical of the closure decision, and it 
recommended an alternative course of action:
•We are forced to the conclusion that you have concentrated 
on certain facile but spurios arguments to ensure that 
British Enkalon closes and that you have chosen to ignore 
the only facts that exist, namely, that British Enkalon 
Limited is the most effective selling and manufacturing unit 
you have in the 6roiq>.
We recommend that you retain British Enkalon Limited in 
operation and, indeed, expand its activities to capitalise 
on its proven ability to achieve cost-effectiveness".
[Telex from BEL workforce to Dr. Van den Boss, March 23» 
1982]
March 29, 1982: Dr. Zempelin replied in a three page letter
supporting the closure decision:
With all due respect for the considerable efforts by the 
Work Force, we regret to inform you that we see no basis for 
a reversal of the Board's final decision".
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g.18.: The Oompany'g View
Aware of the sensitivity of the situation the author approached 
Mr. Schierbeek who had once described the day of divestment 
decision as "the worst day in my life" [Ballvmena Observer. July 
23, 1981].
The interview provided confirmation of this sentiment;
"I would never want to go through it (closure) again".
Newspaper reports and conversations reveal that Mr. Schierbeek 
was and remains a highly respected figure. According to the 
Ballvmena Observer he was "the man whom everyone recognises as 
having done his utmost to keep the ailing British Enkalon factory 
operating" [Ballvmena Observer. July 23, 1981, p.1].
In the week prior to the original closure announcement honours 
were conferred upon him by his native country and by the major 
university of his adopted homeland. He was appointed honorary 
Consul for The Netherlands in Northern Ireland, and Queen’s 
University, Belfast awarded him an honorary Doctorate in Science 
[Ballvmena Guardian. July 16, 1981, p.1]
1980 had been a disasterous year for BEL The strong pound and 
double figure inflation and interest rates compounded the 
Company’s problems sales revenue declined and BEL incurred a loss 
of almost £10m [Ballvmena Guardian. March 19, 1981, p.5].
GjJ8t1.: The Divestment Decision
Unlike most foreign subsidiaries in the UK, BEL was not 
wholly owned and UK nationals traditionally held 20$ of its 
shares. This is a sound indication claims Mr. Scheirbeeck that 
BEL enjoyed considerable autonomy, and indeed it was the UK 
Board that "earmarked" Antrim for closure. Akzo was not prepared 
to continue subsidising the loss-making operation and this 
rendered closure inevitable.
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Following the original closure announcement, middle management at 
Antrim together with the Trade Unions, united to prepare a 
Survival Plan. They received all requested information which 
covered unit costs, raw material costs etc.. Their report argued 
that Antrim could be viable. The Enka Board, having received 
approval from Akzo, withdrew the closure announcement and said 
that it would reconsider Antrim's future in March, 1982. The 
Northern Ireland Government agreed to meet any losses incurred 
during the seven month extension period.
Although Antrim met its targets during the trial period, further 
deterioration in the market precluded retaining the Antrim 
factory. Mr. Schierbeek said that Mr. Freeman who has led the 
union delegation opposing closure, and the plant's senior Shop 
Steward, Mr. Bryson, were obviously dejected by the company's 
final decision but both accepted that BEL had no option given 
the adverse market conditions.
9.18.2.; Codes of Conduct and Employee Disclosure and 
Consultation
All senior Akzo managers are well-briefed on codes of conduct for 
multinational enterprises, Mr. Schierbeek said. They are advised 
to view the OECD's Guidelines as a minimum below which Akzo's 
standards should not fall. Consulting the actual text of the 
Guidelines during the divestment process had been unneccessary, 
as Mr. Schierbeek knew exactly what the Guidelines recommended.
His criticism of the "Vredeling Proposals" was the mild comment, 
- "they do not represent the ideal framework and are rather one 
sided (i.e. in labour's favour)". He restricted his remarks 
because his knowledge of the revised Draft Directive was 
imperfect.
BEL more than fulfilled UK legal requirements on 
notification of redundancy when closing Antrim, according to Mr. 
Schierbeek. It provided employees with all requested information, 
and consultations led to the original divestment decision being 
rescinded.
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g. 19.; The Union*g View
According to Mr. Hanna, the Ballymena District Secretary of the 
ATGWU, Management and Unions met frequently and BEL "totally 
involved" the unions in the plant’s affairs. He described BEL 
as "a very forward looking Company" whose employee disclosure and 
consultation procedures were "absolutely satisfactory", 
[interview with Mr. Hanna, December 21, 1984]
Following the original closure announcement, local Management and 
Trade Unions worked together on preparing a "Survival Plan" for 
Antrim factory, - indeed, Mr. Hanna describes this attempt to 
save the plant as "a joint exercise". He has no doubt that BEL 
Management strove to save the factory, but, he believes, Akzo's 
Board of Directors decided in 1980 to close Antrim.
Mr. Hanna salutes BEL's conduct prior to, and during the 
divestment process, believing that the Company exceeded the 
minimum legal UK requirements. He was unfamiliar with the 
OECD's Guidelines and so he did not refer to them in his dealings 
with the Company.
His sole complaint is that BEL's terms of redundancy were 
"disappointing".
^20.: Epilogue
The withdrawal of BEL signalled the departure of the town's sole 
major employer to Antrim's 30,000 inhabitants. Antrim now had the 
highest unemployment rate in Ulster, which itself was double the 
national average [Ballvmena Observer, March 4, 1982].
In mid-June 1985, three yeears after the closure of British 
Enkalon's Antrim factory, Enka announced that it had donated £1m 
to establish the Enkalon Foundation "to improve the quality of 
life in the Province and in recognition of the twenty years co­
operation between the company and the people of Northern 
Ireland". Charitable projects in Ulster will receive £100,000
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each year from the new trust fund.
The announcement followed a remark at the time of closure by the 
Communist Secretary of the Amalgamated Transport and General 
Workers Union, Mr. Freeman, to Dr. Zemperlin the Chairman of ENKA 
that £1m would be appropriate compensation for the Company to 
leave the people of Northern Ireland.
Mr. Freeman, said:
I have never known such an immediate and sincere response to 
such a request, especially since the company had nothing to 
gain from it. It is further evidence of its concern for 
Northern Ireland and the value it places upon its reputation 
as a good employer, proven often to the people of Antrim" 
[Inter-City Bureaux, p.2-3]
ENKA's gesture of goodwill was greatly appreciated. The 
Belfast Telegraph leader writer commented:
"Multinational companies are seldom noted for their 
generosity, particularly when they have nothing to gain, but 
the Dutch-owned ENKA group has proved a notable 
exception.
..The publicity given to this gesture should alert others to 
their reponsibilities, and give capitalism a better name. 
There is nothing more demoralising for workers, and the 
community they come from, to find out that a big employer 
has suddenly cut and run, with a minimum of redundancy 
payments.
••The gift is a tribute, too, to the Northern Ireland work­
force, which had no responsibility for the market forces 
which brought about the closure". [Belfast Telegraph. June 
18, 1985]
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9.21,; Oonclusions
q.21. 1 Divestment; Theory
It was seen in Chapter 3 that Boddewyn [1983] has identified 
three theoretical models to explain foreign divestment: 
condition-based theory; motivation-based theory; and, 
precipitating-circumstance based theory. There were no new men to 
prompt divestment in the two cases examined, so the third model 
does not apply to this case study. There was clearly sound 
motives for closing both plants, but as the author suggested in 
chapter 3, poor performance and losses merely signal the need for 
divestment, they hardly cause it. Thus, the two closures examined 
here here were in direct response to adverse changes in the 
business environment.
Producers of man-made fibres in Europe became uncompetitive 
almost overnight. The cause - soaring oil prices. Rivals in the 
US cushioned by a cheap energy policy, had a field day 
demolishing once healthy European rivals. The fate of Antrim and 
Dundonald, opened in 1963 and 1965 respectively, was sealed by 
the 1974 oil crisis. It was to be only be a matter of time 
before both companies disposed of their entire European man-made 
fibre manufacturing operations, including, of course, Antrim and 
Dundonald.
Such a huge increase in the price of basic raw materials had been 
unforeseen and lower cost manufacturers won the falling number of 
orders. In Europe the consequences were all too apparent.
Throughout the continent modern plant was closed down, but the
industry was still beset by excess capacity. The financial
consequences were immediate and grave. 1975 was as disastrous a
year as 1974 had been successful.
The oil crisis was the root cause of the Antrim and Dundonald 
closures, but firms were reluctant to abandon manufacturing 
facilities that were only ten years old, and so closure was 
postponed in the false hope that market conditions would improve.
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g.21.2.: The Decision and Employee Disclosure and
Consultation
The divestment process is reputed to take 18 months on average, 
the review process accounting for nine months. Monsanto had
conducted a serious appraisal of European operations two years
before its closure announcement of May, 9, 1979. The gravity of
the situation was abundantly evident in October, 1978, and
judging from the US chairman’s letter to shareholders, the 
decision to close Dundonald had been taken in April.
The Canadian MNC, Massey-Ferguson, had announced in February 
1979 the closure of its plant located Just a few miles from
Dundonald. As will be seen in Chapter 12 the conduct of the
Canadian MNC was exemplary, while the US employer reflecting a 
culture less partial to employee disclosure and consultation came 
in for criticism by shop stewards.
According to the former Chairman of Monsanto PLC, the divestment 
decision had been made in London. The current Chairman admits it 
is unlikely that UK management could have reversed the decision 
without consulting the US parent, but Trades Union officials were 
denied access to US Management, despite frequent requests.
Such encounters may be powerless to avert closures, but can prove 
beneficial to both parties nevertheless. They allow Union 
officials to claim that all options to save the plant have been
exhausted, and to enter redundancy negotiations rather than mere
face-saving opposition to job losses. MNCs get the opportunity 
to project a wholesome image of caring capitalism, rather than 
one of callous profit-maximising and disinterest in the welfare 
of the community. Direct Union contact with foreign decision­
makers was crucial in the Antrim case, and both community and 
company reaped the benefits.
The divestment decision process of Akzo’s subsidiary Enka is 
unique among those examined in this thesis. The workforce had 
refused in November 1980 to accept proposals which Management 
deemed necessary to ensure continued production, eg. short-time
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working, and job losses, and the phase-out of certain products.
Early in 1981 British Enkalon Ltd (BEL) disclosed that Antrim 
would close in June 1981 unless Government aid was forthcoming. 
This deadline was extended to August to allow further discussions 
but by July the Government had turned down BEL’s request for an 
£8.5m subsidy.
On July 15, BEL confirmed that Antrim would close by the end of 
August. Trade Union officials challenged the company’s judgement 
and in this instance their arguments received serious 
consideration. After consultations with British Trades Unionists 
at Enka’s Headquarters in Germany, the divestment decision was 
revoked and it was announced that production would continue until 
March 31, 1982, at least, - a final decision being made in
Febr uary/March 19 82.
Market conditions deteriorated further during the seven month 
extension period and on March 1, 1982, BEL announced its final
decision. Antrim closed at the end of the month. No one in Ulster 
could have been shocked by this latest closure announcement.
Akzo’s subsidiaries - Enka, and BEL - more than satisfied UK 
legal requirements of redundancy notice. Employees at Antrim 
were entitled to at least 90 days notice of redundancy; they in 
fact received 12-14 months notice, having been first notified in 
early 1981. Closure at this plant was conducted responsibly and 
in accordance with what would be expected of the home country’s 
national culture.
The Netherlands’ reputation as a "Feminine" caring country (see 
Chapter 5) was reinforced by Akzo’s conduct. The Dutch MNC had 
acted considerately throughout the closing process at Antrim. 
When the firm subsequently donated one million pounds to Ulster 
it was further enhanced and the gesture evoked the highest praise 
from the Province’s top Trades Unionist.
A fundamental behavioural difference emerges from an analysis of 
the US and Dutch MNC’s conduct. The US MNC, Monsanto, ruthlessly
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exploited loopholes in Section 4 of the 1975 Employment 
Protection Act in order to minimise employee disclosure and 
consultation. The Dutch MNC, Akzo, - in conformity with Dutch 
national culture - conformed to the spirit of the law.
The Chairman of the American based firm’s UK subsidiary correctly 
dismisses the Guidelines as "nothing exceptional", but Mr. 
Schierbeek of the Dutch MNC states categorically that the 
Guidelines are regarded as a floor above which it strives to 
exceed in its daily business.
However, length of notification of redundancy alone hardly seems 
a satisfactory measure of employee disclosure and consultation. 
Trades Union representatives want an opportunity to discuss the 
merits of divestment decisions with the actual decision-makers. 
Instead, as some other cases show, they are deprived of this, and 
so-called "consultations" are reduced to haggling over redundancy 
payments with Managers powerless to reconsider, let alone reverse 
the closure decision.
In this case, the Antrim workforce and its Trades Union 
representatives were kept well aware of the uncertainty 
surrounding the factory. When it was confirmed in July 1981 that 
Antrim would close in August, an irreversible or final decision 
had not been made. Proof of this is, of course, the seven month 
extension period.
The extent of centralised decision-making assumed in the 
"Vredeling Proposals" is apparently slightly at odds with Akzo’s 
decision-making structure. Mr. Schierbeek, CEO of BEL, was 
empowered with a degree of authority uncommon in Subsidiary 
Management of MNCs. For example, he acted independently, he 
claims, when issuing the threat to close Antrim in 1980. He 
therefore had decision-making powers far in excess of those which 
"Vredeling" attributes to subsidiary Management. He did not 
merely implement Parent Company decisions, but rather, he 
apparently shaped them.
This case supports the hypothesis that a firm’s divestment
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strategy is closely related to the culture of the "home" country. 
Akzo’s conduct in the BEL case appears beyond reproach. 
Similarly, Dutch labour legislation is recognised by some as one 
of the most progressive among EEC countries. The authors of the 
"Vredeling Proposals" borrowed heavily from Dutch labour 
legislation, and, significantly, Mr. Vredeling is a Dutchman.
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CHAPTER 10
THE DOMESTIC APPLIANCE/CONSUMER ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
10.1.: Introduction
Unlike the other industrial case studies included in this thesis, 
the three firms examined in this chapter produced quite different 
products, sewing machines, radio cassettes, and washing machines. 
This case reviews three plant closures in three of the Home
Countries. In 1979, the US MNC, Singer announced the closure of
its huge sewing machine plant in Scotland. The following year 
Northern Ireland suffered another body-blow when the German MNC 
Grundig decided to cease radio-cassette production. In 1981, 
Hoover of Ohio chose to continue floor care-eq uipment production 
at its Cambuslang factory, at the expense of its Perivale, London 
plant. These three closures involved a direct loss of 5,000 jobs.
As was seen in Chapter 5, Germany’s national culture bears two of 
the four features which foster secrecy, rather than disclosure. 
The United States, on the other hand, possesses three key 
attributes encouraging disclosure; but for the fact that it is a
"masculine" and not a "feminine" country it would carry all four
characteristics
If corporate behaviour reflects national culture, the German MNC 
should disclose the least information to employees. The behaviour 
of the two US MNCs should be fairly similar. Considerable 
disparity between the disclosure practise of the two US MNCs 
would suggest national culture is not a key determinant of 
corporate behaviour.
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SINGER
10.2.: Origins and Success
The Singer Company was founded in 1850 when Isaac M. Singer 
invented the first practical sewing machine. Ibis technical 
advantage was short-lived, however, and by the end of the decade 
Singer was selling only half as many machines as its main rival, 
Wheeler and Wilson. This ratio was maintained until 1867 when 
Singer finally took the lead and became the unchallenged leader 
of the sewing machine industry throughout the world.
This phenomenal success was a tribute not only to Isaac Singer 
the inventor, but also the failed actor who had never lost his 
sense of the theatrical, and who captured the imagination of the 
American consumer. The contribution of his partner. New York 
lawyer, Edward Clark, was also considerable. It was he who 
foresaw the benefits to the Company of demonstrating and 
servicing its product in its own sales rooms. He also pioneered 
Hire Purchase, which allowed people to purchase a sewing machine 
that would otherwise have been outwith their budget. The Singer 
Company was the first great exponent of creative selling, 
American style.
By 1945, the name Singer had been synonymous with sewing machines 
for almost a century, and the Company was selling more machines 
than all its competitors combined With market conditions of high 
demand, and Singer’s virtual monopoly of supply, there was a
tremendous boom, in which the Company could sell machines as fast 
as it could produce them. Singer’s strength was based upon its
product and sales organisation, but the latter would prove a
severe handicap after the War, inflating the price of domestic 
machines when Singer was struggling to meet a ferocious challenge 
from low-cost rivals.
10.3.: Compétition and Singer’s Decline
But by the following year Singer was no longer enjoying a
monopoly, and competition was intense The Company was exposed as
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having failed to move with the times. Like some football
managers or pop’ groups that have produced a winning team, or a 
succession of hits, it stuck rigidly to the successful formula, 
but just as players age and tastes change, so too do plant and 
market conditions. Singer had been lulled into a false sense of 
security and during the 1950s, it continued to market machines of 
nineteenth century design, manufactured with nineteenth century 
tools, in similarly outdated buildings.
In 1957, sewing machines accounted for 94$ of the Company’s total 
sales, with virtually all domestic machines being sold in 
Singer’s own retail outlets. Singer was therefore highly 
dependent on a single product, and one which it had failed to 
develop and cater for the modern consumer. This alone made
Singer very vulnerable to the competition which was emerging in 
the domestic sewing machine market; the condition exacerbated by 
the location of virtally all of the production facilities in 
high-wage countries, and by the Company’s reliance on one plant 
in particular - Clydebank where almost half of its machines were 
produced.
To make matters worse, the cost of maintaining sales-service 
centres was as high as 50$ of retail prices, and these were a 
luxury the firm could not afford. Whereas, when the sewing 
machine was first launched on the market, and no none knew how to 
operate it. Singer needed trained staff to demonstrate the 
unknown to confused customers, but once established, the brand
name "Singer" sold the machine, and operating instructions were
readily obtained from friends or neighbours, if the manual was 
found too complicated. In short, after the war there was nothing 
to suggest that Singer sold more machines because it had its own 
shops, than it could have done had independent retailers sold 
them. On the contrary, they would have sold them more cheaply, 
and there would have been a consequent increase in demand. In the 
early days Singer’s other advantage in having its own shops was 
that it could offer credit, but now hire-purchase was universal.
Competition came first from Pfaff of Germany, Necchi and 
Vigorelli of Italy, and Elna of Switzerland Eventually, in 1954,
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Singer responded to this threat and launched a new range of 
advanced and lightweight domestic models in pastel colours. This 
retaliatory measure dealt a significant blow to these European 
producers, but in the meantime, the Japanese had stormed world 
markets with low-cost domestic machines making substantial 
inroads into Singer’s markets.
Before the War, Japan had produced virtually no sewing machines 
and Singer had a 90$ share of the Japanese market but in 1945, US 
General Douglas McArthur, responsible for rebuilding the war-torn 
Japanese economy, decided that the vanquished Japanese should 
produce sewing machines instead of munitions. Singer was 
forbidden to re-enter the Japanese market. The irony was that 
Singer patents and plans were provided along with US capital
investment to establish the industry in Japan. By the 1950’s 
Japan had made great progress, and by 1957 over 300 companies 
were producing over two million domestic machines.
The Japanese firms succeeded where their European counterparts 
failed. Singer’s US market share for domestic machines 
plummeted from 66$ in 1950 to 33$ in 1957, and to make matters
worse the latter year saw a sharp decline in the US market_._
Singer’s market share fell to approximately 35$ in most foreign
markets.
The decline of Singer in the domestic sewing machine was in 
marked contrast with the Company’s continued dominance of the 
industrial sewing machine market.
In 1957 industrial sewing machine output worldwide was 400,000 
units, of which Singer produced 175,000 units (44$). The Company 
still dominated the US market with a 35$ share. Its main rivals 
were 6 major American companies, but the largest of these had 
only a 14$ share.
It was, therefore, the poor performance in the domestic sewing 
machine markets that accounted for Singer’s 2 5$ drop in profits 
between 1951 and 1957, and the drop in earnings on total declared 
assets from an already low 6.1$ in 1951 to 3»3$ in 1957»
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10.it.; Oompany and Plant. 1956-1975
It was against this background that a new president was appointed 
on January 1, 1958. Forty-two year old Donald F. Kircher took
over "the stumbling sewing machines giant... at the time of its 
greatest crisis" [Palmer, December 31, 1975]. He correctly
recognised that the root cause of Singer’s difficulties was its 
Management, which had "simply congealed like cold porridge", not 
competition ’per se’ [Thackray, June, 1966]. This accusation, as 
shall be seen, could never be levelled at Kircher; he was quite 
the reverse - hyperactive, particularly when it came to acquiring 
companies. Kircher*s priority was not diversification, but the 
revitalisation of the sewing machine industry. This demanded 
major changes at Clydebank.
It has already been noted that Singer’s difficulties were due 
largely to its poor performance in the market for domestic
machines. Between 1948 and 1952, 79$ of Clydebank’s total
production was of domestic machines. It would seem then that
Singer’s oldest factory outside the US partly contributed to the 
Company’s problems. It shall now be seen why this was the case.
Kircher was aware, that the Scottish factory as it stood was a 
monument to Singer’s period of masterly inactivity - a relic 
of the nineteenth century. Machine tools, bought for opening the 
factory at Love Loan in 1867, were still in use at Clydebank
during the I96 0’s. In 1867 feudalism prevailed in Japan, yet by 
the 1960’s low-cost Japanese sewing machines, and a host of other 
manufactured goods, produced by cheap labour, often with the most 
advanced technology, had erupted on to the market. Japan had
become one of the world’s most advanced economies. Major changes 
were necessary, if Singer and its Clydebank facility were to 
compete successfully against such a rival. The plant was to be 
reorganised and revitalised.
It was felt that new faces were needed to implement the proposed 
changes, in the period between 1912 and 1962 there had been only 
four Managing Directors at Clydebank; all but one were local to
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the area. Managerial positions were filled by men who had worked 
their way up through the factory’s ranks This pattern was now to 
change. In the period 1962-70, there were four Managing 
Directors and all but one were Americans.
In 1961 a Forward Planning Unit was established and staffed by 
Americans from the Parent Company. Its task was to pinpoint and 
remedy the defects within the factory, and devise a campaign of 
modernisation which would reduce costs and increase productivity.
The FPU decided to decentralise the plant and introduce 
Divisional control, in a bid to improve communications and to 
develop cost-consciousness and authority among middle and lower 
Management.
Previously there had existed more than fifty departments, all 
centrally controlled, but now six independent divisions were 
introduced: Cabinet, Needle, Electric Motors, Process, and
Domestic and Industrial Machines.
Under this set up, while the Company had a clear picture of each 
division’s performance, it did not know exactly how much it cost 
to produce one complete sewing machine. Accordingly, in July 
1964 the Divisional structure was replaced, and the factory was 
basically divided into two Groups, the Consumer Products Group 
(CPG) and the Industrial Products Group (IPG). The CPG 
manufactured only domestic machines, the IPG only industrial 
models As a result. Singer could better assess the efficiency of 
the Clydebank plant.
Kircher had also recognised the dangers involved in Singer’s 
excessive reliance on its nineteenth century Scottish plant. He 
decided that this should change:
"We are scaling down Clydebank someidiat by transferring one 
line to Bonnieres. Clydebank will still be our largest 
factory, but the others will be much closer in size than in 
the past" [quoted in McDermott, 1982].
Clydebank and Bonnieres were to produce ’middle-of-the-line’ 
domestic sewing machines, but demand in Europe and the US was
2 7 8
increasingly either for the best, or the cheapest models produced 
at Karlsruhe and Monza, respectively. Therefore the Scottish and 
French plants produced domestic machines with the least market 
potential,
Bonnieres had a great advantage over Clydebank, however, as it 
was closely integrated with Monza, Karlsruhe, and Wurselen, in 
Germany. The closure of any one of these plants would have upset 
production in at least two of the others. Clydebank, being a 
'serious anomaly» in its singular self-sufficiency, was more
vulnerable to closure.
Between I96I and 1965, 27.8m was invested in Clydebank, most of
it in the CPG which continued to produce models designed for the 
European and American markets. Singer's return on its investment 
was determined by the level and nature of demand in these 
markets.
During the same period, investment in the IPG was almost 
negligible. This appeared very ominous to the local work force
who had been informed that a new factory was being built at 
Blankenloch in Germany, which would produce only industrial 
machines; it opened in 1967.
The IPG at Clydebank remained housed in a six-storey Edwardian
building which was unsuitable for manufacturing any sewing 
machines, never mind heavy cumbersome models. From 1964 on, the 
IPG was trapped in a "Catch-22'’ situation: unless a profitable
position was reached there would be no investment; unless there 
was investment, a profitable position could not be reached. As 
early as May 1965, employees were warned that the IPG’s future 
was uncertain fSinger Speaker. May 1965].
By the 1960’s it was evident that Clydebank was no longer 
consistently profitable. During the period, 1962-71, it made a 
profit of only £4.6m, and there was considerable fluctuation in 
profits from year to year, as Table 10.1. shows.
Singer was producing industrial machines at two factories in
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Europe by 1962, - at Clydebank, and at the brand new factory in
Blankenloch.
In 1972 the US market peaked, and two years later the European 
market stopped growing. As demand from these depressed markets 
dropped, the closure of Clydebank grew nearer. An indication of 
their importance is that in 1975 they accounted for 85% of the 
factory's domestic sewing machine output and 43$ of its 
industrial machine output. The growing Third World markets were 
now being served by new plants which Singer had opened in the 
developing countries. The Company was clearly reducing the 
strategic importance of its European operations and of Clydebank 
in particular.
This was indicated by the drastic reduction in the Scottish 
plant's labour force from 15,866 to 6,400 during the decade I960 
to 1970.
In 1975, the IPG was still producing machines in conditions 
which rendered profit-making well-nigh impossible, and indeed it 
had not known a single profitable year in the 1970s In that year 
the factory sufferred a loss of £1,3m.
From what has been seen so far, the closure of the IPG seemed 
imminent, but in 1975 Singer announced that Blankenloch would be 
closed and production transferred to Clydebank, thereby creating 
500 jobs! There was sound logic behind this apparent surprise 
decision: closing Clydebank's IPG would have involved
considerable losses in write-offs, whereas the modern German 
plant could be sold The transfer of plant was completed within a 
year and was fraught with difficulties. Management later 
described it as "a mistake before we even started"
The machinery had satisfied German Health and Safety requirements 
but it failed to comply with British standards. The Health and 
Safety Inspector, who surveyed the factory at the Unions' 
request, concluded that, in addition to 100 machines from 
Blankenloch, a further 4,000 failed to meet the required standard 
Singer was fined £5,000 for this breach of regulations.
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Table 10.1.: Performance data on The Singer Manufacturing Company 
Ltd. (ie.the Clydebank factory)
Year Sales Pre-Tax 
Profits
Post-Tax 
Profits
% Return 
on
Investment
1962 n.a. 74.5 52.7 0.9
1963 n.a. 246.8 246.8 2.9
1964 n.a. 58.1 58.1 0.7
1965 n.a. (889.0) (889.0) negative
1966 n.a. (117.0) 13.0 negative
1967 11,826 (183.0) (294.0) negative
1968 15,478 1,388.0 1,388.0 13.5
1969 19,463 2,516.0 2,516.0 20.0
1970 17,219 1,111.0 766.0 8.3
1971 18,445 1,312.0 738.0 7.7
Source: Company Accounts; Ext el Statistical Services.
In 1958 Kircher had taken over a profitable single-product 
Company, but some of its major markets were close to saturation 
although demand was still rising. Therefore the principle of 
diversification was unquestionably correct.
Between 1962 and 1973, he acquired some 22 companies in such 
diverse fields as furniture, housing, banking, valves, heating 
and air conditioning, power tools, business machines, aerospace 
and tufted and knitting machinery, and even a German mail order 
firm, Friedrich Schwab. But in 1958 Kircher had stated that 
Singer should only diversify into those industries with features 
similar to the sewing machine business. Some of the above 
acquisitions clearly did not comply with his guidelines.
As a result of this activity, sewing related products accounted 
for only 30 per cent of Singer's sales in 1973 compared to 94 per 
cent in 1957, and profits had climbed to record levels, reaching 
a peak of $94.5m. This apparent prosperity disguised the fact 
that Kircher had made some very unsound investments.
Many of these firms had been acquired at the wrong time, and at 
the wrong price. For example, Friden Ind., which manufactured 
electro-mechanical calculators, was bought at a cost of $182m. 
just as electronics were about to revolutionise the market. Then
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in 1968, General Precision Equipment was acquired at a cost of 
$450m. for its aviation electronics technology, but shortly 
afterwards the aerospace boom collapsed.
To finance these acquisitions. Singer’s long term debt rose from 
$86m, between 1962 and 1974. In the latter year, only twelve 
months after the Company’s profits had reached an all-time peak. 
Singer reported a los of $10ml The Company had not made a loss 
since 1917, when it had to write off properties in Russia that 
were confiscated during the Revolution.
Although Kircher had improved the efficiency of Singer’s world 
sewing machine operations, it was evident that his 
diversification policy had plunged Singer into even deeper 
trouble.
By 1975, Singer’s total debt exceeded $1.25 billion, its 
diversification policy was in tatters. The Company’s banks were 
by now disillusioned.
The resignation of the autocratic Kircher created yet another 
problem. He had not identified his sucessor and the banks 
demanded that the next Chief Executive be experienced in Finance. 
None of Singer’s Vice-Presidents was thus experienced.
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10.5.; The NexMea
In September 1975 Joseph Flavin the Chief Executive Vice- 
President of Xerox, was first approached, and in December he was 
appointed President He did not have any experience of the sewing 
machine industry but in other respects he was exceedingly well- 
qualified to tackle Singer’s problems An accountant by training, 
he had spent most of his life in Finance, - with IBM and Xerox, - 
and both these firms were very successful in business machines. 
Singer’s main disaster area.
Flavin’s first priority was to eliminate money-losing ventures, 
particularly business machines which were severely draining 
earnings. Singer incurred a $414.4 million write off divesting 
this product range, and this disposal largely explains the
Company’s $452m loss in 1975.
Once again. Singer was highly dependent on its sewing related 
products, and ironically the Company’s domestic sewing machine 
operations proved highly profitable in 1975. The CPG at
Clydebank had not contributed to this success.
In addition, the IPG at Clydebank had been largely resposible for 
the Corporation’s worldwide industrial sewing machine operations 
reporting a loss of $10 milion.
The Clydebank factory was a massive drain on Corporate resources. 
Its role in the Corporation’s strategy had been greatly reduced 
during Kircher’s reign, and the Company was no longer dependent 
upon it. Would Flavin try to return Clydebank to profitability,
or would divestment be the preferred strategy?
dvdebank: the final veara
During the Blankenloch transfer. Flavin came to Clydebank on a 
fact-finding mission. His main concern at the time was reducing 
Singer’s debt and ridding the Company of its less successful 
acquisitions. He realised that the Sewing Machine business 
needed to be rationalised. Clydebank management attached great
2 83
importance to Flavin’s first visit on St Andrew’s Day, I976, and
prepared a comprehensive report on the factory.
Ian MacGregor, a former Director of the Company, and now Chairman 
of the National Coal Board informed the author that:
»..,.due to low productivity and high costs the plant 
(Clydebank) was very vulnerable. So when Singer’s set 
out to rationalise, it was very hi^ on the list**
[McDermott, 1982].
The report prepared for Flavin shows, however, that despite a 
lack of investment, there had been a significant increase in 
productivity since 1967. Given the age of the plant’s capital 
equipment this was quite an achievment. As of November 1976, the 
total number of machines in the factory was 7,512, of which: -
862 were over 50 years old, - 128 were over 75 years old, - 7 
were over 100 years old.
The "Flavin Report" also revealed that despite the age of the 
machines, much less was added to the factory’s fixed assets than 
was written off in depreciation. In 1974 investment was only 42$ 
of depreciation, and in 1975 it was only 40$. In 1976 the level 
of investment equalled the value of depreciation.
In 1976, the Singer Organisation made a profit of $74.2m., and in
1977 the profits rose to $94.2m. It appeared to some 
commentators that Flavin had saved the Company and according to 
the "Wall Street Journal" he had given a "Textbook example of 
saving a firm from near disaster" [Wall Street Journal, date of 
publication unknown],
Clydebank, however, remained the thorn in Singer’s flesh. 
Instead, Clydebank, which had returned a loss of £2,6m in 1975
(the IPG alone lost £2.2m) lost £680,000 in 1976. The following
year Larry Neely, an American, replaced John Wotherspoon as 
Managing Director, Wotherspoon being made Chairman of Singer U.K. 
In that year, Clydebank’s loss was $2.8m and this could be
directly attributed to the IPG which reported a staggering loss
of $8m. The CPG, on the other hand, which had received some 
investment, made a profit of $5.2m.
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By the end of 1977, it was hard to believe that the Clydebank 
factory had once been the hub of the Singer empire. Its ancient 
buildings served as a powerful symbol of a by-gone age, and 
dwarfed the smaller, newer factory unit which housed the CPG. 
This indeed was tangible proof of the Company’s failure to invest 
in Clydebank Such an ill-equipped and inappropriate facility was 
no match for modern Japanese producers. The town had viewed with 
dismay the workforce dwindling from over 16,000 to under 5,000. 
Redundancies had been the order of the day for almost twenty 
years, and morale fell. Closure seemed inevitable, but the Shop 
Stewards were determined to fight for the plant’s survival.
The US and European markets were of vital importance to the 
Clydebank factory, for together they had accounted for 80$ of its 
production. Between 1972 and 1979, the American market for 
domesic machines fell by 50$ and the European market began to
show a significant drop in the late 1970s.
As a result of this slump in domestic sewing machine sales, the 
Singer Company had "serious overcapacity" in Europe and the US. 
The first step of a "restructuring programme" to solve this 
problem was the closure of Clydebank [Singer Shareholders’ News 
letter, Third Quarter, 1979]. The CPG of the Company’s oldest 
factory in Europe had the lowest productivity of Singer’s 28
plants, and unlike the others in Europe it could be closed 
without disrupting production elsewhere. Clydebank was an 
anachronism. Its productivity in the late 1950s was lower than 
in 1913.
The result of lack of investment was clearly illustrated in the 
IPG at Clydebank. Management recognised that productivity was 
low and costs were high, but instead of providing investment, it 
expected the workers to find a solution. In 1977, the year Queen 
Elizabeth celebrated her Silver Jubilee, the IPG, operating 
Victorian tools, and functioning in an Edwardian building, 
reported a loss of $8m.
Even the CPG which had received almost all of the £10m invested
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at Clydebank did not get sufficient resources. 50$ of the CPG’s 
tools which had been in use during the 1950s were still in use in 
1976. This lack of investment and a demoralised workforce 
explains the CPG’s productivity. During the late 1960s, Singer 
management constantly broke its promise not to introduce 
compulsory redundancies. As the labour force contracted, many of 
the remaining workers believed that the Company had already 
decided to close the Clydebank factory. By doing so, they 
credited management with a long-term strategy it did not possess.
10.7.; Employee Disclosure and Consultation
March 13, 1978: John McFadyen, (the Factory Convener), and his
deputy, Hugh Swan, travelled to London to meet National Officers, 
including Gavin Laird of AÜEW. Two days later, these officials 
discussed the factory’s future with Mr. Bruce Millan, the then 
Secretary of State for Scotland, and he indicated that Government 
money was available, but so far Singer had not approached the 
Government.
March 18-19: the Labour Party in Scotland held its annual
conferance over this weekend. A lobby of Shop Stewards from the 
Clydebank plant attended to convey the gravity of the situation 
at the factory. They discussed the matter with the then Prime 
Minister, Mr. Callaghan, who promised to raise the matter with 
President Carter, during their forthcoming meeting in America.
March 22, 1978: Trades Union representatives met Mr. Ed Keehn,
President of Singer’s European Division, Sewing Products Group. 
According to the "Press handout" issued by the Unions after the 
meeting, Mr. Keehn had agreed to the Stewards request:
. that prior to amr decisions being made relative to the 
future of the Clydebank factory and its total workforce, and 
in light of the fact that Management is currently conducting 
a World Wide Survey of its products manufacturing base and 
selling outlets, the Trade Unions should be given an 
opportunity to -
a) examine the draft proposals srising from this report
b) be given the opportunity to view the alternatives 
contained within the report, as these alternatives may
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affect the Clydebank plant, and
c) be given a commitment that no decisions will be taken by 
Singer Corporate Management on the results of this survey 
prior to the foregoing procedures being carried out".
The statement does not reveal, however, that during this meeting, 
Keehn assured the Union delegation that the Clydebank plant would 
not be closed.
In the first six months of 1978, Singer had reported a loss of 
$3.4m. on industrial sewing machines. Clydebank's IPG, which 
produced half of all Singer industrial machines, was "mainly to 
blame".
Singer had three plants producing industrial machines (Clydebank, 
Elizabethport, and Utsunomiya in Japan) and operating at 34 per 
cent capacity. Clydebank's IPG operated at 35 percent capacity, 
and to make matters worse, many of its machines were not being 
sold, so the level of inventories was involuntarily increased. 
Corrective measures were urgently required.
April 4, 1978: a Union delegation met Mr Keehn who had discussed 
the Clydebank factory with Flavin during their recent meeting at 
Company headquarters in Connecticut. Keehn informed the Stewards 
that Flavin had agreed to visit Britain in June to discuss the 
factory's future with Government Ministers and the TUC.
On June 22, 1978, Flavin announced his plans for the Clydebank
factory. These are outlined in his letter, to its employees, 
which is reprinted below:
"Dear Fellow Employees:
I am sure that you are aware of my visit this week to 
Scotland and London in order to discuss the future of the 
Clydebank Factory with senior government ministers, civic 
leaders, trade union officials and local management. I 
would like to share with you some of the facts and 
conclusions of these conversations.
For a number of years demand for all sewing machines in the 
US and Europe, Clydebank's principal markets, has gone 
down. As a result we face a serious problem of excess 
capacity. The future, unfortunately shows no sign of change. 
Thus, we have spent many months exploring ways to ranain
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viable in Clydebank, to protect as many jobs as possible as 
we can under the circumstances, and to remain the leader in 
sewing worldwide.
With the help and cooperation of our unions and managers, we 
can accomplish all of this As we see it, the mission for 
Clydebank's future must be one which permits most cost- 
efficient manufacture based on fewer products, with high 
volume and streamlined production methods. We are prepared 
to spend about £8 million in updating operations, 
restructuring of work force and tooling for a new household 
sewing machine - one that will give Clydebank a vital new 
role in developed markets. However to aoccHBplish these 
goals, will require a streamlining of consumer sewing 
operations, phaseout of industrial sewing machine and needle 
manufacturing with concentration on household needle 
production only.
This program will take some five years, after which time, by 
a continuing and evenly spread programme of natural 
attrition, early retirement and minimal redundancies the 
factory will be operating with a labour force of around
2,000 people. It is our belief that this course of action 
and no other can ensure the continuation of the Clydebank 
Factory.
I do not expect the loss of jobs to be welcomed and I do not 
enjoy having to carry this news The main point which I wish 
to leave with you is that we believe this program can 
succeed and it will, as long as we can count on the 
cooperation and understanding of the Clydebank workforce 
which has contributed so well to our history".
According to newspaper reports, the whole factory had faced 
closure, and it was only the personal intervention of the then 
Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, in talks with President 
Carter, that saved the CPG and 2,000 jobs. Mr. Gregor 
MacKenzie, MP for Rutherglen, who was Minister of State for 
Scotland, and Mr. Callaghan's Parliamentary Private Secretary, 
states that one cannot be sure whether Singer did plan to close 
the entire factory, but what is certain is that there was 
considerable pressure on the Company to retain its manufacturing 
facility at Clydebank.
Flavin's plan involved, however, reducing the labour force of 
4,800 to 2,000. This was unacceptable to the Unions and even 
though Flavin had stated that, "this course of action and no 
other can ensure continuation of the Clydebank factory", they 
demanded time to review the Company's proposals. Having promised 
(see March 22 "Press Handout") not to take any action until the
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Unions had considered its policy, management was forced to 
concede.
The Company agreed to delay implementing its plan until the 
autumn to allow the Unions time to produce, if possible, a viable 
alternative. In June, Flavin had declared that the viability of 
Clydebank must be a prerequisite of any alternative solution and 
this would be the only background against which the Company would 
consider an alternative solution. He said that the,
"Key conditions required from the unions to made Clydebank a 
cost effective operation were:
1. Subcontracting of parts and services
2. Labour flexibility to move to areas where openings 
exist, when their own areas did not have enough work
3. A new pay plan to generate more productivity, reduce 
incentive anomalies, and to reduce administration costs".
On June 27, John McFadyen, the Factory Convener, addressed the 
workers, and asked them to support the following resolution:
"This meeting of Singer workers totally rejects the
Company's proposals to run down Industrial Sewing Machine
Products, and calls for the reversal of the present Company
Policy by Immediate cash Investment to achieve: 
(a) Continuation of all Industrial Products
(b) To maximise job opportunity In the short term and the 
long-term at Singer, Clydebank".
Only "about ten" workers voted against the resolution.
June 29, 1978: The unions agreed that the services of
professionals should be called upon to advise on a viable
alternative for the factory. It was decided at a Factory 
Committee Meeting on July 24, that PA Management Consultants 
should get the contract. The Unions hoped that the Government 
would completely finance the project.
August 7, 1978: McFadyen reported that he had received a letter
from Gregor MacKenzie, which stated that if the Unions put up 
£25,000 the Scottish Development Agency would provide the other 
£50,000. The Factory Committee unanimously decided to accept
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this offer. The Unions would raise their share by a levy of 50p 
per worker, per week, for a period of ten weeks.
September 12, 1978: According to the Minutes of the Union
meeting held on this day, documentary evidence was produced which 
indicated that the Company was already in the process of phasing 
out the IPG - this to be completed by 1980, and not 1981 as had 
appeared in Flavin's Plan. When confronted. Management denied 
that they were breaking the agreement not to implement the 
phasing out plan, until the Unions had some time to consider a 
viable alternative.
While PA carried on preparing the report in order to save jobs, 
the workers themselves were apathetic and the minutes of the 
Special factory Committee Meeting on October 3, 1978 record that
one Shop Steward stated that only 30 per cent of his members 
wanted to fight for their jobs. The other 70 per cent wanted to 
collect redundancy money and go.
October 6, 1978: McFadyen informed the Factory Committee that Mr
Jack, Director of the SDA had been informed "that if quick 
decisions were not made, then there was a danger the Company 
would possibly close down the whole factory.
Later that month it was revealed that all Singer's European 
plants, with the exception of Clydebank, had obtained an increase 
in orders for domestic machines in 1979. Clydebank had fewer 
orders than in 1978.
Early in November, the Union-commissioned consultants report was 
submitted to Singer Management. This comprehensive 120 page 
report outlined the alternative strategy which retained a reduced 
Industrial Products facility at Clydebank, provided employment 
for 3,000 people (compared with Singer proposals for 2,250), and 
envisaged development, over the next 1-2 years, of an enhanced 
Industrial Products range to secure the future and possibly 
generate further employment.
EA indicated, however, that if the IPG was to be viable the
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following productivity requirements would have to be met: - 2 0$
increase in labour productivity; - 20$ reduction in variable 
labour employees; - 20$ reduction in scrap; - 20$ improvement in 
maintenance productivity; - over 50$ reduction in fixed period 
costs (80$ of fixed period costs are employee costs); - 5$ 
reduction in material costs.
November 27, 1978: Singer replied to the factory Trade Union
Leaders on PA Consultants alternative strategy. It agreed to 
continue manufacturing two industrial models and thus save 335 
jobs. This would involve a further investment of between £1m 
and £2m. beyond the estimated £8 million.
The Unions were "bitterly disappointed" that the Corporation had 
not accepted the alternative strategy in full, and "at this 
juncture are rejecting the Company's proposals". Neely remained 
convinced that "If all the parties co-operate to the fullest.... 
there can be a future at Clydebank." He did warn, however, that 
the plant had 15 months to prove itself or it faced closure.
December 8, 1978: Singer revised its offer and now stated that
"subject to external finance of the estimated order £2 to £4 
million becoming available on terms acceptable to Singer", 
production of another two industrial machine models and related 
spares would continue thereby supporting 165 jobs in additon to 
the 335 previously offered.
December 11, 1978: Keehn told the factory's 130 Shop Stewards
that Singer had reluctantly agreed to accept the Government's 
offer to provide the finance necessary to retain a reduced IPG, 
only because the Company wanted to continue producing domestic 
machines at Clydebank. He also warned them that if the workers 
rejected this latest proposal. Singer would close down the whole 
factory.
Swan, the factory's Deputy Convener, then called on the Shop 
Stewards to accept, in principle, the Company's proposals, and to 
advise the workers to do the same. 74 Shop Stewards agreed with 
Swan's recommendation. 54 voted against his motion.
291
December 13, 1978: the workers rejected 'by about 2-1', the Shop
Stewards' Recommendation "to accept in principle the Company's 
proposals". The Factory Deputy Convener, Hugh Swan, warned that 
rejection would lead to closure; he was booed by the workers 
whose attitude was typified by the one who said,
•Singer Management have held a pistol to our heads, 
let them pull the trigger" [McDermott, 1982].
A Company statement from the Ü.S MNC's New York Headquarters was 
issued saying that The Singer Company was "extremely disappointed 
and apprehensive about the implications of the vote taken today 
by manual workers in Clydebank, Scotland to reject the proposal 
of union leadership to implement a plan designed to save its 
sewing products factory there" [Company statement issued December 
13, 1978].
Mr. Keehn explained that,
"This was hoped to have become a solution to benefit 
everyone concerned, including the Clydebank community as a 
whole. It is unfortunate that the workforce has chosen to 
be so cavalier in its first reaction.
Without the endorsement by the total workforce the plan to 
save Clydebank cannot be successful. And without the plan 
the Company can see no practical way to continue operations 
there much less invest one penny more in the plant.
Althou^ the financial ijq>act on the total company of the 
plant being closed would be significant, it is a step the 
Company will take if the memebership causes it.
We are hopeful that more responsible consideration will be 
given to the leadership's call for support of the plan. It 
would be tragic to force the closing of the plant on the eve 
of such an enlightened solution to the situation there; a 
solution developed in an atmosphere of almost unprecedented 
cooperation between management, labour leaders and 
government" [Company statement issued December 13, 1978].
The Shop Stewards realised that closure was likely unless the 
manual workers accepted the Company's plan. Saving the factory 
was not uppermost in many workers' minds. The majority were 
apparently urging their representatives to restrict negotiations 
to securing favourable redundancy payments [Shop Stewards' Minute
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Book, entry for December 21, 1978]
December 15, 1978: A detailed study was published which forecast
that the closure of the Clydebank factory would have significant 
impact on the local, regional and national economy. It outlined 
its consequences in terms of job losses, income emigration and 
fiscal costs.
The following Sunday, a "Joint Clergy Statement on the crisis at 
Singer's" was read out in every Church in Clydebank and the 
surrounding areas. It said that the clergy were "distressed" to 
find that the workers had rejected the Company's amended
proposals, and appealed "to the workforce of Singer's to think 
again and to act responsibly in the best interest of their 
families and the community".
January 10, 1979: In the meeting held in London at the request
of Singer, Mr. Keehn informed a Trade Union delegation which
included National Officers of the AUEW and the GMWU, that Mr. 
Flavin's original plan would be implemented immediately.
The Trades Unionists asked Mr. Keehn for a seven day extension 
before implementing the original plan proposed by Flavin. They 
argued that the manual workers were now ready to approve the 
modified plan which would save an extra 500 jobs. Their argument 
proved persuasive, and during a break in the proceedings, Mr. 
Keehn telephoned Head Office to seek its approval of the Unions' 
proposal. The Company agreed to give the manual workers a second 
chance. There was to be another vote a week later when, once 
again, the workers would be asked to accept the same motion which 
they had rejected in December [Shop Stewards Minute Book, entry 
Eor January 12, 1979].
January 12, 1979: the acting Factory Convener, Mr. Swan,
instructed the Stewards "to go back to their members and impress 
upon them that this is their last chance to save the factory". 
[Shop Stewards Minute Book, entry for January 12, 1979]
January 17, I979: Employees voted, this time two to one in favour
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of the motion. Shortly afterwards, the Financial Times observed 
that the future of Singer* s Clydebank factory looked "reasonably 
sure, if not secure". By May, however, a threatening cloud once 
again hung over the factory’s future.
In February the Callaghan Labour Government had been in a similar 
position, but on May 4, it was learned that the Conservatives, 
led by Mrs Thatcher, had won the General Election. On the same 
day, Keehn announced that the Clydebank factory faced closure 
unless the Unions agreed to accept the new Pay Plan which Flavin 
had described as one of the three "key conditions... to make 
Clydebank a cost effective operation".
May 14, 1979: a settlement was reached, but the factory's
financial problems remained. In the first six months of 1979»
Clydebank made a loss of £6m. and the order books were very low.
The Company indicated that it intended introducing a four-day 
week in several areas of the factory, and that 598 people would 
be made redundant by September. The alternative was to continue 
with a five day week in all areas, but the workforce of 3,703 
would be reduced to 2,466. On June 27, the Shop Stewards agreed 
unanamously to accept a four-day week.
August 9, 1979: the factory's losses had continued to mount and
Hugh Swan informed his fellow Shop Stewards that losses for the 
current financial year had reached $14.25m. The £8m. of 
investment, promised by the Company had still not materialised, 
although all the conditions laid down by Flavin had been met. It 
was rumoured that the Company had decided to withdraw from 
Clydebank and that machinery was already being sold. Labour had 
lost the General Election in May and the Company felt it was no 
longer constrained to honour the promises, made to Labour MPs. to 
remain in Clydebank,
The Closure Announcement
October 5, 1979: Haldane, the Clydebank factory's Personnel
Director, contacted the Factory Convener, John McFadyen. He 
wanted to contact Gavin Laird, former Convener of the factory.
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who had since become an Executive Councillor of the AUEW, and is 
now the Union's General Secretary. Keehn had instructed Haldane 
to arrange a meeting with the Unions' National Officials to 
discuss the "work situation" at the factory. The headlines of 
the local press described the workers' reaction to this latest 
development: "New fears as Singer call Unions to talks"
[Smnlng-Ilfflês., October 8, 1979]. On the other hand, the
FlnanglaI-.Tj.meg reported that "Singer's European Headquarters in 
Paris said.... that no decision had been taken about the future 
of Clydebank" [Perman, October 8, 1979].
October 12, 1979: Union Officials were particularly anxious as
they travelled to their 10 am appointment. They wondered why the 
meeting was being held in the Bellahouston Hotel, Glasgow, and 
not in the factory; and they had been informed at the last 
minute, that they would be meeting Flavin, the President of 
Singer, not Keehn.
Flavin confirmed the worst fears of the 3,000 employees. The US 
Board had decided that the Clydebank factory should be closed by 
June 1980, A copy of his letter to employees is printed below:
■Dear Clydebank Employees,
It is with the deepest regret that we announce today that 
Singer will be unable to continue sewing manufacturing 
operations at the Clydebank plant beyond June of 1980. This 
conclusion was reached after exhaustive studies of all 
options available to help us to arrest the persistent and 
growing losses being experienced by our sewing machine 
operations in the markets of the develped world.
We are announcing our conclusion fully eight months early, 
in order to provide more time for more people to make 
adjustments in their personal and vocational lives. This 
timing will also give us a chance to pursue a very intensive 
effort to find a buyer for the factory and new jobs for its 
workforce. I'm sure you appreciate that this effort will be 
enhanced by the continued support of everyone in the 
manufacture of sewing machines according to schedule.
The closing of Clydebank is only a part of a sweeping 
program to restructure, consolidate and streamline Singer 
manufacturing and marketing operations throughout North 
America and Europe. It is a program that will take years, 
but is essential if we are going to arrest the crippling 
losses mentioned earlier.
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We will do everything in our power to minimize the effects 
on our Scottish employees and we will cooperate with 
government, unions and civic groups to assist in an orderly 
transition.
But, in the final analysis, it is your continued support 
that we must have to keep Clydebank, operating as 
effectively as possible through these next several months, 
during which we will be trying to make the facility as 
appealing as possible to a prospective buyer and
bring new work to Clydebank" [Joseph B. Flavin, Chairman, 
October 12, 1979].
Lay-offs would begin after the New Year. At the time, Larry 
Mihlan broke the news at a press conference in the Central Hotel, 
Glasgow.
The promise of "a fight to the death" was the first reaction of 
the Union Leaders, but their members did not support this line of 
action and encouraged the Unions to channel their energy into 
negotiating as satisfactory a severance pay-settlement as 
possible.
The reaction of some politicians was not so docile. Mr. Bruce 
Millan, who had been Secretary of State for Scotland until May 
1979, accused the Company of breaking its word. He said that
Singer had told him "it would maintain a substantial operation in
Clydebank". In contrast, the new Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Mr. George Younger, adopted an attitude of "don't cry 
over spilt milk" and urged the workers "to do everything they 
could to bring a new industrial concern to Clydebank".
The factory finally closed in late June 1980
10.9.;; The Oompauv and Union Vie*
The author received a reply from the UK Secretary to the Finance 
Director and Company Secretary explaining that the sole senior 
Manager with "first hand knowledge" of the Clydebank closure had 
left the Company [letter of February 4, 1985, to author from Mrs. 
S. Lymposs].
The General Secretary of the AUEW, a former convener at
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Clydebank, Mr. Gavin Laird expressed his thoughts in
correspondence with the author:
Singer Sewing Machine Oo. — despite my long association 
with same and continuing efforts over many years to create 
and sustain good industrial relations, including just a few 
weeks before they announced the closure, addressing hostile 
mass meetings and convincing people to adopt flexible
working practices and other unpalatable measures to maintain 
or create viability - did not inform me beforehand of the 
closure.
Indeed, I was "summoned" frcsn a national level meeting on 
shipbuilding in Newcastle by a car provided by the Ccxapany 
to a meeting in an hotel in Glasgow where senior American 
Executives intended to announce simultaneously to the Unions 
and the public the intended closure of the plant. We were
only able to delay the announcement by two hours to allow
our Cbnvener to tell our manbers first hand rather than 
learn through the media. Taken aback is not the word for 
itl It was a disgraceful but sadly typical Singer exercise. 
You know the rest [Letter of February 10, 1986, to author
from Mr. Gavin Laird],
JgjIQ.; gpllQKq?
The design and condition of the buildings precluded the 
possibility of their being sold to a private concern, and anyway, 
other areas, such as the new towns, had more to offer than 
Clydebank. It was the Scottish Development Agency which bought 
the site at a cost of £850,000 in June 1980, the machinery which 
had not been transferred to other Singer establishments having 
been sold by public auction.
The SDA realised that virtually all the buildings on the site 
would have to be demolished and new, modern, premises that would 
attract firms erected; these in turn would provide jobs. The 
Government, aware of the town's problems and poor prospects, 
decided that Clydebank should be Scotland's 'Enterprise Zone'. 
As such the town could offer special conditions to any business 
prepared to set up in the zone, - 100 per cent de-rating for 
Industrial and Commercial Companies, and very low, or rent free 
premises are just two of the financial inducements the zone 
offers. Ironically, the Singer Company availed itself of the 'no 
rates' offer and opened an office where six engineers design 
machines for manufacture overseas.
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In retrospect, Singer Management had been completely out of touch 
with the market. They believed that low demand for domestic 
machines was due purely to the Jeans fashion amongst women, but 
their popularity was only a symptom of the real cause - women's 
liberation.
As one Singer executive concluded on his firm's decline:
"What happened Is not at all mysterious.
- We neglected product development
- We neglected manufacturing facilities
- We neglected our retail stores
It's a classic case that will be studied for a long
time to come" [Fortune, November 5, 1979].
Since Clydebank closed. Singer has finally realised that it sold 
machines in spite of, not because of, its retail outlets, and has 
continued its rationalisation of manufacturing facilities. The 
shops have been sold and tfonza is now the only plant producing 
sewing machines in Europe, Its two large US plants have also been 
closed. Virtually all sewing machine production has been 
concentrated in distant Brazil and Taiwan, By 1986 Singer had 
finally diversified successfuly and its announcement in February 
1986 was not unexpected.
It was then announced that its sewing machine division would be 
spun off as an independent, separately-quoted enterprise. The 
stock market's reaction was unequivocal: Singer's share price
showed almost an immediate gain of 20$. As the merger craze 
sweeps America, it is likely that with its celebrated brand name 
and substantial market share, the newly-formed sewing machine 
business will attract a bid from cash-rich predators [Taylor, 
February 19, 1986, p.30; Parkes, March 21, 1986, p.14].
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GRUNDIG
10.11,; Introduction
The media in the UK have a tendency to present all plant closure 
announcements as sudden, unexpected "shocks’*. It can be seen from 
the case studies presented in this thesis that many foreign-owned 
plant closures could have been, and indeed were, anticipated by 
employees.
In a few cases, however, employees were genuinely stunned to hear 
of their plant’s closure and it is to one such example that we 
now direct our attention.
At 2.30 pm. on June 30, 1980, the 1,000 strong workforce at the
Grundig Dunmurry plant, near Belfast, was first informed that all 
production would cease at the site on October 10, 1980.
The factory had returned profits from it opened in I960 until 
1978 and 1979 when losses of approximately £0.5m and £1m were 
reported.
Dunmurry’s past performance record was good, no major 
redundancies had occurred and labour relations were satisfactory. 
Closure therefore could hardly have been expected by the shop- 
floor workers.
What makes the Dunmurry case unique is that Management at the 
Plant was equally taken aback. It had not recommended closure, 
nor had it made any contribution to the divestment decision. It 
had not been involved in preparing the time-table for 
implementing the divestment decision. It had not even been given 
advance warning that the Parent Company would be making an 
announcement pertaining to Dunmurry’s future.
No, incredible as it may seem. Management at the Ulster plant was 
informed of the German Board’s decision just one hour before 
shop-floor workers, and like them, was completely taken aback.
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Although both Management and shop-floor workers had realised that 
rival producers from the Far East now dominated the market, 
Dunmurry’s future did not seem to be in jeopardy.
The author spoke to a former Senior Manager at Dunmurry, and to 
the chief Union official. Neither was aware of the OECD’s 
Guidelines or "Vredeling". The Manager was confident that Grundig 
had conformed with UK legislation.
Where firms have agreed to participate in this study, the views 
of both Company and Union have been presented and in most cases 
the Company has defended its divestment strategy, while the Union 
officials involved have criticised Management for presenting them 
with a "fait accompli". In the case of Grundig, Dunmurry, the 
version of events as described by one side agreed with the other 
side’s version.
10.12;; Background
The opening of a small radio shop in the town of Furth, near 
Nuremburg, Germany, in 1927, probably aroused little excitement. 
Today its proprietor is a household name, for from these humble 
origins Max Grundig created a business empire which was renowned 
for its high quality television and video equipment, its hi-fi 
units, and dictation machines. The Company derives the majority 
of its income from television and video recorder sales.
In i960 Grundig opened its first foreign establishment. It was 
located in Northern Ireland at Dunmurry, on the outskirts of 
Belfast. The plant produced radio-recorders and stereo 
equipment.
Dunmurry produced high quality goods, but its high labour costs 
were reflected in the retail price. Rival producers from the Far 
East with lower labour costs, thus had a cost-competitive 
advantage.
According to the Triah Times newspaper, a major expansion had
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been planned in the early 1970s, but the idea was abandoned 
following the kidnapping and killing in 1974 of the Company's 
Managing Director in Ulster, Mr Thomas Niedermayer. This may have 
been a contributing factor, but the growing number of imports 
from the Far East was the telling influence; Japanese 
manufacturers of hi-fi equipment had become household names and 
their share of the market increased dramatically [Irish Times. 
July 1, 19 80]
Until 1975, Grundig International (ie. Grundig's UK subsidiary) 
operated under franchise in the UK, but in that year it was 
bought over by Max Grundig, and it became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Grundig, the German MNC.
In 1979, Grundig was reported to have negotiated with the 
Department of Commerce for loans and cash for investment. In 
January 1980, the Company terminated these discussions and 
withdrew its application for funds [Irish Times. July 1, 1980]. A 
Company spokesman has flatly denied this; no approach was made to 
the Department of Commerce for funds, other than for the 
Development Grants which all firms in the Province are entitled 
to claim. He denies that Grundig had a cash-flow problem.
Like many of the firms examined in this thesis, Grundig operated 
in a highly competitive market and this competition was the 
problem, not shortage of liquid capital.
In March, 1979, there was an industrial dispute involving 68 
electricians who were aggrieved at not receiving a special £1.2 8 
allowance paid to other workers. Their subsequent work-to-rule 
led to a Company threat to close Dunmurry and transfer production 
to Germany where (as in France) a rationalisation of production 
facilities had begun in January of the same year resulting in a 
cut of 5,000 in the combined work force over the ensuing eighteen 
months, it was an exceptional incident at Dunmurry and the 
dispute was quickly settled, but within a little over a year the 
shock announcement was made.
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10.11.: The Closure Announcement
On June 30, 1980, Dr. Dierolf, Director of Personnel at
Headquarters in Germany, arrived in Belfast to meet an anxious 
local Management team who were anticipating "considerable 
redundancies", but certainly not closure.
In retrospect, their gloomy predictions can be seen to have erred 
on the side of optimism. For, Dr. Dierolf informed them that the 
decision to close Dunmurry had been taken, and that the plant 
would close on October 10, 1980. All 1 ,000 jobs would be lost. 
Even those occupying the most senior management positions at the 
Ulster factory were stunned by the news.
Local Management informed. Dr. Dierolf then relayed the grim news 
to the shop floor workers. Within the space of one hour, local 
Management and ordinary workers alike, heard for the first time 
that the German Parent Company had decided to terminate the 
Dunmurry operation.
This decision received a frosty reception from local Management. 
At the time, they resented being totally excluded from the 
handling of the closure announcement. It would appear that their 
reaction has since mellowed, and one manager now agrees that the 
Parent Company’s chosen course of action "was the only way to do 
it".
His opinion is that early disclosure of the Company’s decision, 
could have led to production being disrupted through some form of 
industrial action - perhaps, the workers would even have occupied 
the factory. Grundig’s shock announcement, and its insistance 
that production continue as normal throughout the 90 days 
notification of redundancy period, led some employees to believe 
that Grundig was merely trying to frighten the workforce into 
increasing productivity. It seemed inconceivable to a large 
number of workers that Grundig would close the fairly modern 
plant which represented a significant capital investment.
The decision to close Dunmurry was based on the Ulster plant’s
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failure to produce goods capable of competing on a cost basis 
with rival producers. A gradual run-down of the plant was out of 
the question, he explains, because it would have necessitated 
operating at a sub—optimal level, thereby increasing production 
costs. As it was, Dunmurry’s best was not viable.
It was for these reasons that the Parent Company presented both 
Plant Management and workforce with the minimum legal notice. It 
was equally adamant that full production be maintained until 
October 10, 1980, when the factory’s gates were finally closed.
Union Attempts to Reverse the Deoiaion
Between July and October 1980, local Management met Union 
officials to negotiate terms of redundancy. The divestment 
decision was clearly final and local Management had no authority 
to reverse it.
Accordingly, in late August, Regional Secretary of the EEPTU, 
and the senior negotiator Mr. Colin Lowry, flew to Germany to 
meet Company Director, Dr. Richter, and Max Grundig himself. Mr. 
Lowry argued that the Ulster plant was more efficient than those 
in Germany and Portugal. However, once he realised that the 
Company was under pressure to keep the domestic plant open, he 
tried to persuade the Directors to close the Portuguese plant 
instead [so much for the ideal of international solidarity among 
Trade Unions]. Prior to this meeting. Union leaders still had 
some hope of persuading the Board to reverse its decision; they 
now realised that closure was inevitable.
The Parent Company blamed closure on competition from low-labour 
cost countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. It 
was impossible to produce audio equipment in Europe and remain 
viable while contending with this kind of competition. Closure 
could only have been avoided by substantial price increases, but 
the market would not have tolerated such a move without a further 
decline in market share. The German Parent argued that closure of 
Dunmurry which had high production costs and had reported a loss 
since 1978, could not be postponed any longer.
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Dunmurry closed on October 10, 198O - 101 days after its shock 
announcement of June 30, 1980.
10,15.; Epilogue
In 1984 the German Federal Cartel Office, which five years 
earlier had prevented Philips from increasing its 24.5$ stake in 
Grundig, allowed the Dutch giant to take control on April 1. The 
baby of the then 76 year old Max Grundig, which at its peak had
40,000 employees, had seen the labour force cut to 28,900 as it 
battled in the intensely competitive electronics market. The only 
condition was that both firms dispose of some divisions or stakes 
in other concerns. The German FCO’s decision was indicative of 
the conversion of policy makers throughout Europe to the "big is 
beautiful" concept, and their recognition that a pan-European 
solution is necessary to arrest Europe’s decline.
However, sometimes the distinction between European and national 
interests is blurred. In such cases, policy makers are likely to 
block a merger which they suspect is designed primarily to boost 
a "national champion". Thus, in 1983, the FCO blocked the 
takeover bid by state-owned Thomson-Brandt, France’s largest 
electronics concern, for Grundig, Germany’s largest. The FCO was 
clearly concerned that national considerations would feature in 
Thomson’s decisions, and thus promote the interests of France at 
the expense of Germany.
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HOOVER
10.16 Origins and Internationalisation
The Hoover family’s first business venture was founded in North 
Canton, (then known as Berlin), Ohio, in the late nineteenth 
century. As producers of accessories for horse-drawn carriages, 
future prosperity was endangered by the burgeoning automobile 
industry. Successful diversification was a priority and in I908 
William H. Hoover formed The Electric Suction Sweeper Company. 
In 1922 it was renamed The Hoover Company. "The Boss", as he 
preferred to be called, had foreseen the market potential of a 
practical vacuum-cleaner and his assessment proved correct. 
Business boomed.
International production began in 1911 with the opening of a 
manufacturing facility at Ontario, Canada. After the war the 
plant exported to the UK where Hoover Limited had been registered 
and a sales office established in 1919»
By the 1930s the Company had an unchallenged brand image in 
Britain - where people already spoke of "Hoovering" their 
carpets; sales soared. The Canadian plant’s capacity was being 
stretched beyond its limits, and it was decided to establish a 
factory in the UK. Production commenced at Perivale, London, in 
1932, and five years later a flotation was made of the UK 
subsidiary’s shares on the London Stock Exchange. Hoover Limited 
became a public company.
After the Second World War the market for domestic appliances 
flourished, and further plants were opened in the UK, at 
Cambuslang, near Glasgow, in 1946, and at Merthyr Tydfill, Wales 
in 1948. Hoover PLC, the UK subsidiary, in turn has wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in Austria, Portugal, Australia, South Africa, and 
in the Scandinavian countries. It also has a 50 per cent share in 
Hoover (Holland) BY., a holding company for operating units in 
Holland, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. These 
plants were established to meet buoyant demand for the Company’s
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highly popular products.
Hoover’s success, like that of Singer, had been due to an 
individual with foresight improving the design of a crude 
product, and then skillfully marketing the refined version. 
Similarities with the sewing machine producer do not end there.
As with Singer, Management has been strongly criticised, and the 
diversification policy of Herbert Hoover and his successor, Felix 
Mansager, was a failure, A small appliance manufacturer had been 
taken over during the 1960’s acquisition boom by US MNCs, but it 
was subsequently divested in 1977, just after Singer had 
completed divestment of money-losing ventures. This move had 
followed a sharp deterioration in the Parent Company’s net Income 
which plummeted from a peak of over $33m in 1973 to under $9m in 
1974. Despite a mild recovery the following year, net income 
dropped to $6.8m in 1976. (see Table 10.2.)
The decline in the Company’s fortunes led to changes in top 
management. Mr. Merle Rawson was appointed Chief Executive 
Officer in place of Mr. Mansager who retired when profits slumped 
in 1974.
Table 10.2.: Performance Data on The Hoover Company
Year
Sales
($000)
Assets
($000)
Net income 
($000)
Employees
1983* 666,847 338,587 28,006 n.a.
1982* 662,549 372,377 3,953 n.a.
1981* 749,919 449,721 (18,778) n.a.
1980 830,465 532,367 30,048 20,081
1979 754,324 491,091 39,263 21,523
1978 691,817 474,350 24,648 22,587
1977 590,740 425,981 23,462 23,370
1976 571,913 391,248 6,838 22,886
1975 593,747 391,489 11,903 23,713
1974 502,731 384,617 8,711 27,452
1973 534,655 399,076 33,035 27,947
1972 458,415 346,123 29,514 25,499
1971 402,2 82 309,094 21,673 22,578
1970 346,6 86 275,522 17,860 22,602
Source: * Company accounts
Hood and Young [19 82, p. 98]
After the mid-1970’s, the market for floor-care and laundry
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equipment became increasingly competitive, and served to 
highlight Hoover’s failure to diversify successfully into growing 
market areas. The Company’s major rival, the Swedish MNC, 
Electrolux, benefited from having diversified successfully into 
lawnmowers. To the consternation of investment analysts and 
employees. Hoover continued to rely on two products. It was to 
their relief that in recent years Rawson successfully led Hoover 
into the growing market for home security products.
Under Rawson’s guidance. Hoover has overcome tough opposition in 
the US market from other US cleaner manufacturers, and 
Electrolux. It was not so successful in overseas markets which 
accounted for 70$ of sales, including the UK market where one 
third of total sales were made. Hoover PLC and its subsidiaries 
served markets which had been swamped by cheap imports from the 
"Iron Curtain" countries. As unit sales fell, the Company’s three 
UK plants cut back on production, and operating below capacity, 
demanded significant reduction in the number employed. Failure 
to respond earlier to changing market conditions had taken its 
toll, especially on the UK subsidiary. Hoover PLC.
10.17.: Hoover PLC
UK sales alone account for well over a third of total sales of 
The Hoover Company, and exports from the UK plants account for a 
considerable percentage of other foreign sales. Dependence on the 
UK subsidiary is illustrated by the fact that, at a peak in 1978, 
UK. employees accounted for 60$ of total employment. The fortunes 
of Hoover were therefore highly dependent on the UK subsidiary.
Table 10.3.: Vacuum Cleaners - UK Market Share
Company 1976 1978 1980
Hoover 49$ 50$ 40$
Electrolux 31$ 32$ 32$
Gobiin 5$ 9$ 9$
Moulinex 2$ 6$
Others 13$ 9$ 13$
Total 100$ 100$ 100$
Source: Crisp, February 26, 1982, p.l8.
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Despite a strong brand image, Hoover saw its share of the UK 
vacuum-cleaner market fall from 50$ to 40$ between I978 and 198I 
(see Table 10.3.) whilst the French firm, Moulinex, increased its 
market share by a vigorous sales promotion. Hoover was more 
concerned, however, by an influx of Eastern European machines.
Profits fell by almost 50$ between 1972 and 1977 despite the 
fact that during the same period turnover increased from £98m to 
£191m (see Table 10.4.). Whereas previously profits were about 
20$ of sales revenue, by 1978 that figure had fallen to 3$; and 
Return on Investment (ROI) had fallen from 35$ to 7$. Added to 
this, the Company had a cash-flow problem. The Group Balance 
Sheet had shown over £22m in liquid funds at the beginning of 
1977, but by 1980 it showed net borrowings of £15m.
All of these problems came to a head and a post-tax loss of 
£4.1m was reported for 1980 - the first since becoming a public 
company in 1937. In an effort to restore profitability, 900 
workers were made redundant, 400 at Cambuslang, 300 at Merthyr 
Tydfil, and 200 at Perivale. Critics blamed the UK subsidiary's 
low productivity, poor labour relations, weak marketing, low 
investment, and unresponsive management. Remedial action was 
required [Perman, March 5, 1981, p.6].
Table 10.4,:^  Performance Data on Hoover's UK Subsidiary 
- Hoover PLC
Year 
ended 
Dec. 31
Sales
(£m)
Net profit 
before tax 
(£m)
average number 
of UK employees 
(000)
1981 201.1 (31.8) 9.8*
1980 206.7 (2.7) 10.2*
1979 203.7 1.9 11.8
1978 212.1 5.3 13.5
1977 191.0 12.2 13.5
1976 180.0 17.0 13.3
1975 162.9 20.7 14.2
1974 113.8 4.2 15.8
1973 121.0 24.0 14.9
1972 98.4 19.5 13.1
• At year end 1980, UK employment was 10,224. By year end 1981, 
the figure had fallen to 6,854.
Source: Hood and Young [1982, p.99l, and Company accounts.
3 0 8
Even more ominous for UK employees was the revelation that the US 
Board had decided to reduce the strategic importance of British 
operations :
•We expect 1981 to be a difficult year, especially in the 
first half, as we continue to restructure the United Kingdom 
manufacturing operations. This action will incur one-time 
costs, but will help increase productivity and reduce 
ongoing costs" [The Hoover Company, 1980 Annual Renortl.
When Hoover PLC, the UK subsidiary issued its "Report for the Six 
Months Ended 30 June, 1981", a trading loss of £6.1 m was revealed 
against a £2.5m profit in the comparable period of I98O. During 
the same period of 1979 and 1978, a trading profit of £636,000 
and £2.9m respectively had been returned. The Parent therefore 
exerted pressure for a reduction in costs and a return to 
profitability before the end of 1981. In the UK 6,000 jobs had 
been lost since 1975 and it was believed that more would be 
announced by the subsidiary's new Managing Director, Mr. Peter 
Goode who had replaced Mr. Gwynne Lloyd in mid-August I98I when 
the latter resigned [Balfour, August 16, 1981].
Some journalists and employees believed that Mr. Goode would 
close Cambuslang in order to reduce from 9,000 to 7,000 the UK 
labour force [Balfour, August 16, 1981; Hetherington, September 
18, 1981, p.2; McBain, October 17, 1981]. The number employed at 
the Scottish facility had already been halved since the mid- 
1970s, and the plant was now operating at less than two thirds 
capacity. The media speculated that Perivale had a secure future, 
but the London factory's workforce had, for a number of years, 
expressed grave concern over job-security. In 1978 Shop Stewards 
there had approached the Company, requesting information on 
future investment plans. Hoover PLC refused to disclose this 
information and the General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied 
Trades Union (GMBATU) reported the US MNC to the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC). The Unions' complaint is briefly 
examined below.
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10,16.; gffiP-Jtepgrtg Hwyer to the Central Arbitration 
committee
On March 27, 1978, the General Municipal Workers' Union (GMWU)
complained to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that Hoover 
had failed to disclose information collated in the document 
"Financial Statement, Hoover Ltd.", and in another report "Sales 
and Cost of Sales Analysis" which focussed on products 
manufactured at Perivale.
The case was heard on August 18, 1978. The GMWU's representatives 
claimed that "it was not seeking disclosure of the contents of 
the reports but only suffisent information to enable them to 
ascertain trends in the profitability of particular product lines 
manufactured at Perivale". The information was necessary, they 
argued, for negotiating with Hoover on pay and the "future 
allocation by the company of its production and investment".
The Company, for its part, opposed disclosure on four grounds
"(i) that lack of the information sought did not impede 
union representatives in bargaining,
(ii) that disclosure would be incompatible with good 
industrial relations practise,
(Hi) that the amount of work and cost involved in providing 
the information was disproportionate to its value to
collective bargaining ,
(iv) that some of the information was commercially
sensitive, disclosure of which could damage the Company".
The Company's view was upheld by the CAC. Undaunted, the Union 
submitted another complaint the following year, on May 18, 1979» 
The Unions motivation for obtaining the information remained the 
same; the case was examined by the CAC on July 10,1979»
At this hearing. Hoover challenged the Union's assertion that 
investment and product allocation were matters for negotiation. 
It argued that consultation on these decisions was acceptable to
the firm, but negotiation implied bargaining which could alter
the original stance of either party concerned.
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10,19.; TimçtabiSLPf Evente Prlpr_t0 the Closure AnnounoAmAnt
Deconber 18, 1980: At the 37th Ordinary Meeting of the Joint
Consultative Committee, Mr. Bristow, Director, read aloud a 
statement which included the following extracts:
"Today, I propose to give you a review of the state of the 
business, how it has changed during the past four months, 
and what has been the Perivale contribution to that change.
....I must point out that the Government have recently 
announced that the short-time working support grant will be 
reduced from 75$ to 50$. We have had to factor this change 
into our current thinking.
There will be little point in taking periods of lay-off when 
we will receive only 50$ if they can be rescheduled to a 
time when 75$ is still available.
At Perivale, during the period July to November sales of our 
products exceeded production by 20,000 units, resulting in 
approximately a £0.5 million fall in finished goods 
inventories, leaving us currently just over £1 million over 
target.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that additional weeks of 
lay-off have been announced at all three plants, our net 
borrowings of £11.2 million in June have increased to in 
excess of £20 million.
The weeks of lay-offs have been reflected in our Company 
results, which showed a trading loss of £1.6 million on a 
turnover of £51.3 million in the third quarter.
Our overall performance for the first nine months 
represented a trading profit of only £862,000 on a total 
turnover of £151.7 million which is only 0.6$ of turnover.
With these sort of results, the Company still has a major 
task to get back into a profitable situation. 
........Subsequent to our last meeting, at a Joint Wages
Committee meeting on 15 October I reported that our stocks 
were not expected to reduce at the rate we had hoped and 
that we are going to increase the number of declared 
redundancies to the Department of Employment by 25$, thereby 
affording us the opportunity to maximise the amount of 
financial assistance from the Government.
We also announced that it would be necessary to extend short 
time working in 1981 by taking 5 days lay-off in January and 
5 days in February.
The current situation is as follows.
We actually made 53 Directs redundant and we also reduced by
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42 Indirects and Staff through voluntary redundancy, 
turnover or retirements".
Mr Bristow then moved on to comment on the performance of the 
Perivale factory during the latter part of 1980.
"Compared to the activity of 88.1$ in July, during the 
periods when the factory has been operating it has fallen to 
82.3$ in August, 84.9$ in September, 80.0$ in October and 
79.5$ in November. ......
Our overall performance for the first 10 months of the year 
was 103$"
March 4, 1981: The 38th Extraordinary Meeting of the JOG was held 
at Perivale. Mr Bristow started the proceedings:
"On 18 August 1980, meetings took place in all our factories 
to explain to you the difficult situation facing the 
Company, As a result of our discussions at that time, all 
factories, unfortunately, had to effect some redundancies.
The number of people made redundant were kept to the
absolute minimum  By now, you will have seen that our
programme was not totally effective.
In 1980 our turnover only increased by £3 million - less 
than 1.5$ - largely because we had to drastically cut prices 
in the increasing competitive market place to keep our 
volumes up and preserve as many jobs as we could. But our 
profit continued to plunge further down to £4.1 million. The 
first published loss in our history. It is, perhaps, even 
more serious that most of that loss was made during the last 
quarter of the year when our short-time working programmes 
were operating to attanpt to keep the Company viable.
Despite redundancies and short-time working our stocks 
continued at a high level and at the end of the year we held 
£56 million in stock. This is some £20 million above our 
requirement to operate the business normally. Because of 
this excess we had to borrow money and at the year end we 
were borrowing £13 million and we paid £2 million in 
interest throughout the year. So, although our short-time 
working was necessary, it did not go far enough to effect 
any real improvement.
We have entered 1981 with high stocks, a continuing 
recession and an increasing overdraft. Even the confidence 
of our shareholders has been shaken, not only by the first 
loss on record but also because their dividend has been 
slashed to helf the level of previous years.
Our continuation of short-time working in January and 
February has helped, but as with last year it is not enough 
to keep the Company viable and guarantee any real 
improvement in our situation.
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There is no sign that the recession in the United Kingdom is 
abating and the high value of our currency makes it almost 
impossible to increase exports of our products to other 
countries where inflation is lower. Meanwhile, our stocks 
will continue to increase our borrowings and pay higher 
interest charges. Unless we take concerted action now, 
Hoover Limited will be heading for a further loss in 1981. 
This business cannot survive if we continue to lose money.
Meetings are taking place throughout the Company today to 
tell our employees of the crisis we are facing and of the 
Company’s determination to effect a major improvement in the 
situation. The proposals we are announcing are designed to 
achieve a return to profitability during this year.
In Merthyr we are proposing a redundancy of around 300
people and a continued programme of short.-time working.
In Perivale we are proposing a redundancy of around 200
people and a continued programme of short-time working.
In Cambuslang we are proposing a redundancy of around 400 
people and a continued programme of short-time working.
In the Head Office of the Company at Perivale we will be
reviewing all jobs during this month with a view to
eliminating unnecessary work".
On completion of his general statement on the UK subsidiary, Mr. 
Bristow informed the JCC of Perivale’s performance. He told them 
that sales of the factory’s products were "disappointingly low" 
and that stock levels had not been reduced to the desired level. 
His statement then read as follows:
"Unless we take some further corrective action, these stocks 
will continue to rise. We are therefore faced with two 
options:
1. To declare further redundancies now.
2. To continue with short-time working and extend our 
present application by a further 90 days.
But the situation at Perivale is further affected by two 
other factors:
1. In July we will close out the Diecast Foundry and
COTnplete the transfer of the MC01 Motor to Cambuslang.
Also in July, the additional work gained from export 
orders for the Model 4014 Senior will have been
completed.
Unfortunately we do not envisage having any alternative 
work to offer employees affected by these changes,and 
therefore a declaration of redundancies which will be
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effective in July is unavoidable.
2. During the past 5 years the output levels from the 
Perivale factory have approximately halved, and during 
these five years, although we have refrained from 
replacing Indirects and Staff wherever possible, the 
total reduction in manning levels has not in any way 
matched the substantial reductions in output.
This has had a very serious impact on our manufacturing 
costs and has been a contributory factor to the OcxDpany's 
poor performance in 1980.
If the Perivale manufacturing operation is to remain a 
viable unit, it is now essential steps are taken to reduce 
our manufactured costs through lower Indirect and Staff 
manning levels.
Therefore, our proposals for Perivale are designed to 
achieve both the objectives of reducing finished stocks and 
manufacturing inventories, and to reduce operating costs.
We are therefore proposing a ccxnbination of both extended 
short-time working and redundancies.
This will be achieved by the following proposals.
I. Production schedules have been set to absorb all 
existing production labour on the assumption that an 
additional 3.6 weeks of short-time working will take 
place in March, April, May, and June.
II. The 99 production manual Directs and Indirect workers 
surplus in July will be made redundant. They 
oooq>rise: Ranger Cleaners 41, MC01 Motors 38, Diecast 
Foundry 18, plus 2 affected by other schedule 
adjustments.
The selection and nomination of employees to the 
total of 99 to be the subject of detailed discussions 
later.
III. To reduce manufacturing costs, the following (i.e.
the above) actions are necessary for immediate 
implementation".
March 5, 1981: The day after the Company had issued the above
statements, Management met the Joint Wages Committee (Combined) 
st 10.30 am in Perivale’s Personnel Conference Room to discuss 
the "Redundancy and Short-Time Working Programme".
Mr. Cope, an employee representative at the meeting (and 
currently a full-time official with the GMBATU) was higly 
critical of the Company’s proposals. According to the Minutes, he
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argued that they "simply aggravated the situation whereby fewer 
manual workers were expected to shoulder the burden of a 
disproportionate number of administrators". Indeed the number of 
workers involved in the production process had been 
disproportionately reduced. For example, between the January of 
1975 and 1981, the number of manual Direct workers had been 
reduced by 44.5$, from 1,283 to 712, whereas the number of manual 
Indirects was cut by only 19$, from 609 to 494. He believed that 
they were "a forerunner of things to come".
Mr. Clarke, the Factory Convener, criticised the Company for 
failing to invest in "people or plant in order to develop 
products or plant". He called on the Company to manufacture home 
protection equipment at one of its three UK plants. He argued 
that it had a moral obligation to maintain the Perivale factory.
Mr. Bristow replied that Hoover "had gone a long way to do just 
that". He assured the JWC (Combined) that the London factory had 
a "significant range of new products on the drawing board".
April 23, 1981: The Company retracted its short-time working
proposal when Management and Employees Represenatives met at 9.30 
am. in the factory’s Personnel Conference Room. Mr. Bristow 
explained to the JCC that Perivale had obtained approval to 
produce 60,000 special Junior Hard Bags, and that consequently, 
short-time working would end .
Mr Bill Clarke, the Factory Convener, commented that the 
information given at the last meeting of the JCC had demonstrated 
that the Soft Bag Cleaner was selling well, whereas the Company 
was having difficulty selling the Hard Bag. According to the 
Minutes of the meeting, he concluded that "it was therefore 
difficult to understand the current emphasis within the marketing 
strategy on the Hard Bag Cleaner".
Mr. Bristow replied that it was "the Company’s intention to have 
greater price flexibility and it was hoped that this, together 
with a special Summer offer of free tools, would considerably 
improve sales performance".
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As regards the Company’s decision to return to full production, 
Mr. Cope claimed to be somewhat confused as this contradicted the 
Company's earlier statements. He explained his predicament;
"On two previous occasions the Trade Unions had been 
informed that the decision to introduce periods of short- 
time working had been taken in order to avoid or reduce the 
requirement for redundancy . What the Company was now saying 
was that it intended to discontinue short-time working and 
replace it with redundancy".
Mr. Bristow also estimated future production trends;
" there is a possibility we will have to consider
short-time working during the second half of the year, but 
we believe ,at this time , that decision should be delayed 
until we have seen the effects of the marketing campaigns on 
our Upri^t cleaners during the second quarter".
It was also revealed that a firm of Management Consultants, A. T. 
Kearney, had been recruited to investigate the firms operations, 
particularly the floorcare sector of the business.
August 25, I98I: Mr. Peter Budd, Hoover’s Associate Director in
charge of Personnel, met the Perivale shop stewards to review
"many of the problems facing our Company’s manufacturing
operations". He reminded them of an earlier meeting the previous 
year at which the Company informed employees of its four major 
problems:
•1. Falling sales
2. Hif^ stocks 
3- A shortage of cash 
4. Overmanning."
He gave the following explanation for the Company’s response to 
these problems, over the previous twelve months:
"These actions of redundancies and short time were right for 
the Company, without them we may not have been here today, 
but they did not go far enough".
He stated that the root cause of Hoover’s "profitability problem"
316
was overmanning and increasing wage costs.
He told Perivale stewards that,
"In general, it is apparent that we must undertake a very 
positive restructuring of our manufacturing facilities in 
all three plants. This must involve the rationalisation of 
premises and further manpower reductions ....
It is the production of our UK floorcare range which offers 
the greatest scope for rationalisation and A.T. Kearney have 
now reported on the options available to us for the 
Directors to evaluate. These options are:
1. Slim down Perivale and Cambuslang to manning and cost 
levels which bear international comparison.
2. Concentrate Floorcare manufacture at Cambuslang and close 
Perivale.
3. Concentrate Floorcare manufacture at Perivale and close 
Cambuslang.
4. Consider alternative sites irtiere Floorcare will be 
manufactured at the minimum cost to the Company".
Mr, Budd stressed that the Company had not yet decided which 
option to pursue. He also listed other measures which had been 
deemed necessary for re-structuring the UK operation. These 
included new work practices, a longer wage agreement (30 months 
instead of 12), a reduction in manning levels, no wage increases
or industrial action until the Company returns to profitability,
and the centralisation of wage negotiations.
The Company presented various tables which showed that the
Company was making a loss, that sales were down, and that high
inflation and the strong pound made it particularly difficult for 
Hoover to compete with its foreign rivals.
Mr. Budd described the loss of £6.1m for the first half of 1980 
as "unacceptable" and he stressed that this situation could not 
continue: (Table 10.4 showed the deterioration in profits since
1977)
"Let me repeat - this business cannot survive unless we make 
profits. We must start making profits row"•
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But this would not be easy, particularly as unit sales of the UK 
subsidiary’s products were in 1981 well down on previous years 
(see Table 10.5 below).
The proceedings closed with Mr. Budd informing the stewards that 
he looked forward to meeting them again to discuss their 
"considered reply".
Table 10.5.: Hoover PLC, Floorcare and Laundry Equipment
Sales (000s)
Laundry Equipment Sales
Year Home UK Exports Total
1977 544 142 686
1978 552 135 687
1979 502 107 609
1980 473 48 521
1981 Jan./June. 194 33 227
Floorcare Sales
Year Home UK Exports Total
1977 940 839 1,779
1978 964 740 1,704
1979 899 602 1,501
1980 725 403 1,128
1981 Jan./June 367 214 581
Source: Hoover PLC., Manufacturing Review. August 25, 1981.
August 27, 1981: The shop stewards at Cambuslang called on the
Company to issue a clear statement on the plant’s future and they
agreeed to meet their counterparts from Perivale to discuss
common threat of closure.
The Scottish press still believed that Perivale was "safe" 
because it was not only Hoover’s headquarters, but the only plant 
owned by the Company ; the other two were only leased, so either 
the Scottish or Welsh plant would be closed. However, one
commentator believed that Merthyr Tydfil was "unlikely to be 
closed" as it was the only UK operation producing washing 
®ashines and the Company was committed to maintaining this 
business.
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September 16, 1981: The 38th Ordinary meeting of the JCC was held 
at Perivale. The Company told the Committee that "the reductions 
in manpower announced in March have so far been achieved as 
planned". During the previous month the factory had operated at 
83.9$ capacity, compared with 75.3$ in January,97.5$ in March, 
and 92.5$ in June.
September 17,1981: The AUEW organised in Brighton a meeting of 
officials from Hoover’s three UK plants. Earlier in the month. 
Hoover had asked employees to accept a 10$ wage cut and a pay 
freeze until 1985. A coalition was formed to reply to the 
Company’s proposals. Mr Gavin Laird, then Assistant General 
Secretary of the AUEW, urged Hoover to "tell us your problems in 
detail and we will take it from there". The coalition group 
requested a copy of the consultants’ report which Hoover had 
commissioned on its UK operations, so that its recommendations 
could be considered.
September 28, 1981: Mr. Budd at an exta-ordinary meeting of the
JCC at Perivale, said that:
"No decision has been made as to the fixture of this 
factory" [Hoover Shop Stewards Minutes, September 28, 1986].
September 29, 1981: Perivale Management Staff met Mr. Budd who
gave the impression of being "deliberately provocative in order 
to prompt an unruly or abusive response to portray the Perivale 
Management staff in a bad light to justify the plan to close down 
the Perivale factory" [Hoover Staff Statement to Mr. Rawson].
The staff asked what forecasts "The Kearney Report” was based on, 
to which Mr. Budd replied:
"I don't know and if I did I wouldn't tell you" [Hoover 
Staff Statement to Mr. Rawson].
After this meeting the staff prepared a statement which was sent 
to Mr. Rawson, Chief Executive Officer of the US parent Company, 
because they believed that he was about to make "a decision on 
the future of the UK manufacturing organisation". The statement
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was prepared in the hope that it would produce a decision 
favourable to Perivale.
Another Staff Statement (undated and unaddressed, though 
apparently intended for Mr. Budd) was issued around this time. It 
included the following passage:
■The opinion of most of the people we speak to ... is that 
the Executive have already made up their mind long ago that 
they will close Perivale and all this activity, including 
the engaging of the consultants, is a not very convincing 
charade in an attempt to give the eventual announcement some 
credibility. This might be totally untrue, but you should 
perhaps spend some time considering your past record your 
attitudes and your communications with your employees that 
give rise to these strongly held beliefs, because such a 
credibility gap is not conducive to creating a strong and 
profitable Company.
Hence we are not sure if we can take your statement 'The 
decision we finally make will be significantlv influenced by 
the outcome of the discussions we have in coming weeks' at 
its face value" [Hoover Staff Statement to Mr. Rawson].
This was followed by a critical analysis of the document issued 
by the Company on August 25, 1981, entitled "Manufacturing
Review".
October 7, 1981: The Company met the JWC to discuss the 1982 Wage 
Claim. The Minutes of that meeting, signed by Mr D.L.B, Iver, 
Employee Relations Officer, reveal that National Union officials 
had requested a meeting with Directors "in order to see the 
Kearney report, to look at the Company’s future plans, and to 
reject the Company’s declared desire to interfere with wages". 
According to these minutes, Mr. Bristow said "it was clear there 
was a need for rationalisation" and it would have "a significant 
Impact on the company’s manufacturing operation, however it was 
achieved".
October 16,1981: Company/Union talks broke down after three and a 
half hours. The Unions issued a statement declaring that they 
would resist any plant closures or wage cuts "with all possible 
means" [The Times. October 17, 19 81].
Company Directors promised that the period of uncertainty would
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end within a week, as the Company would by then have decided 
which option to follow. An undertaking was given to National 
Officials that the Company would make its decision regarding 
rationalisation of manufacturing facilities by October 23. Mr. 
Goode, Managing Director of the UK subsidiary, said:
"it would be Impossible to deny the possibility of plant 
closures" [McBain, October 17, I98I].
10.20.; The Closure Announcement
October 23, Hoover announced its rationalisation plans. 
Cambuslang and Merthyr Tydfil would lose 350 and 400 jobs 
respectively. These two plants had won a reprieve, but only at 
the expense of Perivale which would close with the loss of 1,100 
jobs. The decision had been taken, it was said, under the 
direction of Head Office in Ohio.
Mr. Bristow issued a statement confirming that "the Company 
intends to comply with all its legal obligations, particularly 
those contained within Sections 99 and 100 of the Employment 
Protection Act 1975".
With the benefit of hindsight, industrial reporters saw the 
economic logic in closing Perivale whereas before the 
announcement, they had argued, by the same criterion that 
Cambuslang would be closed. It was now claimed that perhaps the 
telling factor in the decision to close Perivale was the 
attraction of raising capital by re-developing its nine-acre 
site. In addition, Cambuslang was the most modern plant and so it 
made sense to transfer production from Perivale and invest in new 
production facilities. It was also suggested that Hoover had been 
under pressure to maintain the Scottish site and avoid a further 
sharp increase in unemployment in an area notorious, even by 
Glasgow standards, for its deprivation. Besides, the Cambuslang 
factory was located in a Special Development Area and was 
therefore eligible for Government grants.
Perivale was a casualty of Hoover’s competitive weakness and 
previous unsuccessful attempts to diversify, plus external
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factors, especially high interest rates, and the strong pound. 
The upshot of this was that its market share shrank as cheaper 
imports from Italy and the Iron Curtain countries flooded the 
UK market.
1Q.21..;. CQWPaRy/.PnlC>R Meetings After the Closure Announcement
The first took place on October 28, 1981, and Mr. Gibbard, 
Divisional Organiser of the AEU, speaking on behalf of the union 
officials present, asked the Company to reverse its decision. Mr. 
Budd then called for an adjournment.
On re-assembling Mr. Budd explained the reasons for closure and 
said that "it is on this basis that we are not prepared to 
withdraw from our position. Mr. Bristow will be meeting the 
stewards next week to discuss an orderly run down of the plant".
After another adjournment, called for by Mr. Gibbard, he 
criticised the Company for not consulting the unions on the 
Kearney Report.
Two meetings took place on November 2nd and 3rd, and according to 
the Union’s Minutes, discussion was centred on the introduction 
of a 39 hour-week.
On November 4,1981, Union officials told Company Directors that 
Perivale had been the most efficient and profitable of the three 
plants, and once again they requested an opportunity to analyse 
the consultants’ report on which the closure decision was based. 
The Company refused to release a copy of the report to the 
Unions.
At the final meeting on November 12, 1981, Mr. J. Wyman, the 
chief union spokesman, told Management;
"We cannot assist in the closure. We are asking that we 
discuss the future of Perivale" [Hoover Shop Stewards’ 
Minutes, November 12, 1981].
Mr. Budd stressed that the closure of Perivale was the only
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viable option facing the Company.
10.22.; The Union's View
On November 12, 1981, union officials at Perivale had met to
discuss tactics for the meeting with Management later the same 
day. According to the Shop Stewards' Minutes this was to be the 
last Comp any/Union meeting, and the thoughts of the shop stewards 
are recorded:
1. The run-down of the factory, which was under wzgr, had to 
be halted for meaningful discussion to take place.
2. The decision was irreversible.
Mr. John Cope was a leading shop steward at the Perivale factory 
and was a participant at all Company/Union meetings. He confirmed 
reports that employees realised that Cambuslang or Perivale would 
be closed. He was very critical of the Company's continued 
refusal to disclose certain information.
According to Mr. Cope, the Company disclosed a great deal of 
information, but it was considered of little value, and in an 
effort to extract more specific information the GMWU complained 
to the CAC. Prior to the down turn in the fortunes of Hoover's UK 
operations, the GMWU believed it had been succesful in 
establishing a sophisticated disclosure of information process at 
Perivale. Once the employees* concern over job security grew, 
Hoover's reluctance to disclose its investment plans grew apace.
According to Mr. Tony Lusby, a regional official with the GMBATU, 
the trades unionists were familiar with the OECD Guidelines. Mr. 
Carl Casserini, Assistant General Secretary of the International 
Metalworkers* Federation, was informed of the situation at 
Perivale, but there seemed little purpose in referring the case 
to the UK National Contact Point. The unions had indicated to 
Hoover's management that they considered the Company's behaviour 
to be in violation of the Guidelines:
"This point was made to the Cbmpany. The answer was a 
"lemon". To pursue this point we involved our National 
Officer, Ken Baker who in turn involved Carl Casserini of
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the International Metalworkers Federation. The object was to 
secure help from our European and American colleagues. You 
will appreciate that an exercise of this magnitude would 
take some considerable time - one commodity we were short 
of. The outcome did not materialise due to events overtaking 
this initiative" [note to author from Mr. Lusby].
Mr. Lusby accuses Hoover of failing to provide adequate 
information on the grounds for closure:
"To this day we don't know the cost c<xnparisons with 
Perivale and Cambuslang" [interview with Mr. Lusby, November 
11, 1984].
He alleges that Hoover's policy was to present employees with a 
"fait accompli", and the closure decision was no exception:
"the (closure) decision was irreversible -that was normal 
Hoover practise. The unions were not involved before the 
decision was taken, and nor were they allowed to have an 
input into the argument" [interview with Mr. Lusby, November 
11, 1984].
Mr Cope affirms that employees' representatives were consulted 
only after decisions had been made and the expected outcome of 
these decisions was discussed. They were presented with a "fait 
accompli" situation until the very end, when Perivale's closure 
was announced. They never participated in the decision making 
process.
Mr. Lusby believes "there is an absolute need" for the "Richard's 
Directive", "but", he confessed "it could be a hot potatoe for 
unions" [interview with Mr.Lusby, November 11, 1984].
10.23.; The Companv's View
Unfortunately Hoover was unwilling to accept the author's 
invitations to cooperate in this study. Their explanation is not 
dissimilar to that given to the CAC when the GMWU complained that 
the Company had not provided information which had been 
requested:
"We hope you will understand that we are unwilling to enter 
Into correspondence on the matters you have raised as they 
are of commercial importance to us".
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In a telephone conversation with Mr. Budd on November 2, 1984,
the author explained that he had already recorded the views of 
some employees' representatives, and wanted to be given an 
opportunity to note the Company's position. He declined this 
offer.
In the course of conversation, the author revealed that he 
already had copies of the Minutes of many Company/Union meetings. 
Mr. Budd wanted to know which union had allowed me to inspect 
these, so that he could proceed to make a formal complaint to the 
union concerned.
10.24.; J5pllogH&
In 1983, Hoover increased its 58$ stake, and acquired total 
control of the UK subsidiary, at a cost of £19m. But then two 
years later when America was gripped by merger fever, the US 
parent was swallowed by Chicago Pacific, a former railway 
company, in a $530m deal. Although dwarfed by other deals 
concluded in 1985, Chicago Pacific's offer was considered very 
generous and the bid was uncontested.
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10.25.; CopclH3lQng
Three plant closures are examined in this case study, Grundig 
(Dunmurry), Hoover (Perivale), and Singer (Clydebank). The two US 
MNCs - Hoover and Singer - were established in Britain long 
before Grundig became a multinational company. The key factor in 
the divestment of each was the adverse business climate which the 
firms confronted. The section below reveals once again the 
appropriateness of the eclectic theory of divestment which 
encompasses condition-, motivation-, and precipitating 
circumstance-based theories.
..10>25...1 tj. Plyggtxa^ nt Tiieorz 
la); Condition-based Theorv
Singer in 1867 at Clydebank, Scotland and Hoover in 1932 at 
Perivale, England, opened their first plants in Europe when each 
was the undisputed market leader in sewing machines and vacuum 
cleaners, respectively. Their success was attributed to their 
quality products and substantial marketing skills. By the time 
these pioneering operations were closed, each Company had 
declined to a a mere shadow of its former glory. Mastery of 
business functions had been dissipated and rivals had 
mercilesssly exploited the weaknesses of the former market 
leaders and encroached upon markets previously monopolised by 
Singer and Hoover.
Looking back, events political, economic, and social were 
militating against Clydebank's survival as early as 1917 when the 
revolution in Russia lost Clydebank its major market. The 
Japanese miracle and the emancipation of women made closure 
inevitable.
None of the plants examined in this thesis had a lifespan as 
long as Clydebank's 95 years. It is not surprising therefore that 
conditions, prevailing when the original investment decision was 
made, had been totally eroded when the divestment decision was 
finalised almost a century later. In the mid-1970s the labour
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force was less than half In number the previous decade's peak. 
The history of The Singer Company and the Clydebank plant 
conforms to the Product Life Cycle model of divestment. A century 
after the Company opened its original Scottish plant, the sewing 
machine was a mature product facing negligible local demand: 
Clydebank was on its last legs.
Unlike Singer's, Hoover's post-war rivals were not in the East 
but nearer home, in the US and Western Europe. Its major European 
rival was the Swedish MNC, Electrolux, which expanded rapidly in 
a series of astute acquisitions.
The problems facing Hoover stemmed from four key factors: 
overcapacity as markets matured; poor marketing; inadequate 
investment in research, new products, and plant; structural 
changes in the retail trade. Independent dealers were undermined 
and powerful multiples took over. Large chain stores and discount 
warehouses used their not inconsiderable purhasing power to steal 
the price initiative from the makers and force further cuts in 
margins. As with Singer, by the late 1970s/early 1980s 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution techniques were 
totally different from those of half a century earlier when
Hoover opened Perivale.
Grundig was never synonymous with its product as were the two US 
MNCs - only a handful of firms have achieved this kind of name- 
fame. The comparatively small German MNC, like other Western
manufacturers, was swamped by the numerous Japanese firms which 
quickly became household names throughout the world. A concerted 
European response was necessary to hold back the Japanese
invaders, and Grundig was acquired by Dutch giant Philips, only 
after the West German Cartel Office blocked a bid by Thomson of 
France.
The Grundig plant closed within just twenty years of opening, but 
in this comparitively short period, the consumer electronics 
industry was revolutionised. Whereas, significant product 
differentiation was achieved in sewing machines simply by 
introducing pastel coloured models, success in the consumer
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electronics Industry demanded innovation, cost-competitive 
models, and skillful product placing and marketing. The Japanese 
at first merely offered cheaper copies of Western rivals, but 
then they too achieved strong brand image with new products - eg. 
Walkman, pioneered by Sony, became synonymous with personal hi-
fi.
Within its short lifespan, Dunmurry found market conditions in 
1980 totally transformed and the plant's future became 
increasingly tenuous.
(b): Motivation-Based Theory
Singer was overwhelmed with motives for closing the Clydebank 
operation. The parent Company was in tatters after decades of 
managerial ineptitude. The diversification policy had been an 
unmitigated disaster, and "core" business had been neglected. 
The Scottish manufacturing operation was a monument to these 
failures; crumbling Victorian buildings and ancient outdated 
plant precluded the demoralised workforce from achieving 
productivity levels comparable with their Japanese counterparts. 
However, even efficiency and modern equipment could not have 
saved the factory. The market for domestic machines was 
dwindling in Western Europe, and Singer began transferring 
European production to Latin America and the Far East.
Clydebank was Singer's first maior European plant to close. 
Dwindling markets eventually compelled the company to spin-off 
its entire sewing machine business and concentrate on aerospace 
technology. The basic cause of closure, therefore, was clearly 
changing conditions.
Hoover's decision to close Perivale stemmed from excess capacity 
in the UK, a problem which plunged the once highly profitable 
subsidiary into a loss-maker, and with it, the US Parent Company. 
Other producers of vacuum-cleaners in both Eastern and Western 
Europe had made serious inroads on Hoover's markets. Four 
possible solutions to the problem were considered but finally 
Management took the decision to close Perivale.
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Throughout the twentieth century, the time lag between invention 
and mass consumtion has been steadily reduced; no sooner have new 
products been launched, than the market is swamped with rival 
models which swiftly pull down prices and profit margins. 
Whereas, Singer and Hoover had established themselves as 
undisputed market leaders, and basked in this fortunate position 
for eighty and fifty years, respectively. Companies formulating 
investment decisions today realise that they shall never achieve 
such lengthy domination. It is only to be expected, therefore, 
that the lifespan of the average manufacturing operation will be 
shorter as the rate of change accelerates and that the divestment 
process will have to be considered at the time of investment.
ic); Precipitating Clrcumsatnce-based Theory
Singer decided to close Clydebank only after the appointment of 
a new Chief Executive, Mr. Flavin, who came to power with one 
over-riding objective - the disposal of "dogs". Within months of 
his appointment, he visited Clydebank on a fact-finding mission. 
Shortly afterwards he implemented major senior staff changes at 
the UK subsidiary.
In 1977 Clydebank's Managing Director, Scotsman, Mr. John 
Wotherspoon, who was committed to Singer's oldest foreign 
operation, was promoted sideways to Chairman of the UK 
Subsidiary. He was replaced by the parent company's own man, 
American, Mr. Neely who had no emotional attachment to the 
crumbling factory. Significantly, this appointment followed the 
1976 visit of newly appointed Chief Execitive Officer, Mr. Joseph 
Flavin. The appointments of Flavin and Neely broke down any 
"barriers to exit", thus precipitating divestment.
Perhaps, significantly, the Managing Director of Hoover's UK 
subsidiary resigned only two months before the Perivale closure 
announcement. His replacement, Mr. Goode, lived up to 
expectations and quickly streamlined operations. This strategy 
proved successful and the UK subsidiary was restored to 
profitability in 1983 having returned a loss of almost £32m in
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1982. In 1984 post-tax profits doubled to £11m, and in 1985 Mr. 
Goode stepped down, his mission accomplished [Dodsworth and 
Reeves, November 1, 1985, p.30].
The decision to close Dunmurry was taken by well-established 
management at the German parent, suggesting that sufficiently 
adverse conditions and strong motivations will eventually trigger 
off a divestment review by managers, regardless of any commitment 
to certain manufacturing units.
10.25.2^: The Pive^^ment Decision and Emnlovee Disclosure and 
Consultation
In the three cases examined, the divestment decisions were taken 
by parent company executives. Flavin for Singer, and Raw son for 
Hoover. In the case of Grundig, identifying the executive(s) 
proved impossible.
Hofstede and Gray's "cultural relativism" models indicate that 
America is more disposed to disclosure and the two US MNCs, 
Hoover and Singer, provided enough information for employees to 
appreciate that their plant's future was in jeopardy. Unions, 
however, have accused both firms of misleading the workforce.
ia); Singer
Mr, Neely was only months into his new job in Scotland, when on 
March 9, 1978, he warned shop stewards that Singer was 
considering closure. The Company's 1977 Annual Report issued the 
following day, also contained an ominous message concerning the 
future of the Clydebank plant, but European Division President, 
Mr. Ed Keehn assured shop stewards on March 22, that the 
Clydebank plant would not be closed. Then on April 4, they were 
told by Keehn that Flavin was coming to Britiain to discuss the 
factory's future with the Labour Government.
Following talks with Government, Flavin announced on June 22, 
1978, that the labour force would be reduced by more than half, 
from 4,800 to 2,250, and that a five-year £8m investment
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programme would be launched. All production of industrial 
machines would be terminated. The media alleged that only 
Government pressure had saved the Victorian site from total 
closure.
The proposals were unacceptable to Trade Unions and they 
persuaded Singer to give them four months to find a viable 
alternative that would protect more jobs. Shop stewards' own 
perception however was of a workforce more interested in 
redundancy payments than in continued employment.
In November 1978, the Union presented its counter-proposals, 
prepared by PA Management Consultants, which included retaining 
the Industrial Products Group and saving another 750 jobs. On 
November 27 Singer responded by agreeing to continue production 
of two industrial models, thus saving 335 jobs.
This compromise was rejected by the Shop Stewards. Plant Managing 
Director, Mr. Neely, warned that the plant's performance in the 
forthcoming fifteen months would determine its future. On 
December 8 the Company backed down once again, and offered to 
produce two additional industrial models (four in total) thus 
saving another 165 jobs, provided the Government came up with 
another £2-4m. This was to be the Company's final offer and 
employees were presented with the grim reality of the situation: 
to accept the offer would save the plant, rejection would mean 
immediate closure.
Incredibley, the workforce rejected this proposal on December 
13, yet the Company retracted its threat to close. On January 17» 
the workforce, was afforded the opportunity, and voted 2-1 in 
favour of Singer's latest proposals. Observers believed that at 
that point the plant's future was "reasonably sure". However, it 
had been political intervention which had saved Clydebank and the 
Labour Government's subsequent defeat in the 1979 General 
Election placed the Scotish plant in jeopardy.
The divestment decision had certainly been taken by early 
October 1979, but on October 8 European headquartes denied
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closure - perhaps it too had not been informed by the US parent. 
On October 12 employees were informed of the closure decision. 
After years of uncertainty, Clydebank closed eight months later 
in June 1980.
(b): Hoover
On September 2 8, 1981, only four weeks before the Perivale
closure announcement of October 23, UK Management told employees 
that no decision had been taken on the four options. Management's 
statement did nothing to dispell employees' fears. On September 
29 the workforce in a strongly worded statement alleged that 
Hoover had decided to close Perivale at least five months 
earlier, in April, and was currently conducting an elaborate 
masquerade.
The author initially viewed this claim with a degree of 
scepticism, but in the course of research saw that the charge 
could not be dismissed lightly. Why was management so fearful of 
Company-Union minutes being examined; did the Company have 
something to hide? Hoover's announcement that the closure of 
Perivale was only one of four options being considered, appears 
a noble gesture, but was it a tactical masterstroke, eliminating 
the possibility of concerted industrial action at all three UK 
factories.
Hoover divided and conquered. While national officials were 
passing motions threatening all out opposition to job losses and 
wage cuts, shop stewards at plant level in Scotland and London 
were claiming superior performance by their respective plants, 
and implicitly arguing for the closure of the other. Seven months 
after the closure announcement, manufacturing was terminated at 
Perivale.
Ic): Grnndlg
Subsidiary management of the two US MNCs participated in the 
divestment process; not so with Grundig. Local management was no 
better informed than the worker on the shop floor. Executives
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from the German parent company flew to Belfast to deliver 
personally their shock news. Management and the labour force was 
stunned by the irreversible decision. On October 10, 1980, 101
days later Dunmurry closed.
It is not surprising that frustrated European labour movements 
have clamoured for EEC legislation to outlaw such corporate 
behaviour. Paradoxically, although Germany has progressive 
legislation on employee disclosure, national culture, like that 
of France, places a premium on secrecy.
Hampered by lack of corporate fhankness, the author was unable 
to establish exactly when the closure decisions were made. He 
suggests that both US MNCs had reached a decision several months 
before employees were informed. However, although both delayed 
disclosing their decision, each firm was faced with quite 
different circumstances.
Hoover had a crucial advantage:- several UK plants, not just one. 
This situation was skillfully exploited. Hoover disclosed enough 
information to cause maximum panic at its Cambuslang and Perivale 
plants. It thus played the two workforces off against each other. 
The London plant was just as efficient as any other in the group, 
and had a good labour force exasperated by a none too impressive 
management.
Clydebank, on the other hand, bore all the marks of a plant which 
ahd known decades of neglect and mismanagement by its US parent. 
The dwindling work-force was demoralised and apathetic when the 
crunch came and it had lost the will to fight for jobs. The 
Company's plan to save the plant was only marginally different 
from the Unions', yet the workforce, as though fulfilling its 
death-wish, rejected the survival plan and treated corporate 
warnings with contempt. Nevertheless, Singer afforded the 
workforce an opportunity to reverse its previous decision.
Clydebank had not attracted sufficient investment, but during the 
Second World War, the factory, which had been the largest in the 
world at the start of the century, produced munitions, an
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activity that attracted the Luftwaffe. Ironically, the factory
suffered only minor damage from the bombing, but the German
blitzkrieg wiped out the heart of the town, destroying homes, 
schools, and churches.
The Hoover and Singer cases highlight major differences in 
Company motives for information disclosure and employee 
reactions to it. Hoover disclosed information in order to achieve 
a trouble-free closure, while Singer tryed to ensure continued 
production, if only on a reduced scale. Perivale employees 
grappled for further information in order to save jobs,
Clydebank's workforce demonstrated that they cared little whether 
their plant closed or not. Shop stewards, however, at the
Scottish plant, like their London counterparts, did everything in 
their power to prevent closure. Their effort was not backed up by 
those they represented.
Both US MNCs gave their employees more than double the legal 
minimum notice, and the closure of Clydebank and Perivale could 
hardly be described as totally unexpected. Grundig gave 101 days 
redundancy notice, eleven more than the basic minimum
requirement; the Dunmurry workforce was presented with a fait 
accompli, Grundig's conduct was unacceptable - probably more
reprehensible than that of any multinational examined in these 
industrial case studies.
Hoover's former employees at Perivale are in no doubt that they 
were victims of an elaborate deception. No evidence was found to 
refute that belief. Once again the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises played no part in the divestment 
process. Shop stewards at Hoover examined the Guidelines, but 
concluded correctly that it would serve no purpose to appeal to 
the Contact Point.
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CHAPTER 11 
THE TYRE and RUBBER IHDÜSTRT
1 %
The Tyre and Rubber Industry has traditionally been dominated by 
US and European MNCs. In recent years, however, Japanese and 
Eastern European producers have made serious in-roads into 
markets once the preserve of Western producers.
In this chapter we examine employee involvement during the plant 
closure process when the world's three largest tyre manufacturers 
closed one or more of their UK factories. In 1982, Goodyear with
a 22% share was the market leader, followed by Michelin and
Firestone with a 19$ and 10% share respectively. Comparison will 
be made between the two US firms with that of the French MNC, 
Michelin.
It has been found that those firms involved in divestment and
with no other investment in the host country, nor plans to invest
there in the foreseeable future, are particularly prone to 
minimise or avoid negotiations and discussions [BI Study, 1976]. 
Of the companies examined in this thesis. Firestone, alone, has 
ceased all production in the UK,
The tyre industry merits close study because improved employee 
disclosure and consultation practices are seen as an integral 
part of the Tyre Sector Working Party's programme for reflating 
the ailing industry. It was reported in July 1982, that 
Management members of the Tyre Sector Working Party (TSWP) 
believed that,
"all the tyre companies have established well-defined lines 
of ccxnmunication with their own workforce, that these are 
working well and that the risk arising from the involvement 
of third parties such as the SWF is disproportionate to the 
benefit to be obtained from such involvement" [letter from
I.D. Macdonald, Assistant Industry Director of the National 
Economic Development Office to J. Millar, National Secretary
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of the TGWU, dated July 4, 1982]
11.2.; The World Tyre Market
In the 1960s, Goodyear, Michelin, and Firestone opened new plants 
and set employment levels for their worldwide operations, but by 
the mid-1970s their predictions of demand in the tyre market had 
not been realised.
Contrary to Michelin»s estimates, between 1979 and 1982, European 
and North American demand for car and truck tyres (as original 
equipment and replacement) fell by 38m units from 314.7m to 
275.8m.
The result of this was that tyre manufacturers faced serious 
overcapacity. The source of the overcapacity problem can be 
attributed to the huge popularity of radiais which lasted twice 
as long as cross-ply tyres.
The radial tyre had been invented by Michelin in 1948, but failed 
to conquer the global market until about 1970. The French MNCs 
invasion of the giant US market caught domestic producers off 
guard, and Michelin strengthened its market position. US tyre 
manufacturers, quick to recognise the threat posed by their arch
European rival, launched a massive capital investment programme 
to upgrade plants and convert them to radial production. For 
example, between 1974 and 1984 Goodyear spent $3.2 billion to 
cancel out Michelin»s temporary technological advantage [Labich, 
May 28, 1984].
By the early 1980s, virtually all new cars produced in France, 
Italy, and West Germany, and all but 5% in the UK were fitted 
with radiais. Japanese car manufacturers showed the the same 
degree of preference for radiais as European manufacturers. In 
the US, radiais have not proved so successful in the market, but 
they still account for 60% of new car tyre production.
Compounding the industry's problems, motorists drove their cars a 
little less each year in the period 1978-1982. In Britain,for
336
example, the average car covered 9,710 miles in 1978, but only 
9,400 in 1982. The main reason for this was undoubtedly an 
increase in the price of petrol. The universal imposition of
speed limits also led to a reduction in sales of replacement
tyres [Marshall, April 4, 1986, p.23].
The number of tyres bought per car per year dropped sharply. 
Tyres had a longer life-span, and in the same period there was a 
decline in sales of new cars in the big "western markets" - ie. 
the US, W.Germany, France, Britain, and Italy. Between 1972 and 
1981, these markets sufferred a 5% decline in the annual number 
of new vehicle registrations.
During the 1970s, Nissan, Toyota, and Honda made great advances 
in Western car markets by increased import penetration. By 1983, 
Japan was the largest automobile manufacturer and the tyres for 
its vehicles were supplied by Japanese firms.
Table 11.1: Net Income of Firestone, Goodyear, and Michelin
(millions)
Year Firestone Goodyear Michelin
1985 $ 3 $411 $110
1984 102 411 $(256)
1983 111 306 FFr(4,l65)
1982 6 330 FFr (290)
19 81 135 368 FFr 815
1980 (106) 312 FFr 598
1979 113 202 FFr 686
1978 (148) 253 FFr 675
Source: Corporate accounts; various copies of Fortune magazine.
Consequently, Japan's three major tyre makers - Bridgestone, 
Sumitomo, and Yokohama, - have increased their share of the world 
market from next to nothing in the early 1970s to 13% by 19 82, 
and with productivity levels more than double those attained at 
the older US and UK plants. A high proportion of Japanese plants 
were originally equipped for radial production, thus, unlike 
their US rivals, they avoided the expensive transition from 
cross-ply.
In 1982, Bridgestone, for example, increased its net profit by
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21% to $72m. In the same year, Michelin lost $609m and 
Firestone's net profit fell to $6m. Goodyear's net profit fell by 
$38m on the previous year to $330m (see Table 11.1).
Both Goodyear and Michelin have fought ferociously to protect 
their market share of the world tyre market, but Firestone has 
eliminated one third of its capacity, and in 1982 it sold to 
Bridgestone a radial tyre plant in Tennessee, sparking off 
rumours that it planned to divest its tyre operations and sell 
out to Japan's number one tyre producer [Labich, May 28, 1984].
Bridgestone's decision to establish a presence in the US was 
based on the realisation that it had to have local manufacturing 
capacity in order to mount a succesful onslaught upon the US 
market. Under Firestone's ownership, the plant, deprived of 
investment and with an appalling industrial relations record, 
would have closed. During the first year under new ownership, 
output was doubled and a large capital expenditure programme was 
launched.
In the increasingly competitive market, tyre producers have been 
compelled to seek a short-term advantage either through improved 
productivity which generates further surplus capacity, or through 
technological innovations which render their products more 
durable, but in the long-term lowers demand. Whatever the option 
chosen it precipitated the need for plant closures.
Rationalization was initiated by US MNCs. Firestone and Goodrich 
closed plants in Switzerland and West Germany respectively. In 
early 1979, Uniroyal, the third largest US tyre manufacturer, 
sold its entire European operation to Continental Gummi-Werke, 
West Germany's leading producer, and Phoenix, Germany's second 
largest manufacturer, decided to withdraw from the tyre market. 
By the late 1970s, early 1980s, it was apparent that producers in 
the UK were being weighed down by excess capacity, and that 
retrenchment and restructuring was imperative [Hood and Young, 
1982].
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11.3.; The_JIL_ïyre, Market
Between 1979 and 1982 the decline in the UK market was even more 
severe than in Europe, where sales contracted by 16%, compared 
with 12% for the region as a whole, from 27m units to 22.5m 
units.
As foreign-owned firms have ceased or reduced production in the 
UK, imports have increased substantially, contributing to 
Britain's balance of payments problems for manufactured goods. In 
1975, imports accounted for one sixth of the UK market, and as 
import penetration increased, they accounted for one quarter by 
1980. By June 1984, UK imports reached a staggering 46%. Six 
countries have been identified as "main low price suppliers"- 
East Germany, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Poland, Portugal, and 
Turkey. Table 11.2 shows that imports from these Iberian and 
Comecon countries has risen at the expense of imports from other 
EEC countries.
Table 11.2: UK Replacement Tyre Imports -supplier countries
Market
Segment
1982 1984 
(Jan.- June)
1982 1984 
(Jan.- June)
Cars Trucks & Vans
EEC 71% 59% 70% 65%
Spain & Portugal 10% 13% 4% 6%
Eastern European
(incl. Yugoslavia) 11% 12% 9% 11%
Source: Tyre Sector Working Party: internal document
Faced with the above market conditions, the only consolation for 
Western tyre manufacturers is the increase in the number of cars 
on the road. Replacement tyres account for a bigger share of the 
Market than the tyres on new vehicles. In the UK, for instance, 
sales of replacement tyres account for 75% of the market.
This factor did not compensate for the other deteriorating 
conditions, and a major shake-out in the UK market was necessary. 
Between 1978 and I982 employment in the UK tyre manufacturing 
industry was cut by more than half, from about 45,000 to 22,000. 
Table II.3 shows the composition of the UK industry in 1979.
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Table 11.3: Tyre Manufacture* in the UK in 1979
Company Number of 
Plants
%of production Number of 
Employees
Michelin 5 24 11,000
Dunlop 4 23 10,749
Goodyear 4 21 7,062
Firestone 2 11 4,764
Pirelli 2 9 3,837
Avon 1 7 3,347
Uniroyal 1 5 967
Total 21 100 41,326
——— —
» Goodyear, in fact, had only two tyre manufacturing plants, 
Drumohapel and Wolverhampton. Barnsley and Dudley were retread 
plants, and Craigavon produced rubber products.
Source: "Tyres - an industry gone flat". Labour Research, July 
1979.
In 1979, the Dunlop-Pirelli merger was dissolved, and the British 
MNC closed plants at Indhinnan (Scotland), Cork (Eire), and Speke 
(England). Theoretically, these closures cut capacity by a 
quarter, but productivity gains were so sharp that in 1983 Dunlop 
could equal 1979 output levels [Seargeant, September 20, 1983].
In September 1983, Dunlop revealed that it was selling its 40% 
shareholding in Sumitomo Rubber Industries, and the bulk of its 
loss-making European tyre operations to Sumitomo, Japan's second 
largest tyre producer. Ironically, Sumitomo was founded as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Dunlop in the 1920s. This deal had 
been concluded in utmost secrecy, and Dunlop found itself berated 
by British journalists and Trades Unionists alike. The TUC 
referred Dunlop to the UK National Contact Point, accusing it of 
breaching the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
UK subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms did not escape unscathed 
either. By 1981 Firestone had terminated UK production, and the 
following year, Michelin announced the closure of its larger 
plant in Northern Ireland. We begin, though, by examining the 
divestment process and employee disclosure and consultation when 
Goodyear closed its Scottish tyre manufacturing operation in 
1979. This is followed by an examination of the closure in 1983
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of Goodyear's Craigavon plant in Ulster which manufactured rubber 
products only, not tyres.
GOODYEAR
J3rlgjpg and Internationalisation
The Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company was established in I898 in 
Akron, Ohio. It manufactured bicycle and carriage tyres, but 
during its second year, car tyres were added to the product line. 
There was no looking back, and Goodyear mushroomed, becoming one 
of the world's largest MNCs.
In 1910, Bowmanville, Canada, became the site of the Company's 
first foreign venture, and sales branches were opened in 
Australia, Argentina, and South Africa in 1915. Production of 
rubber tyres had grown so rapidly, that by 1916 Goodyear found 
it ecoonomical to acquire a plantation in Sumatra. In 1927, the 
first plant in Europe was opened in the UK, at Wolverhampton:
"This was the beginning of a European manufacturing strategr 
which was heavily based on the ÜK" [Hood and Young, 1982, 
P.137].
Just before war broke out, construction began on a plant at 
Norkopping, Sweden, but the first major plant on the Continent 
was established in 1949 in Luxembourg. The Company reinforced its 
UK presence with the opening in 1957 of a plant at Drumohapel, on 
the outskirts of Glasgow. In the 1960s, further plants were 
either acquired or built in France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and Sweden. Despite expansion on the Continent, almost half 
Goodyear's European employment and a third of its European assets 
were in 1965 still in the UK plants. In 1977, UK operations 
accounted for 45% of the company's 24,000 strong European labour 
force [Hood and Young, 1982].
Hood and Young [1982] examined in depth the corporation's 
European manufacturing strategy. They believe that by the mid- 
1970s it was obvious that Goodyear's European manufacturing base
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was burdened with excess capacity. They argue that,
it was Inevitable that If the corporation were to fulfil 
their rationalisation alms, this would have particularly 
serious Implications for the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber 
Company (Great Britain) Limited" [Hood and Young, 1982, 
p.140].
Table 11.4: Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Ltd.
Year Sales Net Profit Number of
(£000) before Tax (£000) Employees
1984 244,121 6,006 5,840
1983 231,760 873 6,302
1982 226,089 (13,656) 6,578
1981 216,476 (17,093) 7,626
1980 217,176 (717) 8,662
1979 206,318 (13,392) 8,998
1978 179,752 (21,401) 10,785
1977 187,571 (507) 11,432
1976 159,267 611 10,979
1975 131,715 92 11,212
1974 111,955 3,605 10,942
Source: Extel Statistical Services
Goodyear's UK subsidiary had been highly profitable, but 
following the 1974 oil crisis its fortunes deteriorated sharply, 
and before the end of the decade it was carrying heavy losses 
(see Table 11.4). 1978's pre-tax loss of £21.4m outweighed the
profit of £18,621 made in the seven years between 1970 and 19761 
Remedial action had severe implications for UK operations.
Between 1978 and 1984, employment was reduced from 10,785 to 
5,840, as the company closed its tyre plant and rubber products 
facility in Scotland and Ulster respectively. A number of factors 
which prompted the decision to close the former site proved 
irrelevant in the latter divestment, and vice versa, and this 
divergence in key divestment factors appears to have influenced 
Goodyear's handling of each case, in terms of employee disclosure 
and consultation. Our analysis begins by examining the Drumohapel 
closure.
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A. DRUM CHAPEL 
11.5.: The Background
Plans for the Drumohapel Factory were first announced at the
Scottish Motor Show in November, 1955, and 18 months later the
factory was in production, the first tyre coming off the 
production line on May 28, 1957. The plant produced car, truck
and tractor tyres both for motor vehicle manufacturers and the 
replacement market.
On September 26, 1957, at the official opening, the President of
Goodyear International testified to the high standard of
equipment installed at Drumohapel;
"The best I have seen in Goodyear, or Indeed in the rubber 
industry of the entire world" [quoted in Hood and Young, 
1982, p.141]
In common with other manufacturers, Goodyear in the 1960s 
forecast dramatic increases in tyre sales, and the Drumohapel 
plant was expanded. The introduction to this chapter showed that 
this optimism was mis-placed and by the mid-1970s the industry 
was well and truly flattened. Beset by excess capacity, it was 
predictable that Goodyear would trim down its operations. 
Drumohapel's productivity and labour relations record was the
worst in Europe. It was, therefore, high on the list of 
candidates for divestiture.
By early 1978, Goodyear was already meeting Scottish MPs, local 
dignatories, and senior Trades Union officials with the express 
objective of acquainting them with the problems associated with 
its Scottish plant. It also held a continual dialogue with the 
labour force.
May 1978: Three senior managers of the UK subsidiary presented
union representatives with the results for the first quarter. It 
was stressed that Drumohapel*s performance would have to be 
improved significantly or closure could follow. Management 
stressed that it was imperative the plant's ticket (ie production
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target) be met.
June 1978: Mr. Donald Dewar, currently Shadow Secretary of State
for Scotland, had just become MP for Garscadden, and the 
Drumohapel operation was within his constituency. The local 
Management, therefore, invited him to the plant to explain its 
position first hand. .
August 1978: Second quarter results showed further deterioration
and employees representatives were warned once again that better 
utilisation of manpower must be achieved.
September 1978: local factory management briefed all employees of 
Drumohapel's poor performance. Mr. Gregor McKenzie, MP, then 
Minister of State at the Scottish Office, received an updated 
review of the situation.
It became abundantly clear that the US Board was far from pleased 
with the factory's performance when the Chairman of the Board 
himself, flew in from the US to visit the Scottish Factory.
He told Mr. James Milne, then General Secretary of the Scottish 
Trades Union Congress (STUC), and senior shop stewards of the 
three unions represented at the plant that closure had already 
been recommended but that he was reluctant to act on this advice. 
It was during this meeting that he said a prerequisite for 
retaining the factory was a return to 15 shift working.
Later, in a letter to the then Provost of Clydebank, Mr. William 
Johnstone, the Chairman of the Board wrote:
"I specifically advised th^ (ie the Union officials) that 
unless we could make our Glasgow Plant viable, it would have 
to close" [Letter to Provost Johnstone, April 5» 1979]*
His visit coincided, he wrote, with the introduction of a 
programme designed to ensure Drumohapel's future:
"We produced fact sheets and sent letter to the homes of our 
employees clearly spelling out the gravity of the situation 
and the need for the sucessf ul implementation of the 
program".
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October 1978: Local Management's dialogue with Mr. Dewar was
continued. Discussions were held with Mr. R. Macdonald, Regional 
Secretary of the TGWU, Mr. H. Parker, a local official and Mr. H. 
Wyper, then understudying for the Regional Secretary position.
December 1, 1978: The Plant Manager and Production Supervisor,
updated Mr. Milne of the STUC on the plant's financial position. 
The latter was told that closure was likely unless there was an 
improvement. The plant manager telephoned the local MP, Mr. 
Dewar, to relay the content of the meeting with Mr. Milne.
Thg-*PIaB-fgr. SwrylYalü.
December 8, 1978: a number of Shop Stewards were informed of the
third quarter results and the "Survival Plan" in a broadsheet 
entitled "Requirements for Continued Operations: Scotland Plant". 
It read:
A. Factory returns to 15 Shift operations.
B. Plant standards of methods, procedures and mannl ng to be 
competitive with other Goodyear Factories.
C. Maximum Plant coverage with piecework rates fair to both 
Company and Employee with proper piece accountability.
D. Spirit of Union/Management agreement.
E. Company/ Union agreements to be abided by in full to the 
final conclusion.
F. No outside procedure restrictions or actions to be 
initiated, such as overtime bans, movement of equLinnent, 
etc..
December 11, I978: A second presentation of third quarter results 
and the "Survival Plan" was necessary "because individuals from 
the Trade Unions could not be present on the previous occasion". 
Mr. Milne, and officials from the TGWU and the AUEW, plus plant 
shop stewards were in attendance.
The Plant Manager issued the following letter to all employees at 
the Scottish Plant:
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•During our meetings in September we explained to you the 
problems facing our Plant. Since early October you are
aware of the improvement in our performance. Although this 
is encouraging there is till some considerable way to go
before we become ccnnpetitive.
In these meetings we stressed four main points to help us
become competitive these were:
- Meet our daily ticket
- Reduce all in-plant losses — waste, manpower etc.
- Reduce Absenteeism
- Resolve our disagreements by using the agreed 
procedural arrangements and not by instant action
which interrupts production.
We all know some progress has been made in these areas but 
we still have a long way to go.
A further point mentioned to all of you in September was 
that the C^pany was reviewing its idiole structure of 
operations. The announcement made today was the result of 
that review and with it you have learned the conclusions 
reached and how they affect our factory. To help you 
understand the thinking and proposals attached is a copy of 
the statement and it is also arranged for Supervision to 
answer your questions aided by a "Facts" sheet.
Tour (xxnments about our plan will be welc<ne because there 
is no doubt that continued anployment for all of us depends 
upon our collective efforts being channelled to achieve the 
targets for lAich we strive - a low cost, high quality 
product delivered on time.
We are sure that given the necessary co-operation our 
problems can be resolved with the objective that Goodyear 
will continue at Garscadden for a long time to come."
The Department of Employment was notified of 200 proposed 
redundancies, their 90 days notice to expire on March, 10, 1979.
December 12, 1978: Each and every employee was informed of the
"Plan for Survival".
December 22, 1978: The Plant Manager issued the following letter
to all employees at Drumohapel:
"The representatives of the T&GWU have informed the ccmpany 
that at a Branch meeting on December 17 the six points of 
the company* s Plan for Survival for the Goodyear Glasgow 
Factory were rejected.
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We have had several meetings with the shop stewards 
negotiating oommittee to attempt to clarify the company* s 
position. The company has also been attempting to find a 
basis for discussion that would allow the Survival Programme 
to be implemented. To date a mutually agreed programme has 
not been formulated. The management feels that the subject 
under discussion is so serious that it wishes to be sure 
that any final decision is not influenced by the feelings of 
emotion that have obviously affected all of us in the few 
days after the announcement of the programme. It is for 
this reason that discussions with the shop stewards 
negotiating committee have been continued.
It must be emphasised that the magnitude of the daily 
financial losses being sustained by the Glasgow Plant and 
absorbed by the company cannot be continued for any length 
of time. We, therefore, must be sure that everybody is 
aware that without some meaningful progress towards the 
implementation of the Survival Programme in the next several 
days it will be necessary for us to proceed with irtiatever 
course of action is necessary in the circumstances”.
g99dygar* a MarRiBgs.
Decanber 28, 1978: From Company documents it appears that the
plant Shop Stewards had told Management that the membership had 
voted against accepting the "Survival Plan". Goodyear, for its 
part, emphasised that without its implementation, "the Drumohapel 
factory would not be financially viable and could not, therefore, 
hope to exist in today's competitive markets".
A Company spokesman stressed that:
■The magnitude of the financial losses currently being 
sustained by the Drumchapel factory cannot continue”
[Company Statement issued December 2 8, 1978].
It would appear from the cartoon below, drawn by an employee, 
that closure was expected.
January 11, 1979: By this stage Goodyear anticipated rejection of 
its "Plan for Survival", and was busy weighing up the various 
factors that would come into play in the event of closure.
An official Company document dated January 11, 1979» aud
entitled, "Assumption of Closure: assumption of closure based on 
anticipated refusal of rubber workers to accept proposals that
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would make the plant financially viable" was prepared by the 
Director of Personnel, and this document, more than any other 
actually seen by the author, highlights the various factors 
considered by a firm facing a possible divestment.
It pinpointed the perceived pros and cons which Goodyear would
face in the event of closure. For example, the Clydeside's
notorious industrial relations were seen as a major plus for
Goodyear. Goodyear believed the public could well be expected to
blame closure on what it perceived as an awkward militant 
workforce. As evidence of the public's image of Glaswegian 
workers, it cited the article, "Singer Chief Repeats Ultimatum", 
published in the Financial Times the previous week.
This feature had been highly critical of the workforce at the 
Clydebank plant of the US-based sewing machine manufacturers. 
The article was reproduced in full in the report. Goodyear 
therefore believed that its employees too would be lambasted for 
refusing to accept the Company's proposals, especially in view of 
the poor recent industrial relations record at a number of 
foreign-owned plants in the Glasgow area.
On the other hand, it warned that 1979 was General Election year 
in the UK It therefore expected resistance to closure from the 
then Labour Government.
The report also focussed on the various layers of the Trades 
Unions representing the Drumchapel workforce, and concluded that 
employees' representatives at plant level tended to be the most 
politically motivated.
The summary of the Report was entitled, "most likely sequence of 
events once closure intention is announced". It is reproduced in 
full below:
"(1) Unions will want to carry on "negotiations" with the 
company to dilute the conditions.
(2) Failure to achieve above will result in the following 
course of action from the Union:
(a) acceptance of conditions
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(b) Intense industrial activity
(c) acceptance of closure
(c) is thought most likely after a period of (b)
(3) Acceptance of closure will bring pressure to improve 
redundancy terms.
(4) There would be no resistance to pay in lieu of notice 
(90 days) thus a relatively quick closure instead of 90 day 
wind down.
January 15, 1979: National and District officials of the
Transport and General Workers Union met with Management at the 
plant to discuss the Company's six-point programme for survival 
which included the rationalisation of production, involving the 
loss of 200 jobs, the re-introduction of five day, three shift 
working, and adherence to agreements between the Company and the 
Unions involved [News from Goodvear. Statement Issued: January 
16th 1979].
After the meeting a Company spokesman commented:
Very little progress, if any, was made at the meeting owing 
to the refusal of the union representatives to accept itans 
in the programme which will provide for better utilisation 
of plant. This will give the factory the only opportinity to 
cut its losses and become compétitive, in what is a very 
competitive market” [News from Goodvear. Statement Issued: 
January 16th 1979]
The Company stressed the gravity of the situation and asked the 
union officials "to report back to a full meeting of the branch 
to get a more flexible mandate from their 
members" [News from Goodvear. Statement Issued: January 16th
1979].
The spokesman warned:
"No-one should be left in any doubt of the serious nature of 
the situation. The company has repeatedly stressed that the 
financial losses currently being sustained at the 
Drumchapel factory cannot continue. Unless substantial 
progrès is made very quickly then the company will be forced 
to find some other solution to ensure its survival in the 
United Kingdom" FNews from Goodvear. Statement Issued: 
January 16th 1979].
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February 8, 1979: The Chairman and Managing Director of Goodyear
Great Britain, issued the following letter to the plant's 
employees:
•Fellow Goodyearlte
For the last nine months, we have been talking about the 
future of Goodyear Scotland and we all know the situation is 
very serious. To remain competitive, in a shrinking tyre 
market, we have to improve our performance.
We have emphasised through plant-wide presentations, letters 
and 'facts' sheets that our Scottish plant compares 
unfavourably with the rest of the UK tyre industry.....
In September last year, our Board Chairman, Charles J 
Pilliod, came to Garscadden from the USA. During his 
meetings, with management and employee represenatives, he 
emphasised that the plant's poor performance justified the 
announcement of its closure. He pointed out that our 
performance in production, quality, scrap and employee 
attendance was the worst in every aspect when ccmspared with 
the remainder of the company's European factories. He said 
the only way for us to stay competitive was to establish - 
and achieve - realistic goals which could make Garscadden 
viable. Mr. Pilliod said the imost important goal was to 
return to a fifteen-shift working systam.
Following Mr. Pilliod's visit, we announced a programme for 
our survival. During the past few weeks, all employees have 
been fully briefed on the need for the acceptance of this 
programmie, tiie main points of which are:-
1. Factory returns to 15 shift operations.
2. The ticket is produced.
3- Maximum plant utilisation with manning and piecework 
rates, fair to both employees and the campany based on 
actual production (xmpetitive with other Goodyear factories.
4. The rig^t spirit of union/managament agreement, with 
better understanding and co-operation, for example with 
overtime issues and the movement of equipment as necessary.
Since that time, in addition to a series of meetings between 
management and employee represenatives at local level, the 
company has also had discussions with national and regional 
trade uni on officers; members of parliament; the Scottish 
Trades Union Congress; Government officials and the Lord 
Provost of Glasgow. On all these occasions, the company 
expressed its concern over the future of the Garscadden 
plant and has aaphasised the need for mutual agreonent on 
the steps that now have to be taken.
... In this business climate and with its current operating
350
performance, It must be obvious to all of us that Goodyear 
Scotland cannot survive. The present situation cannot 
justify the continuation of the plant.
But In the 85 years Goodyear has been In business, the 
company has always tried to avoid plant closures. 
Management, therefore, presented your union representatives 
with a basis for agreement that will keep our factory alive 
and ensure a future for us all.
During these meetings, the (xxmpany has advised your 
representatives that to make the plant viable It has carried 
out studies to simplify production by reducing the number of 
tyre sizes, compounds and treatments.
At these discussions, your representatives expressed their 
concern about the future of the plant without radial tyre 
production.
Because we wish to explore every opportunity to make the 
Scottish plant viable, the company this week made another 
proposal.
Subject to agreement being reached on the points under 
discussion, the company would consider continuing the 
production of radial tyres at Garscadden. In turn, this 
would mean an Increase In the nmber of emq>loyees who would 
have to become redundant.
To ensure the continuation of the Scottish plant - which has 
been so much a part of our lives since 1957 - it Is vital 
that flexibility Is also shown by employees. A return to a 
fifteen-shift system Is the most Important aspect of the 
survival programme. Without this we cannot make the plant 
viable.
All employees should be fully aware of the gravity of our 
present situation. You are asked to carefully consider all 
the points that have been made so you can make the right 
decision to secure the best future for yourself, your 
families, your community and the Garscadden plant*.
Bnrolovees Vote for Closure
February I3, 1979: less than a week after this solemn warning was 
issued, employees were given the opportunity to accept in full 
the "Plan for Survival*, and prevent the closure of the factory, 
for the time being. However, at a mass meeting, held in Clydebank 
Town Hall, 500 of the 700 employees instead chose to reject the 
recommendation of their District Secretary, Mr. Parker, to accept 
the "Plan for Survival", and thereby gave Goodyear ample 
justification for closing Drumchapel.
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The Factory Convener, Mr. Eddie Duffy, said:
"We put it very strongly to the men that if they did not 
accept these proposals, however unpalatable they are, then 
the plant would be closed completely and not only their jobs 
but those of others in the factory would go. ... The Company 
have left us in no doubt that it would be closure unless the 
plan was accepted" [quoted by Baggot, February 14, 1979].
A return to 15 shift working was considered unacceptable by the 
majority present. Of this majority, most were still confident 
that the company was bluffing, whilst others refused on principle 
to accept the extra Friday night shift, as only a few years 
earlier a protracted strike, lasting eleven weeks, had achieved 
the abolition of this shift which had been highly unpopular. In 
the West of Scotland, Friday night is by tradition the "boys*- 
night-out".
The Scottish media was normally highly critical of foreign-owned 
firms closing their Scottish operations. But on this occasion, 
the workforce was held responsible, and, therefore, it was to be 
the subject of a vitriolic attack by the Industrial 
Correspondents of the various media.
February 14, 1979: The Scotsman newspaper ran a headline which
said it all:
"Clydeside tyre workers vote away their jobs".
J_n9.2 Goodyear Acts
February 20, 1979: Following the workers' rejection of its
proposals Goodyear announced the closure as it had warned it 
would. Despite repeated warnings, the workforce had refused to 
accept the Company's "Survival Plan", but, had voted instead for 
closure.
The Chairman and Managing Director of Goodyear Great Britain 
informed employees, trade unions and the appropriate Government
departments of the Company's decision to close its plant at
Garscadden. This was the Goodyear International's first plant
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closure. A press conference was held at the Excelsior Hotel at 
Glasgow Airport. He explained the situation:
"After 52 years of operation in the UK. and 22 years in 
Scotland, the decision to close the Goodyear Scottish Plant 
has not been taken lightly.
We have three plants in the UK two of which are engaged in 
tyre production and one in general rubber products. The 
current competition in the UK. market has resulted in 
increasing pressure on our UK. plants' productivity. We 
have, therefore, had to consider drastic reductions in 
manning and simultaneous initiation of productivity drives 
in these three plants.
In our English tyre plant at Wolverhampton and in our 
general rubber products plant in Northern Ireland, we have 
had good co-operation and the position in both these 
locations is slowly being corrected through joint 
management/union progress.
Our Scottish tyre plant, however, for the past five years 
has been working only 14 shifts, or 4 2/3rd days per week. 
In order for this plant to have become viable it would have 
been necessary to revert to a five-day week, similar to that 
worked in other UK. plants and on the Gbntinent.
During the last nine months every avenue of negotiations has 
been explored within the plant and at national and regional 
union levels to achieve this situation. Despite these 
efforts the workers have refused to return to the five-day 
work week system.
We have emphasised through plant-wide presentations to all 
employees, as well as through letters and company 
publications that our Scottish plant compares unfavourably, 
not only with the rest of the UK industry, but also with 
other Ckmnmon Market plants.
With output per-man-hour at less than half the average 
production of any of the other company plants in Europe, 
Goodyear tyres produced in Scotland have, for the past few 
years, been sold at substantial losses which have been 
offset by the more productive European plants.
Employees at Garscadden have refused to accept a
productivity plan calling for a resumption of a normal five- 
day week, a reduction in manning and the acceptance of
performance measures, together with an undertaking to settle
disputes within procedure. As a result, we have reluctantly 
reached the conclusion the Scottish plant can no longer 
operate as a subsidised plant within our European production 
system.
The competitiveness of today's tyre business in the UK. has 
been intensified by (xxmpetition from Common Market countries 
and from East European plants -built with Western European 
technology. In the harsh reality of this business it is
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vital we secure the Company's future position in the market. 
Because of our employees refusal to co-operate, we have no 
further option but to terminate tyre production at our 
Scottish plant.
We have, therefore, today taken the necessary steps to 
notify our employees, trade unions, the appropraite 
Government departments and the public of our decision to 
close down the Goodyear Scottish plant"
Preparations by the Company for meeting employees and holding the 
press conference were very thorough. It drafted a list of 
questions likely to be posed, and prepared answers. Some examples 
from the document. Questions .Which Mav Be Asked By Emo- 
lQyees._Or_ At The. Pre^ss,Conference On February 20th 1979, are
reprinted below:
Question
What will Goodyear do if the employees agree to all their 
requirements within the 90 day notice period given to the 
Department of Employment?
Answer
During the last nine months we have done everything possible 
to arrive at an agreement with our employees. We have 
discussed various ways the plant could remain open. In view 
of how much the production of radial tyres appeared to mean 
to our employees in Glasgow, we recently agreed to this as 
well, although we know from a cost point of view it will not 
benefit the Company. The employees have repeatedly turned 
down these suggestions and voted against our latest proposal 
last Tuesday. After nine months we cannot believe any 
purpose will be served now we have announced the closure of
the plant, for re-opening discussions which proved so
unsuccessful in the past.
Question
With shrinking business for the tyre companies in the UK,
Goodyear - like Dunlop - would have probably inevitably had 
to close one of its plants. The employees believe Garscadden 
was singled out for this treatment and that management are 
using the argument of the 15 shift to place the blame on 
employees. Is this correct?
Answer
No, this is not correct. We wanted to use Garscadden as our 
European cross-ply tyre manufacturing unit. When this became 
nn emotive point with employees, we agreed to allow radial 
tyre production to remain in Garscadden. If the plant had
become productive, we could have used the capacity.
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Question
The employees say management has changed its mind several 
times on the future of their Scottish plant and the closure 
announcement has been designed to place the blame on 
employees?
Answer
With the market conditions altering considerably during the 
past year, we have certainly had to make several different 
proposals to our employees. It is the rejection of these 
proposals by the rubber workers that has caused us to 
announce the closing of the plant.
Question
If employees had agreed to the 15 shift system would the 
closure have been averted?
Aflgygr
It certainly could. There were other considerations but this 
seemed to be the main area of difference.
iUIO.: "Who*3 Sorry Wow?
If Management was bluffing, it was certainly doing so in a most 
convincing manner. But, of course, it was not wasting time and 
resources on theatricals.
At last, it finally dawned on the workforce that Goodyear had not 
been bluffing. Another mass meeting was hastily reconvened for 
February 25, 1979, at La Scala cinema in Clydebank. It was clear
that the employees regretted their act of folly, committed the 
previous week.
February 21, 1979: the Department of Employment received notice
of Closure and so the 90 days notice period was due to expire of 
May 21, 1979.
February 22, 1979: A Company official based at Drumchapel
prepared a hand-written brief for senior management at the UK 
headquarters in Wolverhampton. He realised that the original 
decision of the workers would be reversed, and his report 
presented his superiors with the ammunition they needed to 
justify proceeding with closure. It reads:
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"Indications are that at this meeting opposition to the 15th 
shift working will disappear and indeed there nay be 
ovendielming acceptance of the 15th shift".
He added that whilst the press had been favourable so far to the
company it may change "The Industrial Suicide" headline for the 
"Management Murder" headline when there is no Company response to 
acceptance of the 15th shift by the Union".
He therefore advised that Goodyear,
"should have a position which reflects its complete 
scepticism about the Unions ability to 'deliver the goods' 
at the end of the day, particularly in the area of 
performance on a continuing basis".
His six reasons for scepticism on the Company's part included a
twelve month overtime ban by rubber workers in 1977/1978 a
similar ban for six months by engineering workers in 1978, 
failure to meet its ticket, and high absenteeism.
Between January and October 1978, production was more than a 
third below its ticket, and between October and February there 
was an improvement but production still fell 13% below the 
required volume.
Absenteeism, over the thirteen months preceding February, 1979, 
for the entire labour force was 7.2%, and this figure disguises a 
more serious problem. The figure for rubber workers (ie the 
production side) was 10.8% and for the 6 months preceding 
February, 1979, the figure for Supervisors was 11.7%.
February 25, 1979: as everyone at the time had predicted, the
workforce reversed its original decision, and the "Survival Plan" 
won overwhelming acceptance. M.Ps. and local politicians rallied 
together, exhorting Goodyear to reconsider its decision. The 
patience of the US MNC had been sorely tried, however. It had 
plainly had enough. The President of Goodyear International 
issued the following statement:
"The decision is final.... this Scottish Plant is rated at 
the bottom of the totem poll in just about every respect. I
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an not apportioning blame, but we have failed either as a 
company, managers, shop floor or union" [Glasgow Herald. 
March 20, 1979]
Drumchapel, one of the largest housing estates in Europe, was the 
post-war planners* dream, but it has proved a nightmare for its 
residents. It is an area where unemployment was, and still
remains, high above the national average. In 1984, male
unemployment exceeded 60%. The action of the Drumchapel factory 
workers from locations throughout Strathclyde, seems even more 
incredible today, in 1985, than it did, in 1979, to the writer of 
the following Glasgow Herald editorial:
"The Drumchapel plant's industrial record is appalling in
absenteeism and productivity alike ... The STUC mi^t take
its nominal socialism a bit more seriously and start telling 
Scottish workers to change the way in which they see the 
world and their work. Unless they do so our problems cannot
begin to be solved" F Glasgow Herald. March 8, 1979, quoted
in Hood and Young, 1982].
11-.-11..: The Oompanv's View
The author met with Mr. Charles Corfield, Director of Personnel 
for Goodyear's UK subsidiary, in December 1984 and April 1985 
to discuss the Drumchapel closure. It was closed, he said, 
because of its high costs and poor performance. Craigavon had a 
satisfactory production and industrial relations record.
XI f11.1.: The Divestment Decision
Mr. Corfield explained, that Drumchapel was opened in 1957 by the 
then Chairman of Goodyear (Great Britain) who by 1979 had risen
to become Chairman of the Board, the top man, in charge of all
Goodyear's operations.
The parent company's Chairman, therefore, had a certain empathy 
to the Drumchapel plant, and, according to Mr. Corfield, he was 
particularly anxious that UK subsidiary Management ensure that 
everyone - (employees, the media, the community, and the 
Politicians) — was aware of the consequences of rejecting the 
Company's proposals. "UK subsidiary Management appreciated that
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the parent company was particularly anxious that Goodyear (Great 
Britain) adhered to the Company's general policy of frankness in 
employee relations. Management therefore did everything possible 
to ensure that the Drumchapel workforce was fully aware of the 
problems facing the Company and what the situation demanded of 
them".
Mr. Corfield agrees with the literature on the divestment 
decision, that sentiment plays "a vital part in business 
decisions". Anyone who thinks that it does not, is, he suggests, 
rather "naive". Indeed, he suggests that Drumchapel "would have 
been closed earlier if sentiment had not played a part".
Production costs at Drumchapel exceeded the retail price. The 
Company could not withstand increasing the latter, so if 
Drumchapel was to become a viable operation, its costs had to be 
reduced. The first step in the cost-reduction programme was to be 
the resumption of 15 shifts, as Drumchapel worked only 14. Mr. 
Corfield explained that the Company would have demanded further
productivity gains from employees, in order to make the plant
viable. The Unions, he explained, thought the Company was 
bluffing, when it threatened to close the plant if they refused 
to accept its six proposals. When the workforce rescinded its 
original decision, and finally agreed to accept the proposals,
"it was too late, it had gone too far down the road".
According to him, production would have continued at Drumchapel 
if the workforce had accepted .all six of the Company's proposals. 
That is not to say, however, that the plant would still be open 
today, as it would be subject, like all plants, to a regular 
performance evaluation.
H , 11.?.; Emnlovee Disclosure and Consultation 
He commented:
"Because of the reason for closing Scotland (ie. Druntiiapel) 
we wanted everyone to realise irtiat was happening".
He believes, "we have an obligation to keep employees fully
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Informed of the Company's performance". When asked if this 
statement applied to Goodyear's world-wide operations, Mr. 
Corfield said it applied to Goodyear Great Bitain.
He argues that if a Company fails to keep employees abreast of 
developments in the business, "and then out of the blue comes 
closure, that's not fair".
H A  Conduct, and Current and Proposed Legislation
The OECD's "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" do not 
constitute terms of reference for senior UK. management. Mr. 
Corfield explained: "The Guidelines at the moment are something
we are aware of and we believe that what we do fits in with them. 
We believe that what we are doing is right - employee 
participation is a must in what we are trying to achieve in the 
business world".
Mr. Corfield asserts that Trades Union representatives at both 
Drumchapel and Craigavon were consulted "at the earliest 
opportunity". He believes that in both cases the Company met the 
obligations imposed by the Employment Protection Act 1975.
He opposes both the "Vredeling/Richards" and the Fifth Directive 
Proposals. As politicians strive to score points over their 
rivals, industrial relations problems in Britain may be 
exacerbated. He is convinced that legislating for further 
employee involvement is undesirable. Introducing legislation 
throughout the EEC, without allowing for national and cultural 
disparities, will, he emphasises, only create further problems.
He believes that multinationals in particular, must consider the 
nature and character of people. He even gave examples of trouble 
which Goodyear had faced in the UK. On one occasion when the 
Company had presented a video directly to Craigavon*s labour 
force, rather than indirectly through Trade Union channels, the 
Shop Stewards were most aggrieved, but when the same procedure 
the same video had been followed at Wolverhampton, the 
Stewards there were quite amenable.
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Goodyear has made a submission on "Vredeling" to the British 
Rubber Manufacturers Association (BRMA), but the Company has kept 
a low profile on this issue. Mr. Corfield said his Company's 
position on the Directive is "exactly the same as the BRMA and 
the CBI; we just don't like it".
11,12.; The View of the Unions
The author interviewed a number of the Drumchapel plant's former
employees and Shop Stewards. They all confirmed that Goodyear had 
repeatedly warned them of the consequences of rejecting the "plan 
for Survival". They, therefore, could not and did not, criticise 
the Company for failing to keep them informed of the seriousness 
of the situation. It was also acknowledged that Management 
consulted the trade union representatives on a regular basis.
On December 12, 1984, Mr. Parker, District Secretary of the
Transport and General Workers Union was interviewed. He recalled 
that from mid-1978 a series of Comp any-Union meetings were held 
at which the gravity of the situation at the Drumchapel Plant was 
outlined. He was informed that "the situation was pretty drastic 
in respect of cross-ply tyres", Drumchapel's main product.
The Company argued that economies and redundancies were necessary 
if the plant were to become cost-effective. It was stated that 
these measures would be implemented at the Wolverhampton and 
Craigavon Plants also. Cheap imports from Poland were alleged to 
be the main reason for these proposed cutbacks.
Mr. Parker recollected with dismay his unsuccessful attempt at
the critical first mass meeting, to convince those present that
Goodyear would carry out its threat to close Drumchapel if all of 
the "Plan for Survival" was not accepted.
Although he exhorted the workforce to accept the Company's 
proposals, he believed that doing so would only stave off 
closure. His prime concern was to protect the reputation of 
Clydeside workers who had already, though often undeservedly,
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achieved notoriety for industrial militancy. As far as he was 
concerned, the closure of Goodyear "had been pre-determined" by 
the Company.
According to Mr. Parker, the eventual acceptance by employees of 
the "Survival Plan" was only five days outwith the deadline set 
by Goodyear. His opinion is that a decision was taken in early 
1978, at the latest, to close Drumchapel, and that from then on 
the Company had sought justification for implementing the 
decision. He therefore believes that the labour force was 
tricked into a closure situation, and the US Tyre manufacturer 
was relieved to see the plant close.
He believes that once stewards are informed that their plant is 
regularly unprofitable then closure is anticipated, especially 
when the owner is a foreign multinational.
Drumchapel's poor performance and the introduction of 
redundancies evoked anxiety in the plant's stewards and they 
demanded information on the plant's future.
He was highly critical of those firms which inform their 
employees that a reduction in manning is necessary to gave a 
plant, whilst knowing all along that the aim is to close it. He 
urges firms to disclose the whole truth.
When asked whether, in his opinion, Goodyear's behaviour was more 
acceptable to Trade Unionists than that of, say. Firestone which 
gave the legal minimum notification of closure, without any 
previous indication that a divestment review was being 
undertaken, Mr. Parker replied:
■I hate like hell saying it, but Goodyear's is preferable. 
The Firestone case gives you no row* to maneouvre".
He himself was unaware of the OECD Guidelines but confident that 
the National Secretary for the industry, Mr. Millar would be 
f'amiliar with them.
Nor was he familiar with the "Vredeling Proposals", and said he
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was sceptical that legislation could control the activities and
conduct of MNCs.
B. CRAIGAVON
11.13.; Baekgromid
The Craigavon factory, opened in 196?, did not produce tyres. 
Instead, it manufactured conveyer belting, fan belts, rubber 
hoses, and a variety of other industrial rubber products. At its 
peak in 1976, it employed 1,800 workers.
Craigavon, however, lost money from the day it opened and by the 
early 1980s employees realised that the plant's future was, at 
best, uncertain. In August 1980 The Lurean Mail, the local 
newspaper, reported that Craigavon "may be on its last legs". It 
warned that "a shorter working week could be the first step 
towards that closure".
11.14.; Timetable of Run-Down
In October 1980, 100 employees were put on a three-day week, and 
by the end of November half the workforce was on short-time. 
Local Councillor, Tom French warned:
■The conséquences of reduced work days and an acceleration 
of a run down of employment in Goodyear spells disaster for 
Craigavon" [The Lurean Mail. November 20, 1980].
Local Management refuted this allegation, claiming,
"there is absolutely no substance whatsoever in the 
suggestion that Goodyear is pulling out of Northern Ireland.
We have every intention of maintaining our presence in 
Craigavon and look forward to the long term with optimism"
[The Lurgan Mail, November 20, 1980].
In June 1981 , 300 redundancies were announced and Goodyear 
predicted Craigavon would lose £4—5ni in 1981. According to 
h^S-LücfiaiUîall,
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"only the promise of financial aid from the Government to 
offset some of these losses has prevented the plant from 
closing down" [The Lurgan Mall, June 11, 1981].
Craigavon was allegedly losing more money than any other Goodyear 
plant [fortalOMTLNgMg, June 12, 19 81]. Following discussions 
with anxious local councillors, the Plant Director gave an 
assurance that no further redundancies were contemplated, "and 
that production of the company’s industrial rubber products would 
continue at Craigavon" [quoted in Belfast Telegraph June 11, 
1981].
This reduction in manpower was only one of a series of options 
which were tried and tested. They all failed to reverse the tide 
of increasing losses. In April 1982 it was revealed that in 1981 
Craigavon had sufferred its heaviest loss since its openining in 
1967.
In January 1983 a local newspaper revealed that Unions at a 
Goodyear plant in Germany had legally prevented the transfer of 
production of "vitafilm" (a thin plastic wrapping substance) to 
Craigavon. The Lurgan Mail warned that failure to secure this 
extra production "could sign a death warrant" for the Ulster 
plant [The Lurgan Mail. January 21, 1983].
The following month the same newspaper reported that more 
redundancies were imminent and that "a question mark hangs over 
the future of the Goodyear plant in Craigavon" [The Lurgan Mall. 
February 10, 1983].
In the first week of March, Goodyear’s Vice-President, along with 
the Director and the Manager at Craigavon, met Secretary of 
State, Mr. James Prior, to spell out the plant’s problems. 
Ominously, the Company statement following these discussions 
Warned:
•there will be a further review later in the year - the 
situation is clearly serious".
*^ 6 fact that Goodyear saw fit to dispatch one of its most senior 
®en from Akron across the Atlantic to Ulster, underlined the
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gravity of the situation.
Clearly, the decision to close Craigavon "was not made 
overnight".
11.15.; Prer QLosace Announcement Preparations
In May 19 83, the new Chairman of the Board, "a subdued New Jersey 
native", who had taken office only a few months earlier as 
Goodyear’s number one man, decided that Craigavon should be 
closed. Senior Management at the UK Subsidiary’s Wolverhampton 
Headquarters were informed shortly afterwards. They then 
proceeded to prepare a masterplan in which every possible 
eventuality was carefully considered, and a timetable of events 
was prepared. The author was allowed to study three key internal 
Company documents: "Goodyear - Craigavon: Lead In To Plant
Closure", "Goodyear - Craigavon: Plant and Technical Centre
Closure",and, "Goodyear - Craigavon: Closure of Plant and
Technical Centre".
Goodyear aimed to achieve the closure of Craigavon "with an 
orderly rundown of production/work, with no industrial action, 
and at minimum cost". The Company was confident that 
Wolverhampton workers would not resort to industrial action in 
support of their Ulster colleagues [Company document, Goodvear - 
£r.algaYon; Plant and Technical Centre Closur.al
Goodyear expected some reaction from Craigavon employees:
"Bnployees in the plant believe a major statement will be 
made shortly.
An announcement In July will not be unexpected but people 
are anticipating some production to continue but with a very 
much reduced work force.
Closure will come as a shock, with dismay, but this is very 
much the way of life in the Province.
People know how bad the results are — (the Plant Director’s) 
last Presentation was given March 1983. Also people are 
aware of the discussions with James Prior, Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland held with Ib Thmmsen in early 
March 1983.
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People will put up some token resistance to save the plant - 
the following are possible:-
- Involving National Officials of the Trade Onion.
- Seeking discussions with local MPs as well as those from 
the European Parliament.
- Attempting to get public opinion on their side through 
the Lurgan Mail and other newspapers; also the TV.
- Getting dignatories to make approaches to the Cbmpany.
- Letters to Mercer, Thomsen etc.
Once the resistance phase is ended and plant closure becomes 
accepted, people will then turn their minds to getting 
improved severance payments" [Company document, Goodvear - 
- Cralgayon; Plant and Technical Centre Closure]
The Company also anticipated the local Community being shocked by 
the closure decision as the extent of the factory’s problems had 
not been fully appreciated. The Lurgan Mail newspaper was 
identified as "the one which could do the Company most harm". 
[Goodyear - Craigavon: Plant and Technical Centre Closure"]
■11.16. Implementing the Divestment, Decision
June 25, 1983: The first step of the divestment strategy,
prepared by UK Management, was implemented. The Chairman of the 
U.S. Board, the President of Goodyear International, and the 
Qiairman and Managing Director of Goodyear Great Britain, met the 
Minister of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Adam Butler. They 
told him that Goodyear could no longer continue production at the 
loss-making Craigavon plant, and employees would be informed of 
this decision in the near future.
June 27, 1983: Goodyear’s supremo wrote thanking Mr. Butler for
agreeing to meeting him and his two colleagues, "despite the 
rather short notice of our visit". He reminded him that 
Craigavon’s losses since opening, exceeded $100m, "most of which 
occurred in the past five years". The Company Chairman paid high 
tribute to Craigavon’s employees and their representatives.
"Our dealings with trade unions and our workforce have at 
all times been both responsible and realistic and have 
enabled us to make significant gains in productivity, fdilch,
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unfortunately, failed to offset the price erosion In the 
market".
He added:
"This Is a most unpalatable decision for both Goodyear and 
Northern Ireland and we have agonized deeply over the Impact 
that this decision would have on your Government’s effort to 
reindustrialIze Northern Ireland".
However, I would be remiss In my duties to our shareholders 
If I did not take action In the light of our present 
projections.
I hope that we can postpone any official announcement until 
the end of July In order to open negotiations with our 
employees for an orderly shutdown, which should definitely 
precede any public announcement". [Letter dated June 
27,1983, from Chairman of the Board, to Mr. Butler, Minister 
of State for Northern Ireland]
June 29, 1963: The five most senior executives of Goodyear's UK 
subsidiary met to review the divestment strategy. They knew Akron 
would be releasing Second Quarter results on August 2, 1983, and 
these included the costs for closing Craigavon. They, therefore, 
had to ensure that closure was announced in advance of this date. 
Its proposal to issue notification of closure on July 28 had been 
approved by the U.S. Board, and it was agreed that Craigavon 
would close on the ninetieth day after the closure announcement, 
namely, on October 2 8, 1983:
"Pressures to continue production on a reduced basis should 
be resisted".
A team of seven was selected for handling the closure, three of 
them were based at Wolverhampton, and the other four employed at 
the Craigavon Plant. Only the three executives based on the 
mainland would be involved throughout, but,
"The four Northern Ireland people ... should be Informed at 
a time when It becomes absolutely necessary and no earlier".
[Minutes of Meeting of June 29,1983]
July 11-22, 1983: All Craigavon’s employees received their annual 
fortnight summer break. Their first day back would be Monday July 
25, 1983. The glorious summer of 1983 was to come to an abrupt 
end for the employees returning to the Craigavon plant.
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On Sunday afternoon of July 24, 1983, the Personnel Manager at
Craigavon, issued invitations to Union officials employed at 
Craigavon to attend a meeting which would be held first thing on 
the following morning. Some officials suspected that the closure 
of the plant would be announced.
At the same time, Mr. Tom Murray, a full-time official with the 
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU) was 
contacted and told that closure would be announced to employees 
the following day. Goodyear believed that Mr. Murray would have 
"a major influence" on the employees' reaction to the closure 
announcement: -"he has handled the Michelin closure - he is one
who normally urges restraint". [Goodyear - Craigavon: Lead In To 
Plant Closure]
Goodyear believed its announcement would be "unlikely to trigger 
any hostile reaction", and took comfort in the knowledge that "by 
and large the Craigavon workforce have reacted predictably in the 
past to situations - they have demonstrated that they do not live 
'in cloud cuckoo land'" [Goodyear - Craigavon: Lead In To Plant
Closure].
H .17.: Qosqre is Announced
July 25, 1983: The worst fears of the Shop Stewards were realised 
when they were told that the factory would close on October 28,
1983, with the loss of 756 jobs. They were told that the
Company's decision was final.
Formal announcement of closure was made to Craigavon's 756
employees. The American Managing Director of Goodyear Great 
Britain said that key divestment factors were the depressed
market conditions and the poor performance of the factory. 
Craigavon had sustained heavy losses since its opening. Losses 
reached £8m in 1981 and a further £6m in 19 82. By 1983 it was 
operating at less than a third capacity and in the first seven 
months of that year lost £4.5m.
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After holding various press conferances at which the media was 
informed of the closure decision, the UK Managing Director 
returned to the mainland on the 3.30 pm. shuttle from Belfast. 
Mr. Corfield, Director of Personnel, remained behind as chief on- 
the-spot negotiator with Union officials.
July 27, 1983: Consultations with Unions began.
July 2 9, 1983.* The 90 day notice requirement started.
11.18.! The Company's View
Craigavon was closed because there was no market for its 
products. By the time of the closure announcement it was 
operating at only 40% capacity and losing £600,000 -700,000, per 
month.
Employees were aware, Mr. Corfield, Director of Personnel, 
claimed, of the adverse market conditions and their effect on 
the factory. When the Company announced closure, its decision was 
irreversible; it was evident that an upturn in the market was out 
of the question. According to Mr. Corfield, Union officials 
realised that the Company had no option but to close Craigavon. 
He suggests that, privately they were surprised the plant had not 
been closed years earlier. He claims that the Company postponed 
the closure, "and I'm not talking about months", because it was 
aware of its social obligations and the Province's severe 
problems, - "Goodyear had no hassle closing Craigavon"; employees 
had been well aware of the situation.
368
jl.iQ.î The Union* 3-¥lea
Mr. Murray was not particularly willing to discuss the cases, 
other than to judge Goodyear’s conduct an improvement upon 
Michelin’s handling of the Mallusk, Belfast closure.
11.20.1 The Politician's View
According to Mr John Taylor, M.P. for Strangford, the Company had 
kept him informed over the previous 18 months of its serious 
problems, and, therefore, he was not surprised by the decision to 
close the plant. This is in marked contrast to his highly 
critical view of Michelin’s handling of the Mallusk closure 
announcement.
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FIRESTONE
11.21.; The Origins and Development of the Oomoanv
The Firestone company was founded by Harvey Firestone in 1900, 
and became incorporated in 1910. In the mid-1920's it leased a 
million acres of jungle in Liberia and developed rubber 
plantations. Forward integration was achieved by the end of the 
decade with the opening of its own chain of car supply and 
service stations in the US.
After 1945, penetration of international markets was deepened and 
these markets were increasingly served by plants within these 
foreign markets, rather than by exports. A large foreign base was 
created throughout Europe, Latin America, and more recently in 
the Far East.
Until 1982, Firestone was organised into four operating groups: 
"Corporate Development", "Sales and Marketing Operations", "North 
American Tyre", and "International" which manages the Company’s 
business outside North America. It is currently organised into 
three operating groups: "Developing Product Group", "Sales and
Marketing Operations", and "World Tyre Group".
Between 1970 and 1975 Firestone’s sales outside the US doubled 
and in the 1976 Annual Report the Company indicated that it 
expected this growth rate to be matched in the next quinquennium. 
Only one year later, however, it was evident that this projection 
had gone sour. In his annual Report to Stockholders, the 
Chairman, Mr. Richard Riley, admitted that Firestone had faced 
"unexpected challenges in 1977". He described the European market 
as the "major international problem", and diagnosed overcapacity
as a causal factor.
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Table 11.5.: Performance on Firestone 1974-1985 ($m)
Year Net Sales Net Income (Loss) Number of Employees
1974 $3,675 $154 120,000
1975 3,724 134 111,000
1976 3,939 96 113,000
1977 4,427 110 115,000
1978 4,878 (14 8)
1979 5,284 113 112,000
1980 4,850.5 (106) 107,000
1981 4,361 135 83,000
1982 3,869 6 73,000
1983 3,866 111 65,000
1984 4,161 102 59,900
1985 3,836 3 54,700
Source: Corporate accounts; various editions of Fort Wifi, magazine.
The Company's financial problems began in 1978 when it suffered a 
loss of $l48m (see Table 11.4). This can be explained by the 
expensive restructuring program which Firestone had initiated, 
and also by the recall in the US of eight million faulty tyres of 
the 500 series of steel belted radiais which resulted in pre-tax 
charges of $243m. A further set-back came in 1979 when the
proposed merger with Borg-Warner was called off.
By the late 1970s, Firestone subsidiaries produced tyres and 
tubes in France, the UK, Italy, Costa Rica, Portugal, Sweden, 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Kenya, Thailand, and New
Zealand. Affiliates had plants in Spain, Mexico, Uruguay, India, 
the Phillipines, and South Africa. Within these nations some 
plants were now surplus to Firestone's requirements, and 
cuts in plant and labour were implemented. The implications 
UK operations proved severe, and they are the subject 
chapter. It shall be seen below that although British Trades
Unionists were warned by European colleagues that divestment was 
likely, they were unable to alter Firestone s pre-concei
course of action.
XL22.; British Trades Unions 8re VaTBesl
The ICEF Secreteriat notified affiliated organisations 
evidence showed that Firestone was embarking on a massiv 
restructuring programme to alter the shape of company operations
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for the coming decade". It added, ominously, that,
"ICEF affiliate experience has already shown that Firestone 
is intent upon pursuing this programme in a high-handed, 
non-cooperative and socially irresponsible manner" [ICEF 
document, Firestone Restructures: Plant Closures. Job Loas- 
es. Contract Valuations!
It identified four major causal factors for restructuring. In 
addition to falling sales, and managerial incompetence, it 
alleged that Firestone had been in the vanguard of transferring 
production to Eastern block countries where "authoritarian 
governments pursue a repressive labour policy resulting in low 
relative labour costs". ICEF alleged this "Vodka-Cola" policy of 
Firestone and other manufacturers was "substantially affecting" 
the West's tyre industry. Fourthly, banks lost confidence in 
Firestone as problems afflicting industry and Company mounted, 
and they demanded Firestone make provision for guarantees against 
loan default. Consequently, large reserves were set-aside to 
finance plant closure.
The first plants to close were located in Switzerland and Sweden, 
and the US MNC achieved notoriety for its failure to respect 
national law.
Swiss Unions reported Firestone to the Committee for 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) for 
failing to comply with the OECD's Guidelines (see chapter 6). 
More importantly a Swiss court found Firestone guilty of 
violating a collective agrreement, and fined the Company SW. frs. 
2.6 million.
In Sweden, the 350 employees at the Viskafors plant received only 
six weeks notification of closure, when they were entitled to six 
months notice. The Swedish Government intervened, ordering 
Firestone to guarantee employment for the workforce throughout 
the period specified by national law. ICEF indicated that it 
expected the US firm to disobey this instruction, since it would 
te cheaper to pay a fine than meet its legal obligations.
Union officials at UK plants had been well warned of the
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Company's flagrant disregard for Codes of Conduct and national 
legislation. An analysis of Firestone's conduct in closing its UK 
operations is presented below.
11.23.; The Brentford Closure
The plant at Brentford, near London, which was opened in 1928, as 
Firestone's first operation outwith North Amarica. Forty years 
later another plant was established at Wrexham, but Brentford was 
much larger. The older plant had been tooled to make only cross- 
ply tyres, and, as was seen earlier, the demand for these had 
been superceded in the mid-1970s by demand for radiais.
As demand for cross-ply tyres fell, output was cut-back and this 
exerted upward pressure on unit costs as economies of scale were 
lost. The Brentford factory had become a millstone round the 
Company's neck, and largely accounting for the £6m loss which 
Firestone's UK operations reported for the year ending October 
1979.
November 13, 1979: Mr. John J. Nevin was elected as the eleventh
President of the Company with effect from December 1. His 
predecessor Mr. Di Federico had retired, and Mr. Nevin was now 
second-in-command to Mr. Riley who was still Chairman and CEO.
November 14, 1979: Firestone announced that the 51-year-old
Brentford factory would close on February 15, 1980 and all 1,500
jobs would be lost. A statement issued at Company Headquarters 
in Akron, Ohio, also warned that there would be further closures 
or rationalisation in Europe. A gross cost of £33m was placed on 
ell European closures. In addition to a factory at Wrexham, 
Firestone had eight plants on the Continent, three in Spain, two 
in Sweden, and one each in France, Italy, and Portugal. The 
statement did not reveal the Company's plans for any individual 
plant [Erlichman, November 15, 1979].
On December 14, 1979, Mr. Bidwell, MP, asked the Secretary of
State for Employment what notification and representations he 
received "concerning Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company s decision
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to close Brentford?" In his written reply, on behalf of the 
Minister, Mr. Jim Lester stated that the Department of Employment 
was notified on November 14, 1979 "in fulfillment of its
obligations under section 100 of the Employment Protection Act 
1975" [Hansard. 796, December 14, 1979].
Brentford closed on February 15, 1979.
11.24.: The Wrexham Cass.
Despite the Brentford closure, employees at the Welsh plant were 
fairly confident of a bright future for their factory. Only two 
years earlier, during celebrations of Firestone's tenth 
anniversary at Wrexham, the Plant's Industrial Relations Manager, 
Mr. Elliot Ball, announced that "we are more convinced than ever 
that this was a good decision to come to North Wales", though he 
did add that,"Our plans for the future must naturally be decided 
by the demands of the market and our ability to compete" 
[Evening Leader. November 29, 1977].
But in the two years between Mr. Ball's assuring speech and the 
closure of Brentford, industrial relations had detiorated and 
production at Wrexham was subject tp regular disruption. From its 
opening, Wrexham had been dogged by unofficial stoppages and 
these reached a peak in the first half of 1978, with 42 being 
recorded. Management calculated a loss of the equivalent of 41 
days' production per man out of a possible of 237 days [ACAS 
Report, 1979].
Following this period of prolonged unrest, the Advisory, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration Service (ACAS) received an 
invitation in February 1979 from the Plant Manager and the Unions 
to conduct a survey on industrial relations throughout the 
Wrexham factory.
The ACAS team noted that production and personnel matters for the 
two UK factories were administered by the UK Chairman, and the 
Production Director, both of whom were based at the Brentford 
plant.
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It was highly critical of Management’s and Union’s failure to 
accord the Industrial Relations Department the status it 
deserved:
"The Industrial Relations Department was seen by many as not 
performing its proper function; it lacked the status and 
authority to influence management and act as a true co­
ordinator. At the Wrexham plant the Industrial Relations 
Manager is regarded by both management and trade union 
representatives as a mouthpiece only, and not as a custodian 
of agreements as in most other establishments" [ACAS Report, 
1979].
The report presented a dismal picture of a fragmented managerial 
team which was disloyal to the supervisors in the front line. The 
operators frequently witnessed management humiliating 
supervisors. The latter claimed that management gave them verbal 
instructions to transmit to workers on the shop-floor, but "later 
on these same managers would deny to the operators that any such 
orders or decisions had been given" [ACAS Report, 1979].
The supervisors were also critical of management’s refusal to 
elaborate on the rationale behind decisions. One claimed that,
•You are seldcxn told anything or given a reason for 
management decisions; you do not know idiere you stand” [ACAS 
Report, 1979].
Another complained bitterly that,
"Ho guidelines are given by managers to us; what is good for 
today is disowned tomorrow* [ACAS Report, 1979].
The observers from ACAS reached the folowing conclusion:
"We see training of management of all levels in industrial 
relations as one of the foremost needs of the plant at 
present. Mansigement also needs an awareness of the new 
circumstances arising from the growth of individual 
statutory ri^ts and the expansion of employment law in the 
last few years" [ACAS Report, 1979].
The labour force too was found to have contributed to Wrexham's 
woes. Manual workers were represented by the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (T&GWU). In early 1978, however, the 
®Fficial employee representatives apparently "lost control ... to
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unconstitutional factions" which were described as 
"irresponsible".
Employee disclosure and consultation were amongst the subjects 
examined by ACAS. The study found that management did not 
disclose information directly to employees, but relied "entirely 
on information being percolated through the union machinery". 
This is allegedly normal practise in America [ACAS Report, 1979],
Union representatives admitted that whilst they received "a lot" 
of information formally from Management, they lacked a systematic 
method of relaying information to their membership [ACAS Report,
1979].
ACAS researchers found that in terms of information disclosure, 
employees were the victims of negligent management and 
incompetent union representatives:
*We found conmonication blockages throughout the plant - 
between different management levels, between departments, 
between the unions. Management quite complacently considered 
they had discharged their obligations about passing 
information by simply telling the union representatives, who 
often kept it to themselves* [ACAS Report, 1979]»
Employee consultation was undertaken through the Company-Union 
Committee and the Management-Staff Union Committee. A meeting was 
held every two months, the minutes of which were posted on 
factory notice boards. 73 such meetings had been held by March 1, 
1979 since opening in 1967 [ACAS Report, 1979].
It was observed that Shop Stewards at Wrexham did not hold these 
Meetings in high regard, and indeed, they claimed that 
consultation did not take place:
•They (the meetings) were regarded as exercises in 
autocracy, giving information on executive decisions already 
taken unilaterally, with little or no scope for 
consultation" [ACAS Report, 19791*
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11.25.: Timetable of Bun-Down of Wrexham
March 23, 1980: Corapany-Union discussions on short time working 
and some redundancies were issued [Memo signed by E, Ball, June 
20, 1980]. A week later a four-day week was introduced, and on 
June 18 discussions were held on short time working and 
redundancy. Firestone was represented by Mr. J. Fitzpatrick, UK 
Managing Director, and Mr. E. Ball, the Industrial Relations 
Manager. Employees were represented by Mr. P. Jones, Convener 
Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), and Mr. R. Butler, 
Convener for the Association of Clerical, Technical and 
Supervisory Staffs (ACTS), Mr. M. Jefferies, District Secretary 
of the TGWU, and Mr. J. Millar, a National Officer with the TGWU 
[Memo signed by E. Ball, June 20, 1980]. Two days later, Mr, Ball 
informed union representatives that 95 employees would be made 
redundant "due to a reduction in demand for our products" [Memo 
signed by E. Ball, June 20, 1980], and on the last day of the 
month, all 600 workers at the Wrexham factory were put on a two- 
day week, in what the Company described as a "final bid to stave 
off redundancies".
August 6, 1980: only nine months after its promise of further
investment at Wrexham, Firestone announced that it was selling 
its retail outlets in the UK to Kwick-Fit Holdings for £3.3m. The 
significance of this plan was not lost on Union officials.
UK Company Secretary, Mr. Hector Mackenzie, gave an assurance, 
however, that production would be maintained at Wrexham 
[■Evening Leader  ^ August 6, 1980].
Mr, Jim Morris, Divisional Officer of the TGWU, contacted the 
office of UK Managing Director, Mr. Fitzpatrick, "requesting an 
brgent meeting to discuss the overall situation, but specifically 
the Wrexham factory and Hawarden Distribution centre [letter 
from J, Morris to J. Fitzpatrick, dated August 7, 1980].
August 7, 1980: Mr. Morris was informed by Mr. Tampling,
Corporate Personnel Manager, that whilst Mr. Fitzpatrick was 
"willing to have a meeting", he felt that, "at this stage it
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would not have a useful purpose because the company in America 
have not reached any final decision" [letter from J. Morris to J. 
Fitzpatrick, dated August 7, 1980]. This confirms that the
decision to close Wrexham was a centralised one,
Mr. Morris, however, was not satisfied by Mr. Tampling's message, 
and so, he wrote as follows to Mr. Fitzpatrick:
"In my view we do need an urgent meeting, as we would like 
to discuss the situation with you prior to any firm decision 
being taken by the parent CKxmpany, otherwise all we would be 
faced with at a future meeting would be a fait accompli one 
way or the other".
August 13, 1980: Union officials once again, called for a
meeting with the Company's UK Executives to discuss Firestone's 
plans for Wrexham.
According to Mr. Jones, Firestone had been always very reluctant 
to meet unions, but on this occasion the Company agreed to a 
meeting on the 20th [Interview with Mr. Jones August 1984].
August 19, 1980: Firestone revealed that in the first nine months 
of fiscal year 1980 it had suffered losses of $98m on sales of 
$3.62 billion compared with a profit of $78m on sales of $3.87 
billion for the same period in 1979 [Gooding, August 21, 1980].
J,1;26.r The Closure Announcement
August 20, 1980: When the Union delegation attended their pre­
arranged meeting at the Company's UK Headquarters in Brentford, 
Mr. Fitzpatrick, the UK Managing Director, declared that the 
Parent Company had decided to close Wrexham, with the loss of 574 
jobs. Firestone had thereby decided to withraw from the UK 
market. The "Announcement to Sales and Administrative Employees 
Located at Brentford: Closure of Wrexham Plant" read as follows:
•Current losses resulting from overcapacity in a declini^ 
market and the cost/price pressures generated by 
overcapacity, have necessitated the company ex 
whether continued production at the Wrexham p nn 
continue. After due consideration of these stud es an 
options which have included short-tiae work we^, llait^ 
redundancies, etc., the company has concluded that
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Wrexham plant Is no longer viable.
It has therefore been concluded that all production will 
cease at the Wrexham plant on 18th November, 1980.
Onion representatives have been told of this conclusion 
today and consultations will take place with them over the 
next few days to determine selection for redundancy and how 
the close down of production will be achieved. ... ",
Mr. Tampling, Firestone's Personnel Manager, completed form HR1 
which was delivered to the Department of Employment and the two 
Unions involved, the TGWU and ACCTS. The form reveals that 
consultations with Unions began on August 20th, and that the 
first redundancies would be effected on November 18, 1980.
According to Mr. Tampling it was "not known" when the last 
redundancy would occur [Firestone, Form HR 11.
Subsequent Company-Union meetings were "a complete and utter 
waste of time", according to Mr. Jones, Factory Convener. 
Management insisted that their decision was irreversible. By 
October 10, 1980 all but 15-20 employees had been paid off and on 
November 18, 19 80 the factory closed completely.
H t27.; The View of the Unlous
Mr. Jones explained:
"... selling the retail outlets placed the future of the 
plant in grave danger as they had accounted for 35$ of its
output" [interview with Mr. Jones, August 1984].
He said the factory was thereby made dependent on the unstable 
car industry, and that "total closure of the works could not now 
be ruled out". He also added that employees had been assured by 
Firestone that it planned expanding its retail operations, and 
that the sell-off had come as a shock fEvening Leaden, August 11,
1980].
He immediately wrote to the US Board asking them to take into 
account, before making any major decision, Wrexham's past 
performance and the social problems that would be greatly 
aggravated by the plant's closure. In order to increase Wrexham's
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appeal to any cost-conscious Executives, he said that the union 
was prepared to make various concessions to reduce unit costs 
[interview with Mr. Jones, August 1984].
Mr. Jones is now a full-time official with the TGWU. At the time 
of closure he was not aware that the OECD had Guidelines. The 
possibility of referring the case to the UK National Contact 
Point was, therefore, not even considered. Mr. Jones believes 
that current UK legislation is inadequate on notification to 
employees of redundancy in the case of plant closure. He argues 
that if Firestone's conduct was in accordance with the OECD's 
Guidelines, then these are in need of revision [interview with 
Mr. Jones, August 1984].
Mr. Roy Butler, Staff Convener, explained to the author that in 
the 1970*8, a "new, low profile tyre was developed at Wrexham". 
In order to reduce scrap, the workload was cut by 50$, but by 
1978/79 the teething problems had been overcome [interview with 
Mr. Butler, August 1984].
Meantime, Firestone had increased the number of imports from its 
factories in France and Spain. Mr. Butler alleges that "Firestone 
nnd Dunlop were behind the huge increase in imports of East 
European manufacturers tyres which were flooding the market.
According to Mr. Butler, the Union officials representing 
employees at Wrexham had only one meeting with the Company's UK 
Managing Director, Mr. Fitzpatrick; namely, the one at which the 
plant's closure was announced.
He described how each member of the Union delegation attending 
the meeting was given a letter, announcing the divestment 
decision, before the proceedings got underway. They were told, he 
alleges, that if they could raise £11m the factory would be kept 
open. Mr. Butler argues that as Union efforts to raise capital 
began to prove quite successful, it became clear that Firestone 
was determined to close the plant.
Mr. Butler believes that the decision to close Wrexham was
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closely related to market conditions in the United States. He 
considers that the Company was facing fierce competition, 
especially on the West Coast, from Bridgestone, the Japanese MNC, 
and it was decided to close plants throughout the world and 
consolidate operations in the US.
He maintains that within Europe, Wrexham was earmarked for 
closure because UK Employment legislation offers workers 
comparatively little protection, and, therefore, it is cheaper to 
close down a British, rather than a Continental plant [interview 
with Mr. Butler, August 1984].
cpfflpw'g Vi%
The extent of centralised decision making in Firestone can be 
seen in the reply from Mr. Hector MacKenzie, formerly Company 
Secretary of Firestone UK, and now responsible for winding up the 
Company's afairs in the UK, to a request to participate in this 
study:
■I now refer to your letter of 14th September addressed to 
me.
We had two telephone conversations on the subject. As I 
mentioned to you, I was awaiting instructions from parent 
company in U.S.A. whereby I might be enabled to give you 
answers to your enquiry about disinvestment by multinational 
companies operating in this country.
Today I am in receipt of instructions to the effect that 
Firestone would not wish to participate in your enquiry".
[MacKenzie, letter to author dated November 21, 1984]
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MICHELIN
11.29.: Origins and Development
The Company, established in 1893 by brothers Edouard and Andre 
Michelin, originally produced rubber goods, but towards the end 
of the century it foresaw the advantages of supplying the 
burgeoning motor trade, and shifted to tyre production. This step 
was well-timed, and the Company enjoyed a boom as it struggled to 
keep pace with demand. Its growth was impressive, and with its 
tyres selling throughout the Continent, foreign sales 
subsidiaries were established.
Michelin integrated backward into natural and synthetic rubber, 
(thus guaranteeing supplies of vital raw materials), and 
integrated forward by taking a substantial minority holding in 
Citroen, therby gaining a captive outlet for the final product, 
tyres.
By the late 1930s, it was by far the largest French tyre 
producer, and after the war rapid growth continued apace with the 
car industry. This expansion came exclusively from internal 
development and the Company enjoyed a major technological 
advantage with its invention, radial tyres in the late 1940s, and 
steel-belted radiais in the 1960s. These technological 
innovations were to contribute, however, to the decline in demand 
for tyres for they now retained their road-holding features much 
longer.
Michelin*s main markets are the car, motorcycle and bicycle, 
agricultural equipment and aircraft industries. The Company is 
Blso the largest shareholder in Kleher-Colombes, France s second 
tyre producer, and it has a 9$ share in Peugot-Citroen, the 
largest French car manufacturer. It is therefore highly dependent 
on tyres, specialising in steel belted radiais which it 
Pioneered. While most of its competitors have diversified in an 
attempt to reduce dependence on the somewhat volatile automobile 
industry, Michelin is confident that cars will retain their
3 82
popularity, and it believes that motor vehicles will always need 
tyres. Michelin’s dependence on tyres for 95$ of total sales 
revenue does not worry executives at Michelin’s Clerment-Ferrand 
headquarters [Betts and Rodger, July 3, 1985],
Michelin is, and has been for some time, the largest tyre 
manufacturer in Europe with an overall market share of 40$ and 
60$ on new cars and new trucks respectively. It is the market 
leader in every country, but by the late 1960s, it foresaw the 
need to capture a good chunk of the largest tyre market, the US. 
It appreciated the reluctance of the "big three" US automobile 
producers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) to fit Michelins 
until they were produced locally. Cracking the North American 
market was a daunting task for the French company "that was about 
one-fifth the size of Goodyear". Over $1bn was spent building 
eight plants in the US and Canada [Betts and Rodger, July 3, 
1985].
The gamble paid off. The US accounts for 25$ of total sales 
(compared to 15$ from France) and total output quadrupled in ten 
years. But in 1978, the market was slack, and Michelin found 
excess capacity a heavy millstone which dragged its fortunes 
down. Fortunately, the US market proved a valuable outlet greatly 
appreciated by M. Michelin:
•If we had not gone to the US we would be dÿing» [Betts and
Rodger, July 3, 1985].
Michelin, like all Western tyre producers, became a victim of 
intensive competition in a depressed market whose decline is due, 
in no short measure, to the major firms’ own technological 
development of their product. Within the space of a year the 
Company’s fortunes were transformed, - from being highly 
profitable in 19 80, to a loss-maker in 1981 (see Table 11.6). In 
the three years to the end of 1984, total losses amounted to 
FFr8bn (£627). Retrenchment was the order of the day and plants 
were closed in Italy, Belgium and the UK. The section below 
examines the recession’s impact on the French MNC s UK 
subsidiary.
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Table 11.6.: Performance Data on Michelin (Fr.fr. unless where
indicated).
Year Sales Net Profit Total Employees
1985 $5,190 $ 110 NA
1984 $5,075 $(256) 120,000
1983 39,637 2,178 131,000
1982 34,567 (4,165) 115,000
1981 31,337 (290) 128,000
1980 28,178 815 125,000
1979 22,712 598 120,000
1978 19,671 686 120,000
1977 17,439 675 115,000
Source: Corporate Accounts; and editions of Fortune magazine; 
11.30.; Michelin In the UK
In the mid-1920s, certain Government restrictions on foreign 
direct investment in the UK were lifted, and construction work 
began in Stoke-on-Trent on Michelin’s first plant in the UK. 
Shortly before Christmas 1927 the factory came on stream. After 
the War, the French MNC strengthened its presence in the UK, 
opening five other plants: Burnley, 1960; Belfast, 1965;
Ballymena, 1969; Dundee, 1972, and Aberdeen 1973»
Unlike Goodyear’s UK subsidiary, Michelin’s proved profitable in 
the late 1970s (see Table 11.7.)
Table 11.17.: Performance Data on Michelin Tyre PLC (£m)
Year Sales Net Profit 
before Tax
Average Number 
of Employees
1984 £466 (£12) 14,779
1983 £475 23 15,699
1982 474 (11) 20,041
1981 484 11 18,629
1980 474 13 19,229
1979 424 27 18,893
1978 398 21 18,728
1977 342 30 18,658
1976 299 34 18,356
1975 218 23 17,992
^  '« c . I ? 0 4  i i n n u a i  n e p u i  u , e iuu  _ _ .
2.600 redundancies were announced in January 1985, eav ng
6.600 strong UK labour force once they are effected).
Since late 1982, Michelin’s U K  workforce has been halved. In
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December 19 82, it announced that 3,175 jobs would be lost in the 
following two years. In January 1985, a further 2,600 job losses 
were announced. The Company, which had been losing £1m a week in 
Britain, has decided to reduce car tyre production and cease 
making truck and cycle tyres at its Stoke-on-Trent works. Rubber 
production at Burnley is to stop with the loss of 200 jobs [ Bain 
and Rougvie, January 9, 1985]. The Industrial Editor of the
British Broadcasting Corporation’s television news service, Mr. 
Martin Adeney, reported the announcement. He described Michelin 
as "intensely private", a view shared by Paul Betts, French cor 
respondent of the Financial Times, who says the company is as 
secretive "as a Vatican conclave" [Betts, September 6, 1984].
The same description would be equally appropriate of the parent 
company’s top man, Francois Michelin, who prefers, and still 
carries the modest title of "gérant" (manager). In June 1985, the 
Michelin man gave the Financial Times his first newspaper 
interview in six years, and the Howard Hughes of international 
business lived up to his reputation:
■M, Michelin talked to the FT for several hoars in a hotel 
meeting ro<Hs. There was no question of our visiting the 
group's factories. Even so, the secrecy conscious gérant 
sheepishly checked the next room, apparently to make sure no 
one was eavesdropping” [Betts and Rodger, July 3» 1985].
The job-losses announced in 1982, allowed for the closure of the 
Mallusk plant and the attendant 2,000 redundancies. An 
examination of this closure annoucement now follows. It shall be 
seen that Mr. Adeney’s observation was an accurate one.
■Util.; The Clos ore Announcement
Monday, December 13, 1982: the Firm’s OK Executive Director, Mr.
Croiselle, told the Minister of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. 
Adam Butler, that the Company would be announcing, at the end of 
the week, the total closure of the Mallusk site. Mr. Butler 
offered the firm financial assistance, however, Michelin’s 
problems stemmed from excess capacity, not lack of funds and this 
offer was rejected [Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates, December 22, 1982].
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During that week the Department and Personnel Manager were 
working on at the factory after normal hours . The Unions knew 
that this was common practise when Company Statements to 
employees were being printed, the contents of which were not to 
be disclosed or "leaked" prior to the time appointed for release.
December 17, 1982: in the course of the morning, the local radio
station telephoned the Factory Convener, Mr. Lagan, asking for 
his reaction to Michelin’s decision to close the factory. Mr. 
Lagan had not heard of any decision of this kind and the stewards 
believed that the media was merely speculating. As far as they 
were concerned, the Company had convened a meeting for 1.30 pm. 
at which they expected the Company to present its pay offer, or 
at worst, announce some redundancies. Instead, the union 
delegation received stunning news: Mallusk was to close
[interview with Mr. Billy Condit, September 5, 1984].
The Irish Times highlighted just how unexpected the 
closure decision was:
•There vas speculation yesterday morning that major 
redundancies would be announced .... , but the news of a
total closure came as a complete surprise to both trade 
unions and workers" [The Irish Times. December 18, 1982].
As the Stewards left the meeting which lasted less than thirty 
minutes, they discovered that employees had been issued with 
three forms. In the first, Michelin informed employees that up to 
4,000 jobs would be lost at its UK plants over the next couple 
of years; more than half of these would come from the closure of 
Mallusk. In the second, all of the factory’s 2,000 employees were 
served their 90 days redundancy notice even though the factory 
would be phased out "over about one year", and outlined their 
terms of redundancy. It was made clear that these would be 
reduced unless the workforce cooperated in an orderly rundown. 
The final form called for 600 volunteers for immediate 
redundancy.
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11.32.: The Union's View
Mr. Billy Condit, Branch Chairman of the Transport and General 
Workers Union at Mallusk, believed that only the top four 
managers at the plant knew of the Company's decision before the 
employees . He alleges that the Company had given "no indication" 
of its plan to close Mallusk.
He believes that Michelin had decided to close a plant in the UK 
because of its surplus manufacturing problems. The reason that 
Mallusk was chosen, he alleges, was that the British Government 
and Media do not accord the same importance to events in the 
Province that they do to those on the mainland. For example, in 
the summer of 1981 violence erupted on the streets of some of the 
mainland's major cities. These scenes were not dissimilar to 
those normally associated with sectarian clashes in Northern 
Ireland. But whereas those in the Province had been met with 
almost indifference by the mainland population, there was a 
public outcry at the violence in Liverpool and London. Mr. Condit 
believes that despite its superior performance Michelin chose to 
close Mallusk rather than Stoke, in the knowledge that its 
decision would receive comparatively little unwanted attention .
He and his union colleagues were familiar with the Employment 
Protection Act, but he was, and is, unaware of the OECD's 
Guidelines. He said that even if they had known of their 
existence, Michelin would still have presented them with a "fait 
accompli". Unsolicited, he said that employees need legislation 
to compel firms to consult employees before the final decision is 
made. "Being informed at the last moment is just not good
enough".
He also stressed that the workforce was not divided, and thereby 
weakened, on religious grounds.
The Politicians* View
*^e closure announcement was the subject of a lengthy debate in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly. The factory was one of the
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Province’s major employers and its closure represented a loss of 
2.3$ of total employment in the manufacturing sector of the six 
counties. One politician put the proposed closure in perspective, 
commenting that it was the equivalent of the UK losing 150,000 
jobs in one sweep [Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates, December 22, 1982].
During the debate. Councillor Agnew revealed that he had been 
told in confidence in late October that Mallusk was going to 
close:
•Plant on order had been cancelled, existing plant had been 
transferred to Stoke-on-Trent, workers had been pot on a 
four-day week and the situation looked fairly ominous"
[Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of Debates, 
December 22, 1982].
Councillor Agnew did not feel free to divulge the source of his 
information, but it was, he claims, a Michelin Executive. His 
informant "leaked" the Company’s plans to him in the hope that he 
would be able to launch a public campaign to reverse the decision 
[interview with Cllr. Agnew, September 1984].
When the Councillor subsequently approached both management and 
unions, the former denied that there was any proposed closure, 
whilst the latter were convinced that this was indeed the case. 
He commented:
•The unions themseves did not get much help or co-operation 
when they approached the management after I had spoken to
them" [Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates, December 22, 1982].
He also believes that Michelin singled out Mallusk for closure 
because "a militant, leftist element" had gained control of the 
union within the plant.
Mr. Taylor, one of the Province’s three MEPs, was highly critical 
of the firm, and he alleged that there had been no prior 
Consultations with the employees’ representatives:
•I think that throughout Western Europe....the manner in 
which Michelin have handled this whole decision will go down 
as one of the most shameful examples of multinationals in
operation" [Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates, December 22, 1982],
The full title of Britain’s major right-of-centre party is the 
Conservative and Unionist Party, and as a member of the Official 
Unionist Party, one would have expected Mr. Taylor to have a 
negative view of the "Vredeling-Richards Proposal", but Mr. 
Taylor argued that Michelin’s handling of the closure 
announcement was further evidence of the need for the legislation 
which this Proposal offered. He compared the four days notice 
received by Mr. Butler with the original "Vredeling Proposals" 
requirement of a minimum of 40 days notification to employees 
before the final decision is made.
The Reverend Dr Ian Paisley added that Michelin had a history of
non-consultation;
"I salute the patience of the workforce in Michelin because
I...know scMse of the difficulties that the workforce has 
been up against. That workforce has been patient despite not 
being consulted through the unions in the way that other
firms consult their unions, not only in this decision, but 
on many, many other decisions..." [Northern Ireland
Assembly, Official Report of Debates, December 22, 1982].
Councillor Cook reminded the Assembly that soon after it began 
producing in the Province, Michelin withdrew from the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation which had encouraged "good practises of 
management and union negotiations and relationships".
The feelings of the Ulster politicians participating in the 
Northern Assembly debate were best summed up by Mr. Allister, 
Councillor for North Antrim:
"Michelin, it seems, has come to epitomise all that is worst 
in the excesses of the handling by multinationals of their 
workers. These were job losses which were inflicted on the 
people affected without the least consultation. There was no 
consultaion lAatever with unions from management. There can 
be no excuse for that. The very least the workers of 
Michelin deserved was to be advised well in advance of what 
could possibly happen to their Jobs; but, of course, typical 
of the entire attitude of Michelin they were the last people 
to know" [Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates, December 22, 1982].
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He said, therefore, that he welcomed the "Vredeling Proposal", as 
it would enforce consultation with employees.
11.34. The Oompany* 3_Yley
On September 14, 1984, a copy of the standard letter, which the
author submitted to all companies, was sent to Mr. P. Croiselle, 
Head of UK. Factories. In his reply, dated September 25, 1984, he 
wrote:
•I have given careful consideration to your request for help 
in carrying out research into the processes involved in the 
decision to close our Belfast factory, but I regret that I 
am not able to give my agreement. The basis on which our 
decision was made were discussed fully and openly with the 
organisations and authorities concerned; the legal
obligations were fully complied with including those 
concerning redundancy; and our moral obligations were 
fulfilled to an extent idiich went far beyond basic
entitlements.
We consider that the decision we made was indeed ... the 
most difficult, it was also the most painful. Unfortunately, 
in view of the severe shrinkage of our markets, it was 
unavoidable. We are satisfied that in making it, 
communicating it and carrying it out we have acted in the 
best spirit of the various national and European guidelines 
and codes of conduct. Some evidence to support this is that 
not a single hour was lost by industrial action during the 
whole period" [letter dated September 25, 1984, to author
from Mr. P. Croiselle, Head of UK Factories].
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11.35.; Cbnclusions
Two of the three plants studied in the last chapter had a long 
life-span, the oldest closed not long before it would have 
celebrated its centenary. In marked contrast, the tyre industry’s 
problems were unexpected and modern factories opened in the 1960s 
were closed less than two decades later. Apart from Firestone’s
Brentford plant, the factories examined in this chapter had only
been built from 1956 on.
Goodyear, Michelin, and Firestone confronted similar problems,
but as this case study reveals the conduct of world’s largest 
tyre manufacturer was far removed from its American and French 
rivals.
11.36.; Foreign Divestment Theory
11.36.1. : Condition^-based Theory.
Despite increasing oil prices since 1973» the number of motorists 
continues to grow. Average mileage per motorist continues to 
decrease however, and low petrol consumption has become a 
dominant consideratioln in choice of car. Fewer jour nies in 
lighter cars make for less demand in replacement tyres.
But the price of petroleum is perhaps not the main reason for the 
deflated tyre market. Tyre producers themselves have contributed, 
albeit inadvertently to the decline.
As a purely functional product, the tyre is replaced only when 
worn. Unlike the motor car it does not rely on new short-lived 
Fashions to generate sales among image-conscious consumers. 
Consequently, product differentiation rests on technological 
advantage, and so developing a value-for-money, longer-lasting 
tyre is the one and only key to maintaining sales and market 
share.
Thus cross-plys have been superseded by radiais which have
391
themselves been subject to life-prolonging technological 
improvement. The constant battle to produce increasingly wear- 
resistant tyres has proved a double-edged sword, for while the 
sole route to survival, it created further excess capacity in an 
industry already victim of the 1960s» over-optimistic forecasts.
Adverse conditions in the late 1970s, were in marked contrast to 
those prevalent in the pre-energy crisis years when producers had 
brought large modern plants on stream. This hostile business 
environment partly explains the plant closures reviewed in this 
industry case study. The condition-based theory of foreign 
divestment appears a particularly sound model in explaining plant 
closures in the Tyre and Rubber industry.
jj.36.2.: Motivation-based theory
The managerial literature stresses Parent Company losses as a 
major motivation for divestment, and both Michelin and Firestone 
had suffered major losses when they closed their UK operations. 
Goodyear remained profitable throughout the recession but its UK 
subsidiary was a drain on corporate resources, and poor 
subsidiary performance is a key divestment factor.
Goodyear and Michelin have rationalised their UK operations, but 
the US MNC has continued to commit further investment towards its 
British manufacturing plants. However, as the Drumchapel and 
Craigavon closures illustrate, strong motivating forces existed 
for the Akron-based firm to close these two plants.
The twenty-two year-old Scottish site had not only an appalling 
industrial relations record, but it catered for a rapidly 
dwindling market segment - cross-ply tyres. Despite its history, 
the Board Chairman’s soft-spot for Drumchapel proved a powerful 
"barrier to exit" which impacted upon the Company’s decision to 
conduct a publicity campaign of the plant’s problems.
The Ulster plant’s failure to record a single profitable year in 
its short fifteen year life-span suggests that the original 
decision to establish the unit was ill-founded. The political
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climate had changed drastically shortly after the plant opened 
and in August 1969 there was an eruption which has bedeviled the 
Province ever since. Employee relations however were good and 
there is no evidence to suggest that the plant was adversely 
affected by sectarianism.
Craigavon was closed simply because of insufficient demand; the 
factory was a liability. In addition to the condition and 
motivation based theoretical divestment models, the precipitating 
circumstance-based theory provides an important explanatory 
framework for the Craigavon closure. The decision to close was 
taken by the new Chairman of the Board only five months after his 
appointment.
Michelin’s obsession with secrecy has rendered impossible the 
author’s attempts to offer new insight on the causes for the 
Mallusk closure. Its ÜK Management even insisted that the author 
seek permission before "any of the information" contained in its 
closure announcement Press Release "is made public in any way" 
[letter to author, dated July 13, 1984 from T. Forster, Chief 
Personnel Officer].
The decision to reduce sharply UK manufacturing capacity was 
clearly a response to deteriorating market conditions. Mallusk 
was the second largest UK plant, after the older Stoke site which 
doubled as Michelin’s UK Headquarters. Greater strategic 
importance and longer managerial commitment no doubt favoured the 
plant in the Potteries district. At the time of the closure 
announcement, Michelin was at pains to stress that Mallusk’s 
location did not influence the divestment decision, but the 
permanent threat of civil unrest could hardly have endeared the 
Ulster plant to subsidiary and parent company management.
Divestment of UK operations was just part of a major 
nationalisation programme in which employment levels were slashed 
at Firestone, - once rumoured to be withdrawing completely from 
tyre production (see Table 11.8.).
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Table 11.8.: Firestone, Goodyear, and Michelin: Worldwide
Employment
Year Firestone Goodyear Michelin
1985 54,700 134,115 NA
1984 59,900 133,271 120,000
1983 60,200 128,760 131,000
1982 65,500 131,665 115,000
1981 72,900 138,4 87 128,000
1980 83,000 144,860 125,000
1979 107,500 154,373 120,000
1978 112,000 154,291 120,000
1977 115,000 153,033 115,000
Source: Corporate accounts: Fortune
Built before the Second World War, Firestone’s Brentford 
operation, like Goodyear’s Drumchapel plant, produced cross-ply 
tyres whose popularity had slumped during the 1970s. Not 
surprisingly, Brentford with its outdated product range was 
mainly responsible for the firm’s heavy losses in the UK. The 
group’s other plant at Wrexham was blighted by a different 
problem - one which had also dogged Goodyear’s Scottish factory. 
The modern Welsh plant had a history of industrial disputes and 
the report from the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service report, commissioned less than two years before closure, 
reflected a dismal picture of managerial incompetence and 
employee militancy. These factors no doubt contributed to 
Firestone’s decision to dispose of its UK subsidiary and transfer 
production to the Iberian peninsula.
The five plants examined in this case study were opened in 1921, 
1957, 1965, 1967, and 1968. By the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when they closed, the business environment had drastically 
changed from the halcyon days of the 1960s. Faced with excess 
Capacity, manufacturers were compelled to rationalise. The 
motivations for closing these plants can be found in one or more 
of the following divestment factors which rendered them unviable: 
outdated production facilities, low productivity, labour 
problems, and poor pre-investment analysis, and most importantly 
low demand.
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11.36.3.: Pr.e^ llDJLtatlng-QirQumstano.e baaed theory
The role of the "new man" is evident in the Goodyear Craigavon, 
and Firestone Wrexham cases, the divestment decision being taken 
four and nine months respectively after the appointment of a new 
Chairman/Chief Executive Officer. The close relationship between 
a change in personnel and the difficult divestment decision is 
particularly noticeable in the other Firestone case. Brentford’s 
closure announcement was issued the day after Mr. Nevin’s 
elevation to position of President.
Divestment theory puts forward the proposition that the decision 
to reshuffle senior management increases the likelihood that 
another quite diiferent decision will be reached, namely to sell 
or close down certain operations. But is this really an accurate 
interpretation of previous divestment situations. It would be 
foolish to suggest that within twenty-four hours of taking 
office, Mr. Nevin had conducted a review of operations, concluded 
that Brentford should close, and then implemented that decision. 
It is more realistic to view both events - Mr. Nevin’s promotion 
and Brentford’s closure - as symptoms of an ailing company, its 
self-diagnosis, and prescription being major change, essential in 
restoring the parent company’s fortunes.
If this is the case, the value of precipitating circumstance- 
based divestment theory becomes questionable,as it appears 
nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophesy. However, this 
hypothesis is of predictive value in that stakeholders with an 
interest in anticipating divestment have an additional pointer 
upon which to base their expectations.
■U.37.; E n r o l PisGlosore and QonaultatlOP
The Goodyear Drumchapel closure is unique in that employees were 
repeatedly warned by the Company that the plant would be closed 
unless they accepted in full the Survival Plan. Whereas employees 
normally complain of being hampered by lack of information, the 
Drumchapel workforce decided its own fate and rejected Goodyear’s 
programme. By providing employees with all the facts, and
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correctly predicting their rash reaction, the US MNC was able to 
withdraw from Scotland, its reputation intact, while the 
workforce was lambasted by virtually all sections of the Scottish 
media. In this respect it was a perfectly executed divestment 
strategy - success founded upon total frankness with employees, 
their representatives, and the local community.
Local plant management was also totally involved in employee 
communication. Indeed, the Plant Manager provided an invaluable 
service to management at Goodyear's Wolverhampton 
Headquarters. He kept a close monitor on the mood in the plant 
and forewarned UK management of the labour force's most likely 
response to the Company's proposals. Consequently, Management was 
constantly one step ahead of the workforce which raced head-long 
like lemmings to disaster.
The closure of the Scottish operation had been therefore sadly 
predictable. It was closed 89 days after the closure 
announcement, 90 days including the day of the announcement, but 
the Department of Employment states categorically that this day 
should not be included in calculating redundancy notice, the 
fact that they received the Minimum legal notice is hardly 
surprising in view of the employees apparent lack of interest in 
safeguarding their own jobs, and one can hardly blame Goodyear 
for getting out as quickly as possible.
Closure at Craigavon was also anticipated, but there similarities 
with Drumchapel end. Goodyear handled the divestment process 
quite differently, but equally effectively. Instead of directly 
informing the workforce, the Company resorted to a tactic not 
unfamiliar to at least one former British Trade and Industry 
Secretary - the carefully placed leak.
The decision to close the Ulster plant was made in May 1983 by 
Goodyear's newly appointed Chairman of the Board, senior UK 
subsidiary management being notified shortly after. The 
Wolverhampton based executives embarked upon meticulous 
preparation for implementing the divestment decision. They had to 
ensure that employees had been notified by August 2, 1983, and
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they formally decided to keep local Ulster management in the dark 
for as long as possible.
Management at Craigavon was fed selected snippets of information 
by senior UK subsidiary management in the knowledge that it would 
be passed to the local newspaper, The Lurgan M a n . Perhaps, 
discovery of the Craigavon mole and fear of premature publicity, 
explains Wolverhampton’s reluctance to inform plant management.
Nevertheless, Goodyear’s judicial leak policy braced the 
workforce for closure. This was announced on July 25, 1983, some 
two months after the divestment decision had been made in the US 
by Goodyear’s top man. The news could hardly be described as a 
bombshell. If anything the surprise was that closure had not been 
implemented sooner. Craigavon was closed 96 days later on October 
28, 1983. Goodyear thus exceeded by six days the UK’s absolute 
minimum legal notification requirement
In marked contrast to Goodyear, Michelin, the French MNC, gave 
employees almost two years notice. News of the divestment 
decision was greeted with condemnation by all local politicians, 
- no mean achievment in sectarian Belfast. Their views and bitter 
denunciation of the firm are recorded in this case study. 
Michelin incurred the wrath of the workforce and politicians 
alike because, unlike Goodyear, it had given no indication 
whatsoever of its intention to close Mallusk before it presented 
its "fait accompli" in December 1982.
At the time of the closure announcement, more than 20$ of 
Ulster’s labour force was unemployed. The Province was probably 
Europe’s worst economic and social black-spot. Attracting 
prospective employers to the six counties had proved a major 
challenge to Westminster, and in desperation the UK Government 
had rashly invested millions of pounds of tax-payers money in 
Highly suspect projects, notably the De Lorean car and Lear Fan 
jet.
Tempers were fuelled by Michelin’s apparent insensitivity. 
Firstly, it had notified the public authorities of the impending
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2,000 job losses only four days before notifying the workforce. 
Ulster politicians were enraged that such short notice before the 
public closure announcement denied them the opportunity to hold 
discussions with the Company. This was in contrast to Goodyear, 
the US MNC which intimated its intentions to the public 
authorities a full month before informing employees.
Secondly, Michelin chose to make the announcement just before 
Christmas when it would have had nothing to lose by delaying the 
news until after the festive season, - especially as it was 
planning a gradual run-down over twelve months. By contrast, 
seven months later when Goodyear decided to close Craigavon, it 
decided to break the news to the workforce after their summer 
break, rather than before, so as to avoid ruining employees’ 
holidays with such a depressing announcement.
Given Michelin’s conduct, the statement below rings hollow:
"The directors recognise the importance of good 
communications and relations with employees. An integral 
part of such policy is the maintenance and development of 
two-way communications and encouragement to the employees to 
identify themselves with the Company" [Michelin PLC, 
■1984 Annual Report!
Prior to the UK closure, British Trades Unions had been warned of 
Firestone’s notoriously cavalier approach to closure in two other 
European countries, Sweden and Switzerland. The Brentford and 
Wrexham cases underscore the US MNCs reputation.
On November 14, 1979, the workforce at the London plant was given 
the shock news, and presented with a fait accompli. 93 days 
later, on February 15, 1980, Brentford closed. Nevertheless the 
Secretary of State for Employment confirmed in Parliament that 
Firestone’s conduct was in accordance with UK legislation.
However, it is the Wrexham closure which highlights the 
difficulties faced by employees trying to extract information 
from subsidiary management of a foreign parent company. In the 
Goodyear Craigavon closure it was seen that the divestment 
decision was made in the US, and then passed on to subsidiary
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management who delayed telling plant management until the last 
minute.
It is difficult to believe that by early August I98O, Firestone's 
UK subsidiary management did not know that Wrexham was to be 
closed, but if it were genuinly unaware of the fact then the 
parent company deserves strong condemnation. If it knew of the 
divestment decision, the UK management was not only 
unforthcoming, but the principal perpetrators of an elaborate 
deception against employees and their representatives.
The sale in early August of the Company's retail outlets, 
convinced Union leaders that closure was looming, but on August 
6, 1980 UK Management freely assured the workforce that the 
future of the Welsh plant was safe. The following day it 
confirmed that Akron had not yet reached a final decision, but 
rumours of closure were to prove well-founded. Closure was 
announced on August 20, and 90 days later, on November 18, 
Wrexham closed. Most redundancies were implemented by mid-October 
with employees receiving pay in lieu of notice, but Firestone had 
conformed with the basic minimum legal requirements of the 1975 
Employment Protection Act.
The refusal of Firestone and Michelin to participate in this 
study precludes a report of their views on the OECD's Employment 
and Industrial Relations Guidelines and proposed EEC legislation, 
namely the controversial Vredeling Proposals. In its response to 
the author's invitation, however, Michelin stressed that "we have 
acted in the best spirit of the various national and European 
guidelines and codes of conduct".
Of the three MNCs examined in this case study, Goodyear alone 
ensured that employees were not taken by surprise at the closure 
decisions; indeed, the Drumchapel workforce itself effectively 
took the decision. The conduct of this US MNC therefore stands 
above that of the Firestone and the French MNC. Nevertheless, the 
Company’s own standards, not the OECD’s Guidelines, determined 
Goodyear’s behaviour.
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Assessing the impact of national culture on corporate behaviour 
is problematic in this case. Although they not only have the same 
nationality, but are based in the same city — Akron — Goodyear 
and Firestone behaved quite differently. An important 
explanatory variable may be that Firestone was clearing out 
altogether from the UK, and host country perception of the 
organisation counted for little. Goodyear, on the other hand, 
was merely rationalising operations, and had a vested interest in 
protecting its reputation. Previous research noted that firms 
engaged in total withdrawal from a country are inclined towards a 
speedy getaway, rather than the slower, publicity-consciouss 
divestment process preferred by firms intending to maintain a 
presence in that country.
According to Hofstede’s four variable analysis of national 
culture, the US bears three of the four features amenable to 
disclosure, whereas France with only two, is characterised by the 
feature most closely associated with secrecy. High Uncertainty 
Avoidance. Michelin has developed a reputation for obsessive 
secrecy and its corporate behaviour certainly seems to reflect 
national culture. But despite these attributes, Michelin’s 
behaviour was an improvement upon that of Firestone, a US MNC and 
a product of national culture which places a premium on 
disclosure.
A number of points emerge from this case. The actual divestment 
decision is always centralised. In one case it was found that 
while subsidiary management knew of closure plans, it chose to 
withold this information from local management who were the 
Unions’ source of information. However, the response of 
Firestone’s UK management to approaches from Union officials 
representing the Wrexham plant, suggests that Parent Company 
executives had witheld information from the UK executives or, 
that the latter had been less than open with employees’ 
representatives.
As for employee disclosure and consultation by Firestone, the 
former was minimal and the latter non-existent. Michelin gave 18 
months notice, but presented public authorities and workforce
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with an unexpected fait accompli. Goodyear, on the other hand, 
gave Ulster's civic leaders four weeks notice, and had Indirectly 
Indicated that Cralgavon's future was In jeopardy. The Drumchapel 
case Is unique among the closures examined In this thesis. 
Employees given the choice between employment and redundancy, 
voted for the latter. A subsequent change of heart served only to 
highlight the irresponsible nature of the workforce. Goodyear 
closed Drumchapel as soon as legally possible. It was rid of its 
worst plant in Europe.
There can be no greater indictment of current UK employment 
protection legislation than the sad fact of the UK Government's 
admission that Firestone fulfilled its legal obligations.
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CHAPTER 12 
FARM and CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY
12.1:. IntroduQtlQXL
Producers of agricultural and construction machinery, the three 
MNCs studied in this case, - Caterpillar International Harvester 
(known as Navister International with effect from January 1986) 
of the US, and Massey-Ferguson of Canada, - operate in highly 
unstable markets, subject to cyclical and seasonal fluctiations. 
In the late 1970s-early 1980s, all three firms achieved record 
profits.
However, within twelve months of their respective successes, the 
three North American MNCs found themselves facing heavy losses, 
as strongly unfavourable economic factors impacted on their 
major markets.
Massey-Ferguson, confronted with a recession on capital goods, 
particularly in the key markets of South America and Turkey, as 
well as market saturation in Europe embarked on a re-appraisal of 
European combine production. This industry case study begins with 
an examination the Canadian MNCs response to these conditions, 
and considers the review's implications for the Scottish plant, 
at Kilmarnock and the 1,500 strong workforce.
If corporate behaviour reflects home country national culture 
then one would expect the Canadian MNC - Massey-Ferguson - to 
conduct the divestment process in a manner dissimilar to that of 
OS MNCs, since culturally Canada is more disposed to disclosure 
of information. This case study will compare the conduct of the 
Canadian and US MNCs and highlight what influence if any, is 
exerted by the culture of the home country on MNCs' behaviour.
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MASSEY-FERGÜSON
p.?.: Massev-Ferguson'8 Origins and Fortunes
Massey-Ferguson, the Canadian MNC, was founded by Daniel Massey 
in 1830. Foreign sales grew rapidly following a successful 
promotion at the Paris Exhibition in 1867. A merger forged with 
A. Harris and Patter son-Wisner Co. in 1891, saw the new firm, 
Massey-Harris become the largest farm manufacturer in the British 
Empire.
Despite its size and concomitant economies of scale, it failed to 
make any impression on the bordering US market until 1944 when 
wartime shortages made it expedient for America to use Massey's 
self-propelled combine harvester. Tractor sales were 
disappointing, however, and to combat its poor performance, 
Massey, in 1953 acquired the Ferguson Co. which had achieved 
worldwide success in this market segment. Five years later, the 
name Massey-Ferguson was adopted [Stopford, 1982].
Between 1948 and 1977 Massey-Ferguson was controlled by Argus 
Corporation, a Canadian financial hoi ding-company, and it in turn 
was controlled by another Canadian holding company, Ravelston.
In 1977, Massey reported a net profit of $3m on sales of $2,861m, 
but since then the Company has suffered dramatic losses. Table 
12,1. reveals the extent of the decline. By 19 80 its very 
survival was in question, and an international conclave 
"struggled t6 find a refinancing formula while receivers were 
being prepared to take over at any moment" [Rodger and Simon, May 
20, 19851.
Eventually, Massey was bailed out by some 200 lenders, mostly 
banks. The final phases of refinancing involved the Governments 
of Canada, Ontario, and H.M. Government through the Export Credit 
Licensing Department. Mr. Conrad Black, Canadian tycoon and 
Masseyts Chief Executive Officer, who had never been popular with 
Mr. Pierre Trudeau's Liberal Government, severed his and Argus
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Corporation’s connections with Massey when it became clear that 
Government aid was unlikely to be forthcoming whilst he was 
directly involved with the Company.
Unlike most American MNCs, the Canadian MNC’s domestic market was 
of minor strategic importance compared to its foreign operations. 
In 1977» foreign sales (ie.sales outside North America) accounted 
for 70%, whilst sales in Canada accounted for only 7%. Massey 
could not fall back on a large domestic market in periods of 
recession. Further indication of the minor role of its home 
market was in the number employed by Massey in Canada; only one 
third the number employed in the UK.
Table 12.2 reveals that from the mid-1970s sales of tractors, 
combines, and industrial machinery, Massey's three main products, 
fell dramatically. This problem was compounded by the firm's own 
structural weakness. This structural weakness did not go 
unnoticed and at the end of 1977 Massey shares on the Toronto 
stock exchange fell from their 1976 all-time high level of $32 to 
the 1971 level of $13. Bumper harvests depressed grain prices 
and therefore farmers' incomes, so, firstly, they had less 
incentive to grow grain and, secondly, they had a shortage of 
funds at a time of high interest rates. Replacement buying 
therefore predominated over new purchasing among farmers.
Massey was in a vulnerable position as managerial and financial 
resources had been fully stretched when the Company pursued a 
vigorous growth policy financed by heavy borrowing from the 
banks. By mid-1978, Massey's borrowings had reached $1.3bn backed 
by shareholders' funds of $650m, and normal equity financing was 
no longer possible [Rodger and Simon, May 20, 1985].
In May 1978, Massey published its half-yearly results. These were 
unsatisfactory, and at several of its UK plants, redundancies 
were issued, including 87 at Kilmarnock. In the first quarter of 
the 1978 fiscal year, Massey's losses were running at $8m for the 
year, but by the end of the third quarter, in July 1978, they had 
nisen to $14 5m.
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The firm’s problems were even more serious, however, than these 
losses suggest. Massey had a severe shortage of funds and a 
dangerously high debt ratio. Borrowings were almost double 
equities. The 1978 fiscal year ended on October 31, 1978, and a
staggering loss of $268m was returned. The Company was under 
strong pressure from its financiers to prevent further 
deterioration.
Table 12.1.: Net Sales, Net Profit, and Number Employed 1977-1984 
(US Dollars in millions)
Year Ended Net Sales Net Profit Number
Employed
Jan 31, 1984 $1,535 (68) 27,609
Nov 1 19 82-Jan 31 1983 313 (94) 30,095
Oct 31, 1982 2,058 (429) 33,726
Oct 31, 1981 2,646 (240) 39,789
Oct 31, 1980 3,132 (225) 41,690
Oct 31, 1979 2,973 37 56,233
Oct 31, 1978 2,631 (268) 57,983
Oct 31, 1977 2,861 3 67,151
Source: Corporate accounts.
Table 12.2.: Worldwide Industry Unit Retail Sales: Base Year=1976
Year Tractors Combines Industrial Machinery
1976 100 100 100
1977 99 86 107
1978 90 87 , 118
1979 90.5 87 114
1980 85 78 102
1981 81 77 77
1982 73 58 61
1983 70 49 63
Source: Massey-Ferguson, J983 Annual
Deterioration did occur, caused by a temporary downturn 
World markets, and an ill-conceived decision by a 
President since 1959, Mr. Thornborough, to acquire 
construction firm.
During Thornborough's Presidency, Massey had conce
r r r  r
international Harvester and John ,,,, and
proved successful for a number of years.
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1976, when these two US firms braved the worst recession in the 
US market since the thirties, Massey doubled net profits to a 
record $118m.
By 1978, the situation was reversed. The US market had recovered 
and was buoyant, and the Third World and European markets, which 
were of vital importance to Massey, were severely depressed. It 
appeared that dependence on overseas markets would be the death 
of Massey.
This depression in key markets was exacerbated by the effects of 
Thornborough's major decision to acquire, in 1974, the West 
German construction machinery firm, Rheinstahl Hanomag. The 
attempt to diversify was a complete disaster and the decision 
proved even more costly, than abandoning the world's largest 
single national market. The Construction Equipment Division 
remained a thorn in Massey's flesh. In the first nine months of 
1978 it lost $39m. In 1979 the Construction Machinery Operations 
were divested at a huge loss.
The New Men
It was against this background, that in August 1978 Black and 
members of his family gained overall control of the Ravelston 
Corporation, of Argus Corporation, and ultimately of Massey. 
Priority was given to restoring the confidence of Massey's 
bankers, and this demanded rationalisation of production 
facilities.
In September 1978, Mr. Thornborough, was promoted sideways to 
Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. A new President was 
appointed, British-born, Victor Rice who had a mandate to cut 
costs and dispose of the Teutonic millstone [Rodger and Simon, 
May 20, 19853.
Messrs. Black, and Mr. Rice meant business. Their programme for 
restoring profitability was a drastic one. In future. Rice said, 
Massey would concentrate on its core business, namely Tractors 
and Farm Machinery (including Combine Harvesters), Diesel
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Engines, and Light Industrial Machinery. The "Thornborough 
strategy" was to be abandoned, and the Company would devote more 
attention and resources to increasing its home ground, the North 
American market [Hargreaves, October 6, 1980].
By July 1979, Rice had apparently achieved his twin aims: the
Company was back in profit and thus the confidence of the 
financial community had been restored. Indeed the net income 
achieved in the first quarter ending January 1979 was $13m 
compared with a net loss of $39m for the period in 1978,
A few months later, however, everything went horribly wrong. In 
an attempt to control inflation, the US Federal Reserve drove up 
US interest rates to unprecedented peaks, and thus wrecked
Massey's budget plans. American farmers' incomes, already 
undermined by low commodity prices and high interest rates,
slumped even further in the confusion following the Russian grain 
embargo. US sales continued on a downward spiral, whilst the
decline in Massey's traditional markets continued unabated. To 
make matters worse, sterling continued to appreciate against the 
dollar and other major currencies, therby pushing up the cost of 
machinery exported from Massey's main manufacturing base, the
United Kingdom [Hargreaves, October 6, 1980].
Massey's dealers could not even sell their existing stock, never 
mind place further offers, and the firm was compelled to borrow 
heavily in order to meet interest payments on previous borrowing.
In order to appease the Company's financiers, - banks and stock 
exchanges,- Rice had to overcome two major problems: restoring
the Company to profitability and reducing the debt ratio. A four- 
pronged strategy was launched. Short-time working was introduced 
in an attempt to reduce inventories ; a number of operations were 
sold; the number employed was reduced by 14$ by October 1978; 
and, a rationalisation programme of production facilities was 
initiated.
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12.4,; The Implications for Kilmarnock
Massey had opened its Kilmarnock plant in 1949. Originally the 
factory was multi-product, manufacturing a full range of farm 
machinery. During the 1960s, however, the design department was 
transferred to Massey's Coventry plant, and Kilmarnock became 
dependent on a much narrower product range, medium-sized combine 
harvesters only.
By 1978, Kilmarnock was the sole producer of combines in the UK 
and exports accounted for 60$ of its total output. It provided 
1,600 jobs, (its peak period was in the 1960s when the number 
employed exceeded 2,000). There were seven manual and four staff 
unions at Kilmarnock, represented by the Co-Ordinating Committee 
which was formed in September 1978 when employees were first made 
aware that the plant's future was in jeopardy.
In February 1978, Management informed the unions' Negotiating 
Joint Committee (NJC) that the Company had decided that 1978 
would be a year of "substantial adjustment" and that "actions to 
improve profitability and deployment of assets had already begun 
and would continue to be given the highest priority".
In the ensuing summer months, short-time working was introduced, 
and anxious Union officials met with Labour Government Ministers 
to discuss the slump in Kilmarnock's traditional markets.
After meeting with Mr. Hebden, (Massey's UK Managing Director), 
Mr. A. Williams, Minister of State at the Department of Industry, 
wrote to Union officials saying he was satisfied that the Company 
"have no plans to reduce the output of their UK operations 
permanently", and in August the Company gave them the following 
assurance;
•the redundancy programme In the UK...Is virtually 
complete" [Trade Union Research Unit, TURU, unpublished 
paper].
Less than a month later, however, shock news was delivered to the 
Kilmarnock employees.
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September 9, 1978: Massey announced that it would be conducting
a "Feasibility Study" into the rationalisation of combine 
harvester production between its two European plants, Kilmarnock 
and Marquette, in France. The study's "Terms of Reference" were 
as follows:
"(1} To evaluate the two single sourcing alternatives 
available to Ifossey-Perguson.
(2) To evaluate the possible alternative uses of the 
Kilmarnock factory in the event that Ifeirquette is 
chosen as tiie sin^e source
(3) To evaluate the potential expansion of other production 
currently performed at Marquette in the event that 
Kilmarnock Is chosen as the single source".
The shop stewards at Kilmarnock believed that the study was being 
conducted to rationalize the decision already taken to close 
Kilmarnock. Their suspicion grew idien they were denied atqr 
participation in the exercise. Completion of the report within 
just five weeks heightened their suspicions.
October 27» 1978: The "Feasibility Study" was published.
November 7» 1978: the Recommendations of the European Combine
Study Group were disclosed for discussion and consultation with
unions.
The study showed that Massey bad excess combine manufacturing 
capacity in Europe, relative to all foreseeable levels of demand, 
and that concentration of production in a single viable plant was 
essential if Massey was to maintain a viable combine 
manufacturing operation. It inferred that production of combine 
harvesters at Kilmarnock in Ayrshire should cease, and that 
Marquette should be the single source for European combine 
production.
Former employees have alleged that the Scottish plant had been 
starved of capital investment, but even as late as 1977, 
Kilmarnock was in the middle of an Investment programme of more 
than £2ii. It would appear, therefore, that the sudden and sharp
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downturn for Farm Machinery really did catch the Canadian MNC 
off-guard, forcing a re-consideration of its investments.
Unlike the Scottish plant, Marquette was a multi-product 
operation and therefore "the overheads of combine manufacture 
could be offset into the general overhead at the plant to a 
considerable extent. Whereas if combine production had been 
centred at Kilmarnock you would still have had overheads at both 
plants still" [letter dated April 11, 1985, to author from Mr.
Dawe, Director of Communications Europe]. As a part fabrication 
plant supplying other Massey factories (especially the tractor 
plant at Beauvais, Paris), Marquette was a closely integrated 
unit, and accordingly of greater strategic value than the 
independent Ayrshire plant.
The Scottish plant was not to close, however. It was to be saved 
by transferring baler production from Marquette to Kilmarnock, 
but 1 ,000 jobs would be lost, leaving a depleted work-for ce of 
500.According to Massey, it would have been cheaper to close the 
Scottish plant, but, the decision to introduce baler production 
was prompted by Massey's "social responsibility to the area" 
[Massey-Ferguson, Press Statement, November 7, 1978].
November 30, 1978: on Saint Andrew's day, local politicians met
the Company's Director of UK operations, Mr. Henry Hebden, who 
assured them that the Company's proposals were not the first step 
in the total closure of the Kilmarnock plant. He told them that 
the factory would become the sole baler-manufacturing centre in 
Europe.
On the same day, 320 employees at the Kilmarnock plant travelled 
by special train to London to lobby MPs and attend a meeting held 
in the Grand Committee Room at Westminster Hall. The eight 
members of the Co-Ordinating Committee afterwards attended a 
meeting with the then Minister for Industry, Allan Williams, and 
the Under Secretary of State for Employment, John Golding, and 
the MP for Kilmarnock, John Lambie.
February 2, 1979: the unions presented their criticisms of the
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"Feasibility Study". They questioned the basis and value of the 
study arguing that it was "the means designed to justify the 
ends".
May 16, 1979: Three months had passed before Management finally
met the Unions to defend the Study's conclusions, and to pass on 
information requested at the February meeting. Due attention had 
been given to questions and arguments presented by the Unions at 
a previous meeting. Massey confirmed "that at this point in time 
the Study Group did not consider it would be justified in 
changing its original recommendation".
Further details were also provided about the timetable being 
recommended by the Study Group. Combine production would cease 
on April 30, 1980 and full baler production would start on
September 1, 1980:
Massey announced that the decision, anxiously anticipated by 
employees, on the Study Group's proposals, would be made during 
the week of July 25.
"If these deadlines were to be met, Kilmarnock would need to 
begin preparatory work on the baler not later than mid 
August 1979. Consequently the coq>any was proposing to make 
a firm decision on the Study Group recommendation during 
week beginning 25th July, 1979. This required the 
consultative process to be complete by the end of June 
1979".
The Company also stated it was prepared to agree to the Unions' 
request for a representative group to meet the President prior to 
his making the final decision [Press Statement issued by Massey, 
May 16, 1979]
June 6, 1979: the Massey Combined Union Co-Ordinating Committee
wrote to the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, asking for her 
assistance "in our fight to save one thousand jobs at this, the 
only Combine manufacturing plant in the UK".
June 14, 1979: a four man delegation from the Joint Co-Ordinating 
Committee met Sir Keith Joseph, (then Secretary of State for 
Industry), at the headquarters of the Scottish Office in Glasgow.
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It was hoped to convince the Minister of the newly-elected 
Conservative Government that he should do everything possible to 
persuade Massey to reach a decision favourable to the Kilmarnock 
plant.
Mid-Jane 1979 A Conference organised by the Unions represented at 
Massey's European plants was held in Rome. Each national 
delegation described the situation at Massey's plants in their 
country, and it was agreed that the group should "furnish each 
other every two months with information concerning our respective 
factories" [Minutes of Conference].
July 4, 1979; A meeting took place in London between national
union officials, (including the then President of the AUEW, Mr. 
Terry Duffy), and Mr. Rice who assured them that he had not yet 
come to a final decision. The Chief Executive also met 
representatives from the Scottish Trades Union Congress and 
members of Kilmarnock and Louden District Council. The Managing 
Director of UK operations held discussions with the Secretary of 
State for Scottish Industry, Mr. Alex Fletcher, and the Secretary 
of State for Industry, Sir Keith Joseph.
July 17, 1979: it was announced that the "Feasibility Study" was
to be re-opened and that the deadline for announcing the final 
decision was therefore being extended. The Company said that 
considerable consideration has been given to all the 
representations made at the meeting of July 4, and, added that,
"althou^ none has brou^t out new factors, the President 
felt it essential to update the study in the light of 
representations made. Indications of further downtrends in 
the markets for combines and, more especially, balers and 
from (Aanged eooncmic circumstances arising from the world 
oil prices also made this necessary" [Massey Withdrawal 
From Kilmarnock Factory: Timetable Of Events].
July 23, 1979: Massey announced that it would be iqpdating the
study which it was conducting into the utilisation of its combine 
harvester manufacturing resources in Europe, before any decision 
on the future of its Kilmarnock factory could be made.
The Company prepared a document providing Management with
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"Recommended Answers" for anticipated questions. Some of these 
are reproduced below:
Q1 "Does this announcement mean that M.F. has abandoned or 
is likely to abandon its plan to transfer (xxmbine production 
to France?
It would be wrong to make any assumptions. The study is 
being updated to ensure that the final decision is based on 
the most up-to-date assessment possible of all the factors 
which have to be considered. These include the 
representations made to the President, changing market 
forecasts arising from factors such as the effect of the oil 
situation. The objectives of the study remain the same, how 
best to deal with the problems idiich face the Company and at 
the same time protect the maximum number of jobs at 
Kilmarnock factory.
02. Is Massey now backing down on its proposal to 
manufacture balers at Kilmarnock?
(As Answer 1 above)
04. If the marlœt is trending downwards, does this throw 
the future of baler manufacture at Kilmarnock and the future 
of the whole workforce at the plant into doubt?
A4. To assume that would be to pre-judge the outcome of the 
updating of the study. Conditions have not become any 
easier but the need to protect jobs at the Kilmarnock plant 
to the maximum extent possible remains a matter of the 
greatest importance,
07. Originally, Massey stated that a decisions on 
Kilmarnock would have to be made by week (xxnmencing 23 July 
if your proposals were to be carried throu^. How you have 
abandoned this date and have not given another, when do you 
now expect to make a decision? How can you accomodate the 
delay?
A7. We do not have a firm date at present. The date that 
was originally mentioned was put forward as an integral part 
of the study group's original proposals. As the whole study 
was Itself subject to review and final decision the original 
date was not absolute.
Q8. Overall, is the news of the re-opening of the study 
grounds for hope/optimism at Kilmarnock?
A8. It is grounds for assurance that every way to save the 
maximum possible number of jobs at Kilmarnock Is being 
studied to the fullest".
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October 9, 1979: the Factory Director at Kilmarnock, Mr. Thomas,
informed the Co—Ordlnating Committee that short-time working 
would be introduced in the week beginning October 22, and that 
950 employees would be on a four day week. It was also decided
that the nightshift manning level should be cut by 20$.
"the completion of market surveys throughout the world and 
their consolidation into a manufacturing programme is likely 
to take another five to six weeks. It has already beccmie 
clear, however, that the market cannot support five-day
production of Combines at the current rate of build......
It is not possible at this stage in time to indicate how
long four-day working will last but the situation should
clarify itself once the market analysis is completed" 
[Statement Made To All Bargaining Units at Kilmarnock, 
October 9, 1979].
October 16, 1979: Employees were informed that the decision on
short time working would be suspended until Mr. Rice, the 
President, decided Kilmarnock’s future [Company Statement].
Late October, 1979: A Massey official in the Company’s UK
Headquarters (Coventry) announced that a statement would be 
issued on November 9, "but we can give no indication of what this 
may be". He said that it would communicate Mr. Rice’s decision 
on Kilmarnock’s future [Clark, October 31» 1979].
■12.5. The Closure Announcement
On November 9, 1979, two days before the plant was due to
celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of its official opening, Mr. 
Henry Hebden, Managing Director of UK operations, announced that 
the latest study, initiated in July, revealed that the transfer 
of baler manufacture to Kilmarnock was no longer viable because 
of the slump in European sales. The Company therefore withdrew 
its offer of baler production and announced the total closure of 
the Kilmarnock plant. He revealed that the firm would continue 
to undertake the search for other employers, and that Inbucon, a 
firm of Management Consultants, was conducting inquiries on the 
firm’s behalf:
"’MASSEY-FERGUSON CEASE OPERATIONS AT KILMARNOCK’
Massey-Ferguson has today informed employees at the
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company’s Kilmarnock combine harvester plant that the 
renewed study of the utilisation of its European harvesting 
manufacturing resources has been completed. The re-opened 
study was ordered by Massey’s president in July, before 
making the final decision on the future of the plant.
It has confirmed that the market for combines will continue 
at levels too low to maintain two combine manufacturing 
operations in Europe and that the most viable single 
manufacturing source is the company’s plant at Marquette, 
France.
Additonally, the new study has shown that the downward trend 
in the European baler market which first became evident 
earlier this year will be prolonged and is so severe that 
the proposed transfer of baler manufacture to Kilmarnock 
from the Massey plant at Marquette, France, can no longer be 
considered. The projected volumes are not sufficient to 
enable any plant to be viable with the baler as its sole 
product. The company is totally committed to continued 
manufacture of balers in Europe and, to this end, is now in 
the process of deciding which of its other European 
locations would best support viable manufacture of balers.
In view of these factors and because no other sources of 
work have been identified within Massey-Ferguson, the 
company regrets that it now has no option but to concentrate 
all its European combine harvester manufacture at the 
Marquette plant and to cease operations at the Kilmarnock 
plant completely. All MF production at the plant, which has 
1500 employees, will end on February 15» 19 80.
The closedown of MF operations at the Kilmarnock plant is 
one of a series of actions which Massey-Ferguson is taking 
in a number of countries in the wake of difficult world 
trading conditions and which have as their objective the 
better utilisation of manufacturing resources and the return 
of the company to profitability [Massey-Ferguson, November 
9» 1979].
In subsequent negotiations, the Company made a number of major 
concessions to unions’ demands. On January 17» 1980 it announced 
it had established a small firm on the Kilmarnock site which 
would provide 54 jobs:
"An important step in the search for alternative work for 
employees at the Massey-Ferguson combine harvester plant at 
Moorfield Estate, Kilmarnock, has been taken with the 
establishment of Moorfield Manufacturing Company 
(Kilmarnock) Limited.
Formed initially as a wholly owned Massey-Ferguson 
subsidiary with a Board of Management who are Massey- 
Ferguson directors, the new company will function as an 
independent concern and it is planned that Massey-Ferguson 
will become a minority shareholder in due course. The
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company Is assured of continued technical support from 
Massey-Ferguson while it is becoming established [Massey- 
Ferguson January 17, 1980].
Closure finally took place on February 15, 1980.
12.6.; The Unlon’a VleH_
Plant Convener, Mr. Sam Kay, deflected the author’s inquiries and 
recommended that he contact former Shop Steward, Mr. Willie 
Woods, currently a final year Honours undergraduate in Industrial 
Relations and Law, at Strathclyde University. Mr. Woods was 
highly critical of Massey.
He believes that a final decision to cease all production had 
been taken at least as far back as September 1978. All 
discussions held after that were, he claims, a complete waste of 
time from the Union’s viewpoint. On the other hand, they met the 
Company’s objective which was to keep hopes alive and at the same 
time kill off any posibility of organised resistance.
This alleged strategy was brilliantly executed, he argues, and it 
achieved Massey’s dual objectives: a smooth run-down (not one
day’s production was lost due to industrial action), and the 
enhancement, or at least the protection, of Massey’s reputation.
He beleves that the proposed transfer of baler production 
Marquette Kilmarnock, plus the recruitment of Inbucon were key 
instruments in the Machiavellian plot carefully designed by 
Massey.
In order to appreciate his argument, an examination of the age 
structure of the 1,500 labour force is necessary. The workforce 
was composed of three age groups, all roughly equal in size: the 
over-55s, those between 30 and 55» and those under 30.
Massey’s proposal to cease combine production but retain a 
workforce of 500 for baler production» was for the purpose, Mr. 
Woods alleges, of splitting the workforce and precluding 
effective industrial action. %is proposal was very attractive.
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he explained, to all employees except one group, the under-30s.
The over-55s were offered very generous redundancy terms 
whilst the middle group were content because they were safe in 
the knowledge that compulsory redundancies would be based on a 
last-in-first-out-policy. It was therefore only the under-30 
group which stood to lose, for given the brevity of their 
employment, their severance payments would amount to little, and 
finding alternative employment in Ayrshire in 1979 was no mean 
feat.
The recruitment of Inbucon should be seen, he argues, as part of 
a carefully orchestrated strategy to emasculate the power of 
labour. As long as employees believed that a buyer might be found 
for the plant they were unwilling to support the more militant 
stewards who were calling for industrial action.
According to Mr. Woods, Massey's handling of the run-down of 
Kilmarnock was a classic case of divide and conquer.
Mr. Woods argues that employee disclosure and consultation 
practised by Massey should not be compared favourably with those 
firms which gave no advance warning that closure was an option 
being considered. He argues that the only difference is one of 
strategy. Other studies presented in this thesis reveal 
situations in which employees were absolutely stunned by a shock 
closure announcement and 90 days notice of redundancy, the legal 
minimum requirement.
Nor were Mr. Woods' criticisms restricted to Management. He 
recounted how disappointed he had been with the AUEW's 
leadership. The Co-ordinating Committee was apparently unwilling 
to keep other shop stewards abreast of developments at Company 
Union meetings.
As to "Vredeling", Mr. Woods believes that while it would be an 
improvement on UK. legislation, it assumes that employees 
representatives would pass on information to employees. However, 
some Shop Stewards, he alleges, "often withold information", and
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often workers are suspicious of their own stewards.
Mr. Woods has sent a questionnaire to a random 150 ex-employees 
at Kilmarnock. Of these, only one believed that the establishment 
of Moorfield could be explained as altruism or the Company’s 
concept of social responsibility. This research technique 
normally offers respondents anonymity, but not in this instance, 
and some may argue, that the research methodology is therefore 
flawed.
When Massey Ferguson revealed its intentions to conduct a 
Feasibility Study on European combine production, the Co­
ordinating Committee at Kilmarnock enlisted the help of several 
academics, who, since the closure, have presented or published 
several papers, all highly critical of the Canadian MNC. Based at 
Strathclyde University’s Industrial Relations Department, they 
argue that the feasibility study was "a post hoc justification of 
a decision taken for financial (and chiefly cosmetic) reasons. It 
was primarily a propaganda exercise to undermine damaging labour 
and government resistance" [Baldry et al.].
■12^ 7; The Oompanv’s View
On December 12, 1984, Mr. Tony Dawe, Director Communications
Europe, and Mr. John Thomas, former Kilmarnock Plant Manager, 
were interviewed. The latter described Mr. Woods’ allegations as 
"ridiculous". Firstly, he said, had Massey been concerned only 
with its public image, a firm less expensive and less 
professional than Inbucon would have been engaged. Inbucon’s 
services cost Massey £100,000.
Secondly, the Company’s decision to introduce unpopular measures 
to eliminate abuses by employees of the piece-work system, 
resulted in a nine-week dispute which was not in the interests of 
the Corporation. It was exceptionally difficult to remedy the 
situation because supervisory staff had a vested interest in 
allowing these abuses to go unchecked, and so they turned a blin 
sye to irregular practice.
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Thirdly, Massey did not require a lengthy run-down of the plant, 
because the machinery was not needed elsewhere; indeed, Massey 
were prepared to "give away" capital equipment to any potential 
buyer. Mr. Thomas refutes, therefore, the suggestion that the 
decision to close had been taken away back in 1977 when the 
review of European Combine production was announced. He believes 
that the majority of former employees at Kilmarnock recognised 
the Company’s efforts to minimise the adverse effects on 
employees as genuine.
.j_The. Divestment Decision.
Mr. Dawe refutes the notion presented by previous researchers 
(eg, Boddewyn, 1976; Torneden, 1975) that "someone ’decides’ in 
isolation and then ’hands down’ the decision". Subsidiary 
Management was heavily involved, he says, in producing the data 
on which the final decision was based. The decision to close 
Kilmarock was taken only after Subsidiary and Parent Company 
Management had carefully considered the past results and 
potential of both sites.
According to Mr. Thomas, Marquette was retained because it had 
three major advantages over the Scottish factory:
1. It had a foundry on site.
2. It was located nearer the market.
3. It was virtually a non-union plant.
Mr. Dawe described why Kilmarnock was closed:
"The company was losing money in general and on combines in 
particular. All our cKHapetitors in Europe operated fr<» one 
plant, we had two."
12.7.2,; Emolovee Disclosure and ConstiltatiPH
Once it was realised that the European market could not sustain 
two facilities Mr. Dawe (based at Massey’s UK headquarters) and 
his colleagues were determined "to handle this matter as well as 
possible". He was well aware that certain groups in the UK jump 
at the opportunity to castigate MNCs. This was just one reason, 
he stressed, that Massey was particularly eager to avoid
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tarnishing its own reputation, and that of multinationals in 
general.
Mr. Dawe furnished the author with many statements which Massey 
issued to employees informing them of the latest developments 
affecting Kilmarnock. He believes that the information contained 
therein "shows when employees were first informed that the future 
of the plant was under study and that there was then a period of 
several months in which there were numerous exchanges with the 
unions before a final decision was made" [letter from Mr. Dawe to 
the author, dated November 2, 1984].
Mr. Dawe explained that Massey aims to, "be a good citizen 
wherever it operates ..., comply with the law and good practice, 
and work well within the law". Accordingly, once the decision to 
close Kilmarnock was taken, employees were told as soon as the 
necessary minimum work on presenting the news had been completed. 
Once the employees were informed, consultations were held.
Mr. Dawe, calling upon his own experience, described the 
divestment process, and revealed at what stage he believes 
employees should be informed of the firm’s plans to close an 
operation:
■One starts with the imperative of having to save money. If 
one does not do that one will cease to exist.
Various options are identified and researched. At this stage 
it would be clearly wrong to tell the work force - which is 
tantamount to a public statement. It may never happen, in 
depth research may show that the option is not, after all» 
valid. One may be having exploratory discussions with 
government or other firms which must be in confidence.
Equally, it would be foolish indeed to shake dealer 
confidence with a half-baked leak which would soon be 
misconstrued as an intention to abandon the product range.
However, as in depth research proceeds, there <K»es a time 
when so many people have to be consulted that one has no 
option but to make some kind of employee and public 
statement” [letter from Mr. Dawe to the author, dated 
November 2, 1984].
420
12.7.3.; Codes of Conduct for
Mr. Thomas was not aware of the OECD Guidelines at the time of 
the Kilmarnock closure. Mr. Dawe admits that if employee 
disclosure and consultation procedure during the run-down of the 
plant was in accordance with the Guidelines then it was by good 
fortune, not design. Apparent adherence to the Guidelines was, as 
he admits, purely coincidental. He stresses, however, that,
■the standards of good management idiich we ourselves have 
and need to have for our good name are actually more 
demanding than the letter of the guidelines” [Memo to 
author].
Although Massey ostensibly complied with the various Codes of 
Conduct for MNCs, and the OECD Guidelines in particular, it can 
be concluded that the OECD Guidelines do not receive any 
attention in the UK subsidiary, or at European level.
Mr. Dawe criticised both Guidelies and Draft Directive, for 
failing to appreciate that in the plant closure situation "most 
companies find themselves squeezed by imperatives which determine 
the course of action". He was at pains to stress that firms do 
not in reality enjoy the absolute freedom which the Guidelines 
and Vredeling presume.
Mr. Dawe offered his explanation of the term "reasonable notice" 
of plant closure, as contained in paragraph 6 of the Employment 
and Industrial Relations chapter of the OECD’s Guidelines;
”..I think the term Implies «in view of all the 
circumstances” • The circumstances of closing a plant are so 
serious that it is unthinkable that any (xxmpany should act 
capriciously and, in practise, vhat is reasonable tends to 
define itself”.
Should "Vredeling/Richard" become Community legislation, Massey s 
policy will remain the same; it will continue to strive to 
operate "well within the law". The Company has kept a low profile 
on the Draft Directive, on which it does not have a firm policy.
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IP,A.: Postscript
In its 1983 Annual Report, Massey Ferguson, announced that it had 
"essentially completed" the first phase of its long-term 
strategic plan. The Company, it proudly proclaimed, had been 
"resized and restructured" to meet the challenges of the 1980’s.
Since 1978 Massey has closed 18 plants, including two in the U.S. 
The rationalisation programme has taken its toll on the worldwide 
employment level of the Canadian MNC. Almost 50,000 jobs have 
disappeared, leaving a labour force of only 20,000 compared to
68,000 in 1978. The Company’s excess capacity problem is 
confirmed by the decline in tractor sales. In 1976 Massey’s 
tractor output was 168,000 units, but by 1984 it had slumped to 
only 106,000. A leaner and fitter Massey-Ferguson eventually 
returned to the black in 1984, with a modest profit of $7.2m.
In August 1985, Massey-Ferguson ended the year-long uncertainty 
surrounding its Marquette plant. The company confirmed that the 
factory would close with 1150 workers made redundant. Just two 
years earlier the French plant employed over 2,000 workers, but 
the plant had been a serious financial drain running up losses of 
about $20m (£l6m) a year.
In May 1986, Mr. Rice announced that Massey-Ferguson would change 
its name to Varity Corporation. The move was seen as "part of 
efforts to distance itself from its recent image as a 
financially-troubled company dependent on the farm equipment 
market" [Financial Times. May 16, 1986].
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INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER
12.9.: Iptro-dttctlon
International Harvester (IH), the US-based MNC, has its origins 
in McCormick’s mechanical reaper. In 1902, the Company was formed 
by the merging of "McCormick Harvester Company" and four other US 
farm equipment manufacturers - "Deering Harvester", "Milwaukee 
Harvester", "Plano Manufacturing Company", and "Warder, Bushnell 
and Glessner".
Its first foreign plants were established before World War 1. The 
agricultural depression in America during the 1920s led the firm 
to diversify into trucks and machinery for the construction 
industry. Two decades later, in 1943, the Company introduced 
divisionalisation to manage its growing product range.
During the 1980s IH has undergone considerable restructuring 
which compelled major organizational changes. Until 1982 it was 
organised into three operating groups. Trucks, and Agricultural, 
and Construction Equipment with each group responsible for
worldwide operations. In November 19 82, the Construction 
Equipment division was divested in November 1982, and sold to 
Dallas-based Dresser Industries which outbid German firm IBH 
Holding which itself went bankrupt in 1984. A further major 
divestment programme was initiated in late 1984.
Despite its major 1982 disposal, IH’s worldwide operations had a 
severe excess capacity problem, and the Company’s structural 
weaknesses became apparent:
•The country's (ie. America's) leading manufacturer of
heavy- and medium- duty trucks and the No. 2 
agricultural equipment had gone the way of many o er o 
line industrial corporations: Its plants were^o »
markets and sales were shriveling, and debt s 
billion" rBusiness Week. August 15, 1983].
IH, which had reported record profits in 1979, was fighting for
its very survival, and many observers believed that only
 ^ Massey-Ferguson-style government bail-out could save IH
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bankruptcy. The cover of Harvester’s 1981 Annual Report 
proclaimed the Company’s problems and response:
"1981 was one of the most difficult years in IH history. To 
cope with record Interest rates and severely depressed, we 
streamlined our organisation ..trimmed personnel... froze 
salaries, .pruned product lines..and reduced operations"
[International Harvester, IH Faotsl.
By 1982, rationalisation of production facilities was in full 
swing, and in the UK attention was focussed on the Bradford plant 
and on the two other plants, both at Doncaster.
Bradford was closed with the loss of 510 jobs, then in May 1983 
it was announced that Carr Hill, Doncaster, would close with the 
loss of 104 jobs, production being transferred to the larger 
Doncaster plant at Wheatley Road which served as the headquarters 
of IH’s UK subsidiary.
The Bradford closure will be reviewed in this case-study.
12.10.; The Rise and Fall of the Parent OPBPaaaL
Company sales first reached $1 billion in 1951 and $2 billion in 
1964. Between 1964 and 1979, sales grew steadily, and only in two 
years did sales fail to exceed the previous year’s performance 
levels. In 1979, the Company reported all-time record sales of 
$7.0 billion.
Despite this trend, profits were erratic. In 1965, IH reported a 
profit of $109.7m, but in 1975, ten years later, and after the 
very high inflation levels caused by the oil-crisis, it returned 
profits of $80.1m. An IH publication attributed its 
inconsistency to,
"an excessive cost structure prevented the Company from
plant and equipment" [International Harvester, IH FactaJ.
Nevertheless, in 1979, the same year that IH enjoyed record 
sales, it announced record profits of $427m (see Table 
According to IH, this success was due to "strong market demand,
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improved market shares, and cost oontrols". The Company noted 
with concern however, that net income as a percentage of net
sales was 5.1$, while its major rivals achieved almost double 
that profit ratio.
The Company gave the following reason for this disparity:
"IH was handicapped, fï*om a cost standpoint, by contract
provisions which were more liberal than those of principal
COTipetitors" [International Harvester, IH Faotsl.
It wanted, therefore, to revise the contract and this led to a 
strike by United Auto Workers (UAW) at its North American plants 
which lasted from November 1979 to April 1980. The Company
estimated in May 19 80 that the strike cost the Company $225m, and 
according to one commentator, in 1982 the Company had "never
recovered" from the strike [Business Week. December 13» 1982]. On 
the other hand, IH estimated that the new contract could reduce 
IH’s capital needs by up to $500m over the next ten years "by
allowing more effective use of capital equipment".
Table 12.3.: International Harvester, Selected Financial Data 
(Millions of dollars)
Years ended 
Oct.31
Sales Net
Income (Loss)
Worldwide
Employment
1985 $3,751 (364) 16,836
1984 4,802 ( 55) 31,104
1983 3,601 (485) 32,445
1982 4,292 (1,738) 43,290
1981 6,298 (351) 65,640
1980 5,208 (297) 87,162
1979 7,035 427 97,660
1978 6,664 187 95,450
1977 5,975 203 96,890
Source: Corporate Accounts, JEûHtüûS.»
The return to work at the North American plants did not solve the 
Company’s problems, however. In April 1980, US interest 
stood at 20$, much higher than predicted by any 
institution or econometric model, and Harvester suffere 
of $297m. Interest rates would not drop below 15$
At the same time, demand for all three of IH’s principal products
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- trucks, agricultural equipment, and construction machinery - 
were depressed throughout the world. By June 1981, the world
tractor market was at its lowest level since the Second World War 
and "very little improvement" was expected for 1982. 
Consequently, the industry was running at only half its capacity, 
causing intense pressure on production costs.
The third major problem was the lowering of IH’s credit ratings.
As a result, the Company was excluded from a traditional source 
of low cost working capital - the commercial paper market - and 
instead it had to rely on high-cost bank loans. Total Company 
borrowings almost doubled within a year. On October 31» 1979, at 
the beginning of the strike, they amounted to $1.4 billion. On 
the same date the fol owing year, they had risen to $2.2
billion.In order to reduce costs and raise cash a series of 
measures were initiated.
In the course of 1981, the Solar Turbines International Division 
was sold to Caterpillar for $505m in cash, and Harvester divested 
itself of its lawn and garden tractor line, plus its ball-bearing 
business. During 1981 IH»s losses were only fractionally lower 
than in 1980, and the Company^s world-wide operations bore a loss 
of $(394m).
At the end of the 1983 fiscal year, ie. October 31, 1983, IH had 
27 manufacturing plants operating worldwide. Including 15 in the 
8S, compared with 41 worldwide, including 21 in the US, at the 
end of the 1982 fiscal year. Further divestments have occurred 
since 1983, and as the company shrank so too did its labour 
force. The number employed worldwide has been savagely reduced 
from virtually 100,000 at the end of the 1979 fiscal year, to 
just over 16,000 six years later.
Given the Company»s external and internal difficulties, foreign 
divestment was very likely according to the literature on the 
subject. The same literature suggests that divestment becomes 
even more likely when there is a change of senior management at 
the Parent Company»s Headquarters.
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12.11.; The lfeHLMen
Mr Archie R. McCardell joined IH in September, 1977, as President 
and Chief Operating Officer. Four months later, in January, 1978, 
he was elected Chief Executive Officer, replacing Mr Warren J. 
Hayford who was retained as President and Chief Operating 
Officer. A massive plant-modernisation programme was initiated 
to improve efficiency and capital expenditure increased 
significantly.
In 1978, McCardell asked Mr, Don Lennox to join Harvester, and in 
1979, Lennox reported once again to his former boss whom he had 
served under first at Ford and then at Xerox. But the triumvirate 
of Hayford, McCardell, and Lennox proved an ineffective team;
"Because of the mishmash of expertise at the top, important 
decisions were delayed or, worse, sometimes not made at
all" [Business Week, August 15, 19833.
During 1982, a number of major staff changes occurred. Hayford 
resigned in March 1982, and McCardell "was bumped as Chairman" 
[Business Week. August 15, 19833. A special meeting of the Board 
of Directors had been convened for May 2, 1982, and Louis W. 
Menk, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Burlington Northern Inc., was elected Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of IH. Donald D. Lennox, IH Executive Vice- 
President, was elected President and Chief Operating Officer 
(COO).
Menk and Lennox were determined to divest non-performing assets. 
Previous management had known this was necessary, but had failed 
to overcome the "barriers to exit". Lennox’s first move was 
divesting the construction equipment unit.
On December 1 , 1982, Mr. Lennox was elected Chief Executive 
Officer while continuing as President. Mr. Menk continued as 
Chairman of the Board until September 1, 1983, when he was 
succeeded by Mr. Lennox. Jack D. Rutherford was elected President 
and Chief Operating Officer and a Director.
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J2.12.; The Implloationa for Bradford
The Bradford factory had been acquired from Jowett cars in 
October 1954. It produced tractors as well as a range of 
components for IH tractors manufactured at Doncaster, Turkey, and 
India.
By 1962, the factory employed 2,250 and it exported over 60$ of 
its production. In early 1978, Bradford still employed 1,700 but 
by May the number had been reduced to 1,400, in response to 
falling exports, especially to Turkey which had grave economic
problems. By 1980 the world market for tractors had been 
drastically reduced and this demanded a serious analysis of the 
entire Company.
On May 15, 1980, the Board of the US Parent Company met at 2 pm. 
(US time), 8 pm. (UK.time) to review the performance of IH’s 
worldwide operations. The results were conveyed to the UK 
subsidiary, and on the following day, May 16, 1980, Management
informed the Union delegation that Corporate losses for the first 
half of the financial year were in excess of $500m [Notes of 
^CJNC Meeting Held at Bradford on 16 th Ma.Yt_l.98iI].
In response to deteriorating conditions, it was decided to cut 
back on tractor production at Doncaster and Bradford by 2,000 
units and 400 umits respectively. As a direct result short-time 
working was introduced at both plants. After the Spring Bank 
Holiday, Bradford went on a four-and-a-half-day working week and
96 jobs were lost [Notes of SCJNC Meeting Held at .Bradford_aa
16th Mav. 19801.
Throughout the pay negotiations, IH informed employees of the 
"tremendous problems" facing the Company. Management informed 
union officials of the severely depressed market conditions 
afflicting the industry, presented them with detailed information 
covering the Company’s share of world markets, profits, and 
objectives.
In 1979, IH had returned a profit of $427m, but in 1980 it
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sufferred a loss of $(297m). Similarly, the UK subsidiary, which 
had returned a modest profit in 1979, plunged into the black in 
1980 - the Agriculture Group alone reported a pre-tax loss of 
29.8m (see Table 12.4.). In the four years from 1977 to 1980 the 
UK subsidiary as a whole had gone from an £8m profit to a pre-tax 
loss of £(20.2m).
Table 12.4.: International Harvester Co. of Great Britain Ltd. 
(£ra) Year ended October 31.
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Sales 176 168 119 106 99
Profit (Loss) 2.4 (20.2) (18) (14) (6)
Before Tax
Profit (Loss) 3.3 (12.3) (18.9) (14.2) (6)
After Tax
Av. Number 6,653 6,162 4,629 3,259 2,365
of employees
Source: Extel Statistical Services
Throughout 1981, tractor production was cut back at Doncaster, 
and, therefore, at Bradford which supplied the former with 
components. Eventually Bradford ceased manufacturing tractors 
completely, and merely produced components for assembly operation 
in Turkey and India [Telegraph and Argus. October 18, 1982].
On June 25, 1981, Management countermanded increasing speculation 
over the future of IH(GB). Employees were given the following 
assurance:
"Faced with these many serious problems it is understandable 
that there has been mucA speculation and rumour concerning 
the future of the British Company. Recent rumours suggested 
that there would no longer be a manufacturing operation in 
the UK Such rumour is without foundation ... " [Motes .q£. 
Joint CJNC. SCJNC. M2-M6 Meeting Held on 25th June 19.&1].
J2.13.; Disclosure and Consultation
July 1980: Employees at Doncaster and Bradford were told that the 
workforce of the two plants would be reduced by 740, with 
Bradford accounting for about 100 of the total job losses.
Mr. Jon Young, Employee-Relations Director, blamed low demand.
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compounded by high Interst rates, inflation, and the strength of 
Sterling. He also added that the Company’s delivery dates were 
disrupted by the national engineering dispute during the infamous 
1979 "winter of discontent", and customers had taken their 
business elsewhere. However, sources outwith the Company 
attributed the blame for these redundancies to the Parent 
Company’s recent decision to withdraw from industrial wheel 
tractors in the US [Telegraph and Argus. July 30, 1980].
August 1st 1980: It was reported that local management was trying 
to convince the US Board that Bradford should receive further 
investment and new products. However, as the Industrial Relations 
Manager of the plant, Mr. Roland Long explained, Bradford was in 
direct competition for limited funds with other International 
Harvester plants throughout the world:
"There are a number of new products and opportunities for 
new investment for which we are now doing costing exercises 
and which we hope to attract to Bradford.
We believe that tiiis plant compares equally with any other
in the group there is no doubt that, if we are
succesful in our bid for this new work, it will considerably 
strengthen tdie long-term future of this plant" [quoted in 
Telegraph and Argus. July 30, 1980].
November 5, I960: Union representatives met management, led by
the Managing Director of International Harvester (Great Britain) 
(IH(GB)), Mr. Thompson, an American.
The subject for discussion was "Job Security". The meeting was 
convened at IH’s UK headquarters in Doncaster in response to "a 
number of requests from the Union side for information, and an 
opportunity to discuss the general investment strategy of 
IH(GB)". The proceedings began with management explaining that 
the meeting was "an attempt to communicate as fully and frankly 
possible"; it was not to be seen as an opportunity for 
entering into negotiations.
Mr. Thompson told union representatives that since January 1980 
he had held discussions with management at Bradford and he had 
informed Management that the future of the plant would be settled
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before the New Year. He explained that "this was not now
possible" and that a Task Force headed by Mr. W. Elwiss had been
formed to investigate the viability of the 384 Tractor "and to 
review the strategy for Bradford".
This particular model was no longer suitable, he said, for the
mature markets in North America, France, Germany, and Great 
Britain. Its marketing had consequently been geared for the 
developing countries. This had proved particularly successful in 
Turkey, but now came unstuck as the country's recent economic 
crisis precluded Importing of expensive machinery.
The union delegations were concerned also about the Company's 
decision to establish a manufacturing base at Vigo, in Spain. 
They had read in the press that this decision could only be 
detrimental to the future of IH(GB). Indeed, this news caused Mrs 
Husarz, an APEX shop steward, to suspect that Bradford would 
close. Mr. Thompson, however, dismissed this as ill-founded 
speculation. He explained that IH had invested in Spain simply 
because the Spanish market was not only larger than the UK 
market, it was the fifth or sixth largest market in the world. It 
was therefore Important that the Company maximise its penetration 
of such an important market and it was impossible to achieve this 
due to Spain's import controls and the Company must therefore 
produce within the market itself.
He assured Trades Union representatives that the Spanish factory 
would not export to those markets served by IH(GB). This factory 
had originally produced lorries, but following recent discussions 
at Chicago Headquarters, US Management had decided to commence 
manufacture of Vineyard and Orchard tractors, Mr. Thompson and
his eight colleagues assured the 23 strong Trades Union 
delegation that "they (ie. Management) had always given the 
Unions information they believed to be 100$ true at that time, 
but over the period of negotiation things had changed".
Mr. Thompson explained that the UK subsidiary's poor results were 
partly due to rising costs. In 1977 manufacturing costs were 83$ 
of sales revenue, but by 1980, the former actually exceeded the
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latterl [IH, Ng.tjg9 of Extended SCJNC and M2-M6 Held on sth
November.1980 at Doncaster!.
Union representatives were also told that short-time working was 
expected to end in early 1981, and that no further significant 
redundancies were foreseen.
According to Mr. Ray Andrews, Convening Officer for the Joint 
Negotiating Committee for manual workers, Mr. Thompson's 
background was in Personnel Management and his appointment to the 
position of Managing Director broke with tradition in that the 
position had previously been occupied by someone with an 
engineering or financial background. His appointment was, Mr. 
Andrews comments, no doubt due to Head Office recognising this 
young executive's talents. Indeed, Mr. Andrews alleges that these 
talents were so self-evident that his relationship with shop- 
floor workers suffered. Given his professional background, it is 
understandable that Mr. Thompson attached considerable importance 
to communicating with employees. Information was often presented 
on video, and it was always done with "slick professionalism". 
This very characteristic , Mr. Andrews alleges, alienated many 
employees [interview with author].
December 2, I960: Management and Unions held salary negotiations
for the forthcoming year. The Unions demanded that there should 
be no compulsory redundancies in 1981. Management replied that,
"the Unions most be aware that with the state of British 
Industry and IH in particular, everyone is having to cope 
with an unprecedented situation of uncertainty. Management 
cannot, therefore, give the assurance and regretfully 
declined to give that commitment" [Notes of SCJNC Meeting 
Held at Bradford on December 2. .1.9.8.Q].
It explained that there had been a rapid change in market 
conditions since the last meeting, and that had Mr. Thompson been 
present "he would not be expressing himself in quite the same 
terms as before". It claimed that under the terms of the 
Employment Protection Act, "there is a well defined procedure 
that has to be gone through by employers, and there are very 
specific rights conferred upon employees entitling them to 
substantial written information. That obviously falls short of
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the kind of guarantee the Unions are asking to be written into 
the Agreement, and the level of protection cannot be improved 
upon".
February 2T, 1981: Management presented Shop Stewards with a
detailed review of the world market for the agrlcoltinral 
equipment Industry and Its Impact on IH, with particular 
referanee to IH(GB). It was. disclosed that the tractor market was 
at its lowest since 1945, and consequently, further rediimdamcles 
were necessary at the Doncaster plants
Manâi 11, 1981: The two sides met a^in this time to discuss the
"Company Situation and Manpower Reductions". It was disclosed 
that the manufacture of Construction Equipment would cease in 
Doncaster by the end of the 1981 fiscal year, as mixing 
Construction Equipment and Agriculture operations in one plant 
"has not been, and is not economically viable and there is a need 
for focussed manufacturing organisation".
Bradford had been considered as an alternative manufacturlmg base 
for Construction Equipment, but the size of the plant made it 
impractical :
"Eowevmr, as a strategy the Company was committed to he^Amg 
Bradlford viable as part of the Component XWmafactmrimg 
operation",
providing that the Unions accept that the plant would be a 
capital intensive, continuous operation FIH,Rotes of Extended 
j&CJWC Meeting Held On March 11. 19811.
It this meeting, the Company was informed by the union officials 
that their members, its employees, were concerned about the 
future of IH(GB), and that an assurance was, therefore, being 
sought that the British Company would remain in existence. The 
Company was also asked to clarify whether its strategy for 
Bradford represented a "firm commitment or just a possibility". 
The Minutes of the meeting record the information sought by the 
workforce:
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"In general, the Trade Unions requested Management to give a 
firm assurance regarding the future, and that there was no 
Intention of a run-down of the Doncaster and Bradford 
plants" [IH, Notes of Extended SCJNC Meeting Held On March 
■lit 1.98.1].
Mr. Thompson replied that the Company had no intention of 
withdrawing from the UK, and that it was not in the process of 
formulating a strategy for running-down UK operations, leading to 
total withdrawal. However, 635 redundancies at Doncaster were 
announced.
Details of the Company's strategy were presented to all employees 
in a video presenation entitled "Shaping the Future". One shop 
steward told the author he remembered seeing the video but 
claimed that it was a very technical presentation and therefore 
it was meaningless to a lay person .
Early January 1982: 141 redundancies were announced at, what the 
local newspaper described as, the "struggling" Bradford plant 
[Telegraph and Argus. January 9, 1982].
February 1982: Unknown to the Bradford workforce, the decision to 
close the Yorkshire plant had already been taken and UK 
subsidiary management were busy preparing for closure. But the 
workforce was not informed until July, five months later 1
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Meanwhile, Mr. Ray Shepherd, who had succeeded Mr. Thompson, 
resigned after only fourteen weeks as the Managing Director of OK 
operations, following a row over future policy with US executives 
at IH's Chicago headquarters. He was replaced by Mr. Robert 
Calder.
The position of Managing Director had traditionally been occupied 
by an American, and employees at Bradford regarded the departure 
of the blunt-speaking Yorkshireman as an ill-(men for the 
factory's future. At the time, Mr. Ray Andrews, explained to the 
local newspaper that during his brief spell with the firm, Mr. 
Shepherd 'had managed to win the confidence of most of the shop 
floor because of his commitment to IH operations in the UK and 
his determination to make them succeed" [quoted in 
Telegraph and Argus. February 24, 1982].
Mr. Andrews said that Mr. Shepherd had been appointed Managing 
Director because of his expertise in dealing with the financial 
institutions of Third World countries. It was hoped that under 
Mr. Shepherd's guidance, Bradford would win major export orders 
in Iran, Nigeria, Turkey, and Pakistan, but these countries had 
severe economic difficulties and this led to export credit 
guarantee problems. The salvation of Bradford was therefore not 
to be found in these markets [interview with author].
Mr. Shepherd's personality and frankness had made him highly 
popular with employees. For example, if Mr. Shepherd had decided 
not to provide information requested by the Unions, he was very 
forthright and gave a satisfactory reason for his stance, rather 
than "feeble exscuses" which they sometimes received from 
Management [interview with author].
As regards Mr. Shepherd's departure, Mr. Andrews said that it was 
under "suspicious circumstances" and that the Unions did not know 
whether he had jumped or been pushed. Mr. Andrews also told me 
that it was believed that Mr. Shepherd was unhappy with the 
restrictions placed on his authority by the Parent Company.They 
were certain, however, that his departure was not in the 
interests of the survival of IH's three UK plants.
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"The unions then realised it was the end of the road"
[interview with author],
Mr. Coultard, the Convener for all manual unions at IH's three 
plants believes that Mr. Shepherd resigned because the US 
Executives restricted his authority, and that "they continued to 
hold the reins" [interview with author].
Senior management of IH(GB) admitted that Mr. Shepherd's 
appointment "didn't quite work out for a variety of reasons". 
Mr. Page, Director for Industrial Relations, said that Mr. 
Shepherd had resigned because he disagreed with the parent 
company's decision to concentrate Research and Development (R&D) 
at the Hinsdale plant, near IH's Chicago headquarters [Interview 
with author].
The Company had previously conducted R&D at several plants, 
including Doncaster. In its fight for survival, IH was cutting 
costs wherever possible, and it was believed that concentrating 
R&D in one location was in everyone's best interests. Mr. 
Shepherd did not agree and argued that R&D should continue at the 
English plant. His views were not well received by the US Board 
and so Mr. Shepherd tendered his notice. As Mr. Page says, the 
issue at stake in Mr. Shepherd's resignation was "a complete 
policy issue" [interview with author].
However, the author would suggest that the Yorkshireman's 
resignation was not unrelated to the closure of Bradford. As 
Exhibit A proves, Mr. Shepherd's resignation must virtually have 
coincided with the US Board's informing UK subsidiary Management 
of its decision to close Bradford, and instructing that it 
formulate a divestment strategy.
Seen in this light, it seems reasonable to deduce that either Mr. 
Shepherd resigned in protest against the divestment decison - an 
example of local management's goals conflicting with the parent 
company's - or, alternatively. Headquarters in Chicago engineered 
the R&D issue with the explicit intention of provoking Shepherd's 
departure, and replacing him with its own man, Mr. Calder, an
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Anericaa, who would have no qualms about, olosliog plamt-^ . im 
En^amd - thereby, overoomlmg a serlos "barrier to exit".
Thronj#nottt industry the term "hatchet mao" is overused, but io 
the circumstances it does not seem inappropriate to describe Mr. 
Calder thus.
Mardh II, 1982: It was reported in the local oewspapw that
Bradford would close "unless other work can be found which fits 
in with the Company's worldwide rationalisation plans* 
[quoted in Telegraph and Argus, March 11,1982]. Ihe following 
day, Mr. Long, Industrial Relations Manager, slammed the story:
"... the Obnpangy has never taken the view that the only 
alternative to gear and shaft Banufaeture was the eloeore of
the %%dford plant.
Ve have been actively pursuing any nwher of o^ortmltles 
to secure a future for the Bradford works. Ve are a long way 
fkvm the position where the closure of the Bradford ^ ant Is
one of the alternatives being considered.
Ve certainly do not f<n*esee further reduWandea In
Bradford" [quoted in Telegraph and Angus. March 12, 1982].
June 7» 1982: Bradford's local newspaper revealed that "after the 
traumatic cuts in staff and scaling down of operations, the 
factory is now doing everything to attract business to boost 
workers' hours", and that full-time work would be resumed 
shortly. Mr. Long explained that the improved situation was due 
to winning an order from France and he predicted that it would 
provide work for about three months. He added:
"Hopefully we will be able to win more orders whlxA will 
enable os to continue fell—time production In the lougmr 
term, tiwii^rb the market Is still very difficult" [quoted in 
Telegraph and Argus. July 8, 1982].
July 13, 1982: Full- time working was resumed for the first time
in two years at the Bradford plant.
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12.14.: Qoaure Announoement
International Harvester's most senior UK Management were by 
February 1982 at the latest, actively involved in preparing 
Bradford's closure. An internal Company document entitled, "Plan 
for Orderly Closure of Bradford Works", which was prepared by the 
UK management, reveals that Management had planned to announce 
Bradford's closure, not on July 23, but some twelve weeks 
earlier:
■Planned date of announcement May 1st, 1982, assuming 
approval of appropriation and non-participation in Pakistan 
tractor deal" [IH, flan, for Orderlv Closure of Bradford 
Works!.
July 22: The local MPs were told in strictest confidence that
Bradford was to close.
Friday, July 23, 1982: At 7.30 am, in the Victoria Hotel,
Bradford, Mr. Long informed local Councillors and Community 
organisations. These people were told so that they would be on 
hand to help the 510 employees who were given the news one hour 
later.
The Company's statement explained that the industry in general 
was depressed and that IH itself had "severe financial problems". 
As part of its programme to return to profitability, it had been 
decided that,
"the Cbmpany's manufacturing strategy should be based upon 
the fullest attainable utilisation of capacity and 
facilities. We thus have to end production at those 
facilities in excess of our requirements".
[IH, Statement to CJNC. July 23,1982].
Thus Bradford, which was operating at only 22$ of its capacity, 
would be closed and all UK manufacturing would be consolidated at 
Doncaster [IH, Press Release. July 23, 1982].
Employees were told how the decision would effect them in a 
statement issued by Mr. Calder, Managing Director of IH(GB):
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«Today...Is the formal notification of the redundancy which 
marks the commencement of the statutory 90 day period of 
consultation. Detailed discussion of the implementation of 
the closure will continue at plant level.
Hie majority of the 510 people currently emloyed at Bradford 
will be leaving at the end of the 90 day period and beyond 
that date only a small run down team will be retained".
[IH, Statement to CJNC, July 23,1982].
Mr. Calder added.
"I am in no doubt that we will apply ourselves to the 
closure, sad as it is for all of us, with the same care and 
attention that we have always shown. .. I can assure you 
that the Company really has done everything humanly possible 
to save Bradford and we should reflect on how much sooner 
they would have taken this decision, had it not been for 
their genuine regard for the plant" [IH, Statement to CJNC, 
July 23,1982].
Once employees were told, they were sent home to inform their 
families. The Company went to great pains to ensure that those 
emotionally involved with the Bradford factory did not receive 
the news from the media.
Bradford's closure was part of IH's global strategy formulated in 
response to adverse market conditions. The UK tractor market had 
fallen from 36,000 units in 1977 to 22,000 in 1980, and in Europe 
as a whole, the industry had a manufacturing capacity of 600,000 
tractors a year, whilst the forecast for sales was half that 
many I The Company's policy, therefore, was to rationalise its 
operations by concentrating manufacture into fewer plants and 
divesting itself of unprofitable assets.
Bradford was effectively closed on October 22, 1982.
■12.15.; Thft m  Management»3 YieW
On September 11, 1984, the author held a collective interview
with senior UK Management, namely, Mr. Stewart MacDonald, 
Director of Finance, Mr. Ian Page, Director of Industrial 
Relations, and Mr. Roland Long, currently Communications Manager 
and previously Industrial Relations Manager at the Bradford
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plant. The interview lasted for the best part of an afternoon. 
12.15.1.; The Disinvestment Decision
Mr. MacDonald said he believed that in IH, the CEO and the 
President make any divestment decisons. In order to facilitate 
decision-making of this magnitude. Management of subsidiaries 
prepares a report outlining past performance and forecasting 
future trends pertaining to their subsidiary.
The first indication received by Mr. Long that the future of 
Bradford was uncertain came from the then newly appointed 
President and Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Warren Hayford. This 
was during the letter's visit to the Bradford factory in late 
1979/early 1980. Mr. Long was taken aback, and not too impressed 
by the new CEO's first question:
"What's the cheapest way of closing Bradford?"
Mr. Long replied that there was no cheap way to close the plant. 
Indeed, this large Yorkshireman told the American that he was 
asking the wrong question. He told the author that at the time he 
believed that if IH couldn't make a profit at Bradford, then 
where the hell could they? After all, the workforce had been very 
flexible, and their Unions, in recognition of the corporations 
difficulties, had promised to make more concessions.
Shortly after Hayford's visit, Mr. Long was told by Mr. Sadler, 
Vice President of the Agriculture Equipment Group, that gear 
production in the US was to be phased out, and that Bradford had 
been chosen to be the Company's sole gear production centre. This 
proposition did not seem feasible to Mr. Long, as he could not 
foresee the United Auto Workers trades union allowing any further 
"export" of jobs. Such a proposal was, he believed, a recipe for 
severe industrial unrest at Harvester's US plants, and the 
Company was still recovering from the costly 1979-1980 dispute.
According to Mr. MacDonald, Bradford was closed because of the 
depressed market conditions facing all firms in the agriculture 
equipment industry. The industry's manufacturing capacity was far
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in excess of demand, and it was no longer possible to retain more 
than one plant in the UK The largest plant was Wheatley Road, 
Doncaster, and so whilst it was physically possible to 
consolidate at this plant, Bradford was too small to allow the 
reverse. The closure of Bradford was not a reflection on the 
plant's record. Indeed, by every imaginable yardstick, as Mr. 
Page explained, the plant's performance was considered "very 
good".
Mr. MacDonald explained that Bradford was a cost centre, and as 
such it had to win major orders from Third World countries to 
cover its costs. Only then could it offer competitive prices to 
customers from industrialised countries. If Bradford did not win 
large orders from the Third World, it lost the advantage of 
economies of scale, cost prices increased, and so the plant had 
to quote higher prices which obviously attracted less business. 
It was a vicious circle. "It was make or break in the Third 
World".
He also said that it was easier to close a plant in Britain than 
in any other European country. Asked whether this influenced the 
initial investment decision, he thought not, as firms do not open 
a plant with the intention of closing it.
Mr, MacDonald said that he would not describe the closure of 
Bradford as a "crisis" divestment, and indeed he argued that 
plant closures can never fall into that category. It would have 
cost less in the short term to keep Bradford open, and he says no 
firm would close a plant in order to get out of a crisis. Plant 
closures are very expensive. At the time Bradford closed, IH was 
fighting for survival.
He agreed that it is possible to describe the .aalfi. of* & 
subsidiary as a crisis divestment, as a sale raises cash and 
avoids providing compensation to redundant employees.
Mr. Long told me that because Bradford was held in such high 
regard there was "longer than justified agonising over the 
decision".
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12t15»£^l. ■ElmPl oy.e.e Dl s c lOBure and Conauitation
Mr. Page recounted how, until the early 1970s, IH had had a very 
"autocratic" approach to employee involvement, but that the 
Company, after involvement with the Commission on Industrial 
Relations (CIR), had developed a "very open approach" wherby 
employees were informed early of decisions. The CIR was a vehicle 
for change and IH established formalised procedures for 
consulting employees representatives.
Mr. Page told me that the Parent Company Executives decided to 
close Bradford in February/March 1982, and that they informed 
Senior Management of the ÜK subsidiary in late April, who in turn 
communicated the decision, within a day or two, to Plant 
Management at the three UK factories.
Mr. Page implicitly indicated that IH disclosed its decision to 
Bradford employees only after detailed plans and procedures to 
ensure an orderly closure had been laid down. UK management 
received financial appropriation for closure in May/J une and it 
was only then that UK management were empowered to inform 
employees.
The Company were very concerned that the closure of Bradford 
could provoke industrial action at its other plants in the UK, 
and it was anxious to avoid any such action being taken. For 
example, had the employees taken industrial action, production at 
Doncaster would have ground to a halt with grave consequences for 
IH.
I2_.15.?,; Codes of Conduct for MNCs_
Mr Page said that IH would endeavour not to break the Guidelines 
2nd he was highly critical of Caterpillar's handling of the 
Birtley closure. He explained that because of the existence of 
various formal procedures at IH it would have been impossible for 
a source, other than the Company, to inform the Bradford 
workforce.
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The ÜK Management of IH were unaware of CIME's definition of what 
constitutes "reasonable notice" of plant closure. When informed 
of it, they had some criticisms to make. It did not, they argued, 
appreciate that "there is no neat decision making" framework 
within MNCs.
Mr. MacDonald told me that one should not expect subsidiary 
management to have total knowledge of what senior Parent Company 
Executives think. He also explained that if employees were 
informed of every option considered by management they would 
probably be plagued with insomnia.
He recalled the conversation he had in 1982 with the then Vice- 
President of the Agricultural Equipment Division of IH worldwide, 
when he broke the news that he had decided to return to the UK to 
take up the position of Director of Finance. Instead of offering 
congratulations, the Vice-President told Mr. MacDonald he would 
be working for a subsidiary that would probably be divested in a 
few years time. The Scotsman was undeterred, and did not attach 
significance to the remark, and quoted the story to substantiate 
his view that employees cannot be informed of all alternatives 
being considered by Parent Company management. Since then a new 
President has been appointed, and the UK subsidiary's future is 
considered secure, Mr, MacDonald used this example to highlight 
the strategic flexibility of MNCs, and the impact of one 
individual in the upper echelons of management on corporate 
decision making.
They also had grave doubts as to whether it was in their 
employees interests to be told their place of work may close. 
First of all, the "good people" will move on to what they 
consider a more secure Job, thereby weakening the plant and so 
early disclosure of information would only increase the 
likelihood of closure. They also believed that as companies face 
®eny alternatives and circumstances, management often changes its 
mind, and to tell employees at various plants under review that 
the Company was considering closure of a particular plant would 
only build up false hopes for the workers at the factory
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eventually chosen for closure.
Mr. MacDonald emphasised that IH could not afford to meet the 
expense of employing people who were not producing, so once the 
decision to close Bradford had been taken it was in the interests 
of the Company's other 30,000 employees to terminate employment 
at Bradford as soon as possible.
As regards "Vredeling", IH has, as Mr. Page says, kept a low 
profile. He believes that Employers' organisations have over­
reacted, and that the implementation of these Proposals would not 
prove as detrimental as some envisage.
Mr. Page believes that it is wrong to withold information until 
the very last minute. IH's UK Management stressed that once a 
plant and its employees are surplus to requirements, prolonging 
closure and redundancy only endangers the future of other plants 
and employees. It is therefore in the interest of a Company's 
remaining employees, the majority, that plants should be closed 
as soon as possible after the final decision has been taken.
■32*16.; The Unions' View
On August 31,1984, Mr. Jefferey, District Secretary of the AUEW 
in Bradford, was interviewed. According to him, the workforce was 
divided and relations were tense between staff and manual 
workers' unions, indeed acrimonious. Attempts therefore to unite 
the two unions (i.e. AUEW and APEX) to form a Joint Committee to 
fight for the future of IH(GB's) operations were unsuccessful.
He believed that local management were "messenger boys" devoid of 
decision-making powers and that decisions, even those of minor 
Importance, were made at Company Headquarters in Chicago.
Mr. Walter Coultard was the Chairman of the Joint Negotiating 
Committee for IH's three plants in the UK He confirmed that Mr. 
Thompson, who completed his stint as Managing Director in 
November 1981, had given assurance that the future of the 
Bradford plant was secure . Mr. Co ul tard thought there had been
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very little inter-plant union involvement, and that whilst the 
decision to close Bradford took him by surprise, it may not have 
been such a shock to employee representatives at Bradford.
He believed that the decision to close the Bradford factory had 
been made long before employees heard of the Company's proposals. 
He explained that local management had lost its credibility in 
the eyes of the stewards. He said that he did not believe the 
statements issued by management, and he eventually suggested to 
the ÜK Director of Industrial Relations, Mr. Page, that he was 
being deliberately misinformed by US management.
Mr. Co ul tard said Mr. Page explained that the Company operated in 
an ever^changing market and that strategy and decisions were 
flexible, and that this factor accounted for any inconsistencies 
in Company statements. He denied that management consciously 
misled shop stewards. Mr. Coultard still believes, however, that 
the management of the UK subsidiary receives very fragmentary 
information from Company Headquarters in Chicago, USA.
Mr. Co ul tard worked at the Carr Hill plant which closed shortly 
after Bradford, and he claims that he was told by Mr. Thompson in 
1980/1 "this plant will still be open in five years time".
Between 1980 and the closure in 1982, there were three Managing 
Directors of IH(GB). According to Mr. Coultard, Mr. Shepherd said 
that statements which had been issued by Mr. Thompson should be 
disregarded as he took no responsibility for them. The same 
stance was adopted by Mr. Shepherd's successor, Mr. Calder. The 
union was highly critical of this lack of continuity, and 
believed that since the Managing Director was acting on behalf of 
IH(GB), the Company itself was duty bound to honour his word.
Mrs. Husarz, Chairmen of APEX at Bradford, believes that:
"Although we were ^aaonablY well informed at aaat at^es 
there was a great deal of room for Improvement, and I feel 
that the Company as a whole could not have cared less about 
the future lives of its employees and the effect of a 
closure as long as it got a troublefree closure" [letter to 
author from Mrs. Husarz, July 1984].
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On September 10, 1984, the author interviewed Mr.. Ray Andrews, a 
full-time official of the AUEW at the Leeds office. He was the 
Convening Officer for the Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) for 
manual workers. When asked for his views on IH's employee 
involvement policy, he explained that he was "not very happy"
with it prior to the closure announcement, but, after the
decision had been announced, he commented that "we had as much
consultation as possible given the circumstances".
Mr. Andrews also said that it was important to differentiate
between the managers at the three UK factories and the senior
management of the UK subsidiary. The union relationship between
the former was, he said, "very good", and local management "went 
out of their way to be as helpful as possible. They were as 
distressed and disgusted as we were with the decision to close 
Bradford".
Mr. Andrews said that the Bradford plant was the most efficient 
within the entire Group and that it was evaluated on a cost basis 
rather than profit. It was closed, he believes, because it did 
not have a product of its own, and merely supplied parts for 
other IH plants at home and abroad. But the author would suggest 
that this surely begs the question: did it lack its own product
because it had already been ordained that the plant would close ?
It would appear that plant closure, like the death of the
terminally ill, always comes as a shook, even though events have 
indicated that it is inevitable. Mr. Andrews explained that the 
closure of Bradford proved a shock to him, because, he explained, 
"you always hope against hope, but we knew in our heart-of-hearts 
that one of the three UK plants would be closed".
J2*17.r Postscript
In 1984, Britain produced more tractors than any other country in 
the western world, and was second in the world only to the Soviet 
Onion. Although the US market leader, Deere, sources from its 
West German plant, Britain is the principal source of medium­
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sized tractors for the US market. She Is the world's leading 
exporter of farm tractors, with sales In 1984 to 170 countries 
worth a record £800m.
Paradoxically, Britain's recent recovery in the farm equipment 
industry arises mainly from the persistant slump in world demand. 
Depressed market conditions have prompted North American MNCs to 
rationalise worldwide operations. Huge plants in the US have been 
closed, and the firms have chosen the UK to consolidate 
production.
In November 19 84, J. I. Case, a subsidiary of Tenneco, the US 
energy and manufacturing conglomerate, acquired the Agricultuaral 
Equipment Group of International Harvester in a bold $43Om 
takeover [Rodger, August 13, 1985, p.16]. Prior to the
acqiusition Harvester was the third largest supplier of tractors 
in Europe with an 11$ share, while Case with 3$ was an "also 
ran". The new union of Case International, as it is called, ties 
for second place with Massey, behind Fiat of Italy [Rodger, 
August 13, 1985, p.16]
When the acquisition was announced, many pundits predicted that 
Case would consolidate UK tractor production in its large 
Huddersfield plant, and close Harvester's Wheatley Rd., Doncaster 
plant. But rather than rationalise UK operations, new owner Case 
expanded its UK base, at the expense of US facilities.
For example. Case closed Harvester's Davenport, Iowa, tractor 
factory, (and thus in a single stroke wiping out a third of its 
US capacity) and in October 1985 it announced that it will 
transfer production from other US sites to its lower cost UK 
plants [Rodger, July 16, 1985 and August 13, 1985, p. 16].
Apart from Case, Ford Motor Company, and Massey-Ferguson have 
concentrated production of this line in the UK [Rodger, November 
19, 1985, p.?].
Case's £90m investment programme, which is expected to generate
2,000 jobs, is one of the largest inward investment projects
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Britain has ever attracted. Even before this injection, Case was 
already one of the largest tractor producers in the UK, with a 
1984 output level of 23,300 units, but it lagged behind Massey 
with 56,300 units, and Ford with 35,900 [Rodger, October 29, 
19851.
The good news for Doncaster is that not only does the Wheatley 
Rd. factory appear to have a secure future, but Carr Hill which 
Harvester closed in 1983 will re-open [Rodger, October 29, 1985].
Even International Harvester appears strenthened by its lengthy 
convalescence, and in January 1986 the Chicago-based firm changed 
its name to Navistar International. Chairman Don Lennox was 
phlegmatic about his Company's past traumas:
■Harvester has taken Its share of hard knocks over the past 
few years* This is the first day of our new lives"
[Financial Times. January 8, 1986].
448
CATERPILLAR
12.18.; Introduction
This case examines the closure of Caterpillar's plant at Birtley, 
near Newcastle, which had been acquired by the US MNC in 1956. 
News of the closure and loss of 960 jobs dealt a severe body-blow 
to Tyneside where unemployment was already exceptionally high. 
Foreign divestment in a region ravaged by the depression was 
bound to provoke a hostile reaction from the local community, and 
any firm contemplating such a move would have a vested interest 
in handling the divestment process with some sensitivity.
The people of County Durham, a mining area and a Labour 
stronghold, were outraged by Caterpillar's handling of the 
closure announcemet, and local councillors, along with Members of 
Parliament at Westminster and Strasbourg were quick to denounce 
the firm and pledge stpport to Birtley's employees.
The handling of the closure announcement aroused considerable
interest in the European Parliament and European Commission,
particularly since Caterpillar had been one of the most 
vociferous opponents of the "Vredeling Proposals" on employee 
disclosure and consultation.
At the time when the "Vredeling Proposals" were being debated in 
the European Parliament the Company wrote to several MEPs urging 
that they vote against them. Dr. Gordon Adam, Labour MEP for 
Northumbria, received a letter from the Company asking him to 
oppose "Vredeling":-
"We believe that oompanies should inform and involve
employees in matters of concern to them. We m^e a
substantial effort to do so, both within our plants and on a
total company basis.
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There have been Instances in which some multinational 
companies have failed to communicate adequately on matters 
of concern to employees, but the vast majority of 
multinational companies should not be judged or penalised 
for the short comings of a few." [letter dated December 4. 
1981 from Mr.D.H. Gilliver, Director of Administration of 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., to Dr. G. Adam, MEP]
Following such pious utterances, the TUC was appalled at 
Caterpillar’s audacious handling of the Birtley closure. It 
resented what it perceived as blatant hypocrysy, and decided to 
make an example of the Illinois-based MNC.
Shortly after the closure announcement, the TUC grabbed the 
headlines with an announcement of its own. It revealed that it 
was demanding an investigation into Caterpillar’s apparent 
breaches of the OECD's Guidelines for multinationals. The 
Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, Mr. David Lea (defeated 
by Mr. Norman Willis in the 19 84 leadership contest following Len 
Murray's resignation) later stressed that:
■Given the current debate on workers* ri^ts in the context 
of the Vredeling proposals we must continue to ensure that 
this is a test case concerning the limits to voluntary 
guidelines", [letter from Mr. Lea, dated January 12, 1984, 
to Mr. Arthur Scott, District Secretary for Tyne and Wear of 
the Confederation of Shipbuilders and Engineering Unions]
As the only foreign-owned firm which the TUC has referred to the 
OECD for failing to adhere to its Guidelines during the 
divestment process, Caterpillar is unique. One should not jump to 
any conclusions, however, and assume that this firm's behaviour 
was much worse than that of all other foreign-owned firms which 
have closed a UK operation,. The TUC's decision to refer 
Caterpillar’ to the UK National Contact Point may well have been 
prompted by other factors. Once we have compared this case with 
others presented in this thesis we shall be in a better position
to assess Caterpillar's conduct.
This case study proceeds by tracing the origins and growth of 
Caterpillar, before considering the economic background to 
Birtley closure decision. A timetable of events documenting 
employee disclosure and consultation before and after the closure 
announcement is presented, and this allows one to balance the
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daims of both Company and Trades Unions.
12.19.; The Rlae and Fall of Caterpillar
Caterpillar Tractor Company is an American MNC and its main 
product line is farm and industrial machinery. It was founded in 
1925, when the C.L. Best Tractor Co. merged with The Holt 
Manufacturing Company Tractor Company. Caterpillar (as it is 
often known) chose Peoria, Illinois, for its headquarters, and 
business thrived under its first Chairman, C.L. Beat. But the 
"Great Depression" was particularly severe in the primary sector, 
and in 1932 Caterpillar suffered its first loss [Caterpillar, 
May 1984].
The Company* s fortunes soon picked up, however, and after the war 
the backlog of orders was the biggest in company history and a 
major expansion took place at the East Peoria Plant. The firm 
still could not cope with demand, and so work began on a new 
plant at Joliet, Illinois which commenced production two years 
later [Caterpillar, May 1984]..
One reason for the high demand, was a significant increase in 
foreign orders which historically, had averaged 20$ of sales. 
Foreign sales could have been even greater, but imports from the 
US had to be purchased in dollars, and in the post-war era there 
were shortages of dollars so foreign demand was frustrated. The 
problan was particularly acute in the UK which had largely 
exhausted its currency reserves to support the war effort. UK 
manufacturers exploited the situation, and made inroads into 
Caterpillar*s market share [Caterpillar, May 1984].
Realising that potential for sales in the UK and Commonwealth 
countries was immense, on August 4, 1950, the US MNC announced
the formation of its first foreign subsidiary. Caterpillar 
Tractor Company Ltd., whose mission was to inspect and distribute 
parts to dealers. It was another six years before Caterpillar 
began producing in the UK In 1956, it purchased former 
Caterpillar licensee manufacturer. The Blrtley Company Ltd., and 
acquired a plant in the small town of Blrtley. The same year saw
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the start of construction on a large new plant at Uddingston,
near Glasgow which came into operation in 1958 [Caterpillar,
May 1984].
During the decade 1960-1970, Caterpillar’s profile changed 
considerably. The Company expanded and became more 
International, The number of employees increased by nearly 50$
and the manufacturing space doubled. Foreign sales increased 
too, from 37$ in the early 1960’s to more than 52$ in 1970
[Caterpillar, May 1984].
At the same time, however. Caterpillar, like other US MNCs with a 
mature product, was facing increasingly severe competition. At 
the start of the 1960’s 18$ of the "free world’s" construction 
equipment was produced outside the US By 1968 the figure had 
Increased to 27$, an increase of 50$ [Caterpillar, May 1984].
In various industries, many Japanese firms had established an 
excellent reputation for producing good quality, low-cost 
products. In 1970, Caterpillar’s President, William Franklin, 
pin-pointed Komatsu, the Japanese firm, as Caterpillar’s major 
rival and warned that "such a formidable competitor should give 
us (Caterpillar) cause for concern. Komatsu’s real strength is a 
very low price for a reasonably good machine. I am convinced that 
Caterpillar’s management has the kno\^ -how and the resources to 
combat this challenge" [Caterpillar, May 1984, p.52].
Caterpillar was also finding that some countries wanted greater 
control over inward F.D.I., and were demanding that local 
interests have a share in ownership of plants and subsidiaries. 
Caterpillar was therefore obliged to form some joint-venture 
operations, one in Japan, and another in India [Caterpillar, 
May 1984].
Despite this increasingly hostile environment. Caterpillar 
remained king of the construction equipment castle. Its success 
was due to superior management, a long-standing reputation for 
quality and a strong dealer network [Wall 3t. Journal, December 
12, 1983]. Sales and profits increased sharply - despite
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occasional hic-oups because of the Company’s cyclical business. 
Both peaked in 1981, and Caterpillar’s global strategy was 
considered a key factor in this "phenomenal success" [Hout, et 
al, 1982. p.100].
Table 12.6.: Caterpillar Tractor Co. (Consolidated) 
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Year Sales Profit
(Loss)
Average Number of 
Employees
1985 $6,769 $198 53,616
1984 6,576 (428) 61,189
1983 5,424 (345) 58,402
1982 6,469 (180) 73,249
1981 9,154 579 83,455
1980 8,598 565 86 , 3 50
1979 7,613 492 89,266
1978 7,219 566 84 , 004
1977 5,849 445 78,565
1976 5,042 383 77,717
1975 4,964 399 79,393
1974 4,082 229 76,993
1973 3,182 247 71,028
1972 2,602 206 62,134
1971 2,175 128 62,528
1970 2,128 144 66,062.
Source: Company Annual Reports; Fortune magazine.
This accolade seemed somewhat inappropriate when in the following 
year the Company’s fortunes slumped. Caterpillar was confronted 
with a host of problems which surfaced simultaneously: worldwide
recession, decline in large construction projects, record-high 
interest rates, stronger international competition, political 
exclusion from large markets, currency imbalances, a stronger US 
dollar, crisis-level debt in developing countries, and a seven 
month labour strike by the United Auto Workers Union at the 
company’s major US plants. The dispute is the longest ever waged 
by the DAW, surpassing the union’s bitter battle against 
International Harvester in 1979-80. The Company which had 
survived two World Wars, "the Great Depression", and the "oil 
crisis", later commented:
■So many difficulties at one tine was unprecedented"
[Caterpillar, May 1984, p.58].
These factors took their toll on the Company. In 1980,
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Caterpillar announced its first redundancies in two decades. More 
lay offs followed in 1981 ,-82, and -83. The number employed fell 
from a peak of 90,000 in 1979, to 58,000 at the end of 1983. 
Capital expenditures were slashed from a high of $836m in 198I to 
$534m in 19 82 and $324m in 1983.
High costs and severe surplus capacity plagued the Company. In 
1982 total Company sales in Europe were 7$ down on the 1981 
figure, while sales to Africa and the Middle East dropped by a 
massive 44$ during the same period. For the first nine months of 
1983, the Company’s sales outside the ÜS were only 60$ of the 
volume for the comparable period in 1982, which had also been a 
period of depressed sales.
In 1982, a loss was reported for the first time in fifty years, 
and Caterpillar did not wait long to report its next unprofitable 
year. In 1983, losses amounted to $345m, almost double those of
1982, as sales fell from a 1981 high of $9.2 billion to $6.5
billion in 1982 and $5.4 billion in 1983. The situation had 
reached the critical stage, and a 22$ cost reduction programme 
was given top priority throughout the organisation.
Komatsu, on the other hand, saw its sales in 19 82 increase by 15$ 
to $3.4 billion, and profits slipped 2$ to $139m, and its
President, Mr. Ryoich Kawai warned that, "We will not remain
satisfied to be in second place to Caterpillar forever" [Loomis, 
1983]
Caterpillar impressed upon its employees that its Japanese rival
represented a real, and immediate threat. It could no longer
efford the luxury of excess capacity and cost-cutting was to be
stepped up, and plant closures loomed.
As of January 1983, Caterpillar’s manufacturing activities were 
conducted in 24 plants in North America, 6 in Europe, 2 in 
Brazil, and one each in Australia, Indonesia and Japan. The 
Company’s excess capacity problem was particularly acute at its 
Six European plants, and in retrospect, it is not surprising that 
the ÜK subsidiary did not escape rationalization. We will examine
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the restructuring of UK operations in the following section.
As world demand fell, competition became even more intense as 
firms fought for orders to take up the slack in their 
manufacturing facilities. A price war broke out, particularly in 
Europe. Despite transport costs, Komatsu's machines were 30$ 
cheaper in Europe than in Japan where they were produced.
Eventually in 1985, Caterpillar and other producers referred 
Komatsu to the European Commission, accusing it of "dumping" in 
EEC member countries. A tariff of almost 30$ was placed on 
Komatsu’s earth moving equipment, but Caterpillar had already 
restructured its UK operations. The fierce, and apparently 
unfair, competition for shrinking markets had proved too much for 
even the world’s number one, and Caterpillar felt compelled to 
close its Birtley operation with the loss of almost 1,000 jobs.
■1^ 20,; Thft iBPllgatlOBg for %tsrpillar/8 UK Sttbgldlary
During the 1970s, Caterpillar had sought to maintain the high 
level of growth which it had enjoyed during the 1950s and 1960s. 
No one foresaw the dramatic decline in demand for construction 
equipment products. As a result, the Company was faced with 70$ 
excess capacity by 1982/3 and no indication of a sudden increase 
in demand for its products [Caterpillar, August 15-17, 1983].
Clearly, the Company had to at least consider divestment as a 
solution, especially in Europe. Caterpillar, as was noted 
earlier, had six plants in Europe: three in the UK (Birtley, 
Leicester, and Uddingston), two in France (Grenoble and Vernon), 
and one in Belgium (Gosselies) which produced excavators, the 
market for which was still bouyant.
By 1982 rationalisation of UK operations seemed highly likely. 
Leicester produced fork-lift trucks and its future was not In 
question. The same could not be said for the other two plants 
which catered for the construction industry. Birtley was a 
fabrication plant, while Uddingston was an assembley operation.
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The Glasgow and Newcastle plants catered mainly for the European, 
African and Middle East markets. These had witnessed a serious 
downturn for political as well as economic reasons. President 
Reagan had imposed an embargo on the export of certain capital 
goods to the USSR in response to the invasion of Afghanistan by 
Soviet troops in December 1979. Caterpillar had Just secured a 
huge export order from Russia, but it could not afford to violate 
the embargo.
The Soviet Union was constructing the Siberian gas pipe-line. It 
needed 1,000 large tractors. Komatsu won an order for 500, 
Caterpillar had won an order for 300-350 DC8s and other firms 
picked up the rest. This was a large order, even for Caterpillar. 
The UK plants were not directly affected by the embargo, but 
clearly the loss of such a major order when the world market was 
so depressed represented a severe setback to the parent company.
The situation was made worse when sales to the Middle East, one 
of the firm’s largest markets, were drastically reduced due to 
the revolution in Iran, and the Iran-Iraq war.
The UK subsidiary’s domestic and European sales had ranained 
fairly stable, but foreign sales to other geographic areas fell 
considerably. Exports fell from £124m in 1980 to £53m in 1983. 
Sales to Africa plummetted from £l4m in 1982 to £3ni in 1983 (see 
Table 12.7). Nonetheless, although profits had fallen, however, 
from £11m in 1981 to £6m in 1982, Caterpillar’s UK subsidiary had 
not contributed to the parent Company’s heavy losses in 1982 and 
1983, (see Table 12.8).
Table 12.7.: Analysis of Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd.’s Turnover
(£000)
Year Domestic Exporti 13Ï
1980 4 2 , 3 7 3 2^ 4 , 3 5 4
1981 4 5 , 1 4 8 I v l ln
1982 4 4 , 24 0 Vo 7^1
1983 4 6 , 2 7 9 53 ,1 7 4
Source: Extel Statistical Services
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Table 12.8.: Caterpillar Tractor Company Ltd. (£000)
(Year end September 30)
Year Sales Profit 
before Tax
Profit 
after Tax
Average Number 
of employees
1979 183,258 5,021 11,685 5,288
1980 208,978 (508) 94 5,307
1981 190,029 3,914 11,871 5,015
1982 146,833 5,493 6,181 3,703
1983 114,226 2,865 3,791 2,608
1984 115,190 821 2,476 2,248
Source: Extel Statistical Services
From 1979, the Glasgow and Newcastle plants had had their 
production capacity run down. By January 1983 the number employed 
at both plants had been halved and the performance of the UK 
subsidiary had been somewhat erratic (see Table 12.8.). This 
situation clearly perturbed both local communities, but UK 
Management had assured them that there was no plan to close 
either operation. Nonetheless, rumours were rife in August 1983 
that the Uddingston plant was to close with the loss of more than
2,000 jobs. The Scottish factory learned of a reprieve however, 
when, on August 31 the Glasgow Herald and Newcastle’s morning 
’paper. The Journal broke the news that employees at Birtley 
would that day be informed of Caterpillar’s decision to close 
that plant. The section below documents the employee disclosure 
and consultation process before and after Caterpillar’s closure 
announcement.
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Employee Dlaclosore and Oonaultatlon
In 1979/1980, Birtley had operated close to its capacity, and it 
employed approximately 2,100, but by August I983 it was severely 
underutilised and the workforce had been more than halved. The 
first real anxiety about the plant’s future had been expressed in 
1979 when Birtley Plant Manager, Mr. Bob Bur rough announced that 
Head Office had decided to cease production of components for the 
new D8 machine at Birtley, and that production would be 
concentrated in the US. This news sparked off rumours of closure 
in the plant, but after talking to Mr Burrough the Joint 
Negotiating Committee believed that these "now seem to be false" 
[Joint Negotiating Committee Minute Book].
In retrospect, the UK subsidiary’s problems began to surface 
early in 1980. On February 18, 1980, Mr. Burrough informed
stewards that a reduced working week would be introduced on March 
18. It was necessary due to the significant drop in demand from 
Birtley’s major markets, Africa and the Middle East, and it 
affected 1,300 employees. According to the Secretary of the Shop 
Stewards’ Committee, Mr John Jordan, it was introduced only after 
consultation with the Unions and they had accepted it 
[The Journal. March 28, 1980; Posfct April 3» 1980,
p.15].
Mr. Jordan was quoted as saying:
■There are no jobs being lost and this is only a tenporary 
arrangement” PGateshead Posl, April 3, 1980, p.
Local newspapers ran headlines telling readers that production 
was being cut to avoid redundancies -"Workers go on short time 
save jobs" rnat.pshead Post, April 3, 1980], and "Work cut to 
avert lay-offs" FThp» Journal. March 28, 1980]. Caterpillar sai 
nothing to dispel this interpretation of events. Indeed, local 
management issued reassuring statements to anxious employees 
feared that they too would be made redundant.
April 2, 1980: The Industrial Relations Manager at Birtl y, 
Mr.Ted Green, denied that short time working had become necessery 
only because of the Parent Company’s decision to discontinue
458
production at Glasgow of the D8 Tractor for which Birtley had 
supplied components [^ bteshead Post, April 3, 1980]
May 12, 1980: The employees’ representatives were told that
short-time working would continue until September, at least. Mr 
Burrough assured the stewards that although the market would 
remain depressed in the short term due to "the political 
situation in Africa and the Middle East", the long term prospects 
for Birtley were "good" [Joint Negotiating Committee Minute 
Book].
July 12,1980: Mr. Green, Industrial Relations Manager, told
employees that short time working would end on September 12. He 
urged the work force to continue giving the same co-operation 
which the Company had received in recent months. "The object is 
survival but there are no thoughts of redundancies this year and 
hopefully not next year" [Joint Negotiating Committee Minute 
Book].
August 20, 1980: Mr. Burrough declared that short time working of 
10$ would continue until the end of the first quarter of 1982,
but on October 14, he announced that the figure would have to be
increased to 15-20$. He called for co-operation to "work out our 
problems", and promised that there were no planned redundancies 
or lay-offs. Indeed short time working had been introduced to 
avoid recourse to these very measures [Joint NegotiatiHK Çftnnill- 
itee Minute Book].
December 22, 1980: Mr. Green explained that Caterpillar wanted a
three year wage agreement in order to facilitate long term
planning and to provide security [Joint Negotiating Cffflniitteg 
Minute Book].
January 6, 1981: an External Conference between Union and
Management took place. Mr Selkirk, UK Director of Industrial 
Relations refused to attend the meeting and this clearly upset 
the Unions’ representatives who appreciated that Plant management 
was a poor substitute and, it had to rely on direction from 
above in negotiations. The Unions clearly believed that they had
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been denied access to the real decisior>-makers.
January 26, 1981: Mr. Green told the Unions that short-time 
working would continue until the second quarter. By June the 
situation had apparently deteriorated, and Burrough announced 
that the factory’s current labour force was surplus to 
requirements, and that it could be reduced by 35-40$ without 
affecting production. He said that he would be visiting Head 
Office in a few days and that he "will know by the end of August 
which way he is going". This suggests that the real decision­
makers were the executives in Peoria [Joint Negotiating Committee 
Minute Book!.
November 6, 1981: Mr. Gavin Laird, then Assistant General 
Secretary of the AUEW, chaired a meeting of national Union 
delegates which had been convened because of the growing concern 
surroundung Caterpillar’s UK operations. It was concluded that 
only US management was in a position to provide the relevant 
information. Mr Laird said that a meeting would be sought with US 
management in order to determine the Company’s investment plans, 
and to measure the rate of decline of the UK operations since 
1979.
January 19, 1982: Mr. Burough announced that a further 280 jobs
would have to be shed by April. Only in October 19 81, 500 had 
volunteered for redundancy. Production was by then less than half 
the level attained immediately prior to the introduction of short 
time working which had been introduced in March 1980 [Amos and 
Borrell, 1982].
February 1982: National and local Union officials were very 
disturbed at these developments and a meeting was held in 
Newcastle to discuss the future of Caterpillar’s UK operations.
June 16, 1982: Compulsory redundancies were announced at Glasgow. 
The Stewards at the Scottish plant had contacted their Newcastle 
counterparts, complaining that it was impossible to obtain a 
"true picture" of the Company’s intentions [Joint NeKOtlati&K 
_Comnil tf ee Minute Book].
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June 23, 1982: Mr Green scotched rumours that the Birtley plant 
would be closed. He was reported as saying that there was no 
concern whatsoever that the Birtley plant would be closed. He 
reassured the workforce that their future was secure:
"As we see things now, there’ll be no further redundancies, 
bat these days. It Is Impossible to be categoric"
Poet, June 24, 1982, p.25].
September 1, 1982 further redundancies were announced at Birtley.
October 11, 1982: The Company presented its three year plan. 
According to Mr. Green, the Chief Execitive Officer at Peoria, 
Mr. Morgan, had called for a 15-20$ reduction in costs 
[Joint Negotiating Committee Minute Book!.
December 1, 1982: Mr. Giles Radice, Labour MP for North Durham 
and Opposition Employment Spokesman, wrote to European 
Director, Mr P.C, Guerindon, asking for a meeting to discuss the 
Company’s plans for its Birtley plant.
January 1, I983: A three-day week was introduced at Birtley where 
the workforce had been almost halved in 18 months from 2,100 to 
1,100.
January 4, 1983: Another External Conference was called. The 
Unions found the Company "totally inflexible" on the three year 
agreement. The CSEU recorded its contempt of conducting these 
negotiations, which it considered "farcical" since "once again 
decisions had been taken elsewhere" [Joint Negotiating OoiBlBlttefi 
Minute Booki.
January 1 7, 1983: Workers rejected the Company’s three-year wage 
agreement which would have ruled out any pay increase during that 
time [Joint Negotiating Committee Minute Pogkl*
January 24, 1983: Mr. Radice, having not yet received a reply 
from Europe sent another letter bearing a similar request. Mr. 
Radice eventually received a reply from European Director, Mr
46 1
P.C. Guerindon dated January 5, 1983. Mr Hadlee claimed:
prepared to SAve me any assurance about the future of the
1 ^ 1  [Statement issued by Mr. Radice on September
ID f I y u j j #
Mr. Guerindon had urged Radice to speak to Burrough:
•he can give you as much Information as I can concerning the 
prevailing circumstances and until some positive indication 
of a revival in business emerges, neither of us can be very 
helpful on the subject of future plans", [letter dated 
January 5, 1983 from Mr. Guerindon, Caterpillar’s European 
Director, to Mr. Radice, MP]
February 3, 1983: Mr. Alex Selkirk, Caterpillar’s UK Director of 
Industrial Relations, wrote to AUEW official, Mr Dougan, in 
connection with a national recall meeting which had been arranged 
for February 18 between the Company and the Unions in Newcastle. 
He wrote:
■•••at a meeting of the Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. 
Directors on January 25,.....it became obvious that there 
was a strong feeling that our meeting could be counter­
productive from both a company and union point of view, as 
the current business position in the company is still poor, 
with no immediate pick up in sight. Further, the Parent 
Company in the United States is now approaching the 
twentieth week of the strilœ; this is another factor which 
contributes to delaying any decisions within the company on 
the rearrangement of work schedules. Therefore we as a 
company have nothing positive to say at the meeting 
scheduled for February 18. This, in our view, could 
aggravate an already low morale atmosphere in our plants.
I do realise that a delay of this nature could create an 
unwarranted suspician in your own and your own union 
colleagues' minds of the company's motive in proposing a 
further postponement. In an effort to dispel any of these 
concerns, could I suggest that in the meantime, we would be 
happy to arrange that appropriate national level officials, 
responsible for the area in which our plants are located, 
visit with the individual plant managements there during 
February/March to generally view the plant and have some 
local information discussions", [letter dated February 3, 
1983, from Mr. Selkirk, UK Director of Industrial Relations 
to Mr. Dougan, full-time official of the AUEW]
February 7, 1983: Mr Dougan replied to Mr Selkirk stating:
"It is my opinion that the Company are abrogating their
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responsibilities regarding the accredited Trade Union 
affiliated organisations who are recognised by Caterpillar 
Tractor Company Ltd—
Farther to this, it is also my opinion that a further delay 
by management will not inspire confidence by the workforce 
on this subject as undoubtedly the question will be raised 
regarding management's lack of awareness or autonomy 
regarding the United Kingdom operations”, [letter dated 
February 7, 1983, from Mr. Dougan, full-time official of the 
AUEW], to Mr. Selkirk, UK Director of Industrial Relations].
February 21, 1983: Caterpillar cancelled the national meeting. In 
which Union officials at all three UK plants were to meet 
management, because It had "no business to discuss" fJoint 
Negotiating Committee Minute Book].
May 1 9 8 3: Shop stewards were told by management that there were 
Indications that the market had picked up, and accordingly full­
time working would be resumed. Ihe labour force had been reduced, 
they were told, to a level at which full-productIon was 
economically sound. Unions accepted the three year wage deal 
which they had rejected In January [Joint Negotiating Committee
Late June/Early July 1983: Full production resumed. Optimism 
Increased with speculation that Blrtley "could be In line for a 
slice of Caterpillar's share of a £215m contract to construct the 
new Falkland Islands airport" [Unwin, August 31» 1983]»
August 1 5- 1 7, 1 9 8 3: Caterpillar officials met In San Francisco, 
Chicago, and New York with "a number of Interested parties from 
the financial community". At these meetings the Company's overall 
situation and outlook was discussed, and a review was undertaken 
of the steps being taken "to ensure that Caterpillar retains both 
Its financial strength and Industry leadership" [Caterpillar,
August 15-17, 1983, p.1].
Executive Vice President, Mr Schegel, painted a depressing 
picture, but he Indicated some signs for optimism. For example, 
although sales outside the US remained "weak", domestic sales 
were Improving. He did however Indicate the adverse market 
conditions facing the Company. These Included high Interst rates,
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an overvalued dollar, and the massive debts of many lesser 
developed countries (LDCs) [Caterpillar, August 15-17, 1983, p.2],
It was unlikely therefore that the Company would see a return to 
profitability by the year end , especially when Caterpillar would 
have a non-recurring charge to operations of about $50 million 
associated with the closing of Its Mentor Plant In the US. 
Despite these difficulties, the firm had managed to reduce Its 
debt from a peak of $2.7 billion In 1982 to $2.5 billion by the 
end of the 1983 second quarter [Caterpillar, August 15-17, 1983,
p.2].
Qilef Operating Officer, Mr Gilmore, announced that the Company 
"was actively pursuing programs to reduce costs and Improve 
employee/union relationships". The former exercise, he said, 
"would affect ....size and number of facilities" [Caterpillar, 
August 15-17, 1983, p.2].
Mr Morgan, CEO, described how some LDCs were now stipulating that 
firms must serve their domestic market by Internal production, 
or else face expulsion from the market as they prohibited the 
Importation of certain goods:
*A prime example: Indonesia. We either had to go into 
Indonesia with an assembly plant or give up the Indonesian
market". [Caterpillar, August 15-17, 1983, p.3].
This political pressure was bound to have serious consequences 
for the Company. Caterpillar's major manufacturing facilities had 
been In the OECD countries, and these plants, especially those In 
Europe, had served the burgeoning markets of the LDCs. As the 
firm was "compelled" to open more and more plants whilst world­
wide demand was stable. It was Inevitable that the company would 
create an excess capacity problem, and that the plants most 
likely to be affected would be those In Europe.
August 30, 1983: Brian Unwin, Industrial Editor of The Journal 1
had discovered that on the following day Caterpillar would be 
announcing the closure of Blrtley. As he prepared his scoop, he 
telephoned the Chairman of the Shop Steward’s Committee, Mr Bill 
Manning, at approximately 9pni. He asked him to comment on
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Caterpillar's decision to close Birtley. Hr Manning was 
astonished at Mr. Unwin's revelation, as Caterpillar had not even 
hinted to him or any of the other Shop Stewards that Birtley was 
to close. All Manning could say was:
■I cannot comment until I have been told this officially, 
but if what Ihg. JphTBal says is true it will be an absolute
tragedy". [Unwin, August 31, 1981]
Indeed, Mr. Unwin had not been the only journalist to learn of 
Caterpillar's plans before the Newcastle workforce.
August 31, 1983: In Scotland, readers of The Glasgow Herald were 
Informed by Mr. John McKlnlay, Scottish Industrial Correspondent, 
that Uddingston was safe, but that Newcastle would close. 
According to The Glasgow Herald,
"The rationalisation plans were drawn up at company 
headquarters in Peoria, Illinois". [McKlnlay, August 31» 
1983, p.1]
In Newcastle too, the local morning newspaper was first to break the 
news that Blrtley was to close with the loss of 960 jobs. 
Meanwhile, Caterpillar had yet to officially Inform Its own 
employees that they were losing their jobs.
Later In the day, the Company notified Union representatives and 
employees of Its plan, but Its failure to ensure that It notified 
Its employees of Its divestment decision has proved a costly 
mistake In terms of damage to Caterpillar's reputation.
J2.22.S List of Unlop/Oompanv Meetings After tfao QPgHCfl 
Announcement
September 8, 1983: Domestic representatives of all trade unions 
at Blrtley plant met with the plant manager and other senior 
managers from the plant to discuss the closure. No agreement was 
reached f Caternl] lar's Submission to UK Contaot failli.]'
September 14, 1983: An external conference, which was the next 
stage in the procedure took place at the offices of the North- 
East Employers' Association under the chairmanship of the
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Director of the Association. Unions were represented by the local 
committee of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions, and local plant management represented the Company 
[Cat.e r p m ar.!^ „S.ubiDl8slon to UK Contanf. Point, 1983, p.4].
The meeting ended with a "failure to agree" on the plant closure, 
and the unions asked for a further meeting with senior 
management who were responsible for the closure decision. The 
Company agreed to such a meeting [Caterpillar's Submission to UK
F.oint, 1983, p.5].
September 30, 1983: The entire Board of Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
Ltd. UK attended the meeting, together with Blrtley plant senior 
management. Board Chairman and Managing Director, D.F. Dominick, 
headed the Company team (Mr. Dominick Is also a Corporate Vice 
President In charge of all European operations). After a long 
recess, the Unions, Indicating that while they were not at the 
stage of accepting the plant closure, they wanted a further 
meeting to discuss terms. I.e. redundancy pay, etc. 
[Caterpillar's Submission to UK Contact Point. 1983, p.5].
According to union sources. Caterpillar declared that Its 
decision was "Irreversible".
October 14, I983: At this meeting, which was again held In the 
offices of the North-East Englneelng Employers' Association, the 
Union delegation requested that the Company consider:
■a) delaying the Initial date of redundancies from 6 January 
to May 1984;
b) significantly improving its proposed terms of redundancy 
in the event of plant closure" [Cat erplll 
.Submission to UK Cpptact Point. 1983, P*5].
The Company agreed to delay Implementing Initial redundancies 
until March 30, 1984, and to Improve the existing level of 
redundancy payments by 25$, lu return for employees co operation 
in the smooth shutdown of the plant by August 31, 1984. The 
Unions took these Company-proposed Imptovements to a mass meeting 
of all Blrtley Plant employees on 18 October, 1983 [CaterplllarlÆ
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SubmlgglOJi-to. UK Contact Point, 1983, p.5].
October 18, 1983 : The Unions held a mass meeting to inform 
members of the results of the two previous Company-Unlon 
meetings. Employees voted to continue to oppose the plant closure 
[Catgrplllar*s .Sabmlgglon to UK Content 1983, p.5].
October 24, 1983: Mr. Burrough met with the Blrtley plant's Shop 
Stewards to clarify the mass meeting decision to continue to 
oppose the plant closure, "as there seemed to be some confusion 
regarding the Company proposals made at the previous 
Company/Union meeting". He explained that the only two 
alternatives now were:
"a) A phased and orderly closure which would be in the best 
interests of all concerned, with employees guaranteed 
employment to the end of March 1984 and with many going 
through to August 1984, all with decent severance payments; 
or
b) An earlier plant closure which would really be in no 
one's interests" [ Caterpillar's Submission to UK Contact 
Point. 1983, p.6].
Union leaders believed that the Company had presented these 
options In réponse to the bad publicity It had received, the 
closure announcement being the subject of an Impending 
Investigation by the European Community. This thinly veiled 
threat was Caterpillar's ace. The campaign at national, and 
International level (via the EEC and OECD), to save Blrtley had 
been gaining momentum, but only as long as employees stood firm 
In opposing the closure decision. It would have been obvious to 
the TUC and to Caterpillar that as soon as the workforce voted to 
accept closure, momentum would be Irreversibly lost and that the 
Plght against closure was lost.
Given the choice between Imminent redundancy, and the opportunity 
to work for a further 6-9 months, plus time to seek alternative 
employment, and make the necessary emotional and financial 
readjustment. It was predictable, and understandable, that 
employees would pick the option that forestalled redundancy. 
Caterpillar knew the stakes were too high for Its Blrtley
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employees. The workforce could not afford to gamble 6-9 months 
wages on testing the OECD's Guidelines impact on corporate 
decision making, which Is just as well for only changing market 
conditions would have prompted Caterpillar to reverse its 
decision. Only one course of action was open to the Birtley 
workforce.
October 26, 1983: A further mass meeting, convened by Blrtley Shop 
Stewards, was held and Its outcome was a formality. Employees 
agreed to reverse their decision of only the previous week and 
accept a phased shutdown of the plant by August 31, 1984. However, 
they gave a mandate to the shop stewards to approach management 
once again for additional Increases In severance pay 
[^atgrPlllar's Submission to UK Contact Point. 1983, p.6].
November 1, 1983: Mr. Burrough met Blrtley's Shop Stewards and 
Indicated that "as a final gesture the Company would add the 
equivalent of four weeks pay per employee to the redundancy 
package previously proposed by the Company on 14 October 1983. 
The shop stewards requested that this be distributed In the form 
of a flat payment of just over £530 per employee. The shop 
stewards agreed to recommend at a further mass meeting, that 
employees accept these closure terms" FCaterolllar-'S-.SubmlsslPP 
J;o UK Contact Point. 1983, p.6].
November 3, 1983: A mass meeting was held to establish the 
workforce's view of Caterpillar's redundancy package. Employees 
voted by "a substantial majority to accept the phased shutdown of 
the plant by 31 August 1984, and the total severance package as 
now proposed by the Company" F Caterpillar's Submission to ÜK 
Skmtact Point, 1983, p.6].
It had taken six weeks for Caterpillar to break down opposition 
to closure, and a further two weeks to reach a settlement on 
redundancy payments. Therein lies the major problem facing Union 
officials In the divestment situation - their membership, 
for sound reasons, lack confidence In the ability of labour 
organisations to reverse a major corporate decision, and are
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likely to pressuriee officials into early haggling over 
redundancy payments, so as to secure a good deal as early as 
possible after the closure announcement.
12,23jÎ. ReferraL  the OECD's UK National Oontaot Point
The news of closure had been greeted with anger among Trade 
Unionists, but It seemed most unlikely that their hostility could 
be translated Into constructive action to save the factory. 
Poorly attended demonstrations through Blrtley by demoralised 
employees were not going to persuade top executives In distant 
Illinois to reverse their decision. Such futile gestures were 
never likely to attract more than transitory attention In the 
local newspaper, let alone send shock-waves through America’s 
sixth largest exporter. To the plant's 960 employees the 
situation seemed desperate.
Hopes were suddenly revived on September 30, 1983, when the
Assistant General Secretary of the British TUC, Mr. David Lea,
revealed at the Bowater Conference that the TUC had decided to
demand an Investigation "under the OECD procedure" of the 
Blrtley, Caterpillar case. He accused Caterpillar of the "most 
flagrant disregard for both the letter and spirit of the
voluntary codes". He launched a bitter attack against the UK
Government for refusing to support labour's efforts to secure 
accountability from their employees. Caterpillar's conduct, he 
concluded, underlined the necessity for some of the key elements 
highlighted by the "Vredellng" debates, for example, the need for 
legal enforceability, and the need for Information and 
consultation prior to decision making.
Lea's speech was picked up by all the "quality" national 
newspapers. Once again Caterpillar was national news, and the US 
MNCs reputation reached a new depth. This PR victory was followed 
cp by another. On September 12, 1983, Dr. Gordon Adam, MEP, put
forward a motion In the European Parliament In which he accused 
Caterpillar of not adhering to Article 4 of the amended 
"Vredellng Proposals" which the European Parliament had approved 
and submitted to the Council of Ministers whose unanimous support
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was required before the revised Dlreotlve oould beoome Conmunity 
legisaltion.
12,21.1, tup;g,View
The TUC and Labour politicians allege that Caterpillar conformed 
to neither Its own code of conduct, the OECD Guidelines, nor the 
amended Vredellng/Rlchards Proposals.
In 1974, Caterpillar Issued "A Code of Worldwide Business Conduct 
and Operating Principles". In It the Company declared that
"•••we Intend to treat people as Individual human beings - 
to be considered one at a time, not as a "oomnodity" simply 
to be employed.
We aspire to a hi^ standard of human relationships. 
Specifically we intend.  ....
To provide employees with timely information concerning 
ccMspany operations and results, as well as other work- 
related matters in which they logically have an interest".
In his letter of October 7, 1983, to Mr.C. Batten at the UK
Contact Point, Mr. Len Murray, General Secretary of the TUC, said 
that the TUC "Is firmly of the view that the actions of
Caterpillar "constitute a breach of the Guidelines".
Mr, Murray's account of the case Is presented below :
"%e company’s management informed union representatives on 
August 31 that the plant in Birtley, Tyne and Wear, was to 
close with the loss of 960 jobs. Hot only did the company 
fail to carry out any prior consultation on this major
decision, but in fact the news of the closure decision was 
revealed in local newspaper reports before the meeting of 
August 31.
This behaviour is clearly at odds with paragraph 6 of the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Section of the 
Guidelines. It also contrasts sharply with the company's 
previous statements concerning the conduct of industrial 
relations. Whilst lobbying members of the European Assembly 
against the proposed European Community directive on 
procedures for informing and consulting with employees lie 
"Vredellng"], for example, the company stated that 'we 
believe that companies should inform and involve employees
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In matters of concern to them'. ... it went on to argue 
against the proposed EEC directive on the basis that it 
'would create havoc with our established procedures for 
communications and consultation with employees' and claimed 
that ' instead of decisions being discussed and taken close 
to those yiho will be affected more and more decisions would 
be made at CKxnapany headquarters far removed fr<m the local 
scene'.
In fact on this last point there are indications that the 
decision to close Birtley was taken on grounds connected 
with a restructuring of the Company's global activities 
rather than on the basis of local considerations. In August 
13 e meeting was held in New York involving top management 
of the US parent company to discuss the comapny's overall 
situation and outlook. The ..statement arising from that 
meeting clearly envisages both measures to reduce the size 
and number of operating units and a general re-orientating 
of the company's activities towards developing countries, 
and in particular towards the Asian area. This aspect of 
the background clearly raises the issue of Paragraph 9 of 
the Bmployment and Industrial Relations section of the 
Guidelines in relation to union representatives' lack of 
access to the real decision makers - idio in this case appear 
to be in the US
A further aspect of the background is also relevant to the 
guidelines. The company has received some £1.6 million 
since 1972 in Regional Development Grants for the Birtley 
plant. The closure decision is clearly at odds with the 
regional development objectives that underlie the grants 
system and calls into question the comqxany's adherence to 
paragraphs 1-4 of the General Policies section. These call 
for wei^t to be given to industrial and regional 
development priorities and cooperation with local community 
interests".
Mr. Murray accordingly asked the Contact Point to draw the 
attention of Caterpillar to its breach of the Guidelines. He also 
asked the ÜK Contact Point to liase with the US Cbntact Point, in 
order to verify that the closure of Birtley was part of the 
Company's international restructuring programme.
J2.23.2.Î Caterpillar's, liStt
By November 9, 1983, Caterpillar's UK management had prepared its
own submission to the UK Contact Point, entitled "Summary of
Events Concerning the Closure of the Caterpillar Birtley
(Newcastle) Plant". This document rebuked the TUC's charges. It
concentrated on "three areas of particular interest: Economic
Background ; Steps taken to Inform and Consult with Birtley Plant
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employees and their Onion repreeentatlves ; and, Relevant 
provision of British Law, the OECD and ILO Guidelines, and the 
Vredellng Proposal".
The first section explained the difficulties facing the Company. 
In addition to what was seen earlier, Caterpillar justified their 
decision by referring to cases of divestment by some of their 
rivals, including Hyster, Clark, International Harvester, and the 
collapse of IBH Holdings, a West German firm.
According to Caterpillar,
•Employees and trade anions were kept fully informed of 
these trends [ie the recession and low demand}. With their 
oo-operation, short work weeks were introduced. 
Subsequently, voluntary redundancy/early retirement and 
mandatory redundancies took place at all three plants. 
Glasgow and Birtley Plants were hardest hit, coming down to 
employment levels of approximately 1,100 at Glasgow, and 
Just under 1,000 at Birtley by 1983»
By mid-1983, Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. [ie the ÜK 
subsidiary] - like the rest of Caterpillar - was operating 
at only about 30 percent of capapcity. It became obvious 
this could not continue, and some consolidation of 
operations had to take place. The Board of Directors of 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. in the DK had to consider very 
seriously the future of the three UK Plants - particularly 
since there was no prospect that the manufacturing capacity 
of all three plants would be required in the foreseeable 
future.
By mid-August 1983, the UK Board had concluded that one 
plant in the UK Company would have to be closed because of 
the serious overcapacity situation here. Even if demand 
increased significantly over the foreseeable future, the 
spare capacity in two plants could accomodate such demand at 
lower overhead costs.
Since Leicester Plant is a relatively new and modern 
facility, with a lift truck assembly building built in 1975- 
76 and demand for lift trucks holding reasonably well, an 
early conclusion was reached at this point that this plant 
should continue operating.
Therefore it fell between Glasgow and Birtley Plants as to 
which should be considered for closing. Because Glasgow was 
already an assembly plant and a more modern facility.
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Previous studies have found that the decision to divest is 
usually taken nine to eleven months before it is publicised. 
Caterpillar claim, however, that the decision to close Birtley 
was made by the UK Board just a few weeks before the public 
announcement. Caterpillar's submission to the OECD, and UK 
Director of Industrial Relations, Mr Selkirk, confirm that the 
closure announcement date was brought forward because of 
increased speculation in late August:
"Timing of the closure was also an important consideration. 
While the plant could have been closed almost immediately 
from a manufacturing perspective, it was determined that as 
much advance warning as possible should be given to 
employees and their representative trade unions. In regard 
to timing, careful consideration was also given to our own 
Company procedures as explained in our Code of Worldwide 
Business Conduct and Operating Principles, the OECD 
Guidelines, and UK Statutory Communication and Consultation 
Requirements.
Thus the general phased shutdown of the plant during 1984 - 
and how that would affect employees - would be a matter for 
Birtley Plant management and local Trade Union Officials to 
agree upon.
The Company was aware that because of Uie recession, short 
work-weeks, three voluntary redundancy programmes, and the 
readily apparent excess capacity, in both Glasgow and 
Birtley Plants, there had already been a great deal of 
speculation and rumour among employees that one of these 
plants would have to be closed. In the last few days of 
August, the speculation increased that the Birtley Plant 
would close. It was, therefore, determincKJ that we should 
communicate to employees as quickly as possible and 
Wednesday, 31 August, was the earliest possible date.
Communications were timed to begin at 9*30 a*m. on the 31at, 
with the Plant Manager at Blrtley advising all shop stewards 
in the plant, followed by communication to employees by 
their appropriate supervisors. In addition individual 
letters were sent out on Wednesday, 31 August, to the homes 
of all Birtley plant employees. Employees at the other UK 
Plants were also to be advised of the situation and how it 
affected their particular plant.
Unfortunately, some members of the press learned of the 
planned announcement. To our regret, some por ons o e
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media - although aware of the Company's Intention to Inform 
employees before making a public announcement - 
nevertheless published the news on the morning of 31 August. 
Therefore, our employees learned the news from that source 
before our planned communication. Placing, as we normally 
do, a great deal of Importance on the quality of our 
communications to our employees, we were greatly concerned 
about this state of affairs in so important a matter for 
them. We can only express our regret that those involved in 
publishing the news apparently took no account of the effect 
on our employees' feelings or the damage their actions could 
have had on Company/Trade Union relationships.
Thankfully, those relationships eventually withstood this 
unfortunate incident, and since then a considerable number 
of Company/Union meetings have taken place" F Caterpillar's 
Emission, to the UK Contact Point. 1983, p.3].
Caterpillar concludes Its submission to the UK Contact Point with 
an examination of "Laws and Guidelines on Plant Closure". It 
states, correctly, that the Employment Protection Act of 1975, as 
ammended, requires employers to consult with unions at least 90 
days before implementing redundancy of 100 or more employees. 
Caterpillar, in fact, informed employees and Union 
representatives of its intention to close the Birtley plant on 
August 31, 1983, although the first compulsory redundancies would 
not be until after March 30, 1984:
■Thus the period between initial consultation and 
implementation of redundancies will be 7 months - or more 
than twice the period specified in the Employment Protection 
Act" F Caterpillar's Submission to the UK .Contact FolJlit 
1983, p.9].
However, Caterpillar in its own Code of Operating Principles 
states that:
"The law is a floor. Ethical business conduct nhould 
normally exist at a level well above the minimum required by 
law".
As regards the OECD's Guidelines, Caterpillar itself agreed that 
paragraphs 6 and 9 of the Employment and Industrial Relations 
section "apply most directly to the Birtley situation". The 
Company believes its conduct was beyond reproach:
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compulsory redundancies will not begin before March 30, 1984
notification. Pinal provisions are well 
in excess of those provided under British law.
Regarding Clause 9, the Union Committee asked for a meeting 
with senior management responsible for the closure decision. 
The Company agreed to this request, and .. a meeting took 
place on 30 September 1983 between the Chterpillar Tractor 
Co. Ltd. UK Board of Directors and Regional Officials to all 
nnions concerned. At that meeting, careful consideration was 
given to Union representatives that the plant should remain 
open. In response. Company representatives explained that 
they had already considered many alternatives, but the 
problem of long-term excess manufacturing capacity in the 
United Kingdom could not be solved other than by plant 
closure. In our view, the Company has clearly complied with 
all relative provisions of the OECD Guidelines..* 
[Caterpillar's Submission to the UK Contact Point. 1983, 
P* 7—8].
Caterpillar also commented that paragraphs 1-4 of the General 
Policy section of the OECD Guidelines "could also be said to have 
an indirect bearing on the Birtley situation". The Company 
claimed it faced,
*a Hobson's choice in that it had either to close the UK 
Plant or risk putting the future security of all three 
British plants in jeopardy. The General Policies section of 
the OECD Guidelines do not provide any guidelines in such a 
situation, and the UK Board exercised its best judgement how 
to secure the future of the overall British company* 
[Caterpillar's Submission to the UK Contact Point, 1983,
p.8].
In its submission to the UK Contact Point, Caterpillar once 
again underlined its opposition to the "Vredeling Proposals":
"In common with the overwhelming majority of employers in 
the EC, Caterpillar believes that the mandatory and 
restrictive provisions of the proposed Directive are 
unnecessary, and will serve only to discourage investment 
and job creation in EC member countries.
In our specific case, the existence of such a Directive 
would not have changed the factors with which we must 
contend. The economic situation would still have required 
the company to take action to reduce excess manufacturing 
capacity. Were we unable to take these steps because of 
barriers created by such a Directive, or were jecossa^ 
actions seriously delayed, the result would be to Jeopardise 
the job security of all employees of Caterpillar Tractor Co.
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PHbnil8»1on to the m
This last point was stressed by Mr. Selkirk, UK Director of 
Industrial Relations, when interviewd by the author. He explained 
that the decision to close Birtley had not been taken lightly, 
and that retaining the plant would only have endangered the 
employment prospects of all UK employees. Indeed, the closure of 
Birtley, improved employment prospects at the Glasgow factory.
In its detailed submission to the UK Contact Point, Caterpillar 
stated that "employees and trade union were kept fully aware" of 
the difficulties facing the Parent Company and its UK subsidiary 
[■gat.OTlllarJg. SwbmlSglgn to the UK Contact Point. 1983, p.3]. 
This was the case, but as was seen earlier, employees were 
constantly assured that the run-down of operations was to 
safeguard Blrtley's future. Prior to the announcement of August 
31, there had been no indication that either UK subsidiary or 
Parent Company management was contemplating closure.
In its presentation of Company/Union meetings. Caterpillar 
provided a time-table and summary of those which occurred only 
after closure had been announced. It did not provide dates of 
consultative meetings prior to August 31, 1983, when closure was 
announced.
Nevertheless Caterpillar summarised its case as follows:
*We have already described in this report the extensive 
communications and consultations with employees and union 
representatives over the past three years. It has been a 
period of discouraging economic developments, requiring 
adjustments at Birtley Plant such as short work-weeks and 
three voluntary redundancy plans.
Since the 31 August announcement of the intended plant 
closure, we have — as also describe earlier in this report — 
held several meetings with unions representing Birtley Plant 
employees. We have also reached agreement on the ’Closure 
Plan’ in repect of our employees. No redundancies will 
begin before 30 March 1984. These circumstances are 
considerably in excess of the thirty days mentioned in the 
Vredeling Proposal.
The Company takes no pride in the fact that it is necessa^ 
to close Birtley Plant, which is located in an area already
476
representltl^^V adrS rtonTat th^B^rtl'ey Mant^hwe
accepted the plant closure, and negotiations have been 
concluded on the separation terms. Our attention is now 
directed, therefore, toward the orderly shutdown of the 
plnnt with the co-operation of our employees
We have, however, endeavoured to communicate and consult 
with employees in honest and timely fashion during the 
period of business downturn preceding and leading up to the 
decision to close Birtley plant" FCaterntiiar'a 
Submiggion-to. the UK Contact Point. 1983, p.9].
Contrary to the claims of UK Management, Mr. Steve Newhouse, a 
Caterpillar spokesman at Company headquarters in Illinois, 
admitted to The Journal that employees had not been consulted 
before the final decision was made. He explained that,
"..it is very hard for the decision-making process if you 
open it up on a large scale. It makes it that much harder to 
reach a conclusion” [Unwin, September 1, 19831.
■12.23.3.; The Response of the UK Contact Point
It was seen in Chapter 6 that National Contact Points are 
expressly forbidden to comment on the conduct of an individual 
enterprise. Their function is to clarify, on request, sections of 
the Guidelines. Should a case arise in which a Contact Point is 
uncertain of the meaning of a particular section, the case is 
referred to CIME.
In his letter of October 7, 1983, to the UK National Contact 
Point, Mr. Murray had stated that the main areas of complaint 
concerned paragraphs 6 and 9 of the Employment and Industrial 
Realtions section and paragraph 8 of the Introduction. He 
believed that,
•taken together these can be seen as calling fort-
timely consultations with union representatives before the 
announcement of such major changes as plant olosi^es or 
other decisions with major effects on workers’ livelihoods;
opportunities for unions to negotiate on the issues with the 
management which has taken the decision;ssa'fass
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BattenT to Mr. C.
On December 7, 1983, the Contact Point, baaed at the Department 
of Trade and Industry, replied to Mr. Murray's letter. It 
disagreed with Mr. Murray's interpretation of the aforementioned 
sections of the Guidelines:
While I can understand your desire to summarise the outoome 
in the [above] three points ...we - and I think the same 
goes for the CIME as a whole - would not agree with your 
summary in all respects.
In particular, ...we would not accept that the Guidelines 
themselves provide for "negotiation" on closure or transfer 
of undertakings. The clarification of paragraph 9 which was 
published in the Mid-Term Report goes into this at some 
length, I would only quote one sentence: 'Paragraph 9 does 
not institute a claim for opening consultations or 
negotiations in the absence of other relevant provisions'. 
The significance of this last phrase is that the Guidelines 
are, of course, set firmly within the framework of national 
law and practise.
On the point you raise about the involvemnt of management 
representatives authorised to take decisions, the new 
clarification of paragraph 6 is relevant. As you will see 
this states that management participating in the process of 
"co-operation* dealt with in paragraph 6 should have 
sufficient authority to co-operate in good faith and to take 
the decisions that mi^t be called for in the circumstances. 
(Of course, the process of mitigation may involve decisions 
that are outside the responsibility of the company 
altogether). This, in turn, is put in the context of 
paragraph 8 of the Introduction. Here the Committee was 
particularly thinking of the passage indicating that 'the 
Guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the 
MHE .... on the understanding that they will co-operate and 
provide assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate 
observance of the Guidelines'.
It may be helpful if I summarise our view of the most 
salient elements of paragraph 6 of the Industrial Relations 
chapter and paragraph 8 of the Introduction:
(i) timely notice, if possible prior to the final decision 
being taken, of major changes in the operations of an 
enterprise (including the transfer of undertakings).
(ii) co-operation by management with employee 
representatives so as to mitigate to the maximum extent 
practicable the adverse effects of such major changes
(iii) the involvement in such "co-operation"
with sufficient authority to co-operate in good faith and to 
take any decisions, related to the mitigation o a vers
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effects, that might be required", [letter from Mr. W.L.
Stow, UK National Contact Point, dated December 7, 1983, to 
Mr. Murray]
The UK Contact Point then proceeded to summarise the document 
which Caterpillar had submitted. This summary is at odds, 
however, with the copy of the document which the author received 
from the Company's Director of Industrial Relations, in that the 
Contact Point's summary, unlike the original document, stresses 
in detail Caterpillar's contribution to the British economy.
The letter to Mr. Murray concluded with a reminder that the OECD 
has no judicial function:
"Finally, you also asked os to submit supplementary reports 
to the OECD as a contribution to the 1984 Review procedures# 
The OECD, of course, does not get involved in individual 
cases unless issues of clarification are involved# However, 
at the meeting of the CIME Working Group last week, I 
mentioned the two cases [Caterpillar and Dunlop] in general 
terms to update the HE response to the questionnaire on the 
Guidelines and, in the context of the 1984 Review, to 
illustrate the working of the National Gbntaot Point system 
in the HE", [letter from Mr. W.L. Stow, UK National Contact 
Point, dated December 7» 1983, to Mr. Murray]
J2.24#; The Unions' View
12.24.1.! The View of the Secretarv of the Shoo Stewarl'a 
■Committee.
When interviwed by the author in May 1984, Mr, Jordan, Secretary 
of the Shop Steward's Committee, recalled that while employees 
had been informed regularly by Caterpillar that the Company was 
experiencing difficulties, they were never told that the closure 
of Birtley was under review.
The Company claim that employees expected closure, but the fact 
of the matter was that employees and their representatives were 
constantly being reminded by Management that short-time working, 
and redundancies, had been introduced in order to avoid closure. 
It was not, they were assured, the first steps towards total 
closure. As far as the Unions were concerned, these measures were 
2 "quid pro quo".
479
Employees were never told that these measures represented 
indications of impending closure, but now Caterpillar claims in 
effect, that at one end of the spectrum is investment and at the 
other is divestment and that as one approaches the latter one 
finds short— time working, and voluntary and compulsory 
redundancies,
Mr, Jordan admited that he had been concerned for some time about 
Birtley's future. His suspicions that Birtley's future was in 
question were first raised when, in 1980, Caterpillar embarked on 
cutting production at the plant. These were confirmed, he 
remembers, by a 1981 Company publication which carried the 
following statement from Caterpillar President, Mr Bob Gilmore:
"By the end of 1979 we’d oommitted a great deal of time and 
manpower to two important planning exercises that produced 
well-defined product and parts strategies for the decade 
ahead. So we had our product and facilities plans pretty 
clearly in view".
Prior to the closure announcement Mr. Jordan had never heard of 
the OECD's Guidelines or of "Vredeling". He learned of their 
existence from Euro-MP, Joyce Quin, member for Tyne and Wear 
Constituency, who approached the work-force offering her support 
in the campaign to reverse the closure decision.
J2.24.2.Î The View of Regional QffloiflU
As the Divisional Organiser for TASS, Mr. Arthur Scott was 
heavily involved in this case and attended all the external 
Union/ Company meetings after the closure announcement.
Mr. Scott recalled how he first heard of Caterpillar's plans to 
close Birtley. On the evening of August 30, he met a neighbour 
who asked him if he had heard the rumour that Caterpillar would 
be announcing its decision to close Birtley the following day. 
The following morning he received confirmation through the media, 
and later that day, he received a hand delivered letter from the 
Company, informing him of the closure.
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Mr. Scott believes that the parent company decided in April 1982 
to close the Birtley plant. He also believes, that local 
management were not informed of this decision until shortly 
before it was revealed to the workers. He thinks that local 
management really did believe that the cut-backs were introduced 
in order to safeguard the future of Birtley.
Mr. Scott argues that the only reason compulsory redundancies 
were postponed until the end of March 1984 was because it was in 
Caterpillar's interests to have a gradual rundown.
According to Mr. Scott, it was clear that Caterpillar had had 
problems since 1981. These difficulties led the Company to asking 
the workforce to accept short-time working and even redundancies, 
and also a 3 year wage deal. These measures were accepted because 
Caterpillar said they were needed to ensure the future of the 
plant. The Union officials believed this.
The Birtley factory was closed, not due to poor performance, but 
due to falling worldwide demand for Caterpillar's products. The 
firm had excess capacity and therefore decided to rationalise, 
with Birley's production being transferred to Caterpillar's other 
UK Plants and to those in Belgium and France.
Mr. Scott could not provide copies of Company Statements 
regarding the future of the plant because, he said, there were 
none.
As regards the OECD Guidelines, Mr. Scott said that "to suggest 
we were au fait with them would be kidding". He had heard of 
them, but was not aware of their contents. He states that the 
Guidelines never acted as a term of reference for employees, but 
then again, neither did the Employment Protection Act, 1975. The 
unions' terms of reference were the agreements reached with the 
Engineering Employer's Federation; which were binding on 
Caterpillar as a member.
The OECD's Guidelines were, and still are, never used in day-to- 
day negotiations. Mr. Scott believes that the only value of the
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Guidelines, lies in the area of propoganda - "The Guidelines are 
less than useless but from a propaganda point of view they are 
great".
Mr. Scott had never heard of the "Vredeling Proposals" until 
Joyce Quin, HEP, and Dr. Gordon Adam, MEP, approached the 
workforce shortly after Caterpillar had announced its intention 
to cease production at the Birtley Plant. He now believes that 
Strasbourg offers employees much more protection than Westminster 
and this observation has tempered his view on Britain’s 
membership of the European Community. If "Vredeling" were 
implemented however, he believes that Companies would find 
loopholes and thereby avoid adhering to the principles and spirit 
of the Directive. He concluded though that, "At least, 
legislation is more authoritative than guidelines."
According to the Regional Secretary of the Northern TÜC, Mr Bob 
Howard,
•The TOC Northern Regional Connoil, following 
representations from the convenor and shop stewards at the 
factory, unanimously condemned the behaviour and practises 
of .. Caterpillar .. In contravention of the "Vredeling 
Proposals" and the OECD Guidelines at a meeting held on 1 
October 1983.
•• the workforce were convinced that the management’s 
decision was Irreversible and accordingly recognised that 
they were faced with a fait accompli. However It should be 
stated, to place the problem In Its true context, that there 
had been a considerable run down and demoralisation of the 
workforce prior to the official announcement which had 
softened up any effective resistance" [letter dated May 22, 
1984, from Mr. Howard to the author].
Former employees and shop stewards interviewed by the author were 
all very critical of Caterpillar’s handling of the announcement. 
The reduction in numbers employed, coupled with lack of orders, 
did arouse concern, but the Company had said the retrenchment wa 
necessary to safeguard the factory’s future, and the unions 
accepted this. There was no resistance to trimming down the 
Birtley plant as they believed it was in their best interests - a 
necessary evil. According to union representatives there was no 
consultation, nor did Caterpillar indicate that it was
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considering closure.
It must also be stressed that none of the mmiom officials
involved at plant, or regional, level bad a soiaind kmowledge ®f 
the Guidelines prior to the closure anmouncememt. Ome leadlmg 
official believed that the Guidelines emanated from the Euarogsœasii 
Parliament. When asked why the British TDC apparently made so 
little use of them, he explained that Onion» could mot 
and refer to then because this could be interpreted as 
British membership of the EEC, from which the British Labour 
Party was committed to withdrawal.
In retrospect, the Unions may appear to onlookers as rather 
naive, but at the time, the Company’s arguement that it was 
necessary to temporarily trim down the factory until there was am 
upturn in the market, must have sounded plausible. Industrial 
action was always a possibility but Unions are now very wary of 
resorting to it, because in the past, it las been used toy 
Company’s as a justification for closure, blaming the militant 
work-force.
The Economic and Social Committee of the TIC in a •Private 
Confidential" document reveals its lack of understanding of the 
OECD’s Guidelines. The Committee was dissatisfied that the 
Contact Point had not passed judgement on Caterpillar’s conduct, 
and intended writing to request that "the Contact Point should 
now assess the validity of the Company’s claims, against the 
Contact Point’s own interpretation of the Guidelines". It appears 
that the TUC still does not realize that Contact Points, and OME 
are forbidden to pass Judgement on the conduct of am Individual 
enterprise.
The OK lational Contact Point’s reply led the TOC’s Enomnmie 
Committee to the following conclusion:
"VWAM n  It confirms the established vl«w of the gh— nilttee
about the inadequacy of voluntary codes of oomdmett, and the 
need for statutory rights to information and eomsmltatimm 
such as those in the draft •VredelingT proposals— -"L
12.25.: Postscript
Almost two years to the day that Caterpillar announced the 
closure of Birtley, Tÿne and Wear County Council confirmed it was 
negotiating a purchase price with Caterpillar for Birtley. The US 
MNC*s arch-rival Komatsu had decided to establish a manufacturing 
facility in north-east England, obviously having been impressed 
with the "Geordie" welcome extended to Nissan which had chosen 
to open a plant at Washington, Tyne and Wear.
Komatsu’s European sales had been hit by the 26.6% tariff imposed 
in March 1985 by the EEC on Japanese hydraulic excavators, and 
the firm therefore has a clear incentive in quickly establishing 
a plant in the EEC. In September 1985 the Japanese firm met 
officials from the Department of Trade and Industry to discuss 
the Government aid package for the proposed plant [Gray and 
Rappaport, 1985; Gray, 1985]
Finally, on December 17, 1985, Komatsu confirmed that it had 
acquired the former Caterpillar plant at Birtley, only a week 
after the US MNC had sold the site to Tyne and Wear Enterprise 
Trust. The £12.3m manufacturing project, which is expected to 
create 300 jobs, will be Komatsu’s first production unit in the 
EEC, and by far its largest foreign operation. The British 
Government’s aid package amounted to only £2.3m, end so gaining 
prior approval from the European Commission was unnecessary 
[Townsend, December 17, 1985, p.1; Rodger, December 18, 1985,
p. 8].
1985 proved a watershed too in the great industrial battle 
between the world’s top two construction companies. Only four 
years earlier, Komatsu’s President had been making bellgerent 
speeches, warning Caterpillar that its days as supremo were
4 84
limited. The new President, Mr. Shoji Nogawa, has adopted a much 
more reconciliatory tone:
•We have no Intention of taking on Caterpillar and fighting 
them like an enemy until one of us falls. What is Important 
to both Caterpillar and Komatsu is our customers. It is not 
businesslike to put them aside, just to fight each other. 
The kind of thinking that says, 'If we do not get them, they 
will get us,' is what Japan used in the Second World War, 
and look what that produced" [Rodger, December 4, 1985,
p.12].
Nevertheless, Komatsu’s 1985 decisions to manufacture within the 
EEC, at Birtley, and within the US, in Tennessee, is evidence 
that the the Japanese firm has finally overcome its reluctance to 
Invest abroad. Ominously for Caterpillar, this new strategy has 
emerged partly in response to the recent revival in Caterpillar’s 
fortunes. The world’s largest construction machinery company 
must still guard against complacency - after all, the Japanese 
are coming.
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12.26.: OoDGlusing?
At their peak, the three plants examined in this chapter each 
employed more than 2,000 workers. By the time closure was 
announced the workforce at each had been significantly reduced, 
especially at Birtley and Bradford. All three MNCs received 
strong criticism from Trades Union officials, but this case 
reveals that it was not always deserved.
12.,27. Foreign Divestment Theory
Closure of the three plants examined here support Boddewyn’s 
contention that an eclectic theory of foreign divestment seems 
much more appropriate than the mutually exclusive "Condition" 
"Motivation", and "Precipitating Circumstance-Based"theories. All 
three closures were initially triggered by the exceptionally 
dramatic downturn in the Construction and Farm Equipment 
Industry. This slump, along with record high interest rates, 
represented a significant change in market conditions from the 
post-war boom period during which all three plants had been 
opened.
By the late 1970s the Farm and Construction Machinery Industry 
was operating at well below full capacity and firms were unable 
to achieve satisfactory economies of scale. During 1979-80, in a 
bid to lower production costs. Harvester took on the United Auto 
Workers in a costly six month dispute to revise labour contracts. 
In 1982, Caterpillar adopted the same tough stance and production 
ground to a halt for seven months as the UAW fought to safeguard 
their members’ contracts. The Harvester and Caterpillar strikes 
were, and remain, the longest ever staged by the UAW.
There can be no question that the slump was rapid and unexpected.
In 1976 Massey Ferguson reported record profits, and in 1977 it 
launched a £2m investment programme at its Ayrhire plant. But 
just four years later, only a Chrysler-style bail-out saved the 
Canadian MNC from bankruptcy. Similarly, Harvester enjoyed record 
sales and profits of $427m in 1979, but by 1981 total tractor 
sales reached a post-war low, and it too tottered on the verge of
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bankruptcy. Caterpillar was also a victim of the sudden slump. 
The Peoria-based giant whose sales and profits peaked in 1981, 
reported the following year its first loss in fifty years.
Although they attained success, Massey and Harvester had been 
built on weak foundations and these were exposed by the 
recession. Caterpillar, on the other hand, was a highly 
efficient and well-managed firm, and these strengths prevented 
decline on the same scale, but, like the other two. Caterpillar 
was dogged by heavy losses and excess manufacturing capacity. 
Thus all three MNCs had strong motivation to rationalise global 
operations, particularly those in developed countries. The extent 
of retrenchment can be seen in the employment level of each firm 
since the late 1970s (see Table 12.9).
Table 12.9.: Worldwide Employment Level
Year Caterpillar International
Harvester
Massey
Ferguson
1985 53,616 16,836 20,262
1984 61,189 31,104 23,751
1983 58,402 32,445 27,609
1982 73,249 43,290 33,726
1981 83,455 65,640 39,789
1980 86 , 3 50 87,162 41,260
1979 89,266 97,660 56,233
1978 84,004 95,500 57,983
1977 78,565 96,900 67,151
Source: Corporate Accounts; Fortune magazine.
Unlike all its rivals which relied on just one unit manufacturing 
combine harvesters in Europe, Massey Ferguson in 1978 sourced 
from two such plants. An internal Feasibility Study recommended 
single sourcing and that from Marquette, rather than Kilmarnock. 
From a managerial perspective, the French operation enjoyed three 
crucial advantages over its Scottish counterpart: Its favourable
location; it was non-unionised; and, it had a foundry on site.
Caterpillar and Harvester had excess capacity in Europe, but 
especially in the UK. It was decided to reduce the number of 
British plants. Caterpillar had three, but only the Glasgow and 
Newcastle plants were in danger of closing. Glasgow was already 
an assembly operation and had been built only in 1956, whereas
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Birtley was an older factory which had been acquired from another 
firm 27 years earlier, in 1954.
Similarly, Harvester was forced to close two plants and 
concentrate production at its largest plant - Wheatley Road in 
Doncaster. In 1982 it closed Bradford, acquired 28 years earlier, 
and the following year the small Carr Hill unit at Doncaster.
Not one of the three plants was closed because it had performed 
badly, but because each firm was compelled to rationalise. The 
characteristics of other plants safeguarded their future at the 
expense of Birtley, Bradford, and Kilmarnock.
Both the Massey and the Harvester case testify to the importance 
of overcoming "barriers to exit" in the divestment process, and 
the precipitating circumstance-based theory. Massey was 
apparently willing, in order to save 500 jobs, to undertake the 
expensive option of transferring Baler production from Marquette 
rather than close Kilmarnock. Mr. Rice extended his decision-day 
deadline so that fuller consideration could be given to this 
matter.
Similarly, according to a UK spokesman, the closure of Bradford 
was postponed simply because the factory was held in such high 
regard within the corporation. However, local managers have often 
proved "barriers to exit" and representatives from the home 
country are often sent to oversee divestment in the host country. 
This was the case with Harvester.
In February 1982, Harvester’s ÜK Chairman, Yorkshireman, Mr. 
Shepherd, resigned unexpectedly just fourteen weeks after his 
appointment. His resignation appears to have coincided with 
Chicago headquarters’ decision to close Bradford, reaching senior 
DK subsidiary management. Significantly, Mr. Shepherd was 
replaced by American, Mr. Calder, whose loyalties were clearly to 
the parent company, rather than to the UK subsidiary.
Managerial literature stresses the likelihood of divestment 
following the arrival of new men who have no emotional attachment
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to any particular division or unit and therefore have no 
"barriers to exit" to overcome. The Black/Rice leadership was 
barely a month old when Massey announced its Feasibility Study on 
European Combine production. Similarly, between September 1977 
and December 1, 1982, Harvester had no fewer than four Chief
Executive Officers - Hayford, McCardell, Menk, and Lennox. 
Boardroom reshuffles were symptomatic of an ailing Company; loss- 
making operations were jettisoned.
J2^28t;The Divestment Décision and Bimloyee Disclosure and 
jQpngqltatipn
j2..28,1_..: Massev-Ferguson
Massey Ferguson’s UK management claim they were heavily involved 
in the divestment decision, but as was seen earlier, the final 
decision rested entirely with the President, British-born Mr. 
Victor Rice. Before reaching his final decision, he himself flew 
from Canada to Britain to meet National Officials of the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. They were given an 
opportunity to argue the case for retaining Combine production at 
the Kilmarnock site. Union leaders were therefore given access to 
the real decision maker.
The decision made, employees were informed on November 9, 1979
as soon as minimum preparations for disclosing the fact had been 
completed. Kilmarnock was closed 98 days later on February 15, 
1980. The Canadian MNC had however gone to great lengths to find 
a buyer for the plant, and on January 17, 1980, announced the
establishment of Moorfield Manufacturing which would initially 
provide employment for 54 of the Kilmarnock employees.
J2.28.2.: International HarYe8t.aH
The decision to close Bradford, on the other hand, was made at 
International Harvester’s US head office. The planned date for 
announcing Bradford’s closure was originally May 1, 1982,
however, the announcement was postponed until July 23. Virtually 
all employees were made redundant on October 22, 1982. They had
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received 90 days notice, the absolute legal minimum.
News of the divestment decision had been communicated to UK 
management by February 1982 at the latest and senior subsidiary 
management began preparing for closure, but for five months at 
least UK management witheld from employees the firm’s intention 
to close Bradford. In other words, management witheld news of the 
closure for months, while it gave the 550-strong workforce
only three months redundancy notice.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that IH failed to 
consult Trades Union representatives "at the earliest possible 
opportunity", but as was seen in Chapter 5, the Department of 
Employment itself regards this term as being of "minor 
significance where the redundancy involves 10 or more employees". 
It can be concluded that while Harvester conformed to UK 
legislation - it did give 90 days notice - UK Management 
consciously misled the workforce in order to restrict organised 
resistance to closure.
Harvester’s UK Management argued convincingly that one should not 
simply gauge a firm’s conduct by the length of the redundancy
notification period. They cited the Caterpillar case to
substantiate their argument. Caterpillar employees firal heard of 
the Company’s decision to close the Birtley plant on the local
radio, yet it was a year later that the factory closed.
Harvester’s senior UK executives believe that although they gave 
less notice of closure, they have a more positive attitude to 
employee disclosure and consultation; a claim which does not seem 
unwarranted.
It has to be remembered that at the time of the Bradford closure. 
International Harvester was in the throes of crisis, and, unlike 
Caterpillar, could not afford a gradual run down which would only 
imperil jobs at other plants. UK Management and Union officials 
held regular discussions and a considerable amount of Information 
was disclosed to these employees’ representatives, - indeed to 
the workforce itself. On the other hand. Union officials were
denied access to the real decision-makers, - who alone were
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capable of reveralng the divestment decision - the parent company 
executives.
It was seen in the Caterpillar case, that there were no official 
Minutes of Company-Union meetings; indeed, it would appear that 
no such meetings occurred prior to the closure announcement. In 
contrast, IH had established rigorous formal procedures for 
communicating with its employees. Nonetheless, Harvester’s 
employees and Union officials believed that the Company’s 
employee disclosure and consultation procedures left "room for 
improvement".
Harvester believes it kept its employees well informed and was 
always conscious of their welfare. Once employees were told, they 
were sent home to inform their families. The Company went to 
great pains to ensure that those emotionally involved with the 
Bradford factory did not receive the news from the media.
Employees paid glowing tribute to Plant Management, but were 
unimpressed by senior Subsidiary Managers, whom they dubbed 
"messenger boys". Confidence in them had been irrevocably lost; 
Shop Stewards were convinced that Managers were mere puppets in 
the hands of the US parent, and victims of cruel deception.
12^27,3,; Caterpillar
Caterpillar announced its closure plans on August 31» 1983. The
first compulsory redundancies were not issued until March 30, 
1984. Thus employees had received seven months notice, more than 
double that given by both Massey Ferguson and International 
Harvester and twice the minimum legal requirement.
However, from interviews with Union officials it was apparent 
that Caterpillar had aroused considerable resentment. Extending 
the notification period beyond the minimum requirement was 
considered irrelevant to the major issue at stake. Employees and 
Trades Unionists refused to believe that the decision had been 
taken only a couple of weeks before the closure announcement. In 
retrospect they felt they had been deceived and that the run down
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of Birtley was part of the divestment process, and not an attempt 
to save the plant as the Company had claimed.
Caterpillar claim that its ÜK Board ratified the decision to 
close Birtley just two weeks before the public announcement; 
employees were therefore informed as soon as possible; Indeed, 
they were told earlier than planned because speculation was rife 
at the Glasgow and Newcastle factories. The author was unable to 
verify the Company’s claims, but if true, the divestment process 
was carried out with surprising alacrity.
Caterpillar’s reputation had been severely tarnished firstly by 
the media’s pre-emptive announcement, and secondly by the alleged 
discrepancy between the Company’s claims (made during its 
onslaugit on Vredeling) and its actions.
Caterpillar’s conduct does not compare favourably with Massey- 
Ferguson’s. At the start of 1983» local MP., Mr. Giles Radi ce, 
was fobbed off by Hr. Guerindon, European Director, when he 
requested an assurance on the Birtley plant’s future, and Of 
Management cancelled an important meeting with Onion officials.
J2.28.I The OECD’s amolovment and Industrial Relations Guidelines
All three firms in this case study conformed with OK legislation, 
and therefore the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. Ironically, althou^ it gave twice the legal minimum 
notice, and more'notice than Massey Ferguson and Harvester put 
together. Caterpillar received the most bitter criticism from the 
TOC, and lodal officials of the AÜEW and GMBWU.
Of all the firms studied in this thesis. Caterpillar is unique in 
that its employees at Birtley learned of their plight from local 
media reports and not from the firm’s scheduled public 
announcement. In view of the US MN^s vociferous denunciation of 
the Vredeling Proposals this seemed like hypocrysy and British 
Trade Union leaders determined to make an example of Caterpillar.
The TUC referred the US MNC to the OECD’s UK National Contact
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Point (NCP) for violation of the OECD’s Guidelines. Had 
Caterpillar been less critical of "Vredeling", the TUC would 
possibly not have called upon the OECD’s UK National Contact 
Point (NCP).
Caterpillar is the only foreign-owned firm formally accused by 
the TUC of violating the Guidelines during the divestment 
process. The case went no further than the UK National Contact 
Point. It appears that the TUC had failed to grasp that the 
OECD’s Committe for International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises lacks any judicial powers and is expressly forbidden 
to discuss the case of any individual company. The response to 
the TUC’s complaint against Caterpillar confirms just how 
pointless it is for a Union to refer a firm to a NCP.
The Caterpillar and International Harvester examples confirm that 
the Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines do nothing to 
inhibit those MNCs who regard minimum legal requirements as a 
ceiling; for those MNCs which aim to respect not just the letter, 
but the spirit of the law, the Guidelines are unnecessary. Massey 
Ferguson’s UK Management admits that the Guidelines played no 
part in the handling of the divestment process. At the time of 
Kilmarnock’s closure, the Plant Manager knew nothing of their 
existence. Yet Massey Ferguson’s conduct was beyond reproach. 
Caterpillar, on the other hand, conformed with the Guidelines, 
yet failed to break the news of closure to its own workers.
The UK Management of all three MNCs argue that it is not in 
anyone’s interests to inform employees of plans to close a plant 
before a final decision is made.
It is evident from the above case-histories that the Companies 
informed employees of their divestment decision, only when the 
decision was irreversible, or final.
The findings of this industry case study also lends some support 
to the hypothesis that employee disclosure practise reflects home 
country culture. As expected, the employee disclosure and 
consultation practise of Massey-Ferguson, the Canadian MNC, was
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significantly different from that of the two US MNCs.
Only the Canadian MNC can justly claim to have held meaningful
consultation with Trades Union officials. Caterpillar and 
Harvester issued closure announcements without first consulting 
employees* representatives. Management of all three companies 
firmly believe that witholding information until a definite 
decision has been made, is in everyone's best interests, and that 
premature disclosure could precipitate the very contingency which 
employees hope to avert, - namely, closure.
Nevertheless, Massey Ferguson did inform employees and consulted 
with their representatives before announceing the closure of 
Kilmarnock. Yet academics and former employees have been highly 
critical of the firm and even its expensive attempts to locate a 
buyer have been interpreted cynically. The message seems to be 
that regardless of the reasons behind divestment decisions, or 
the endeavours to act with due regard to the interests of 
stakeholders, any MNC closing a plant is in a no-win situation 
and is regarded by the workforce as callous and greedy.
Such criticism and adverse publicity tends to serve only to 
dissuade firms from good conduct and increases the likelihood of 
their meeting only the minimum legal requiremnts, rather than 
seeking a more magnanimous solution.
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CHAPTER 13 
SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The author hopes that this thesis has achieved its main 
objectives, namely, - to contribute to the theory of foreign 
divestment through a detailed analysis of the causes of UK plant 
closures by foreign-owned MNCs, - and to evaluate UK legislation 
on employee disclosure/consultation, with particular reference to 
its effect on foreign MNCs.
Financial Times has recorded since 1978 the closure of 96 
manufacturing operations majority-owned by foreign MNCs. This 
thesis analysed 13 of them as case studies involving the 
compulsory redundancy of 500 or more employees. They were drawn 
from four industries and the impact of home country culture was 
assessed.
J3.2.; Foreign Divestment Theory
The studies reveal that plant closures by foreign MNCs were due 
to certain unfavourable changes in the business environment. The 
rising cost of oil, foreign competition, high interest rates, 
market saturation, and social and technological change emerge as 
the key explanatory divestment factors and their impact 
reinforced the need for restructuring, thus creating strong 
motives to divest. As these changes took their toll on the 
industries, new Chief Executives were appointed to mastermind 
recovery. It must be stressed, however, that the need for 
rationalisation was triggered by one or more of the variables 
listed above, and the arrival of a new man at a troubled firm 
should have been seen as a signal to divestment.
None of the firms closed a plant simply because of perceived 
opportunity to make larger profits elsewhere. The closures were
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necessary to safeguard and maintain market share threatened by 
intense competition. Table 13.1 illustrates the various adverse 
factors which led the eleven foreign MNCs to rationalise, or to 
withdraw from completely, their UK operations.
Table 13.1.: Condition-based theory: adverse changes in the
Business Environment
PLANTS
A D C D P D C B W M K B B
ADVERSE n u 1 u e r r r r a i r i
CHANGES t n y n r u a e e 1 1 a r
IN THE r d d m i m i n X 1 m d t
BUSINESS i 0 e u V c g t h u a f 1
environment m n br a h a f a s r 0 e
a a r 1 a V 0 m k n r y
1 n y e P 0 r 0 d
d k e n d c
1 k
Emergence or increase
in competition from:
- Japan and the East XX X X X X X
- Western Europe X X X X X
- Eastern Europe X X X X X
- the US X X
Recessionary conditions X X X X X X X X X X X X
Record high interest rates X X X
Soaring raw material costs X X
Social change X X X X X
Technological change
increasing products'
life-span, and leading to X X X X
obsolescence of plant and
equipment
Many of the parent firms had gone from record profits to massive 
losses within the course of a year. The onset of recession was 
sometimes sudden, and in all industries competition emerged to 
challenge market leaders. The slump and fierce rivalry had caught 
strategic planners unawares. Plans for expansion came to a halt 
as sales fell. Resources, both capital and labour, were 
underutilised. Production costs increased. Margins were cut to 
win orders, and as revenue fell, so too did profits. Competitive 
edge was lost to Japanese and "Red” MNCs which increased market 
penetration.
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All of the plant closures examined in this thesis were part of a 
broader corporate restructuring strategy:
- Monsanto has ceased all man-made fibre production in Europe;
- Akzo has performed major surgery on its man-made fibre group 
throughout Europe;
- Singer has closed all its sewing machine operations in the US 
and Europe (apart from the Italian factory at Monza) and has 
spun off its sewing machine business as an independent 
company;
- Grundig, unable to withstand the Japanese challenge has 
fallen into the hands of Dutch electronics giant. Philips;
- Hoover has been acquired by another US firm, Chicago Pacific, 
but only after its rationalisation programme throughout the 
group enabled it to make a significant recovery.
- Firestone has withdrawn completely from the UK, concentrating 
European tyre production in Spain. It was once rumoured to be 
contemplating a sell-out to Bridgestone of Japan.
- Goodyear has become one of the main proponents of 
"globalisation” and in 1985 it bought Toyo Giant Tyre, its 
first Japanese acquisition;
- Michelin too has closed plants on the Continent, in Belgium 
and Italy; many others have been rationalised, and automation 
introduced;
- International Harvester, now known as Navistar International, 
sold off its Agricultural Equipment division for $430m to US 
conglomerate, Tenneco, in December 1984;
- Massey—Ferguson has ceased combine harvester production in 
Europe, and in May 1986 it too announced that it was changing 
its name, to Varity Corporation.
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- Massey and Harvester were each on the verge of bankruptcy in 
the early 1980s.
Caterpillar has just completed a stringent cost-reduction 
programme, and in 1985 it reported a profit of $198m after 
three years of massive losses.
These MNCs have had to implement job-outs throughout the world as 
Table 13.2. illustrates. Of the four non-US MNCs, the slump 
particularly affected Massey-Ferguson where the workforce in 1985 
was only one third its 1975 level. Having cut back to ensure 
survival, the Canadian MNC plunged from 85th place among non-US 
MNCs in 1975, to the comparatively low position of 368 in 1985. 
The three European MNCs have also trimmed their workforce and 
have failed to maintain their status in the International 500.
Table 13.2.: Worldwide employment (in 000s) and Rank in Fortune 
US 500, and Fortune International 500.
Company No.
Empl.
Rank No.
Empl
Rank
Fortune International 500
1975 1985
Akzo 98 48 65 83
Grundig 36 252 23 485
Massey-Ferguson 65 85 20 368
Michelin 108 69 NA 91
Fortune US 500
1974 1985
Caterpillar 80 36 54 52
Firestone 120 40 55 102
Goodyear 154 23 134 35
Hoover 27 334 n.a.
(385 in 1984)
International 111 26 17 104
Harvester
Monsanto 61 43 56 53
Singer 111 66 46 156
Source: Various editions of FortlUlS.
The decade preceding 1986 was a period of major corporate surgery 
at a number of US MNCs too, notably Firestone, Harvester, and
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Singer. These three firms alone accounted for worldwide Job 
losses in excess of 200,000.
The adverse business climate is not sufficient, however, to 
explain some closures. In the Farm and Construction Equipment 
case study it was seen that each Company's starting point was the 
realisation that one plant closure was necessary. The next step 
was to compare the merits and demerits of each site in order to 
identify the divestment candidate. Thus Massey-Ferguson preferred 
to retain Marquette and close Kilmarnock because the French 
facility was nearer the market, had its own foundry, and weak 
Unions. Bradford's size militated against its being International 
Harvester's sole UK manufacturing base; it was closed and 
production transferred to the larger Doncaster plant. Caterpillar 
closed its older Birtley operation which manufactured components 
rather than its comparatively modern, assembly plant at Glasgow.
In 1981 rigorous competition demanded that Hoover rationalise its 
UK operations. Perivale in comparatively affluent London was 
closed rather than Cambuslang Glasgow, located in an area of 
particularly high unemployment - even for Scotland. The decision 
to maintain the Scottish factory was probably determined by the 
level of Government support grants available to employers in 
Cambuslang.
Rigorous competition and excess capacity have taken their toll on 
western tyre producers. In recent years, they have had to come to 
terms with a massive excess capacity problem, the causes of which 
are explored in Qiapter 11. However, it was not Goodyear which in 
effect decided to close the Drumchapel plant; it was the 
workforce itself. Employees refused to agree to fifteen shifts 
per week as this would have involved re-introducing night shift 
on Friday night/Saturday morning. This closure in 1979 coincided 
with the onset of a troubled period for tyre producers battling 
for survival, but Drumchapel's closure is best explained by 
motivation-based theory: poor performance; low productivity; high 
absenteeism; and, appalling industrial relations. Four years 
later, in 1983, Goodyear closed Craigavon which manufactured 
rubber products. It had a good labour force, but the investment
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decision had always appeared unsound, and Craigavon closed within 
fifteen years of opening.
In retrospect. Firestone's decision to terminate production in 
the UK appears logical. The larger pre-war plant at Brentford had 
been equipped for cross-ply production, and Wrexham, although a 
modern manufacturing facility, had a history of unofficial 
stopages.
The French MNC, Michelin, like its US rivals, was forced to 
rationalise its UK operations and by 1982 was trying to effect 
cut-backs in productivity and jobs. Limited in options, its 
decision to close the Ulster plant may have been influenced by 
the political situation as well as the economic one.
The Divestment Decision
Apart from the Goodyear Drumchapel closure in which employees 
decided their own fate, virtually all of the 13 plants examined 
in this thesis were closed on the basis of a centralised 
decision. The author was unable to ascertain whether the Michelin 
Mallusk closure was decided In the UK or at parent company level. 
Caterpillar claim Its UK Board took the decision to close 
Birtley.
The handling of the divestment process, and the role of 
subsidiary and plant management. Is best seen In the conduct of 
two US MNCs International Harvester and Goodyear, In the Bradford 
and Craigavon closures, respectively. Each Illustrates the tlme- 
gap In relaying Information down through the corporate hierarchy, 
and finally to the workforce. In both cases, employees were 
Informed some months after the decision had been made at 
corporate headquarters across the Atlantic.
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fiBIPlQYee Dlscloaare and Consultation
The divestment process requires to be handled with sensitivity if 
hostility from the workforce and local community is to be 
avoided. Some firms fuelled the highly charged and emotive 
situation by the manner of their response to Trades Union 
Officials anxious about future employment, while some others 
appear to have been deeply conscious of their employees' welfare.
Prior to many of the formal closure announcements, Companies had 
cut back production, reduced the number employed and in some 
cases introduced short-time working. Not surprisingly employees 
and their representatives were concerned and their concern was 
recorded by the local media. Often rumours abounded that closure 
was imminent. Eventually, some firms, Akzo of the Netherlands, 
Massey-Ferguson of Canada, and two US MNCs, Hoover and Singer, 
warned that closure was a possibility.
Table 13.3.: Notification of Redundancy to Employees 
Company PI ant Home Warning of Closure Days/Months
Country Given Before Formal Redundancy
Closure Announcement Notice Given
Akzo Antrim Netherlands yes
Monsanto Dundonald US no
Singer Clydebank US yes
Grundig Dunmurry Germany no
Hoover Perivale US yes
Goodyear Drumchapel US yes
Goodyear Craigavon US no
Firestone Brentford US no
Firestone Wrexham US no
Michelin Mallusk France no
Massey-
Ferguson
Internat,
Kilmarnock Canada yes
Harvester Bradford US no
Caterpillar Birtley US no
12-14 months 
78 days
8 months 
101 days 
7 months
89 days 
96 days 
93 days
90 days 
22 months
96 days 
90 days
8-9 months
The behaviour of the Dutch and Canadian MNC conformed with the 
cultural profiles documented in Chapter 5, Among other attributes 
their culture is characterised by openness rather than secrecy.
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Significantly, management at Massey's UK Coventry Headquarters, 
and of Akzo's UK subsidiairy, British Enkalon Ltd., were 
particularly helpful to the author.
The behaviour of Akzo, and Massey-Ferguson was in marked contrast 
to some firms which, until the last minute, flatly denied that 
the firm was contemplating closure. Just two weeks before the 
closure announcement, employees at Firestone's Wrexham factory 
were assured by the UK Company Secretary that production would be 
maintained. International Harvester's Bradford employees received 
similar messages after UK subsidiary management had been informed 
that the Yorkshire factory was to close. Caterpillar told its 
employees that Job outs were necessary to save the plant, yet 
after the closure announcement suggested that the workforce 
should have expected closure precisely because of these job 
losses.
Yet another approach was to take employees totally by surprise. 
The Grundig, Dunmurry closure was particularly unexpected, and 
while in retrospect it is easy to appreciate the industrial logic 
of the Mallusk closure, Michelin's workforce could hardly have 
been expected to anticipate such drastic action. Once again 
corporate behaviour appears related to the home country's 
national culture. The German and French MNCs, in accordance with 
national cultural values, were secretive giving no prior signal 
to employees that the factories were about to be closed.
Home country culture appears to have had influence on the three 
European MNCs - Akzo of Holland, Grundig of Germany, and Michelin 
of France - and on the Canadian firm, Massey-Ferguson, but the 
behaviour of the seven US MNCs is so disparate that national 
culture appears to have had little impact} but, then again this 
very divergence may be indicative of the multi-racial "new world" 
and the efficacy of "the melting pot".
Considering the sheer size of the country, regional differences 
may have explained the discrepancy, but Firestone and Goodyear 
are based in the same city, and their behavioral patterns bear no 
similarity. Firestone's disclosure record ranks among the worst.
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Brentford was closed without warning, and months later Wrexham 
was closed, despite management assurances that Firestone would be 
investing in, not closing down the factory. Goodyear, on the 
other hand, postponed closing Craigavon because it appreciated 
the grave social consequences to Ulster. By the time closure was 
announced, the local community could not claim to be surprised by 
the decision. The Goodyear Drumchapel closure was also sadly 
predictable, but for a quite different reason.
Proponents of greater information disclosure believe that 
employees would use the knowledge to save Jobs, but in the two 
closures on Clydeside, the fully-informed workforces voted 
against proposals in the knowledge that rejection endangered 
their plants. The Company's "survival plan" was rejected by 
Goodyear's Drumchapel workforce. Once was enough for this US MNC 
and it in turn refused to give the workforce a second chance. 
Singer, was arguably more lenient, and gave the Clydebank 
workforce (which had ignored shop stewards' advice) a second 
opportunity to accept its conditions.
Assessing employee disclosure and consultation demands not Just a 
comparison of behaviour, but an analysis of motives. The 
Company's interests can be well-served by disclosure. This was 
certainly true In the Hoover Perivale case. By revealing that it 
was undecided as to whether to close Perivale or Cambuslang, or 
both, Hoover management succeeded in splitting the Trades Union 
camp in two.
UK Législation
The Department of Employment has a very narrow interpretation of 
Part IV of the 1975 Employment Protection Act. It makes no 
attempt to ensure that firms consult "at the earliest 
opportunity", but is content that workers receive the statutory 
minimum notifciation of redundancy, or pay in lieu of notice. The 
Department transmits this policy to companies and they in turn 
conclude that they will receive universal approval by extending 
the notification period. Thus employees of the French MNC 
Michelin were given 22 months notice, and among US MNCs,
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Caterpillar gave 9 months, Singer 8, and Hoover 7 months notice. 
Trades Union officials were critical of all four firms, and it is 
important that one appreciates their grievances.
Despite having exceeded UK legal requirements, Michelin was 
denounced in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and Caterpillar was 
condemned in the European Parliament and reported to the OECD for 
breach of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Hostile Reaction in Ulster to Michelin's decision appears to have 
been due to the feeling that job losses could, and should, have 
been spread among all the French MNCs UK plants. Angry Ulster 
politicians were convinced that the decision to close Mallusk had 
been determined by the plant's location, and not by its 
performance which was reputedly better than that at Stoke 
headquarters on the mainland. Had Michelin given the public 
authorities four weeks notice rather than four days it might have 
avoided the roasting it received from Ulster's politicians. 
Caterpillar made two related errors which provoked a Union 
backlash: it claimed to be a model employer in its campaign 
against the "Vredeling Proposals" and then it failed to be first 
to break the news of closure to its workers.
Surprisingly, the German MNC, Grundig, whose conduct compares 
unfavourably with even Michelin and Caterpillar, escaped the 
fierce criticism which rained down on the other two firms. 
Grundig's employees were presented with an unexpected "fait 
accompli" and very little notice, only 101 days. The almost 
placid acceptance may be explained by two factors. Firstly, the 
workforce was mainly female. Secondly, there was no question that 
Europe was an uncompetitive location for producing consumer 
electronics, and the decision to close Dunmurry was made on this 
basis and no other. Trades Union officials and employees are 
particularly bitter when they consider closure unnecessary, or 
their plant judged inferior, - this is seen as adding Insult to 
injury. Hence, former employees at Caterpillar Birtley, Hoover 
Perivale, and Massey-Ferguson Kilmarnock, were all bitterly 
critical of their ex-employer's divestment decision.
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Union officials, and politicians too, are unimpressed by firms 
which exceed the 90 days notice requirement. They argue that 
companies give extra notice only because they themselves need the 
time to implement a gradual shut down. Condemnation of Michelin 
was so resounding because the closure announcement was completely 
unexpected, and Caterpillar incurred the wrath of Unions for 
failing to ensure that the workforce first heard of closure from 
the firm and not from other sources.
It can safely be concluded that employees’ representatives are 
not consulted "at the earliest opportunity", and are notified 
only when the parent has already taken the decision to divest. 
Full-time Union officials and Shop Stewards were clearly very 
bitter about plant closures in which they had been involved. The 
"Vredeling Proposals" implicit objective is to avoid such ill- 
feeling by giving employee representatives an opportunity to 
present their views to decision makers. Indeed, they explicitly 
request enterprises to hold consultations with employees 
representatives "with a view to attempting to reach agreement on 
the measures planned in respect of employees".
The OECD’s Galdelines for Moltlnatlonal Enterprises ; The 
BaPloYment and Industrial Relations Chapter
Caterpillar remains the only foreign-owned firm which the British 
TUC has formally accused of breaching the OECD Guidelines during 
the divestment process. Chapter 12 reproduced the actual 
correspondence between the OECD’s UK National Contact Point, the 
TUC, and Caterpillar itself. It was seen that the Contact Point 
did little more than relay the TUC’a accusations to Caterpillar, 
and subsequently pass on the US MNC’s defence to the TUC. This 
illustration of the OECD Guidelines "in action" reinforces the 
conclusions of Chapter 6, which judged the key Employment and 
Industrial Relations section of the Guidelines as of little 
value. These Guidelines have no impact on corporate behaviour, 
and are ineffective because they do not supplement national law.
Shop stewards at Hoover Perivale, and Singer Clydebank
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contemplated resorting to the OECD Guidelines, but they were 
correctly advised that this would prove a futile exercise. 
Virtually every Shop Steward interviewed by the author was either 
unaware of the Guidelines, or had heard of them but knew nothing 
of their content or function. Even full-time Union Officials had 
a very limited knowledge of them. One thought they emanated from 
the EEC, and as he was an anti-marketeer he decided not to 
familiarize himself with the Guidelines.
Some Companies insisted that their behaviour conformed with the 
Guidelines - and it did, - after all the key Employment and 
Industrial Relations chapter asks only that MNCs adhere to the 
national legislation of each country in which they operate. 
However, the UK management of the Canadian MNC, Massey-Ferguson 
conceded that they had not referred to the Guidelines at all 
during the divestment process. These forthright managers 
explained that it was by coincidence, not deliberate design, that 
Massey’s behaviour was in accordance with the OECD’s Guidelines 
during the Kilmarnock divestment process. The author interviwed 
an executive of British Enkalon, (the subsidiary of Dutch MNC, 
Akzo,) who said that all senior management of his company was 
very familiar with the OECD’s Guidelines. He stressed that Akzo 
always aimed to exceed the Guidelines’ recommendations.
13.7.; The ■Vredeling Proposals"
It was seen in Chapter 7 that the original text has been diluted. 
Indeed, probably the most radical and relevant section, the "By- 
Pass" clause, has been withdrawn in the revised text. Thus 
employee representatives are not assured access to the real 
decision-makers who sometimes may be located abroad. The revised 
text lacks precision, but it is difficult to imagine that it 
could confer any significant benefits or advantages to labour. 
The EEC’s Mass Dismissals Directive has been enacted by member 
governments. The UK, like other EEC countries, requires employers 
to consult employees’ representatives when redundancies are 
proposed. The evidence in this thesis suggests that firms notify 
employees and hold consultations only when it has already been 
decided to have redundancies issued.
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The Mass Dismissals Directive has proved unsuccessful in ensuring 
that workers receive maximum notification of redundancies, and 
every opportunity to present their views before a final decision 
is reached. It has fallen well short of these aims. It protects 
workers' interests by establishing the floor level of notice 
which employees must receive, but firms' decisions are unlikely 
to be influenced by the arguments of Trades Union officials. The 
latter are clearly dissatisifed with existing EEC legisaltion, 
but the solution is surely to fully enforce current legislation, 
rather than introduce another piece of legislation which no doubt 
will prove an even greater disappointment. Indeed, it seems 
strange that Union leaders throughout the EEC have ignored the 
Fifth Directive on employee participation which appears a more 
radical proposal, and one which may prove more appropriate to 
Union needs.
Prolonging plant closure does not serve any great purpose. Often 
employees are keen to collect their redundancy money and leave as 
soon as the closure announcement has been made. Indeed, some 
employees are attracted by redundancy payments, notably those 
near retiring age or those confident they will find work 
elsewhere, but there can be little doubt that many suffer 
socially, economically, and most of all psychologically. In a 
period of high unemployment, many are unable to find other work 
because of their age, lack of skills, or obsolete skills. Even 
workers from firms which exceed the minimum redundancy pay, may 
receive a paltry sum, which once spent leaves them dependent on 
Unemployment Benefit and/or Supplementary Benefit. In addition to 
a lower standard of living, the male unemployed must contend with 
role reversal if their wife works.
The "Vredeling Proposals" though well-meaning would be unlikely 
to provide what employees value most: financial security.
"Vredeling" would only raise the minimum legal requirements and 
this may in fact endanger employment elsewhere if firms are 
compelled to maintain employment at a loss-making unit. As has 
been seen many firms already give notice well in excess of the UK 
legal minimum.
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In a time of already record high unemployment in the UK, British 
Trades Unions already face a crisis in terms of falling 
membership and low morale among members. Trades Union officials 
have always condemned plant closures, especially when a foreign 
multinational is involved. Regardless of market conditions and 
the parent company’s financial situation Union Officials will 
always castigate companies which close plants. It matters little 
whether they receive three months or three years notice, and 
whether or not their representatives meet the Chief Executive 
Officer of the parent company.
The enactment of the "Vredeling Proposals" would be seen by 
Trades Unions and observers as a notable victory for organised 
labour over intensive lobbying by employers’ organisations. 
Sadly, this is all it would be, a win of some propaganda value, 
but of no practical use. "Vredeling" will not generate jobs nor 
enhance job security, and neither will it effect the level of 
state welfare benefits available to the unemployed.
The objective of national governments and the EEC must be to 
create an economic climate that encourages plant openings and 
further investment rather than divestment. Secondly, those whose 
age, or work experience is likely to preclude them from finding 
gainful employment should surely be entitled to additional 
compensation in their terms of redundancy. Indeed, the debate on 
the "Vredeling Proposals" has diverted attention away from the 
real issue: the penalties which national governments impose upon 
their own citizens who are unable to find work.
13.7.; Limitations of the Stody_ and Sw«e8.tlOPa for FatHCfi 
JleseaiMdi
The study has several limitations. Firstly, it examines plant 
closures in only one EEC country: Britain. An examination of the 
foreign divestment process in other EEC countries would allow 
interesting comparison of the causes of closure and employee 
disclosure and consultation in other EEC host countries which all 
tend to have more rigorous legislation. An examination of all
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foreign-owned plant closures in numerous countries would be the 
ideal test-bed of foreign divestment theory.
Secondly, it concentrated on industrial sectors which have 
witnessed a series of closures and found that a change in the 
business environment was the prime cause for the plant closures. 
An examination of the other major foreign-owned closures in 
unrelated sectors may have found other divestment factor(s) 
mainly responsible for the divestment decision. Some of the other 
major closures were certainly due to a deterioration in the 
business environment. For example, the Swiss MNC, Ciba-Geigy, 
closed its Brentwood and Basildon plants with the loss of 1,500 
and 800 jobs respectively, because of the huge price increase of 
silver, the basic raw material for photographic film.
However, other causes of plant closure can be identified. Peugeot 
closed its Linwood car plant in 1981 with the loss of 3,000 jobs 
just five years after it had been acquired from the US MNC, 
Chrysler which had sold all its European manufacturing facilities 
to the French MNC in 1976. Similarly, Nabisco the world's largest 
biscuit manufacturer (which itself was acquired by R.J. Reynolds) 
closed its newly acquired Huyton plant with the loss of 800 jobs 
only months after Britain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
approved its takeover of Britain's second largest biscuit 
manufacturer, Huntley and Palmer.
Thus, post-acquisition restructuring can lead to reductions in 
overlapping production capacity and job losses. In view of the 
current wave of merger-mania, it is highly likely that major 
closures will occur, especially in cases of horizontal merger.
The verdict on the impact of home country culture on the 
behaviour of the Canadian and European MNCs is inconclusive 
because only one MNC was examined from each country. A wider 
study of foreign divestment by non-US MNCs is required.
A hopeful message emerges from this study. Britain has not lost 
its attraction for foreign investors. Some of the closures were 
partly due to technological development and rising living
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standards in Britain. Divestment will continue. Delays lift 
restructuring may ultimately prove counter-productive. As the 
rate of technological change accelerates, the western world must 
come to grips with its fundamental economic and social profelem, 
ie. a surplus of labour. Protracted debate and discussion on 
further legislation on employee disclosure and consultation 
has tended to divert attention from more pressing matters.
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